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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Defence strategy, planning & research > General
This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.
SOE in France was first published in 1966, followed by a second impression with amendments in 1968. Since these editions were published, other material on SOE has become available. It was, therefore, agreed in 2000 that Professor Foot should produce a revised version. In so doing, in addition to the material in the first edition, the author has had access to previously closed government records, as well as drawing upon his own invaluable wartime experiences and the recollections of those involved. SOE in France begins by explaining what SOE was, where it fitted into the Allied war machine, and how it worked in France. The narrative then recounts the adventures of its agents who worked on French soil. This intricate tale concentrates on the work of the 400 hand-picked men and women of the 'independent French' section, although it also covers SOE's five other sections that operated mainly in France. All told, the six sections despatched over 1,800 clandestine agents, who between them changed the course of the war. This updated new edition will be essential reading for scholars and for all those with an informed general interest in the activities of the SOE.
In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.
Presenting the views of leading experts on strategic considerations in Eurasia, this volume shows that the 11 September attacks and subsequent developments have affected the way in which international relations are evaluated. In addition, these developments have turned the concept of asymmetric threats, including large-scale international terrorist attacks, into genuine realistic dangers threatening our security. As a result, the conventional mindset over issues of war and peace, of existing alliances and partnerships, even of the character of the international system has to be re-evaulated. This volume sheds light on the aspects of change that have taken place in the post-11 September evolution of international relations in Eurasia.
This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."
This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."
Carter and Ehteshami consider the significant geopolitical, economic and security links between the Middle East and the wider Asian world - links which are often overlooked when the Middle East is considered in isolation or in terms of its relations with the West, but which are of growing importance. Topics covered include Asia's overall geostrategic realities and the Middle East's place within them; relations between the Middle East and China, Russia, central Asia, southeast Asia and south Asia; Islam in central Asia and southeast Asia and the connections with the Middle East; and the important links between the Middle East and India and Pakistan's military and security establishments.
First published in 1998, this volume examines East Asia, especially Northeast Asia, which has been a region of considerable political security of importance for several key reasons. It features several great and medium powers: China, Japan and Russia, as well as North and South Korea. Even though no arms race is yet discernible among these states (with the partial exception of the two Koreas), it is conceivable that one might commence. If it did, the level of militarization could become quite alarming, if only because of the tremendous and rapidly growing economic potential of the regional states. Even though relations among regional sates (except the two Koreas) are currently peaceful, the region features several unresolved issues (e.g. concerning territory) and a historical legacy of enmity between several states. To prevent such conflicts of interest from erupting into armed conflict is of the utmost importance. A stabilizing factor is that the military potentials in the region are still predominantly defensively oriented, i.e. most states lack the requisite power projection or invasion capabilities to inflict serious harm on each other. However, this might change in the not-so-distant future. Hence the importance of confidence-building measures; of an institutionalization of regional relations; and of a strengthening of commitments to defensive military strategies and postures.
On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.
On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.
The optimism that arrived at the end of the cold war and marked the turn of the Millennium was shattered by September 11. In the aftermath of that event it is not unwarranted pessimism that lines the pages of "Grave New World," it is unavoidable reality. Terrorism is but one aspect of many other wider concerns for national and international security, and the contributors to this volume not only warn us, but reward us as well with the clarity of their views into -- and possible solutions for -- a difficult, complicated future. They speak convincingly of the numerous military and non-military challenges that create security problems -- whether those are interstate, intrastate, or transnational -- many of which are being dangerously overlooked in public policy debates. The challenges and complexities might seem insurmountable but the first step in solving problems is recognizing that they exist. "Grave New World" provides an eye-opening assessment of the prospects for peace and security in the 21st century. Michael E. Brown frames these issues in his Introduction, "Security Challenges in the 21st Century;" and in his summation, "Security Problems and Security Policy in a Grave New World."
What special vulnerabilities does the world of the 21st century have to terrorist attacks? What kind of role does the United States see itself playing as the world's only superpower in the coming decades? How should we now characterize the conduct of the US foreign policy? Answers to such questions are perhaps not much clearer now than they were immediately after the attacks, but one of the more positive effects of these attacks has been to stimulate much serious discussion about them, and thus about the place of violence about changing forms of warfare, about different forms of terror, and about challenges to prevailing accounts of the legitimacy of violence in contemporary political life in the context of emerging and in many respects dangerously unstable structures of power and authority on a global scale. These essays do not constitute a unified perspective on what happened on 11 September 2001, and the US response to it. They are perhaps most usefully read as an experiment in writing contemporary history as it evolves. Some essays contradict others, some are quite specific, and others generalize very broadly. They all affirm, however, that there is no simple answer to difficul
Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability, 1919-1939 is the first unified study of the development of Britain's anti-submarine capability between the armistice in 1919 and the onset of the second world German submarine attack on Britain's maritime trade in 1939. Well researched and yet accessibly written, this book challenges the widespread belief that the Royal Navy failed to anticipate the threat of the U-boat in the Second World War.
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler simply beat him to the punch.
Naval warfare in a typical narrow sea such as the Baltic Sea or the Arabian Gulf includes peculiarities not found in war on the open ocean. Because of the proximity of the landmass, the employment of naval forces and aircraft is far more complex than in war on the open ocean. The outcome of war in a typical narrow sea depends - to a larger degree than on the open ocean - on the course of events on land and in the air. The threat of land-based aircraft, submarines, coastal anti-ship missiles and mines makes the operations of blue-water navies such as the US Navy both more complicated and riskier than on the open ocean.
This volume records the transition from planning against any post-war resurgence of German and Japanese militarism to preparations against a possible threat from the Soviet Union. It charts Foreign Office resistance to consideration of even the possibility of Soviet hostility after the war. Changing Direction is likely to remain the standard work of reference on this period, both for scholars and for the wider public.
The Art of War by Sun Tzu is the best known book on military strategy ever written. Although its wisdom is ancient, its principles and advice are timeless; it remains as influential as ever in military strategy, leadership roles, business tactics, legal challenges, martial arts philosophy and more. Everyone from New England Patriots' coach Bill Belichick to Tupac Shakur have turned to this time tested treatise. This translation is by Hanshi Stephen F. Kaufman, one of America's leading martial artists, and is specifically aimed at martial practitioners to demonstrate how Sun Tzu's strategies can be applied to martial combat. The book's thirteen sections present vital information including: Planning ahead--how a solid battle plan can help lead to victory Attacking the enemy--considerations when choosing to attack or, perhaps even more importantly, when to not attack Flexibility in combat--the importance of changing tactics as the fight evolves Exploiting weakness--how understanding your enemy's shortcomings is crucial to success This edition includes 32 pages of full color images, capturing the pageantry of ancient combat. A new foreword by martial historian and decorated martial artist Alexander Bennett explains the importance of Sun Tzu's text and the value of Kaufman's interpretation for the martial artist. |
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