Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts-whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want. Over the last several decades, military theorists and others began to believe that new technologies were generating a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), capabilities so revolutionary that they would redefine warfare. Spurred by these beliefs, and led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts-and spending billions to make the hypothetical capabilities real. The entire structure of the armed forces changed as a result. This vision, however, was totally dependent on a set of unproven suppositions and often nonexistent capabilities, especially a network of information technologies. Moreover, the services, the media, Congress, and industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology and military reality offers a fascinating narrative.

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.

The fourth and final volume in a pioneering series on the Chinese military, "Imagined Enemies" offers an unprecedented look at its history, operational structure, modernization, and strategy. Beginnning with an examination of culturee adn thought in Part I, the authors explore the transition away transition away from Mao Zedong's revolutionary doctrine, the conflict with Moscow, and Beijing's preoccupation with Taiwanese separatism and preparations for war to thwart it. Part II focuses on operational and policy decisions in the National Command Authority and, subsequently, in the People's Liberation Army. Part III provides a detailed study of the Second Artillery, China's strategic rocket forces. The book concludes with the transformation of military strategy and shows how it is being tested in military exercises, with Taiwan and the United States as "imagined enemies."

Discerning the early stages of the rebirth of a new Russian empire from the ashes of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival argues that Russia's recent overtly aggressive actions and foreign policy doctrines have signaled a renewal of the Cold War. At the least, Russia's actions represent the potential for renewal. This book explains these developments in a historical context. The book begins by describing Russia's initial policy of rapprochement after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its development into a foreign policy of threatened or actual armed aggression. It identifies today's Russia as a nation determined to re-establish itself as a political and military force. As a prominent figure in the development and continuation of its current foreign policy, Vladimir Putin plays a central role in the topics covered. Previous literature often treats Putin as an individual phenomenon examining his connections to corruption or the secret police, but here David E. McNabb examines him as the latest in a long history of Russian despots who followed similar expansionist policies. He details some of the tactics Putin uses to instill fear and dominate political policies of republics newly independent from Russia. These tactics include the use of energy as a weapon, cyber terrorism, and military support for ethnic Russian separatists in other sovereign nations, most recently exemplified by Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine via armed invasion. In an attempt to demystify Russia's re-emergence as an international political force, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival grounds its analyses in history. It explores as far back as the establishment of the first Russian empire, and regards Putin as a leader determined to establish a fifth imperial incarnation. It provides a nuanced understanding of how Russia arrived at its current position through recent and distant internal and international events.

Again and again, American taxpayers are asked to open their wallets and pay for a national security machine that costs $1 trillion operate. Yet time and time again, the US government gets it wrong on critical issues. So what can be done? Enter bestselling author Thom Shanker and defense expert Andrew Hoehn. With decades of national security expertise between them and access to virtually every expert, they look at what's going wrong in national security and how to make it go right. Age of Danger looks at the major challenges facing America-from superpowers like Russia and China to emerging threats like pandemics, cybersecurity, climate change, and drones-and reimagines the national security apparatus into something that can truly keep Americans safe. Weaving together expert analysis with exclusive interviews from a new generation of national security leaders, Shanker and Hoehn argue that the United States must create an industrial-grade, life-saving machine out of a system that, for too long, was focused only on deterring adversaries and carrying out global military operations. It is a timely and crucial call to action-a call that if heeded, could save Americans lives, money, and our very future on the global stage.

Hurricane Katrina is the latest in a series of major disasters that were not well managed, but it is not likely to be the last. Category 4 and category 5 hurricanes will, according to most predictions, become both more frequent and more intense in the future due to global warming and/or natural weather cycles. In addition, it is often said that another terrorist attack on the United States is inevitable; that it is a question of when, not whether. Add to that the scare over a possible avian flu pandemic. As a result, the United States should expect that disaster response--to natural and other types of disasters--will continue to be of vital concern to the American public and the policymakers and officials who deal with disaster response and relief, including the military. The U.S. disaster relief program reflects a basic division of responsibility between federal, state, and local governments that has generally stood the test of time. At the federal level, a single agency, FEMA--now under the Department of Homeland Security--has been charged with the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the various federal agencies that have a role in disaster relief. A successful disaster response requires three things: timely and effective coordination between state and federal governments; effective coordination among the federal agencies; and effective coordination between and among state and local government agencies. Miskel examines the effects that operational failures after Hurricanes Agnes, Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina have had on the organizational design and operating principles of the disaster response system program. He also discusses the impact of 9/11 and the evolving role ofthe military, and he identifies reforms that should be implemented to improve the nation's ability to respond in the future.

Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars Preparing for the next war at an unknown date against an undetermined opponent is a difficult undertaking with extremely high stakes. Even the most detailed exercises and wargames do not truly simulate combat and the fog of war. Thus, outside of their own combat, militaries have studied foreign wars as a valuable source of battlefield information. The effectiveness of this learning process, however, has rarely been evaluated across different periods and contexts. Through a series of in-depth case studies of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, Brent L. Sterling creates a better understanding of the dynamics of learning from "other people's wars," determining what types of knowledge can be gained from foreign wars, identifying common pitfalls, and proposing solutions to maximize the benefits for doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Other People's Wars explores major US efforts involving direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations at key junctures for the US armed forces: the Crimean War (1854-56), Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Spanish Civil War (1936-39), and Yom Kippur War (1973), which preceded the US Civil War, First and Second World Wars, and major army and air force reforms of the 1970s, respectively. The case studies identify learning pitfalls but also show that initiatives to learn from other nations' wars can yield significant benefits if the right conditions are met. Sterling puts forth a process that emphasizes comprehensive qualitative learning to foster better military preparedness and adaptability.

This book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars. This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and how this interaction has had significant consequences historically. Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone. Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not) why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies and war and conflict studies.

How do military organizations assess strategic policy in war? In this book Scott Gartner develops a theory to explain how military and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. But different actors within a government use different indicators of success: some will see the strategy as succeeding when others see it as failing because of their different dominant indicators. Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also tests his approach in a nonwar situation, analyzing the Carter Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt. In each case, his dominant indicator model better predicts the observed behavior than either a standard-organization or an action-reaction approach.

In this work, two senior naval historians analyze the discussions held in leading Soviet political, military, and naval circles concerning naval strategy and the decisions taken for warship-building programmes. They describe the reconstitution of the fleet under difficult conditions from the end of the Civil War up to the mid-1920s, leading to a change from classical naval strategy to a Jeune ecole model in the first two Five-Year Plans, including efforts to obtain foreign assistance in the design of warships and submarines. Their aim is to explain the reasons for the sudden change in 1935 to begin building a big ocean-going fleet. After a period of co-operation with Germany from 1939-41, the plans came to a halt when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Finally, this work covers the reopening of the naval planning processes in 1944 and 1945 and the discussions of the naval leadership with Stalin, the party and government officials about the direction of the new building programmes as the Cold War began.

Rarely has security been such a preoccupation of Australian politics, and rarely has it seemed so far from being achieved. This celebrated book argues that security has dominated and distorted Australia's foreign policy and national life, from Cook's first voyage to the Tampa crisis, 9/11 and Iraq. Whether in the Great War, Vietnam or the treatment of asylum seekers, Anthony Burke shows that Australia's security has been bought with the insecurity and suffering of others. Against this corrosive tradition, he offers a new - cosmopolitan and non-coercive - model of national existence and responsibility. At once a deep historical survey and an argument with its society, Fear of Security is a landmark account of how Australia relates to itself, its region and the world. Turning powerful academic and political orthodoxies on their heads, it is essential reading for those concerned with the burning questions that face Australia and the Asia-Pacific.

Military Strategy in the 21st Century explores military strategy and the new challenges facing Western democracies in the twenty- first century, including strategy in cyber operations and peacekeeping, challenges for civil-military relations, and the strategic choices of great powers and small states. The volume contributes to a better understanding of military strategy in the twenty- first century, through exploring strategy from three perspectives: first, the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; second, new areas for strategic theory, such as peacekeeping and cyberspace; and third, the makers of strategy, and why states choose suboptimal strategies. With the increasing number of threats challenging strategy makers, such as great power rivalry, terrorism, intrastate wars, and transnational criminal organisations, Military Strategy in the 21st Century will be of great value to scholars of IR, Security Studies, Strategic Studies, and War Studies as well as policymakers and practitioners working with military strategy in particular and international security and war in general. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies.

This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to modern strategy, covering the context, theory, and practice of military strategy in all its different forms. Covering all the main issues in the field, the book explores the major themes through a combination of classical and modern strategic theory, history, and current practice. It is split into three main sections: The first provides the context for contemporary strategy and includes discussions of the human, technological, intelligence, ethical, and grand strategic dimensions. The second part explores the theory and practice of strategy in different geographical domains, including land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. The final part engages with three of the most challenging forms of strategy in the contemporary era: nuclear weapons, terrorism, and insurgency. This second edition brings the book up to date by including discussions of the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the emergence of robotics and artificial intelligence; major events in space and cyberspace; and the growing profile of nuclear weapons. Each chapter presents the reader with a succinct summary of the topic, provides a challenging analysis of current issues, and finishes with key points, questions for discussion, and further reading. This book will be essential reading for upper-level students of strategic studies, war studies, military history, and international security.

Why do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "surge" decision, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions.

David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced America's decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success.
In The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen provides a remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror. Kilcullen takes us "on the ground" to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the big global war (the "War on Terrorism") and its relation to the associated "small wars" across the globe: Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Pakistani tribal zones, East Timor and the horn of Africa. Kilcullen sees today's conflicts as a complex interweaving of contrasting trends--local insurgencies seeking autonomy caught up in a broader pan-Islamic campaign--small wars in the midst of a big one. He warns that America's actions in the war on terrorism have tended to conflate these trends, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles and thus enormously complicating our challenges. Indeed, the US had done a poor job of applying different tactics to these very different situations, continually misidentifying insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances--whom he calls "accidental guerrillas"--as part of a coordinated worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win them where necessary.
Colored with gripping battlefield experiences that range from the jungles and highlands of Southeast Asia to the mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the dusty towns of the Middle East, The Accidental Guerrilla will, quite simply, change the way we think about war. This book is a must read for everyone concerned about the war on terror.

Recent years have seen a growing role for private military contractors in national and international security. To understand the reasons for this, Elke Krahmann examines changing models of the state, the citizen and the soldier in the UK, the US and Germany. She focuses on both the national differences with regard to the outsourcing of military services to private companies and their specific consequences for the democratic control over the legitimate use of armed force. Tracing developments and debates from the late eighteenth century to the present, she explains the transition from the centralized warfare state of the Cold War era to the privatized and fragmented security governance, and the different national attitudes to the privatization of force.

The Brahmand World Defence Update 2022 aims at providing a comprehensive assessment of the present day global military order with a focus on each nation's military capabilities, new arms acquisitions and defence spending. The 11th edition of the yearbook features a new chapter with focus on the "Counter-Terrorism & National Security" efforts of Germany, India, Israel, Russia, UK and USA. The yearbook also contains up-to-date information on defence capabilities of 113 countries, including 33 strategically important countries. It highlights their geopolitical importance, internal and external conflict areas, threat perspectives, strategic relations, multilateral alliances, and over strength and latest procurement deals.

The Western Front evokes images of mud-spattered men in waterlogged trenches, shielded from artillery blasts and machine-gun fire by a few feet of dirt. This iconic setting was the most critical arena of the Great War, a 400-mile combat zone stretching from Belgium to Switzerland where more than three million Allied and German soldiers struggled during four years of almost continuous combat. It has persisted in our collective memory as a tragic waste of human life and a symbol of the horrors of industrialized warfare. In this epic narrative history, the first volume in a groundbreaking trilogy on the Great War, acclaimed military historian Nick Lloyd captures the horrific fighting on the Western Front beginning with the surprise German invasion of Belgium in August 1914 and taking us to the Armistice of November 1918. Drawing on French, British, German, and American sources, Lloyd weaves a kaleidoscopic chronicle of the Marne, Passchendaele, the Meuse-Argonne, and other critical battles, which reverberated across Europe and the wider war. From the trenches where men as young as 17 suffered and died, to the headquarters behind the lines where Generals Haig, Joffre, Hindenburg, and Pershing developed their plans for battle, Lloyd gives us a view of the war both intimate and strategic, putting us amid the mud and smoke while at the same time depicting the larger stakes of every encounter. He shows us a dejected Kaiser Wilhelm II-soon to be eclipsed in power by his own generals-lamenting the botched Schlieffen Plan; French soldiers piling atop one another in the trenches of Verdun; British infantryman wandering through the frozen wilderness in the days after the Battle of the Somme; and General Erich Ludendorff pursuing a ruthless policy of total war, leading an eleventh-hour attack on Reims even as his men succumbed to the Spanish Flu. As Lloyd reveals, far from a site of attrition and stalemate, the Western Front was a simmering, dynamic "cauldron of war" defined by extraordinary scientific and tactical innovation. It was on the Western Front that the modern technologies-machine guns, mortars, grenades, and howitzers-were refined and developed into effective killing machines. It was on the Western Front that chemical warfare, in the form of poison gas, was first unleashed. And it was on the Western Front that tanks and aircraft were introduced, causing a dramatic shift away from nineteenth-century bayonet tactics toward modern combined arms, reinforced by heavy artillery, that forever changed the face of war. Brimming with vivid detail and insight, The Western Front is a work in the tradition of Barbara Tuchman and John Keegan, Rick Atkinson and Antony Beevor: an authoritative portrait of modern warfare and its far-reaching human and historical consequences.

This book provides a concise and up-to-date analysis of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the whole period of the Cold War from 1945 to 1991.

The author explains the rise of the two superpowers immediately after World War II and discusses the historical controversy over the origins of the Cold War. He describes the growing confrontation between East and West in Europe dating from the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1949 to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

The analysis includes coverage of the extension of the conflict beyond Europe to China, Korea, and Vietnam and also to the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The author highlights the role of Nixon and Kissinger in an examination of the rise and fall of detente during the 1970s. He explains, too, how superpower relations were dramatically altered during the 1980s by the impact of Reagan and Gorbachev. Finally, the book offers an assessment of the reasons for the sudden ending of the Cold War and its final outcome.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.

War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict provides insights for those involved in the design of military strategy, and the forces that must execute that strategy. Emphasizing the impacts of technology, new era strategic competition, demography, and climate change, Mick Ryan uses historical as well as contemporary anecdotes throughout the book to highlight key challenges faced by nations in a new era of great power rivalry. Just as previous industrial revolutions have advanced societies, the nascent fourth industrial revolution will have a similar impact on how humans fight, compete, and build military power in the twenty-first century. After reviewing the principle catalysts of change in the security environment, War Transformed seeks to provide a preview of the shape of war and competition in the twenty-first century. Ryan examines both the shifting character of war and its enduring nature. In doing so, he proposes important trends in warfare that will shape all aspects of human competition and conflict in the coming decades. The remainder of the book analyzes how military institutions must prepare for future competition and conflict. Competing and engaging in combat in this new era involves new and evolved strategies and warfighting concepts, as well as adapting our current military organizations. It will also demand building an intellectual edge in military personnel through evolved concepts of training, education, and development. As the competitive environment and potential battlefields continue to change, conceptions of combat, competition and conflict must also evolve. Mick Ryan makes the case for transforming how Western military institutions view war in this century.