Although the West won the Cold War, the continuation of the status quo is not a foregone conclusion. The former Soviet-aligned regions outside of Russia -- Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, and others -- sit atop decaying armed forces while Russian behavior has grown more and more aggressive, as evidenced by its intervention in Ukraine in recent years. Thomas Young delves into the state of these defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, whose resources have declined at a faster rate than their Western neighbors' due to social and fiscal circumstances at home and shifting attitudes in the wider international community. With rigorous attention to the nuances of each region's politics and policies, he documents the status of reform of these armed forces and the role that Western nations have played since the Cold War, as well as identifying barriers to success and which management practices have been most effective in both Western and Eastern capitals. This is essential reading for undergraduates and graduates studying the recent history of Europe in the post-Soviet era, as well as those professionally involved in defense governance in the region.

In this unique, interactive story, you are the leader of a U.S. Army M1 Abrams tank platoon. Throughout the text, you will have an opportunity to make life-or-death decisions, and the events that unfold will be dictated by the choices you make. As you progress through the book, you will learn important tactical and operational lessons. Whether or not you are – or want to be – a tank platoon leader you will find this book highly entertaining and instructive. There are two operations to survive – an assault and a counter-reconnaissance mission. In each you must bring your knowledge and judgment to bear on the scenario in order to achieve the objective. If you choose wrong, defeat and even death may be your fate. If you succeed, you can savor the taste of victory and live to fight another day. The scenarios are highly realistic, and there are maps and appendices with detailed specifications of the hardware involved to help you make informed decisions. Written before Operation Desert Storm, and published in 1991, the military technology in Armor Attacks may be dated by today’s standards, but the need for human leadership and effective, rapid decision-making has not changed. Armor Attacks was recognised as an invaluable teaching tool by United States Military Academy, West Point and used to teach cadets the essential skills of leadership, decision-marking and tactics – a decade of USMA leaders trained with this book. To supplement the original text, this new edition includes the West Point instructor reference guide, which explains and amplifies the teaching points of each scenario encountered. Want to know more? Click here to hear John Antal discuss all things gaming - from tabletop war-gaming to WWII video games.

James H. Lebovic explores the logic of seeking peace in an arms race. Flawed Logics offers a compelling intellectual history of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty - from the Truman to the Obama administration - is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic's controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control.

Based on extensive Japanese-language materials, this book is the first to examine the development of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. It addresses: how the GSDF was able to emerge as the post-war successor of the Imperial Japanese Army despite Japan's anti-militarist constitution; how the GSDF, despite the public skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, built domestic and international legitimacy; and how the GSDF has responded to changes in international and domestic environments. This path-breaking study of the world's third-largest-economic power's ground army is timely for two reasons. First, the resurgence of tensions in Northeast Asia over territorial disputes, and the emphasis recent Japanese governments have placed on using the GSDF for defending Japan's outlying islands is driving media coverage and specialist interest in the GSDF. Second, the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has focused global attention on the GSDF as Japan's lead disaster relief organization. This highly informative and thoroughly researched book provides insight for policy makers and academics interested in Japanese foreign and defense policies.

Since the 1979 revolution, the ruling establishment of Iran has developed and articulated a defense strategy reflective of the country's Iran-Iraq war experience and its international isolation. Its asymmetrical warfare doctrine, use of irregular forces in military campaigns, deployment of ballistic missiles, use of fast naval vessels to harass and confuse adversaries, and finally development of a sophisticated cyber warfare capability, are all features of this unique defense strategy. Based on a wide range of primary sources in Persian, Arabic and English, Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami offer a detailed and authoritative analysis of Iran's defense strategy. Additionally, this book provides a comparative analysis of the Islamic Republic's capabilities in relation to Israel and Saudi Arabia, its main regional adversaries. Framing Tehran's threat perceptions following the revolution within a wider historical context, this book will facilitate further analytical reflections on the country's changing role in the region, and its relations further afield, with the United States, Europe, Russia and China.

Since the 1979 revolution, the ruling establishment of Iran has developed and articulated a defense strategy reflective of the country's Iran-Iraq war experience and its international isolation. Its asymmetrical warfare doctrine, use of irregular forces in military campaigns, deployment of ballistic missiles, use of fast naval vessels to harass and confuse adversaries, and finally development of a sophisticated cyber warfare capability, are all features of this unique defense strategy. Based on a wide range of primary sources in Persian, Arabic and English, Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami offer a detailed and authoritative analysis of Iran's defense strategy. Additionally, this book provides a comparative analysis of the Islamic Republic's capabilities in relation to Israel and Saudi Arabia, its main regional adversaries. Framing Tehran's threat perceptions following the revolution within a wider historical context, this book will facilitate further analytical reflections on the country's changing role in the region, and its relations further afield, with the United States, Europe, Russia and China.

This book offers a discursive analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy on Humanitarian Interventions (HI) and the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Across the chapters the author addresses important questions, such as: what is the position of the HI and R2P in the Turkish foreign policy discourse? Is there any variation between cases when it comes to the use of these concepts? How do these discourses shape/change/transform or sustain the Turkish identity? Despite the tendency in some countries to incorporate HI and R2P principles into their foreign policy (UK, Netherlands, Canada, Japan), and the fact that some countries are lobbying to make these principles a part of international or UN law, in the developing world these policies and concepts have not gained widespread recognition or approval. Countries like China, Brazil and India approach these concepts with suspicion or with reservation. The same tendency can be observed in the MENA region and in some parts of Africa and Asia. In this book, the author looks at the reasons behind these differences in approach and explores how the concept of identity affects Turkish foreign policy specifically. This study is invaluable for researchers and students of R2P and HI and foreign policy discourse in general.

The Strategic Survey 2014 is the annual review of world affairs from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It argues that changing patterns in international relations make it vital for the world's businesses to carry out geopolitical due diligence. The resurgence of major-power geopolitics was the striking feature of international affairs in the year to mid-2014. Russia and Europe competed for influence in Ukraine, where a revolution in support of closer integration with Europe was followed by Moscow's annexation of Crimea and a pro-Russian insurgency in eastern regions. Tensions rose between China and Japan as the leaders of both countries stepped up their assertive nationalism. However, progress was made in nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world's major powers. The year's developments heralded a period of heightened strategic change that would sharpen the challenges facing the United States in maintaining global influence. Strategic Survey 2014: The Annual Review of World Affairs analyses the events and themes of the year region by region. It includes essays on cybersecurity and privacy, on assessing drivers of strategic change, and on hybrid forms of insecurity in the developing world. The Strategic Geography section includes maps on the humanitarian disaster in Syria, France's role in Africa and the Pacific Alliance trade bloc in Latin America. The book contains a chronology of key events around the world. It is an invaluable tool for interpreting world-wide strategic developments and has, since 1966, provided essential analysis of the year's key events in international relations for government policy makers, journalists, business leaders and academics.

In this study, first published in 1966, Quester analyzes pre-nuclear age theories of deterrence to equip us with perspective and data by which current theories can be evaluated. Quester presents a forceful argument in support of the relevance of history to discussions of military strategy.

Military Strategy of Middle Powers explores to what degree twenty-first-century middle powers adjust their military strategies due to changes in the international order, such as the decline in US power. The overarching objective of the book is to explain continuity and change in the strategies of a group of middle powers during the twenty-first century. These strategies are described, compared, and explained through the lens of Realism. In order to find potential explanations for change or continuity within the cases, as well as for similarities and differences between the cases, the strategies of 11 'middle' powers are analysed (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, India, Japan, and South Korea). This group of countries are considered similar in several important aspects, primarily regarding relative power capacity. When searching for potential explanations for different strategic behaviours among the middle powers, their unique regional characteristics are a key focus and, consequently, the impact of the structure and polarity, as well as the patterns of amity and enmity, of the regional context are analysed. The empirical investigation is focused on security strategies used since the terrorist attacks 9/11 2001, which was one of the first major challenges to US hegemony. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe at the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a new balance of power. The settlement established in 1815 ushered in the emergence of a genuinely European security culture. In this volume, leading historians offer new insights into the military cooperation, ambassadorial conferences, transnational police networks, and international commissions that helped produce stability. They delve into the lives of diplomats, ministers, police officers and bankers, and many others who were concerned with peace and security on and beyond the European continent. This volume is a crucial contribution to the debates on securitisation and security cultures emerging in response to threats to the international order.

What qualities made the Duke of Wellington a strategic genius? How did Oliver Cromwell, a gentleman farmer create an army that overthrew a king and changed the course of British history? Why was Simon Bolivar able to overcome early reverses to become the greatest figure in the Latin American struggle against Spanish colonialism? The answers to these and a myriad other fascinating questions can be found in Great Commanders of the Early Modern World, a sumptuous chronological survey of the 25 greatest commanders of the early modern world. Compiled by an distinguished team of historians (including such names as Antonia Fraser, Saul David and Stephen Brumwell) working under the general editorship of Andrew Roberts, Great Commanders of the Early Modern World is an authoritative and beautifully illustrated account of the lives and careers of the 25 greatest military commanders of the period, from the Duke of Marlborough to Napoleon Bonaparte, from Robert Clive to Carl von Clausewitz, and from Frederick the Great to Shaka Zulu. Every commander is profiled in a concise and informative 3000-word article which not only brings its subject vividly to life via a lively, fact-driven narrative, but also analyses and assesses his tactical and strategic gifts. As accessible and informative as it is rigorous and scholarly, Great Commanders of the Early Modern World is the perfect introduction to its subject for the layperson - but also a stimulating and thought-provoking read for those with greater knowledge of military history. With its companion volumes, focusing on the great commanders of the ancient, medieval and modern eras, it forms an indispensable guide to the greatest generals the world has seen.

Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be wrong. In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman shows how foreign policy officials often try to avoid the challenge of assessing uncertainty, and argues that this behavior undermines high-stakes decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination of historical and experimental evidence, he explains how foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international politics, and shows how placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate. A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.

An army, Lewis Mumford once observed, 'is a body of pure consumers' and it is logistics that feeds this body's insatiable appetite for men and materiel. Successful logistics - the transportation of supplies and combatants to battle - cannot guarantee victory, but poor logistics portends defeat. In Feeding Victory, Jobie Turner asks how technical innovation has affected this connection over time and whether advances in technology, from the railroad and the airplane to the nuclear weapon and the computer, have altered both the critical relationship between logistics and warfare and, ultimately, geopolitical dynamics. Covering a span of three hundred years, Feeding Victory focuses on five distinct periods of technological change, from the preindustrial era to the information age. For each era Turner presents a case study: the campaign for Lake George from 1755 to 1759, the Western Front in 1917, the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad from 1942 to 1943, and the Battle of Khe Sanh in 1968. In each of these cases the logistics of the belligerents were at their limit because of geography or the vast material needs of war. With such limits, the case studies both give a clear accounting of the logistics of the period, particularly with respect to the mode of transportation - whether air, land, or sea - and reveal the inflection points between success and failure. What are the continuities between eras, Turner asks, and what can these campaigns tell us about the relationship of technology to logistics and logistics to geopolitics? In doing so, Turner discovers just how critical the biological needs of the soldiers on the battlefield prove to be; in fact, they overwhelm firepower in their importance, even in the modern era. His work shows how logistics aptly represents technological shifts from the enlightenment to the dawn of the twenty-first century and how, in our time, ideas have come to trump the material forces of war.

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin's actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West's interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country's own definitions? While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, 'Strategiya' takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia's contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia's own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking--both its conceptualisation and its implementation--from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs. Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, 'Strategiya' offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

Borders are not just lines in the sand, but increasingly globalised spaces of practice. This is the case in West Africa, where a growing range of local and international officials are brought together by ambitious security projects around common anxieties. These projects include efforts to stop irregular migration by sea through international police cooperation, reinforcing infrastructures at border posts, and the application of new digital identification tools to identify and track increasingly mobile citizens. These interventions are driven by global and local security agendas, by biometric passport rules as much as competition between local security agencies. This book draws on the author's multi-sited ethnography in Mauritania and Senegal, showing how border security practices and technologies operate to build state security capacity, transform how state agencies work, and produce new forms of authority and expertise.

Defence Planning as Strategic Fact provides and elaborates on an "upstream" focus on the variegated organizational, political and conceptual practices of military, civilian administrative and political leaderships involved in defence planning, offering an important security and strategic studies supplement to the traditional "downstream" focus on the use of force. The book enables the reader to engage with the role of ideas in defence planning, of organizational processes and biases, path dependencies and administrative dynamics under the pressures of continuously changing domestic and international constraints. The chapters show how defence planning must be seen as a constitutive element of defence and strategic studies - that it is a strategic fact of its own which merits particular practical and scholarly attention. As defence planning creates the conditions behind every peace upheld or broken and every war won or lost, Defence Planning as Strategic Fact will be of great use to scholars of defence studies, strategic studies, and military studies. This book was originally published as a special issue of Defence Studies.

This book is about Japan-China power politics in the military, economic and propaganda domains. The post-2012 standoff over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has unveiled the antagonistic quality to Sino-Japanese relations, with an important addition: a massive information war that has cemented the two states' rivalry. Under the Xi and Abe administrations, China and Japan insisted on their moral position as benign and peaceful powers, and portrayed the neighbor as an aggressive revisionist. By highlighting great power rivalry, this study makes a theoretical contribution in favor of the power politics behind Sino-Japanese identities. The work is multidisciplinary in spirit and aims to speak both to academics and to general readers who might be curious of understanding this fascinating if worrisome facet of Sino-Japanese relations. In turn, the assessment of the diplomatic, economic and identity clash between the world's second and third wealthiest states provides a window in understanding the international politics of the Asia-Pacific in the early 21st Century. This book is an invaluable resource for scholars, Area Studies and Political Science students and policymakers alike.

This book examines a series of questions associated with the increasing application and implications of biometrics in contemporary everyday life.

In the wake of the events of 9/11, the reliance on increasingly sophisticated and invasive technologies across a burgeoning field of applications has accelerated, giving rise to the term 'biometric state'. This book explores how these 'virtual borders' are created and the effect they have upon the politics of citizenship and immigration, especially how they contribute to the treatment of citizens as suspects. Finally and most importantly, this text argues that the rationale of 'governing through risk' facilitates pre-emptory logics, a negligent attitude towards 'false positives', and an overall proliferation of borders and ubiquitous risk, which becomes integral to contemporary everyday life, far beyond the confined politics of national borders and frontiers.

By focusing on specific sites, such as virtual borders in airports, trusted traveller programs like the NEXUS program and those delivered by airlines and supported by governmental authorities (TSA and CATSA respectively), this book raises critical questions about the emerging biometric state and its commitment and constitution vis-a-vis technology of 'governing through risk'.

This book will be of interest to students of biopolitics, critical security, surveillance studies and International Relations in general.

Benjamin J. Muller is assistant professor in International Relations at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada. He completed his PhD in the School of Politics and International Studies at Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland, in 2005."

Churchill has gone down in history as one of the greatest leaders the world has ever known. From the day the Second World War was declared he stood out as the only man wanting to take offensive action. But is this accolade deserved? The first few years of the war were nothing short of disastrous, and author Stephen Napier shows how Churchill's strategies - and his desire not to be the first British prime minister to surrender the nation - brought the war effort to the brink of ruin and back again. Did his series of retaliatory raids in response to a German accidental bombing help cause the Blitz? Were plans already at large for the US to join the war, with Churchill as the primary puppet master? Napier explores all this and more in a shocking examination of Churchill's leadership using first-person accounts from his peers and his electorate.

Learning, innovation and adaptation are not concepts that we necessarily associate with the British army of the First World War. Yet the need to learn from mistakes, to exploit new opportunities and to adapt to complex situations are enduring and timeless. This revealing work is the first institutional examination of the army's process for learning during the First World War. Drawing on organisational learning and management theories, Aimee Fox critiques existing approaches to military learning in wartime. Focused around a series of case studies, the book ranges across multiple operational theatres and positions the army within a broader context in terms of its relationships with allies and civilians to reveal that learning was more complex and thoroughgoing than initially thought. It grapples with the army's failings and shortcomings, explores its successes and acknowledges the inherent difficulties of learning in a desperate and lethally competitive environment.

This book contains a collection of projects and scenarios dealing with new risks from emerging technologies, future peace keeping operations, and water distribution issues by combining analysis with dialogue. Special attention is paid to the methodology of narrative scenarios, and the role of imagination in the generation of these scenarios. Appearing as short stories, narrative scenarios include a great amount of explicit and implicit knowledge and they need story telling skills to become consistent, coherent as well as compelling and convincing pictures of the future.

A critical look into how and why the U.S. military needs to become more adaptable. Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat. Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.

A comprehensive account of Israel's doctrine of national security, this study examines to what degree security theories have proven valid and suggests an updated security doctrine for the next century. Beginning with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Israeli defense planners have faced a daunting task. General Tal describes the history of the Israel-Arab wars from the War of Independence onward and presents a security theory specific to Israel from which the fighting doctrines of the Israeli military derive. He also to categorizes the levels of security various nations enjoy as a result of their differing geo-political situations, their power, and the conflicts of interests that they face with their neighbors. This volume clarifies topics in the area of national security, the art of war, principles of war, and lessons learned from past conflicts. Tal concludes that previous security theory proved valid because it was based upon a decision to allocate the great portion of available resources, both intellectual and material, to secure national defense. However, this theory is no longer valid due to political changes in the Middle East and the development of modern military technologies. He asserts a new approach that rests upon mutual strategic deterrence throughout the region.

This yearbook continues SIPRI's annual analyses of developments in major armed conflicts, in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and in peacekeeping, developments in chemical and biological weapons, new military technology, world military expenditure, nuclear explosions, arms production, the arms trade, and nuclear, chemical, and biological arms control. Special Studies in this volume: BL area studies of the Middle East, Russia, and Europe BL armed conflict prevention, management and resolution BL information on multilateral observer, peacekeeping and electoral operations BL the comprehensive test ban treaty BL multilateral military-related export control measures BL the trade in major conventional weapons and conventional arms control