This volume brings together contributions by eleven noted specialists on peace and security issues in the Caribbean. All chapters are based on recent research on the radically transformed regional situation in the post Cold-War context. Particular emphasis is placed on the formulation of security policies by the most relevant security actors, including both external powers present in the region, independent states and subregional groupings. This discussion is placed in the framework of post Cold-War security outlooks which focus on 'non-traditional' threats, mainly drugs and illegal migration.

This book outlines how to reorganize the U.S. Army into a fully 2 and 3-Dimensional maneuver capable, ground force with terrain-agile, armored fighting vehicles sized to rapidly deploy by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to the scene of world conflicts and strike at the heart of freedom‚s enemies. The plan to build the Army into Air-Mech-Strike Forces, exploiting emerging information-age technologies, as well as America‚s supremacy in aircraft and helicopter delivery systems---at the lowest cost to the taxpayers, is described in detail. These Army warfighting organizations, using existing and some newly purchased equipment, will shape the battlefield to America‚s advantage, preserving the peace before it is lost; if not, then winning fights that must be fought quickly. The dangerous world we live in moves by the speed of the AIR, and the 21st Century U.S. Army 2D/3D combat team will dominate this medium by Air-Mech-Strike!

In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778-81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War - and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire. Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis's operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists' support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command. Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter's analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.

This study analyzes the readiness of the British military establishment for war in 1899 and its performance in the South African War (1899-1902). It focuses on the career of Field Marshal Paul Sanford, 3rd Baron Methuen, whose traditional military training, used so effectively in Queen Victoria's small wars, was put to the test by the modern challenges of the South African War. A subsidiary aim of this work is to correct and refine the historical consensus that Methuen's campaing in the South African War was plagued by practical errors and poor judgement. The South African War was a crucial transitional episode in the history of the British army. Unlike Great Britain's other expeditions, it required the concentrated resources of the entire empire. It was a modern war in the sense that it employed the technology, the weaponry, the communications, and the transportation of the second industrial revolution.

An indispensable guide to how wars are fought, James F. Dunnigan's classic text has been enormously popular with citizens, professional soldiers, and journalists alike. Now, it's been revised to include a stunning array of new subjects. From the cutting edge of cyberwar to the current concern about terrorism, How to Make War presents a clear picture of complex weapons, armed forces, and tactics.

Describing a new world order, one with a greater number of equipped players than the "Big Two" (the United States and the former Soviet Union), this updated edition features all the elements of traditional warfare, along with a discussion of terrorist techniques; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and Third World ballistic missiles. Past editions of How to Make War were chillingly accurate in assessing and predicting the outcomes of all the major conflicts in the past two decades. Loaded with expertise and the latest information, this edition is an essential reference for any military library -- and a work that forewarns, and forearms, the Free World for the conflicts ahead.

This book provides an introduction to the theory and practice of diplomacy and its vital role in an era of increasing international uncertainty.

The work employs a distinctive "diplomatic perspective" on international relations and argues that the experience of conducting diplomacy gives rise to a set of priorities: first, the peaceful resolution of disputes; second, the avoidance of unwanted conflict; and, third, the minimization of the intensity of violent conflict where it has become unavoidable. It argues that changes in the international system require a shift in priorities from the diplomacy of problem-solving by building institutionalized cooperation, to the diplomacy of managing relationships between people. Divided into three sections, the first examines what is meant when we talk about diplomacy, why we need diplomats, and the operations of the modern diplomatic system of states. The second discusses the "three bads," about which people generally worry: bad leaders, bad media, and bad followers. The idea of "bad" is considered in terms of the moral character, professional competence, and the consequences of what people do for us. The final section discusses diplomacy and bad diplomats, reviewing what people can do to help themselves and the professionals be good diplomats.

This book is intended as a primary text for courses in international diplomacy and as a supplementary text for courses on contemporary issues in international relations.

Table of Contents

Part I: Diplomacy and Diplomats

1. Introduction: What are we talking about when we talk about diplomacy?

2. Why we need diplomacy and diplomats

3. The modern diplomatic system of states

Part II: Diplomacy and "The Three Bads" of International Relations

4. Diplomacy and bad leaders

5. Diplomacy and bad media

6. Diplomacy and bad followers

Part III: Conclusions

7. Diplomacy and bad diplomats

European Security in the New Political Environment provides a thorough analysis of the detail and nature of post-Cold War security issues, from both traditional and new security agendas, assessing the current efficacy of current institutions and policies to address these issues.

In November 1983, Soviet nuclear forces went on high alert when intelligence reported alarming activity on US bases. In response, the Soviets planned for a nuclear strike by NATO on Eastern Europe. And then Able Archer 83, a vast NATO war game exercise, ended. What the West didn't know was that the Soviets thought Operation Able Archer 83 was real and were preparing for a surprise missile attack from NATO. This close scrape with Armageddon was unknown until 2015, when the US released an analysis. Able Archer 83 vividly recreates the atmosphere that nearly unleashed nuclear war.

The Instant New York Times Bestseller "I could not put this extraordinary book down. Three Days at the Brink is a masterpiece: elegantly written, brilliantly conceived, and impeccably researched. This book not only sparkles but is destined to be a classic!" -Jay Winik, bestselling author From the #1 bestselling author and award-winning anchor of Special Report with Bret Baier, comes the gripping lost history of the Tehran Conference, where FDR, Churchill, and Stalin plotted D-Day and the Second World War's endgame. With the fate of World War II in doubt and rumors of a Nazi assassination plot swirling, Franklin Roosevelt risked everything at a clandestine meeting that would change the course of history. November 1943: The Nazis and their Axis allies controlled nearly the entire European continent. Japan dominated the Pacific. Allied successes at Sicily and Guadalcanal had gained them modest ground but at an extraordinary cost. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet Red Army had been bled white. The path of history walked a knife's edge. That same month a daring gambit was hatched that would alter everything. The "Big Three"-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin-secretly met for the first time to chart a strategy for defeating Adolf Hitler. Over three days in Tehran, Iran, this trio-strange bedfellows united by their mutual responsibility as heads of the Allied powers-made essential decisions that would direct the final years of the war and its aftermath. Meanwhile, looming over the covert meeting was the possible threat of a Nazi assassination plot, code-named Operation Long Jump. Before they left Tehran, the three leaders agreed to open a second front in the West, spearheaded by Operation Overload and the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy the following June. They also discussed what might come after the war, including dividing Germany and establishing the United Nations-plans that laid the groundwork for the postwar world order and the Cold War. Bestselling author and Fox News Channel anchor Bret Baier's new epic history, Three Days at the Brink, centers on these crucial days in Tehran, the medieval Persian city on the edge of the desert. Baier makes clear the importance of Roosevelt, who stood apart as the sole leader of a democracy, recognizing him as the lead strategist for the globe's future-the one man who could ultimately allow or deny the others their place in history. With new details discovered in rarely seen transcripts, oral histories, and declassified State Department and presidential documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Baier illuminates the complex character of Roosevelt, revealing a man who grew into his role and accepted the greatest challenge any American president since Lincoln had faced.

Since the 1979 revolution, the ruling establishment of Iran has developed and articulated a defense strategy reflective of the country's Iran-Iraq war experience and its international isolation. Its asymmetrical warfare doctrine, use of irregular forces in military campaigns, deployment of ballistic missiles, use of fast naval vessels to harass and confuse adversaries, and finally development of a sophisticated cyber warfare capability, are all features of this unique defense strategy. Based on a wide range of primary sources in Persian, Arabic and English, Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami offer a detailed and authoritative analysis of Iran's defense strategy. Additionally, this book provides a comparative analysis of the Islamic Republic's capabilities in relation to Israel and Saudi Arabia, its main regional adversaries. Framing Tehran's threat perceptions following the revolution within a wider historical context, this book will facilitate further analytical reflections on the country's changing role in the region, and its relations further afield, with the United States, Europe, Russia and China.

Since the 1979 revolution, the ruling establishment of Iran has developed and articulated a defense strategy reflective of the country's Iran-Iraq war experience and its international isolation. Its asymmetrical warfare doctrine, use of irregular forces in military campaigns, deployment of ballistic missiles, use of fast naval vessels to harass and confuse adversaries, and finally development of a sophisticated cyber warfare capability, are all features of this unique defense strategy. Based on a wide range of primary sources in Persian, Arabic and English, Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami offer a detailed and authoritative analysis of Iran's defense strategy. Additionally, this book provides a comparative analysis of the Islamic Republic's capabilities in relation to Israel and Saudi Arabia, its main regional adversaries. Framing Tehran's threat perceptions following the revolution within a wider historical context, this book will facilitate further analytical reflections on the country's changing role in the region, and its relations further afield, with the United States, Europe, Russia and China.

Although the West won the Cold War, the continuation of the status quo is not a foregone conclusion. The former Soviet-aligned regions outside of Russia -- Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, and others -- sit atop decaying armed forces while Russian behavior has grown more and more aggressive, as evidenced by its intervention in Ukraine in recent years. Thomas Young delves into the state of these defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, whose resources have declined at a faster rate than their Western neighbors' due to social and fiscal circumstances at home and shifting attitudes in the wider international community. With rigorous attention to the nuances of each region's politics and policies, he documents the status of reform of these armed forces and the role that Western nations have played since the Cold War, as well as identifying barriers to success and which management practices have been most effective in both Western and Eastern capitals. This is essential reading for undergraduates and graduates studying the recent history of Europe in the post-Soviet era, as well as those professionally involved in defense governance in the region.

James H. Lebovic explores the logic of seeking peace in an arms race. Flawed Logics offers a compelling intellectual history of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty - from the Truman to the Obama administration - is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic's controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control.

Based on extensive Japanese-language materials, this book is the first to examine the development of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. It addresses: how the GSDF was able to emerge as the post-war successor of the Imperial Japanese Army despite Japan's anti-militarist constitution; how the GSDF, despite the public skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, built domestic and international legitimacy; and how the GSDF has responded to changes in international and domestic environments. This path-breaking study of the world's third-largest-economic power's ground army is timely for two reasons. First, the resurgence of tensions in Northeast Asia over territorial disputes, and the emphasis recent Japanese governments have placed on using the GSDF for defending Japan's outlying islands is driving media coverage and specialist interest in the GSDF. Second, the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has focused global attention on the GSDF as Japan's lead disaster relief organization. This highly informative and thoroughly researched book provides insight for policy makers and academics interested in Japanese foreign and defense policies.

Sun Tzu's book of strategy and psychology has as much to tell us today as when it was written 2,500 years ago. Michael Nylan, in her provocative introduction, sees new and unexpected lessons to be learned from The Art of War-in business, relationships, games of skill, academic careers and medical practices. Strategy, like conflict, is woven into society's very roots. Nylan's crisp translation "offers a masterly new evaluation of this classic work, which balances the overtly military content with a profound and thought-provoking analysis" (Olivia Milburn). It proves that Sun Tzu is more relevant than ever, helping us navigate the conflicts we know and those we have yet to endure.

This book offers a discursive analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy on Humanitarian Interventions (HI) and the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Across the chapters the author addresses important questions, such as: what is the position of the HI and R2P in the Turkish foreign policy discourse? Is there any variation between cases when it comes to the use of these concepts? How do these discourses shape/change/transform or sustain the Turkish identity? Despite the tendency in some countries to incorporate HI and R2P principles into their foreign policy (UK, Netherlands, Canada, Japan), and the fact that some countries are lobbying to make these principles a part of international or UN law, in the developing world these policies and concepts have not gained widespread recognition or approval. Countries like China, Brazil and India approach these concepts with suspicion or with reservation. The same tendency can be observed in the MENA region and in some parts of Africa and Asia. In this book, the author looks at the reasons behind these differences in approach and explores how the concept of identity affects Turkish foreign policy specifically. This study is invaluable for researchers and students of R2P and HI and foreign policy discourse in general.

The Strategic Survey 2014 is the annual review of world affairs from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It argues that changing patterns in international relations make it vital for the world's businesses to carry out geopolitical due diligence. The resurgence of major-power geopolitics was the striking feature of international affairs in the year to mid-2014. Russia and Europe competed for influence in Ukraine, where a revolution in support of closer integration with Europe was followed by Moscow's annexation of Crimea and a pro-Russian insurgency in eastern regions. Tensions rose between China and Japan as the leaders of both countries stepped up their assertive nationalism. However, progress was made in nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world's major powers. The year's developments heralded a period of heightened strategic change that would sharpen the challenges facing the United States in maintaining global influence. Strategic Survey 2014: The Annual Review of World Affairs analyses the events and themes of the year region by region. It includes essays on cybersecurity and privacy, on assessing drivers of strategic change, and on hybrid forms of insecurity in the developing world. The Strategic Geography section includes maps on the humanitarian disaster in Syria, France's role in Africa and the Pacific Alliance trade bloc in Latin America. The book contains a chronology of key events around the world. It is an invaluable tool for interpreting world-wide strategic developments and has, since 1966, provided essential analysis of the year's key events in international relations for government policy makers, journalists, business leaders and academics.

After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe at the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a new balance of power. The settlement established in 1815 ushered in the emergence of a genuinely European security culture. In this volume, leading historians offer new insights into the military cooperation, ambassadorial conferences, transnational police networks, and international commissions that helped produce stability. They delve into the lives of diplomats, ministers, police officers and bankers, and many others who were concerned with peace and security on and beyond the European continent. This volume is a crucial contribution to the debates on securitisation and security cultures emerging in response to threats to the international order.

In this study, first published in 1966, Quester analyzes pre-nuclear age theories of deterrence to equip us with perspective and data by which current theories can be evaluated. Quester presents a forceful argument in support of the relevance of history to discussions of military strategy.

Churchill has gone down in history as one of the greatest leaders the world has ever known. From the day the Second World War was declared he stood out as the only man wanting to take offensive action. But is this accolade deserved? The first few years of the war were nothing short of disastrous, and author Stephen Napier shows how Churchill's strategies - and his desire not to be the first British prime minister to surrender the nation - brought the war effort to the brink of ruin and back again. Did his series of retaliatory raids in response to a German accidental bombing help cause the Blitz? Were plans already at large for the US to join the war, with Churchill as the primary puppet master? Napier explores all this and more in a shocking examination of Churchill's leadership using first-person accounts from his peers and his electorate.

Military Strategy of Middle Powers explores to what degree twenty-first-century middle powers adjust their military strategies due to changes in the international order, such as the decline in US power. The overarching objective of the book is to explain continuity and change in the strategies of a group of middle powers during the twenty-first century. These strategies are described, compared, and explained through the lens of Realism. In order to find potential explanations for change or continuity within the cases, as well as for similarities and differences between the cases, the strategies of 11 'middle' powers are analysed (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, India, Japan, and South Korea). This group of countries are considered similar in several important aspects, primarily regarding relative power capacity. When searching for potential explanations for different strategic behaviours among the middle powers, their unique regional characteristics are a key focus and, consequently, the impact of the structure and polarity, as well as the patterns of amity and enmity, of the regional context are analysed. The empirical investigation is focused on security strategies used since the terrorist attacks 9/11 2001, which was one of the first major challenges to US hegemony. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be wrong. In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman shows how foreign policy officials often try to avoid the challenge of assessing uncertainty, and argues that this behavior undermines high-stakes decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination of historical and experimental evidence, he explains how foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international politics, and shows how placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate. A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.

Borders are not just lines in the sand, but increasingly globalised spaces of practice. This is the case in West Africa, where a growing range of local and international officials are brought together by ambitious security projects around common anxieties. These projects include efforts to stop irregular migration by sea through international police cooperation, reinforcing infrastructures at border posts, and the application of new digital identification tools to identify and track increasingly mobile citizens. These interventions are driven by global and local security agendas, by biometric passport rules as much as competition between local security agencies. This book draws on the author's multi-sited ethnography in Mauritania and Senegal, showing how border security practices and technologies operate to build state security capacity, transform how state agencies work, and produce new forms of authority and expertise.

Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty explores and examines why and how security communities prepare purposefully for their future defence. The author explains that defence planning is the product of interplay among political process, historical experience, and the logic of strategy. The theory of strategy best reveals both the nature and the working of defence planning. Political 'ends', strategic 'ways', and military 'means' all fed by reigning, if not always recognized, assumptions, organize the subject well with a template that can serve any time, place, and circumstance. The book is designed to help understanding of what can appear to be a forbiddingly complex as well as technical subject. A good part of the problem for officials charged with defence planning duties is expressed in the second part of the book's title. The real difficulty, which rarely is admitted by those tasked with defence planning duty, is that defence planning can only be guesswork. But, because defence preparation is always expensive, not untypically is politically unpopular, yet obviously can be supremely important, claims to knowledge about the truly unknowable persist. In truth, we cannot do defence planning competently, because our ignorance of the future precludes understanding of what our society will be shown by future events to need. The challenge faced by the author was to identify ways in which our problems with the inability to know the future in any detail in advance-the laws of nature, in other words-may best be met and mitigated. Professor Gray argues that our understanding of human nature, of politics, and of strategic history, does allow us to make prudent choices in defence planning that hopefully will prove 'good enough'.

An army, Lewis Mumford once observed, 'is a body of pure consumers' and it is logistics that feeds this body's insatiable appetite for men and materiel. Successful logistics - the transportation of supplies and combatants to battle - cannot guarantee victory, but poor logistics portends defeat. In Feeding Victory, Jobie Turner asks how technical innovation has affected this connection over time and whether advances in technology, from the railroad and the airplane to the nuclear weapon and the computer, have altered both the critical relationship between logistics and warfare and, ultimately, geopolitical dynamics. Covering a span of three hundred years, Feeding Victory focuses on five distinct periods of technological change, from the preindustrial era to the information age. For each era Turner presents a case study: the campaign for Lake George from 1755 to 1759, the Western Front in 1917, the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad from 1942 to 1943, and the Battle of Khe Sanh in 1968. In each of these cases the logistics of the belligerents were at their limit because of geography or the vast material needs of war. With such limits, the case studies both give a clear accounting of the logistics of the period, particularly with respect to the mode of transportation - whether air, land, or sea - and reveal the inflection points between success and failure. What are the continuities between eras, Turner asks, and what can these campaigns tell us about the relationship of technology to logistics and logistics to geopolitics? In doing so, Turner discovers just how critical the biological needs of the soldiers on the battlefield prove to be; in fact, they overwhelm firepower in their importance, even in the modern era. His work shows how logistics aptly represents technological shifts from the enlightenment to the dawn of the twenty-first century and how, in our time, ideas have come to trump the material forces of war.