Occasionally, militaries during times of peace achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce calls these 'disruptive innovations'. The more common innovation phenomenon, however, has been that of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The central theme of this book is that senior leaders who have successfully managed disruptive innovations disguised them as sustaining in order to ensure their innovations survived.
The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations?
This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.

Emmers questions the dichotomy implicit in this interpretation and investigates what role the balance of power really plays in such cooperative security arrangements and in the calculations of the participants of ASEAN and the ARF. He offers a thorough analysis of the influence the balance of power has had on the formation and evolution of the ASEAN and ARF and reveals the co-existence and inter-relationship between both approaches within the two institutions.
The book contains case studies of Brunei's motives in joining the ASEAN in 1984; ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina Conflict; the workings of the ARF since 1994 and ASEAN's involvement in the South China Sea dispute. It will interest students and researchers of the ASEAN and ARF, the international politics of Southeast Asia, Regionalism and the Balance of Power theory.

This book is a comparative study of the evolution of the German navy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It examines the development of strategy, especially commerce-raiding, in comparison to what other navies were doing in this era of rapid technological change. It is not an insular history, merely listing ship rosters or specific events; it is a history of the German navy in relation to its potential foes. It is also a look at a new military institution involved in an inter-service rivalry for funds, technology and manpower with the prestigious and well-established army.

Cunningham was the best-known and most celebrated British admiral of the Second World War. He held one of the two major fleet commands between 1939 and 1942, and in 1942-43, he was Allied naval commander for the great amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. From 1943 to 1946, he was the First Sea Lord and a participant in the wartime conferences with Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt and the US Chiefs of Staff, deliberating the global strategy for Allied victory.
He also led a very active public life for almost twenty years after his retirement in 1946. Cunningham's papers are abundant for the period 1939-63 and are supplemented here by Cabinet and Admiralty records, papers of his service contemporaries and of Churchill, and by memories of his family and friends, as well as extensive US archives and private papers.

Occasionally, during times of peace, military forces achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce terms these developments 'disruptive innovations' and shows how senior leaders have often disguised them in order to ensure their innovations survived. He shows how more common innovations however, have been those of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations? This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.

New developments in the Asia Pacific are forcing regional officials to rethink the way they manage security issues. The contributors to this work explore why some forms of security cooperation and institutionalisation in the region have proven more feasible than others. This work describes the emergence of the professions in late tsarist Russia and their struggle for autonomy from the aristocratic state. It also examines the ways in which the Russian professions both resembled and differed from their Western counterparts.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.
Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

Presenting the views of leading experts on strategic considerations in Eurasia, this volume shows that the 11 September attacks and subsequent developments have affected the way in which international relations are evaluated. In addition, these developments have turned the concept of asymmetric threats, including large-scale international terrorist attacks, into genuine realistic dangers threatening our security. As a result, the conventional mindset over issues of war and peace, of existing alliances and partnerships, even of the character of the international system has to be re-evaulated. This volume sheds light on the aspects of change that have taken place in the post-11 September evolution of international relations in Eurasia.

This book assesses the evolution of the Soviet approach toward European security policy since the mid-1980s, as seen from the prism of assessments of and policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, examining basic Soviet analyses of West Germany in the period prior to unification.

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

Carter and Ehteshami consider the significant geopolitical, economic and security links between the Middle East and the wider Asian world - links which are often overlooked when the Middle East is considered in isolation or in terms of its relations with the West, but which are of growing importance. Topics covered include Asia's overall geostrategic realities and the Middle East's place within them; relations between the Middle East and China, Russia, central Asia, southeast Asia and south Asia; Islam in central Asia and southeast Asia and the connections with the Middle East; and the important links between the Middle East and India and Pakistan's military and security establishments.

On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.

On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.

Series Information:
Warfare and History

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from the West and from Taiwan itself who examine the key issues connected with Taiwan's air power, which is a key aspect of the China-Taiwan military balance. During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re-equipping its air force with modern air defence and strike aircraft equipped with modern missiles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, air power will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance, as China's efforts to upgrade its own air force's capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan's current advantages.

The optimism that arrived at the end of the cold war and marked the turn of the Millennium was shattered by September 11. In the aftermath of that event it is not unwarranted pessimism that lines the pages of "Grave New World," it is unavoidable reality. Terrorism is but one aspect of many other wider concerns for national and international security, and the contributors to this volume not only warn us, but reward us as well with the clarity of their views into -- and possible solutions for -- a difficult, complicated future. They speak convincingly of the numerous military and non-military challenges that create security problems -- whether those are interstate, intrastate, or transnational -- many of which are being dangerously overlooked in public policy debates.

The challenges and complexities might seem insurmountable but the first step in solving problems is recognizing that they exist. "Grave New World" provides an eye-opening assessment of the prospects for peace and security in the 21st century.

Michael E. Brown frames these issues in his Introduction, "Security Challenges in the 21st Century;" and in his summation, "Security Problems and Security Policy in a Grave New World."

Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability, 1919-1939 is the first unified study of the development of Britain's anti-submarine capability between the armistice in 1919 and the onset of the second world German submarine attack on Britain's maritime trade in 1939. Well researched and yet accessibly written, this book challenges the widespread belief that the Royal Navy failed to anticipate the threat of the U-boat in the Second World War.

On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler simply beat him to the punch.

The Chronicle of a People's War: The Military and Strategic History of the Cambodian Civil War, 1979-1991 narrates the military and strategic history of the Cambodian Civil War, especially the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), from when it deposed the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 until the political settlement in 1991. The PRK survived in the face of a fierce insurgency due to three factors: an appealing and reasonably well-implemented political program, extensive political indoctrination, and the use of a hybrid army. In this hybrid organization, the PRK relied on both its professional, conventional army, and the militia-like, "territorial army." This latter type was lightly equipped and most soldiers were not professional. Yet the militia made up for these weaknesses with its intimate knowledge of the local terrain and its political affinity with the local people. These two advantages are keys to victory in the context of counterinsurgency warfare. The narrative and critical analysis is driven by extensive interviews and primary source archives that have never been accessed before by any scholar, including interviews with former veterans (battalion commanders, brigade commanders, division commanders, commanders of provincial military commands, commanders of military regions, and deputy chiefs of staff), articles in the People's Army from 1979 to 1991, battlefield footage, battlefield video reports, newsreel, propaganda video, and official publications of the Cambodian Institute of Military History.

Sun Bins' Art of Warfare is an essential text of Chinese military philosophy and of strategy in general. This book, lost for over two thousand years and rediscovered only in 1972, has not yet reached the prominence of Sunzi's (Sun-tzu) The Art of Warfare, which is the best-known military treatise in the world. Sun Bin's work is an indispensable companion to the work of Sunzi, who is believed to be his ancestor, but deserves to be better known in its own right, both philosophically and historically. Here, noted sinologists D.C. Lau and Roger T. Ames offer an admirably lucid translation, and provide an introduction examining the life, times, and original philosophical contributions of Sun Bin. Sun Bin, advisor to King Wei of the state of Qi, worked and wrote during the mid-fourth century B.C.E. during China's Warring States period. It was a time of unprecedented violence; without a central national authority, nation-states fought fiercely amongst one another. New technologies made fighting more deadly, so that between the mid-fourth and mid-third centuries B.C.E, the number of battlefield casualties increased tenfold. Sun Bin's work is the key to understanding the physical and intellectual revolution that made such "progress" in the efficiency of warfare possible.