This compendium on Europe's military situation is written by leading analysts of military studies representing every major nation of Europe. Also included are three overview chapters that set the tone for this volume. These chapters--Martin Shaw on the evolution of a "common risk" society, Christopher Dandeker on the military in democratic societies, and Wilfried von Bredow on the re-nationalization of military strategy--provide an introduction to the work. Although the Cold War is now two decades removed from Europe, the challenges of transition to new defense systems and institutional structures still confront those who plan the future for military establishments. The country studies as well as the final analysis of the trends and probable future developments in Europe should be required reading throughout the national security structure for politicians and decision makers seeking to understand the dilemmas facing European militaries and the societies they defend. The chapters cover a wide range of nations. Jean Callaghan, Christo Domoztov, and Valery Ratchcev examine the Bulgarian armed forces after the 1997 elections and Marie Vlachova and Stefan Sarvas review civil-military relations in the Czech Republic. Janos Szabo studies the defense sector in Hungary. Adriana Stanescu sees Romania as a case of delayed modernization. Vladimir Rukavishnikov studies the military in post-communist Russia. Paul Klein and Jurgen Kuhlmann review the German armed forces in the context of a peace dividend. Bernard Boene and Didier Danet consider France and the post draft situation. Marina Nuciari and Giuseppe Caforio consider the Italian military in a democratic context. Jan van der Meulen and his colleagues look upon the Netherlands military as a case study in post-modernization. The final contribution summarizes lessons learned in assessing the contemporary civil-military complex.

Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific examines what drives the different regional security strategies of four middle powers in the Asia Pacific: Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. Drawing on the extant middle power literature, the authors argue that the regional security strategies of middle powers could take two forms, namely, functional or normative. A functional strategy means that the middle power targets its resources to address a specific problem that it has a high level of interest in, while a normative strategy refers to a focus on promoting general behavioural standards and confidence building at the multilateral level. This book argues that whether a middle power ultimately employs a more functional or normative regional security strategy depends on its resource availability and strategic environment.

From Russia’s tampering with the US election to the WannaCry hack that temporarily crippled the NHS, cyber has become the weapon of choice for democracies, dictators, and terrorists.

Cheap to acquire, easily deniable, and used for a variety of malicious purposes ― from crippling infrastructure to sowing discord and doubt ― cyberweapons are re-writing the rules of warfare. In less than a decade, they have displaced terrorism and nuclear missiles as the biggest immediate threat to international security and to democracy.

Here, New York Times correspondent David E. Sanger takes us from the White House Situation Room to the dens of Chinese government hackers and the boardrooms of Silicon Valley, piecing together a remarkable picture of a world now coming face-to-face with the most sophisticated ― and arguably most dangerous ― weapon ever invented.

The Perfect Weapon is the dramatic story of a new era of constant sabotage, misinformation, and fear, in which everyone is a target.

In a very short time, individuals and companies have harnessed cyberspace to create new industries, a vibrant social space, and a new economic sphere that are intertwined with our everyday lives. At the same time, individuals, subnational groups, and governments are using cyberspace to advance interests through malicious activity. Terrorists recruit, train, and target through the Internet, hackers steal data, and intelligence services conduct espionage. Still, the vast majority of cyberspace is civilian space used by individuals, businesses, and governments for legitimate purposes. "Cyberspace and National Security" brings together scholars, policy analysts, and information technology executives to examine current and future threats to cyberspace. They discuss various approaches to advance and defend national interests, contrast the US approach with European, Russian, and Chinese approaches, and offer new ways and means to defend interests in cyberspace and develop offensive capabilities to compete there. Policymakers and strategists will find this book to be an invaluable resource in their efforts to ensure national security and answer concerns about future cyberwarfare.

The Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies provides a comprehensive collection of essays on contemporary defence studies by leading international scholars. Defence studies is a multi-disciplinary study of how agents, predominantly states, prepare for and go to war. Whereas security studies has been broadened and stretched to cover at times the near totality of international and domestic affairs, and war studies has come to mean not just operations and tactics but also experiences and outcomes, defence studies remains a coherent area of study primarily aimed at how defence policy changes over time and in relation to stimulating factors such as alterations in power, strategy and technology. This new Handbook offers a complete landscape of this area of study and contributes to a review of defence studies in terms of policy, security and war, but also looks forward to new challenges to existing conceptions of defence and how this is changing as states and their militaries also change. The volume is divided into four thematic sections: Defence as Policy; Defence Practice; Operations and Tactics; and Contemporary Defence Issues. The ability to review the field while also looking forward to further research is an important element of a sustainable text on defence studies. In as much as this volume is able to highlight the main themes of defence studies, it also offers an in-depth look into how defence issues can be examined and compared in a contemporary setting. This Handbook will be of great interest to students of defence studies, strategic studies, war studies, security studies and IR.

This book attempts to conceptualise EU action in the field of regional security.

Drawing on constructivist theory, the framework of the book focuses on the meeting - or 'interface' - of actors, a situation reflecting the mutual construction of self, other and situation. The analytical framework applied here to European security politics is potentially open-ended as the theoretical logic that informs the framework is general and abstract in character, and not limited to state actors in an international setting. The empirical aim of this book is to further our understanding of the EU as a security actor in a regional perspective. The book thus links International Relations scholarship with that of EU studies. By analyzing a number of different interfaces (such as with Russia, the US, and other states), we can learn more about the circumstances and preconditions and with what resources and power the EU acts in a regional security setting.

This book will be of great interest to students of European security, EU policy, IR theory and security studies in general.

Rikard Bengtsson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. He has a PhD in Political Science, from Lund University, Sweden.

Arms purchases are among the most expensive, technologically challenging and politically controversial decisions made by modern-day governments. Superpower spending on weapons systems is widely analysed and discussed. But defence procurement in smaller industrial countries involves different issues which receive less attention. This volume presents a general framework for understanding smaller country defence procurement supported by country, industry and project studies. Part I provides a general framework for analysing smaller country defence procurement, focusing on the formation of national defence capabilities. The framework is then used to analyse issues around the development of procurement demand, the characteristics of defence industry supply, contracts and relationships between buyers and sellers, and government policy for defence procurement and industry development. Part II focuses on defence procurement in seven smaller industrial nations with widely varying historical and political settings (Australia, Canada, Israel, Singapore, Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands). Part III consists of two Australian case studies of the procurement issues raised in, respectively, the naval shipbuilding industry and in a major, complex defence project. The book addresses the needs of public and private sector managers, military planners, procurement specialists, industry policy-makers, and defence procurement and industry educators. It presents general principles in an accessible manner and points to real-world experience to illustrate the principles at work. Therefore it will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in defence economics, strategic procurement, public sector procurement, and defence industry policy.

Indonesia is the largest archipelago state in the world comprising 17,480 islands, with a maritime territory measuring close to 6 million square kilometres. It is located between the two key shipping routes of the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Indonesia's cooperation in maritime security initiatives is vitally important because half of the world's trading goods and oil pass through Indonesian waters, including the Straits of Malacca, the Strait of Sunda and the Strait of Lombok. This book analyses Indonesia's participation in international maritime security cooperation. Using Indonesia as a case study, the book adopts mixed methods to assess emerging power cooperation and non-cooperation drawing from various International Relations theories and the bureaucratic politics approach. It addresses not only the topic of Indonesia's cooperation but also engages in debates across the International Relations, political science and policy studies disciplines regarding state cooperation. Based on extensive primary Indonesian language sources and original interviews, the author offers a conceptual discussion on the reasons underlying emerging middle power participation or non-participation in cooperation agreements. The analysis offers a fresh perspective on the growing problems of maritime terrorism and sea robbery and how an emerging power deals with these threats at unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The book fills a significant gap in literature on Indonesian foreign policy making in the post-1998 era. It provides the first in-depth study of Indonesia's decision making process in the area of maritime security and will thus be of interest to researchers in the field of comparative politics, international relations, security policy, maritime cooperation, port and shipping businesses and Southeast Asian politics and society.

Overturns existing thinking to show that the Royal Navy engaged professionally in war planning in the years before the First World War. It has been widely accepted that British naval war planning from the late nineteenth century to the First World War was amateur and driven by personal political agenda. But Shawn T. Grimes argues that this was far from the case. His extensive original research shows that, in fact, the Royal Navy had a definitive war strategy, which was well thought-through and formulated in a professional manner. Faced by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat, the Admiralty adopted an offensive strategy from 1888 to 1905 based on observational blockade and combined operations. This strategy was modified after 1905 for war with Wilhelmine Germany. The book shows how specific war plans aimed at Germany's naval and economic assets in the Baltic were drawn up between 1906 and 1908 and that the strategy of primary distant blockade, formulated between 1897 and 1907, became a reality in late 1912 and not July 1914 as previously thought. The book argues that the Naval Intelligence Department, which took a lead in devising these plans, was the Navy's de facto staff. Overall, it is clear that there was a continuity underpinning British thinking about how to wage a naval war. SHAWN GRIMES received his PhD in history from the University of London and has been a Lecturer in European History at the University of Saskatchewan.

This book provides a detailed application of identity theory to contemporary questions of extremism, radicalization and security. The analysis considers how identity forms a central aspect of notions of extremism and security in Western societies, as articulated both by political leaders, the media and the government. It also takes a close and critical look at counter-extremism policy in contemporary Western society. With its detailed and empirical approach to these questions, this book is an accessible and invaluable resource for academics, practitioners, policy-makers and general readers keen to establish a deeper understanding of the key societal security threats of the day.

This wide-ranging book analyses EU-Asia security relations in a systematic, substantive and comparative manner. The contributions assess similarities and differences between the EU and its Asian partners with respect to levels of threat perception, policy response and security cooperation in the context of historical, institutional and external factors - such as the influence of the United States. The book presents original empirical research organised in four parts: a number of contributions providing discussions of the global context in which EU-Asia security relations develop; a series of chapters covering the range of dimensions of EU-Asian security, including both traditional and non-military aspects of security; chapters addressing the specific issues touching on bilateral relations between the EU and its partners in the Asia-Pacific region; and a final part presenting the overall findings across the various contributions together with the future outlook for EU-Asia security relations.

The United States in the Vietnam War, 1954-1975 is an invaluable reference guide to the costly and controversial war the U.S. waged in Vietnam, over the course of five presidential administrations. Focusing not only on the conflict in Southeast Asia, but also on the tumult the war inspired on the domestic front, Louis Peake provides an authoritative guide to the wide range of media available on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. From collections of art work and poetry about the soldiering experience, to journalistic accounts of battles, and military training films, the entries consistently provide clear and concise descriptions, allowing the reader to easily identify the value of any particular resource.

With revised and updated annotations, and over 150 new entries, this second edition of The United States in the Vietnam War, 1954-1975 is an invaluable reference tool for researchers and students of the Vietnam War.

Routledge Research Guides to American Military Studies provide concise, annotated bibliographies to the major areas and events in American military history. With the inclusion of brief critical annotations after each entry, the student and researcher can easily assess the utility of each bibliographic source and evaluate the abundance of resources available with ease and efficiency. Comprehensive, concise, and current???Routledge Research Guides to American Military Studies are an essential research tool for any historian.

A direct consequence of the War on Terror launched after the attacks of September 11, 2001 is an awareness of the need for homeland security. This war is being used to justify a huge expansion of government powers and spending, but funds allocated for homeland security are often for programs far removed from anything that might be termed "defense" or "security." In Homeland Security Scams, James T. Bennett shows that this government spending is doing very little to make us safer, but a great deal to make us poorer, less free, and more dependent on the federal government.

Regardless of the color of the "security alert" issued by the Homeland Security czar, the spending light is always green as pork barrel dollars are showered on programs of dubious worth. Lobbyists lobby for homeland security grants and contracts; corporations and state and local governments are becoming ever more dependent on federal subsidies; the vested interest in prolonging and intensifying the concern about homeland security increases; and lobbyists press for ever more money. As Bennett makes clear, with government money comes government control. Law enforcement and emergency response agencies at all levels of government are being effectively "nationalized." Police power is being concentrated, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) envisions a "surveillance" state that the East German State Police under Communism would have envied.

In this hard-hitting critique, Bennett argues that all the spending and surveillance will not win the War on Terror or preserve us from natural disasters. The foe cannot be beaten (we're having trouble even finding the enemy), cannot surrender, and still has awesome powers to lay waste to American cities and citizens. He argues that we should view terrorism as just one of many other serious threats to individuals and to nations. More sternly, he warns that the War on Terror is also a War on Privacy and a War on Liberty.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

As she charts her destiny in lifting her masses from poverty and backwardness, India is also obliged to ward off incessant military aggression from her two near, and most inimical neighbours. Resultantly, she is compelled to spend as much as Rupees three hundred thousand crores annually from her overburdened national income to maintain the world's third largest defence forces. In normal course of state wisdom therefore, one would expect that such a humungous investment would be managed in the most efficient manner to get the maximum purchase out of every paisa. But alas, that is not the case. What else could explain the contradiction that even with so much manpower, hardware and funding committed upon her military power, none of her adversaries are deterred from perpetrating acts of gross military escalation while indulging in brazen acts of sabotaging the Indian nationhood - freely and with immunity. It is also hard to explain as to why must India's massive defence forces have to be left short of their due war wherewithal, burdened with obsolete weaponry and hardware, and saddled with overgrown and over-frigid organisations for higher (mis)management. The answer is straightforward: the Indian military institution is inefficiently managed. The long festering flaw is observed, understood and enthusiastically banished now and then, but corrections are never actually attempted. Solutions are known, more or less, but are held down, diverted and scotched by systemic prejudices, paranoia and partisan machinations, as if by design. The causes of such afflictions too are no secret: political apathy, bureaucratic subterfuge and to some extent, myopic military leadership.This book is devoted to arguments for empowerment of the apex military management system, identification of the hurdles, redress of systemic concerns valid or conjured, and goes on to offer certain options to modernise the system of Indian defence management into an operationally efficient political instrument that would promote the cause of India's sovereignty in a cost-effective manner.

In the first book to focus on civil-military tensions after American wars, Thomas Langston challenges conventional theory by arguing that neither civilian nor military elites deserve victory in this perennial struggle. What is needed instead, he concludes, is balance.

In America's worst postwar episodes, those that followed the Civil War and the Vietnam War, balance was conspicuously absent. In the late 1860s and into the 1870s, the military became the tool of a divisive partisan program. As a result, when Reconstruction ended, so did popular support of the military. After the Vietnam War, military leaders were "too" successful in defending their institution against civilian commanders, leading some observers to declare a crisis in civil-military relations even before Bill Clinton became commander-in-chief.

Is American military policy balanced today? No, but it may well be headed in that direction. At the end of the 1990s there was still no clear direction in military policy. The officer corps stubbornly clung to a Cold War force structure. A civilian-minded commander-in-chief, meanwhile, stretched a shrinking force across the globe. With the shocking events of September 11, 2001, clarifying the seriousness of the post-Cold War military policy, we may at last be moving toward a true realignment of civilian and military imperatives.

During the 1930s, war with Germany became increasingly likely. The British Government believed that it would start with massed ranks of enemy planes, dropping bombs and poison gas on civilians in major towns and cities, terrifying them into surrendering. When war broke out, preparations to protect the population were piecemeal and inadequate. As anticipated, people were shocked by the first raids and the response of rescue services was chaotic. But far from breaking morale, the Blitz galvanised public opinion in support of the war. Soon people became hardened by their experiences and attacks from the air became a normal, albeit terrible, part of daily life. Blitz Diary tells the story in a remarkable series of eyewitness accounts from the war's earliest and darkest days through to the end, when the V-2 rockets brought devastation without warning. Preservation of such first-hand accounts has become increasingly important as the Blitz fades from living memory. This expanded edition includes new chapters and new accounts from key eyewitnesses.

Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.

The perspectives of academics and practitioners are brought together in this insightful work, which examines the war on terrorism, the Iraq war and the roles of NATO and the EU. The book analyzes the new threats posed by terrorist strikes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction despite the total failure of Cold War conceptions of deterrence. It also delineates the key issues and problems that have arisen from the NATO and EU double enlargement and from the new NATO-Russian relationship. Casting light on the global and regional ramifications of the crisis, as well as the tensions in the transatlantic relationship caused by the war with Iraq, NATO and the European Union addresses the key policy questions that concern the maintenance of global peace and security.

The key roles played by the Royal Observer Corps in the Second World War have, all too often, been overshadowed by more glamourous arms of the defence forces. The teams in the Sector Stations, plotting the battles raging above, and the Spitfires and Hurricanes swooping upon the formations of enemy fighters and bombers, present easily-imagined and dramatic scenes. Yet between the radar stations, detecting the German aircraft approaching over the Channel, and the Sector Controls were the little sand-bagged posts of the Observer Corps that provided over-land tracking of the enemy formations. The Royal Observer Corps (the Royal' prefix being approved in 1941) proved a vital link in the communication chain in the defence of the UK, particularly in the Battle of Britain, as it provided the only means of tracking enemy aircraft once they had crossed the coastline. The highly-skilled Observers were also able to identify and count the enemy aircraft, turning blips on a screen into actual types and numbers of German machines. Even after the threat from the Luftwaffe receded after the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the ROC again came to the fore when the V1s opened a new reign of terror in 1944. Because these small, fast weapons were so hard to detect the RAF's fighter controllers moved into the ROC's operations rooms so that they could respond to the V-1 threat more rapidly. In this official history of the ROC written shortly after the war, the corps' operations throughout the conflict are set out in great detail. This includes a section on the last flight of Rudolf Hess, as well as one detailing the work of those who were selected for employment as Seaborne Observers on ships during the D-Day landings, where their specialist identification skills were used to prevent the all-too prevalent instances of friendly fire'.

Immerse yourself in the world of the Samurai with this classic text. Code of the Samurai is the 350-year-old summary of the rules and expectations embodied in Bushido--the ancient Japanese "Way of the Warrior." Written by Taira Shigesuke, a Samurai and prominent teacher of military techniques, it was published posthumously in 1834. This influential book was intended as a training manual for young Samurai, outlining personal and professional standards. This accessible and enjoyable translation is by Thomas Cleary, the foremost translator of Asian martial classics, accompanied by the powerful line drawings of master illustrator Oscar Ratti. A new foreword by Alexander Bennett, a leading expert on Samurai history, explains the lasting importance of this classic work and its place within the canon of Japanese literature.