This volume examines the ethical issues that arise as a result of national security intelligence collection and analysis. Powerful new technologies enable the collection, communication and analysis of national security data on an unprecedented scale. Data collection now plays a central role in intelligence practice, yet this development raises a host of ethical and national security problems, such as privacy; autonomy; threats to national security and democracy by foreign states; and accountability for liberal democracies. This volume provides a comprehensive set of in-depth ethical analyses of these problems by combining contributions from both ethics scholars and intelligence practitioners. It provides the reader with a practical understanding of relevant operations, the issues that they raise and analysis of how responses to these issues can be informed by a commitment to liberal democratic values. This combination of perspectives is crucial in providing an informed appreciation of ethical challenges that is also grounded in the realities of the practice of intelligence. This book will be of great interest to all students of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies, foreign policy and international relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

The first work to lay out Roman strategic thinking from its start under Augustus until its final demise in 476 CE From Octavian's victory at Actium (31 bc) to its traditional endpoint in the West (476), the Roman Empire lasted a solid 500 years-an impressive number by any standard, and fully one-fifth of all recorded history. In fact, the decline and final collapse of the Roman Empire took longer than most other empires even existed. Any historian trying to unearth the grand strategy of the Roman Empire must, therefore, always remain cognizant of the time scale, in which she is dealing. Although the pace of change in the Roman era never approached that of the modern era, it was not an empire in stasis. While the visible trappings may have changed little, the challenges Rome faced at its end were vastly different than those faced by Augustus and the Julio-Claudians. Over the centuries, the Empire's underlying economy, political arrangements, military affairs, and, most importantly, the myriad of external threats it faced were in constant flux, making adaptability to changing circumstances as important to Roman strategists as it is to strategists of the modern era. Yet the very idea of Rome having a grand strategy, or what it might be, had not concerned historians until Edward Luttwak's The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire appeared forty years ago. Although this pioneering work generated much debate, it failed to win over many ancient historians, in part because of its heavy emphasis on military force and its neglect of considerations of diplomacy, economics, politics, culture, and the changing nature of the threats that confronted Rome. By employing an expansive definition of strategy and by focusing much of the narrative on crucial historical moments and the personalities involved, James Lacey provides a comprehensive, persuasive, and engaging account of the rise and fall of the Roman Empire. It assimilates the most recent work of classical historians and archaeologists to correct the flaws and omissions of previous accounts, thus presenting the most complete and nuanced narrative of Roman strategic thinking and execution ever published.

This book gathers the proceedings of the Multidisciplinary International Conference of Research Applied to Defense and Security (MICRADS), held at the Eloy Alfaro Military Academy (ESMIL) in Quito, Ecuador, on May 13-15,2020. It covers a broad range of topics in systems, communication, and defense; strategy and political-administrative vision in defense; and engineering and technologies applied to defense. Given its scope, it offers a valuable resource for practitioners, researchers, and students alike.

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.

Countless attempts at analyzing Russia's actions focus on Putin to understand Russia's military imbroglio in Ukraine, hostility towards America, and disdain of 'Gayropa'. This book invites its readers to look beyond the man and delve into the online lives of millions of Russians. It asks not the question of what the threats are to Russia's security, but what they are perceived to be by digital Russia. The author examines how enemy images are manufactured, threats magnified, stereotypes revived, memories implanted and fears harnessed. It looks at the legacy of the Soviet Union in shaping discussions ranging from the Ukraine crisis to the Pussy Riots trial, and explores the complex inter-relation between enemy images at the governmental level and their articulation by the general public. By drawing on the fields of international relations, memory studies, visual studies, and big data, this book addresses the question of why securitization succeeds - and why it fails. "Security theory meets the visual turn and goes to Russia, where old tsarist and Soviet tropes are flooding the internet in support of Putin's neo-tsarism. A magical mystery tour that comes recommended. Iver B. Neumann, author of "Russia and the Idea of Europe" "The novelty of her approach is in going beyond the traditional top down perspective and capturing the receptivity and contribution of various social groups to securitized discourses." Andrei P.Tsygankov, author of "Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity". "When do scary proclamations of security threats attract an audience? When does securitization work? 'Security Threats and Public Perception' combines in-depth analysis of the Ukraine Crisis in the Russian digital media with discourse theory to make an innovative argument about how and when people believe that they are insecure. A must read!" Laura Sjoberg, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, USA

The Strategic Survey 2014 is the annual review of world affairs from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It argues that changing patterns in international relations make it vital for the world's businesses to carry out geopolitical due diligence. The resurgence of major-power geopolitics was the striking feature of international affairs in the year to mid-2014. Russia and Europe competed for influence in Ukraine, where a revolution in support of closer integration with Europe was followed by Moscow's annexation of Crimea and a pro-Russian insurgency in eastern regions. Tensions rose between China and Japan as the leaders of both countries stepped up their assertive nationalism. However, progress was made in nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world's major powers. The year's developments heralded a period of heightened strategic change that would sharpen the challenges facing the United States in maintaining global influence. Strategic Survey 2014: The Annual Review of World Affairs analyses the events and themes of the year region by region. It includes essays on cybersecurity and privacy, on assessing drivers of strategic change, and on hybrid forms of insecurity in the developing world. The Strategic Geography section includes maps on the humanitarian disaster in Syria, France's role in Africa and the Pacific Alliance trade bloc in Latin America. The book contains a chronology of key events around the world. It is an invaluable tool for interpreting world-wide strategic developments and has, since 1966, provided essential analysis of the year's key events in international relations for government policy makers, journalists, business leaders and academics.

Defence Planning as Strategic Fact provides and elaborates on an "upstream" focus on the variegated organizational, political and conceptual practices of military, civilian administrative and political leaderships involved in defence planning, offering an important security and strategic studies supplement to the traditional "downstream" focus on the use of force. The book enables the reader to engage with the role of ideas in defence planning, of organizational processes and biases, path dependencies and administrative dynamics under the pressures of continuously changing domestic and international constraints. The chapters show how defence planning must be seen as a constitutive element of defence and strategic studies - that it is a strategic fact of its own which merits particular practical and scholarly attention. As defence planning creates the conditions behind every peace upheld or broken and every war won or lost, Defence Planning as Strategic Fact will be of great use to scholars of defence studies, strategic studies, and military studies. This book was originally published as a special issue of Defence Studies.

Borders are not just lines in the sand, but increasingly globalised spaces of practice. This is the case in West Africa, where a growing range of local and international officials are brought together by ambitious security projects around common anxieties. These projects include efforts to stop irregular migration by sea through international police cooperation, reinforcing infrastructures at border posts, and the application of new digital identification tools to identify and track increasingly mobile citizens. These interventions are driven by global and local security agendas, by biometric passport rules as much as competition between local security agencies. This book draws on the author's multi-sited ethnography in Mauritania and Senegal, showing how border security practices and technologies operate to build state security capacity, transform how state agencies work, and produce new forms of authority and expertise.

Due to the continuing expansion of the notion of security, various national, regional and international institutions now find themselves addressing contemporary security issues. While institutions may evolve by adjusting themselves to new challenges, they can also fundamentally alter the intricate balance between security and current legal frameworks. This volume explores the tensions that occur when institutions address contemporary security threats, in both public and international law contexts. As part of the Connecting International with Public Law series, it provides important and valuable insights into the legal issues and perspectives which surround the institutional responses to contemporary security challenges. It is essential reading for scholars, practitioners and policy makers seeking to understand the legal significance of security institutions and the implications of their evolution on the rule of law and legitimacy.

This new handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counter-insurgencies. In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research. In order to contain this wide-ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework, the Editors have divided the text into three key parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues Part II: Insurgent Movements Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter-terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers.

An army, Lewis Mumford once observed, 'is a body of pure consumers' and it is logistics that feeds this body's insatiable appetite for men and materiel. Successful logistics - the transportation of supplies and combatants to battle - cannot guarantee victory, but poor logistics portends defeat. In Feeding Victory, Jobie Turner asks how technical innovation has affected this connection over time and whether advances in technology, from the railroad and the airplane to the nuclear weapon and the computer, have altered both the critical relationship between logistics and warfare and, ultimately, geopolitical dynamics. Covering a span of three hundred years, Feeding Victory focuses on five distinct periods of technological change, from the preindustrial era to the information age. For each era Turner presents a case study: the campaign for Lake George from 1755 to 1759, the Western Front in 1917, the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad from 1942 to 1943, and the Battle of Khe Sanh in 1968. In each of these cases the logistics of the belligerents were at their limit because of geography or the vast material needs of war. With such limits, the case studies both give a clear accounting of the logistics of the period, particularly with respect to the mode of transportation - whether air, land, or sea - and reveal the inflection points between success and failure. What are the continuities between eras, Turner asks, and what can these campaigns tell us about the relationship of technology to logistics and logistics to geopolitics? In doing so, Turner discovers just how critical the biological needs of the soldiers on the battlefield prove to be; in fact, they overwhelm firepower in their importance, even in the modern era. His work shows how logistics aptly represents technological shifts from the enlightenment to the dawn of the twenty-first century and how, in our time, ideas have come to trump the material forces of war.

Based on extensive Japanese-language materials, this book is the first to examine the development of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. It addresses: how the GSDF was able to emerge as the post-war successor of the Imperial Japanese Army despite Japan's anti-militarist constitution; how the GSDF, despite the public skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, built domestic and international legitimacy; and how the GSDF has responded to changes in international and domestic environments. This path-breaking study of the world's third-largest-economic power's ground army is timely for two reasons. First, the resurgence of tensions in Northeast Asia over territorial disputes, and the emphasis recent Japanese governments have placed on using the GSDF for defending Japan's outlying islands is driving media coverage and specialist interest in the GSDF. Second, the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has focused global attention on the GSDF as Japan's lead disaster relief organization. This highly informative and thoroughly researched book provides insight for policy makers and academics interested in Japanese foreign and defense policies.

Iran, Egypt, and Turkey all experienced remarkably similar coup-installed regimes in the middle of the twentieth century, and shared comparable state-building ambitions. Despite these similarities, each followed a different trajectory: Iran became an absolutist monarchy that was overthrown from below; Turkey evolved into a limited democracy; and Egypt metamorphosed into a police state. What accounts for this divergence? In The Power Triangle, Hazem Kandil attributes the different outcomes to the power struggle between the political, military, and security components of each regime. Following a coup, officers immediately divide their labor: one group runs government, another supervises the military, and the third handles security. Their interests initially overlap, but begin to vary as each group becomes identified with its own institution. The politicians wish to remain in power indefinitely, but need the support of the custodians of violence; military officers prefer to withdraw from politics after implementing the needed reforms, since their prerogatives are usually guaranteed regardless of regime type, and politicization corrupts the corps; and security men strive to consolidate authoritarianism in order to maintain the inflated privileges they have acquired during the emergency period following the coup. Driven by conflicting agendas, the three partners struggle to control the regime. Through comparative historical analysis, Kandil demonstrates that the new regime is shaped and reshaped through the recurrent clashes and changing alliances between the team of rivals in this 'power triangle.' Bringing realism into domestic politics, The Power Triangle demonstrates that we cannot gain a clear understanding of pivotal events in Iran, Egypt, and Turkey without a firm grasp of the balance of power within the ruling bloc of each country.

Analyzes the cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces throughout American history While traditionally, Americans view expensive military structure as a poor investment and a threat to liberty, they also require a guarantee of that very freedom, necessitating the employment of armed forces. Beginning with the seventeenth-century wars of the English colonies, Americans typically increased their military capabilities at the beginning of conflicts only to decrease them at the apparent conclusion of hostilities. In Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, a stellar team of military historians argue that the United States sometimes managed effective drawdowns, sowing the seeds of future victory that Americans eventually reaped. Yet at other times, the drawing down of military capabilities undermined our readiness and flexibility, leading to more costly wars and perhaps defeat. The political choice to reduce military capabilities is influenced by Anglo-American pecuniary decisions and traditional fears of government oppression, and it has been haphazard at best throughout American history. These two factors form the basic American "liberty dilemma," the vexed relationship between the nation and its military apparatuses from the founding of the first colonies through to present times. With the termination of large-scale operations in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the United States military once again faces a significant drawdown in standing force structure and capabilities. The political and military debate currently raging around how best to affect this force reduction continues to lack a proper historical perspective. This volume aspires to inform this dialogue. Not a traditional military history, Drawdown analyzes cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces.

Learning, innovation and adaptation are not concepts that we necessarily associate with the British army of the First World War. Yet the need to learn from mistakes, to exploit new opportunities and to adapt to complex situations are enduring and timeless. This revealing work is the first institutional examination of the army's process for learning during the First World War. Drawing on organisational learning and management theories, Aimee Fox critiques existing approaches to military learning in wartime. Focused around a series of case studies, the book ranges across multiple operational theatres and positions the army within a broader context in terms of its relationships with allies and civilians to reveal that learning was more complex and thoroughgoing than initially thought. It grapples with the army's failings and shortcomings, explores its successes and acknowledges the inherent difficulties of learning in a desperate and lethally competitive environment.

Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty explores and examines why and how security communities prepare purposefully for their future defence. The author explains that defence planning is the product of interplay among political process, historical experience, and the logic of strategy. The theory of strategy best reveals both the nature and the working of defence planning. Political 'ends', strategic 'ways', and military 'means' all fed by reigning, if not always recognized, assumptions, organize the subject well with a template that can serve any time, place, and circumstance. The book is designed to help understanding of what can appear to be a forbiddingly complex as well as technical subject. A good part of the problem for officials charged with defence planning duties is expressed in the second part of the book's title. The real difficulty, which rarely is admitted by those tasked with defence planning duty, is that defence planning can only be guesswork. But, because defence preparation is always expensive, not untypically is politically unpopular, yet obviously can be supremely important, claims to knowledge about the truly unknowable persist. In truth, we cannot do defence planning competently, because our ignorance of the future precludes understanding of what our society will be shown by future events to need. The challenge faced by the author was to identify ways in which our problems with the inability to know the future in any detail in advance-the laws of nature, in other words-may best be met and mitigated. Professor Gray argues that our understanding of human nature, of politics, and of strategic history, does allow us to make prudent choices in defence planning that hopefully will prove 'good enough'.

The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. "Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age" takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest--twenty-two essays--are new.

The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

In a world that is increasingly unstable, intelligence services like the American CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6 exist to deliver security. Whether the challenge involves terrorism, cyber-security, or the renewed specter of great power conflict, intelligence agencies mitigate threats and provide decisional advantage to national leaders. But empowered intelligence services require adequate supervision and oversight, which must be about more than the narrow (if still precarious) task of ensuring the legality of covert operations and surveillance activities. Global Intelligence Oversight is a comparative investigation of how democratic countries can govern their intelligence services so that they are effective, but operate within frameworks that are acceptable to their people in an interconnected world. The book demonstrates how the institutions that oversee intelligence agencies participate in the protection of national security while safeguarding civil liberties, balancing among competing national interests, and building public trust in inherently secret activities. It does so by analyzing the role of courts and independent oversight bodies as they operate in countries with robust constitutional frameworks and powerful intelligence services. The book also illuminates a new transnational oversight dynamic that is shaping and constraining security services in new ways. It describes how global technology companies and litigation in transnational forums constitute a new form of oversight whose contours are still undefined. As rapid changes in technology bring the world closer together, these forces will complement their more traditional counterparts in ensuring that intelligence activities remain effective, legitimate, and sustainable.

On a clear moonlit night in November of 1940, the Luftwaffe used hundreds of bombers, thousands of high explosives and tens of thousands of incendiary bombs to attack the industrial might of England by bombing Coventry. This book analyzes the raid in detail, reviews the actions of both the Germans and the British preceeding the raid, and investigates the impact the raid had on British as well as American public opinion. The book also investigates the controversial question of how much advance notice the British actually had concerning the raid. The Coventry bombing proved to be the most concentrated single air attack of the entire Luftwaffe bombing campaign directed against the British during World War II.

In February 2019, Donald Trump announced the United States withdrew from the landmark Cold War-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia sparking worldwide concerns over the specter of a new nuclear arms race. The rational actor and game theoretic models dominating international relations literature failed to predict or explain this strategic choice. Rationalist, normative, and materialist models of strategic choice saturate the study of international relations. Scholars continue to expose the shortfalls in these approaches in explaining or predicting outcomes of strategic interactions. This book advances a new model of strategic choice through a narrative lens. This narrative turn reframes the logic to emphasize the propositions of motives, perceptions, preferences, and the reflexive interaction of strategic choices. Case studies of American and Russian nuclear arms control treaties from the negotiations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 to the crisis of the American withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019 support building a theory of "narrativized" strategic choice.

Practical case-based guide illustrating the challenges and solutions of adopting IoT in both secure and hostile environments IoT for Defense and National Security covers topics on IoT security, architecture, robotics, sensing, policy, operations, and more, presenting the latest results from the U.S. Army's Internet of Battle Things and the U.S. Defense Department's premier IoT research initiative. The text discusses organizational challenges in converting defense industrial operations to IoT and summarizes policy challenges and recommendations for controlling government use of IoT in free societies. As a modern reference, this book covers multiple technologies in IoT solution deployment that include KepServerEX for edge connectivity to industrial protocols, AWS IoT Core for IoT data processing, Amazon S3 for scalable storage of IoT Data, and more. To aid in reader comprehension, the text uses case studies illustrating the challenges and solutions for using robotic devices in defense applications, plus case studies on using IoT for a defense industrial base. Witten by leading researchers and practitioners of IoT technology for defense and national security, IoT for Defense and National Security also includes information on: IoT resource allocation via mixed discrete/continuous optimization (monitoring existing resources and reallocating them in response to adversarial actions) Principles of robust learning and inference for Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBTs), covering methodologies to make machine learning models provably robust AI-enabled processing of environmental sounds in commercial and defense environments, such as detecting faults in industrial manufacturing Vulnerabilities in tactical IoT systems that come about due to the intrinsic nature of building networks using several devices and components For application engineers from security and defense-related companies and professors and students in military courses, IoT for Defense and National Security is a one-of-a-kind resource of the topic, providing expansive coverage of an important yet sensitive topic that is often shielded from the public due to classified or restricted distributions.

Robert C. O'Brien's collection of essays on U.S. national security and foreign policy, with a forward by Hugh Hewitt, is a wake up call to the American people. The world has become steadily more dangerous under President Obama's "lead from behind" foreign policy. The Obama Administration's foreign policy has emboldened our adversaries and disheartened our allies. Indeed, Obama's nuclear deal with Iran is a 1938 moment. At the same time, the U.S. military has been cut and risks returning to the hollow force days of the 1970s. O'Brien lays out the challenges and provides the common sense "peace through strength" solutions that will allow the next president to make America great again.

Winner of the Helen and Howard Marraro Prize A Times Literary Supplement Book of the Year "Perhaps the greatest study ever written of Renaissance political thought." -Jeffrey Collins, Times Literary Supplement "Magisterial...Hankins shows that the humanists' obsession with character explains their surprising indifference to particular forms of government. If rulers lacked authentic virtue, they believed, it did not matter what institutions framed their power." -Wall Street Journal "Puts the politics back into humanism in an extraordinarily deep and far-reaching way...For generations to come, all who write about the political thought of Italian humanism will have to refer to it; its influence will be...nothing less than transformative." -Noel Malcolm, American Affairs "[A] masterpiece...It is only Hankins's tireless exploration of forgotten documents...and extraordinary endeavors of editing, translation, and exposition that allow us to reconstruct-almost for the first time in 550 years-[the humanists'] three compelling arguments for why a strong moral character and habits of truth are vital for governing well. Yet they are as relevant to contemporary democracy in Britain, and in the United States, as to Machiavelli." -Rory Stewart, Times Literary Supplement "The lessons for today are clear and profound." -Robert D. Kaplan Convulsed by a civilizational crisis, the great thinkers of the Renaissance set out to reconceive the nature of society. Everywhere they saw problems. Corrupt and reckless tyrants sowing discord and ruling through fear; elites who prized wealth and status over the common good; religious leaders preoccupied with self-advancement while feuding armies waged endless wars. Their solution was at once simple and radical. "Men, not walls, make a city," as Thucydides so memorably said. They would rebuild the fabric of society by transforming the moral character of its citizens. Soulcraft, they believed, was a precondition of successful statecraft. A landmark reappraisal of Renaissance political thought, Virtue Politics challenges the traditional narrative that looks to the Renaissance as the seedbed of modern republicanism and sees Machiavelli as its exemplary thinker. James Hankins reveals that what most concerned the humanists was not reforming institutions so much as shaping citizens. If character mattered more than laws, it would have to be nurtured through a new program of education they called the studia humanitatis: the precursor to our embattled humanities.

The Triangle of Death in Iraq, south of Baghdad, was a raging inferno of insurgent activity in August of 2006; by November 2007, attacks had been suppressed to such an extent as to return the area to near obscurity. In the intervening months, the U.S. Army 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry ("Polar Bears") employed a counterinsurgency approach that set the conditions for a landmark peace agreement that holds to this day. With a focus on counterinsurgency, this book is the first to look at the breadth of military operations in Yusifiyah, Iraq, and analyze the methods the Polar Bears employed. It is a story not of those who fought in the Triangle of Death, but of how they fought.