Arms Procurement Decision-Making Processes is a comparative analysis of the arms procurement decision-making processes in five countries China, India, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. It examines whether or not national arms procurement processes, even as they involve sensitive security issues and complex systems, can become more responsive to the broader objectives of security and public accountability. The country case studies are based to a large extent on original research papers written by experts from the respective national academic and defence procurement communities.

When does the legitimate application of military technology to the problem of national defence become needlessly provocative? What obstacles must developing countries overcome if they hope to use military technology effectively? And when might military technology itself become a cause of conflict? Eric Arnett addresses these questions in the context of four particularly important Asian states - China, India, Pakistan, and Iran - from the perspectives of regional specialists and experts in technology and military affairs. The resulting analyses demonstrate the link between military technology and conflict, which is more palpable in southern Asia than elsewhere, while suggesting that it must be approached in a more nuanced way than has been the case so far in discussions of the region.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

Why has U.S. security policy scarcely changed from the Bush to the Obama administrations? The theory of "double government" posed by the 19th century English scholar Walter Bagehot suggests a disquieting answer that is extensively discussed in National Security and Double Government. Michael J. Glennon challenges the myth that U.S. security policy is made through the visible, "Madisonian institutions"-the President, Congress, and the courts, proposing that their roles are largely illusory. Presidential control is nominal, congressional oversight is dysfunctional, and judicial review is negligible. He argues that security policy is really made by the managers of the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies- a concealed "Trumanite network" of several hundred members who are responsible for protecting the nation, and who are primarily immune from constitutional restraints. As such, this new system of "double government" will not correct itself, as to do so would require those branches to exercise the very power that they lack. Glennon suggests that the main problem is political ignorance, which is becoming more acute as public influence on security policy declines. This book aims to inform and enlighten the reader about the Trumanite network, and highlight the restraints on the Constitution, which operates primarily upon the hollowed-out Madisonian institutions, and poses a grave threat to democratic accountability.

The ebbs and flows of Indian history can also be charted through the country's "maritime blindness" - its onset and the national endeavour to overcome it. The story of developing India's maritime capacity, since independence, is also about the kind of international and regional footprint it needs to have. In this book, the author discusses India's new and old maritime challenges and contextualises them in terms of its inherent institutional strengths to cope with their bewildering complexity. Their complexity is not just due to their sheer scale; the degrading institutional capacities, within countries and internationally, act as threat multipliers. The dynamics of global geopolitics, the seismic perturbations of global economy, and the dizzying pace of technology belie presuppositions for global future; all strategic analysts recognise our current, persisting conundrums. Taking into account the country's critical strategic weight in the maritime domain, the author suggests an approach - about the right 'mix' of the 'traditional' and the 'non-traditional' threats - in the institutional agendas of various governance mechanisms concerning different water bodies, especially the Indian Ocean Region, which also demands of India both hardware and software capacities, including diplomatic. He concludes that the effect of such an approach would be stabilising, consonant with the civilisational vision of the founders of the modern Indian nation.

Major General Sir Wilkinson Dent Bird (1869 1943) saw active service in campaigns from the Niger Campaign in 1897 to the opening of the First World War, when he served in France. In 1923 he was appointed head of a committee to analyse wartime experiences and propose changes intended to modernise the British army. First published in 1920 and issued in an enlarged second edition in 1925, this book provides a comprehensive study of military strategy current at the time of publication, using historical examples to illustrate key concepts. Bird focuses primarily on land battles, with a chapter for naval battles and a small section for aerial combat. Originally intended as a guide to current strategic thinking, his book provides valuable analyses of historical battles with insights into the development of British military strategy after the First World War. This reissue is of the 1925 edition.

Security concerns have mushroomed. Increasingly numerous areas of life are governed by security policies and technologies. Security Unbound argues that when insecurities pervade how we relate to our neighbours, how we perceive international politics, how governments formulate policies, at stake is not our security but our democracy. Security is not in the first instance a right or value but a practice that challenges democratic institutions and actions. We are familiar with emergency policies in the name of national security challenging parliamentary processes, the space for political dissent, and fundamental rights. Yet, security practice and technology pervade society heavily in very mundane ways without raising national security crises, in particular through surveillance technology and the management of risks and uncertainties in many areas of life. These more diffuse security practices create societies in which suspicion becomes a default way of relating and governing relations, ranging from neighbourhood relations over financial transactions to cross border mobility. Security Unbound demonstrates that governing through suspicion poses serious challenges to democratic practice. Some of these challenges are familiar, such as the erosion of the right to privacy; others are less so, such as the post-human challenge to citizenship. Security unbound provokes us to see that the democratic political stake today is not our security but preventing insecurity from becoming the organising principle of political and social life.

In 1993 the first Clinton administration declared environmental security a national security issue, but by the end of the Bush administrations environmental security had vanished from the government's agenda. This book uses changing US environmental security policy to propose a revised securitisation theory, one that both allows insights into the intentions of key actors and enables moral evaluations in the environmental sector of security. Security and the Environment brings together the subject of environmental security and the Copenhagen School s securitisation theory. Drawing on original interviews with former key players in United States environmental security, Rita Floyd makes a significant and original contribution to environmental security studies and security studies more generally. This book will be of interest to international relations scholars and political practitioners concerned with security, as well as students of international environmental politics and US policy-making.

Using major new documentary sources, the authors tell the story of why and how China built its nuclear submarine flotilla and the impact of that development on the nation's politics, technology, industry, and strategy.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors-their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment-determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

Recent years have seen a growing role for private military contractors in national and international security. To understand the reasons for this, Elke Krahmann examines changing models of the state, the citizen and the soldier in the UK, the US and Germany. She focuses on both the national differences with regard to the outsourcing of military services to private companies and their specific consequences for the democratic control over the legitimate use of armed force. Tracing developments and debates from the late eighteenth century to the present, she explains the transition from the centralized warfare state of the Cold War era to the privatized and fragmented security governance, and the different national attitudes to the privatization of force.

President Bill Clinton, speaking as might any commander-in-chief, on the eve of his decision to deploy ground troops to Bosnia in 1995, declared he had ""no responsibility more grave than putting soldiers in harm's way [and, it should be noted, in today's operational environment this means civilians as well]."" Such a statement suggests that a study of the decision-making process associated with the weighty matters of using force would be enlightening. Indeed, it is. The decision-making process is far from standardised nor is it simple. While all individuals associated with important decisions about national security and the lives of America's service members take their responsibilities seriously, the processes by which they reach their conclusions are varied and complicated. This book traces traditional and emerging theories of decision-making by first explaining the components of each model and then analysing its practical application through three case studies. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of the utility and explanatory power of the particular theory. Because even at their very best a particular decision-making theory can only explain some cases, the chapter then segues to another theory with different characteristics.

Governments recognise that national security in the turbulent conditions of the early twenty-first century must centre on the creation of public confidence that normal life can continue even in the face of threats such as terrorism and proliferation, and of natural hazards such as pandemics and climate change. Based on his own experience in government, David Omand argues that while public security is vital for good government, the effects of bad government will result from failure to maintain the right relationship between justice, liberty, privacy, civic harmony and security measures. His book examines in detail how secret intelligence helps governments to deliver security, but also risks raising public concern over its methods. A set of ethical principles is proposed to guide intelligence and security work within the framework of human rights. Securing the State provides a new way of thinking about the cycle of activities that generates secret intelligence, examines the issues that arise from the way that modern intelligence uses technology to access new sources of information, and discusses how the meaning of intelligence can best be elucidated. The limits of intelligence in enabling greater security are explored, especially in guiding government in a world in which we must learn not to be surprised by surprise. Illustrated throughout by historical examples, David Omand provides new perspectives for practitioners and those teaching security and intelligence studies and for a wider readership offers an accessible introduction to pressing issues of public policy.

This edited collection explores the fruitfulness of applying an interpretive approach to the study of global security. The interpretive approach concentrates on unpacking the meanings and beliefs of various policy actors, and, crucially, explains those beliefs by locating them in historical traditions and as responses to dilemmas. Interpretivists thereby seek to highlight the contingency, diversity, and contestability of the narratives, expertise, and beliefs that inform political action. The interpretive approach is widespread in the study of governance and public policy, but arguably it has not yet had much impact on security studies. The book therefore deploys the interpretive approach to explore contemporary issues in international security, combining theoretical engagement with good empirical coverage through a novel set of case studies. Bringing together a fresh mix of world renowned and up-and-coming scholars from across the fields of security studies, political theory and international relations, the chapters explore the beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas that have informed security practice on the one hand, and the academic study of security on the other, as well as the connections between them. All contributors look to situate their work against a broader historical background and long-standing traditions, allowing them to take a critical yet historically informed approach to the material.

The sixth edition of "American National Security" has been extensively rewritten to take into account the significant changes in national security policy in the past decade. Thorough revisions reflect a new strategic context and the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the early twenty-first century. Highlights include:

- An examination of the current international environment and new factors affecting U.S. national security policy making- A discussion of the Department of Homeland Security and changes in the intelligence community- A survey of intelligence and national security, with special focus on security needs post-9/11- A review of economic security, diplomacy, terrorism, conventional warfare, counterinsurgency, military intervention, and nuclear deterrence in the changed international setting- An update of security issues in East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean- New material on globalization, transnational actors, and human security

Previous editions have been widely used in undergraduate and graduate courses.

Tactics is the art and science of employing all available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the actions taken by a commander to arrange units and activities in relation to each other and the enemy. Filled with diagrams of attack plans, defensive strategies, and troop movements, U.S. Army Tactics Field Manual is the playbook the U.S. Army uses to employ available means to win in combat. This book provides combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army and joint capabilities. This book focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control measures, and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each type and form of combat operation. It is the common reference for all students of the tactical art, both in the field and the Army school system.

This book integrates strategy, technology and economics and presents a new way of looking at twentieth-century military history and Britain's decline as a great power. G. C. Peden explores how from the Edwardian era to the 1960s warfare was transformed by a series of innovations, including dreadnoughts, submarines, aircraft, tanks, radar, nuclear weapons and guided missiles. He shows that the cost of these new weapons tended to rise more quickly than national income and argues that strategy had to be adapted to take account of both the increased potency of new weapons and the economy's diminishing ability to sustain armed forces of a given size. Prior to the development of nuclear weapons, British strategy was based on an ability to wear down an enemy through blockade, attrition (in the First World War) and strategic bombing (in the Second), and therefore power rested as much on economic strength as on armaments.

'Outstanding ... combines a glimpse behind the security screens with a sharp analysis of the real global insecurities - growing inequality and unsustainability' - New Internationalist Written in the late 1990s, Losing Control was years, if not decades, ahead of its time, predicting the 9/11 attacks, a seemingly endless war on terror and the relentless increase in revolts from the margins and bitter opposition to wealthy elites. Now, more than two decades later and in an era of pandemics, climate breakdown and potential further military activity in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, Paul Rogers has revised and expanded the original analysis, pointing to the 2030s and '40s as the decades that will see a showdown between a bitter, environmentally wrecked and deeply insecure world and a possible world order rooted in justice and peace.

While scholarship abounds on the diplomatic and security aspects of the Cold War, very little attention has been paid to military planning at the operational level. In Blueprints for Battle, experts from Russia, the United States, and Europe address this dearth by closely examining the military planning of NATO and Warsaw Pact member nations from the end of World War II to the beginning of detente. Informed by material from recently opened archives, this collection investigates the perceptions and actions of the rival coalitions, exploring the challenges presented by nuclear technology, examining how military commanders' perceptions changed from the 1950s to the 1960s, and discussing logistical coordination among allied states. The result is a detailed study that offers much-needed new perspectives on the military aspects of the early Cold War.

The scope and applicability of risk management have expanded greatly over the past decade. Banks, corporations, and public agencies employ its new technologies both in their daily operations and long-term investments. It would be unimaginable today for a global bank to operate without such systems in place. Similarly, many areas of public management, from NASA to the Centers for Disease Control, have recast their programs using risk management strategies. It is particularly striking, therefore, that such thinking has failed to penetrate the field of national security policy. Venturing into uncharted waters, Managing Strategic Surprise brings together risk management experts and practitioners from different fields with internationally-recognized national security scholars to produce the first systematic inquiry into risk and its applications in national security. The contributors examine whether advance risk assessment and management techniques can be successfully applied to address contemporary national security challenges.

In the summer of 793 AD Viking raiders attacked and looted the monastic island of Lindisfarne, off the coast of Northumberland. This assault was only the beginning, within 18 months huge areas of the British coast was being devastated by the terrifying shi

Today's North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with nearly thirty members and a global reach, differs strikingly from the alliance of twelve created in 1949 to "keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." These differences are not simply the result of the Cold War's end, 9/11, or recent twenty-first-century developments but represent a more general pattern of adaptability first seen in the incorporation of Germany as a full member of the alliance in the early 1950s. Unlike other enduring post-World War II institutions that continue to reflect the international politics of their founding era, NATO stands out for the boldness and frequency of its transformations over the past seventy years. In this compelling book, Seth A. Johnston presents readers with a detailed examination of how NATO adapts. Nearly every aspect of NATO-including its missions, functional scope, size, and membership-is profoundly different than at the organization's founding. Using a theoretical framework of "critical junctures" to explain changes in NATO's organization and strategy throughout its history, Johnston argues that the alliance's own bureaucratic actors played important and often overlooked roles in these adaptations. Touching on renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, which has reignited the debate about NATO's relevance, as well as a quarter century of post-Cold War rapprochement and more than a decade of expeditionary effort in Afghanistan, How NATO Adapts explores how crises from Ukraine to Syria have again made NATO's capacity for adaptation a defining aspect of European and international security. Students, scholars, and policy practitioners will find this a useful resource for understanding NATO, transatlantic relations, and security in Europe and North America, as well as theories about change in international institutions.

This book contains the proceedings of an interna tional symposium devoted to Modeling and Analysis of Defense Processes in the context of land/air warfare. It was sponsored by Panel VII (on Defense Applications of Operational Research) of NATO's Defense Research Group (DRG) and took place 27-29 July 1982 at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Except perhaps for the Theater-Level Gaming and Analysis Workshop, sponsored by the Office of united 1 states Naval Research in 1977, this symposium was the first international scientific meeting on Operations Research/Systems Analysis in the area of land/air war fare since the conference on Modeling Land Battle Systems 2 for Military Planning sponsored by NATO's Special Pro gramme Panel on Systems Science in 1974. That conference dealt primarily with modeling small unit (company, bat talion) engagements and, to a lesser extent, large unit (corps, theater) campaigns with principal emphasis on attrition processes and movement in combat. It was considered as rather successful in that it revealed the state-of-the art around 1972 and identified problem areas and promising approaches for future developments. lWith regard to foreign attendance, this wo- shop was largely limited to participants from the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany (see L.J. Low: Theater-Level Gaming and Analysis Workshop for Force Planning, Vol II-Summary, Discus sion of Issues and Requirements for Research, SRI Report, May, 1981)."

This book offers an overview of space strategy in the 21st century. The purpose of space strategy is to coordinate, integrate, and prioritize space activities across security, commercial, and civil sectors. Without strategy, space activities continue to provide value, but it becomes difficult to identify and execute long-term programs and projects and to optimize the use of space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. Strategy is essential for all these ends since dependence on, and use of, space is accelerating globally and space is integrated in the fabric of activities across all sectors and uses. This volume identifies a number of areas of concern pertinent to the development of national space strategy, including: intellectual foundations; political challenges; international cooperation and space governance; space assurance and political, organizational, and management aspects specific to security space strategy. The contributing authors expand their focus beyond that of the United States, and explore and analyse the international developments and implications of national space strategies of Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil. This book will be of much interest to students of space power and politics, strategic studies, foreign policy and International Relations in general.