Spurred by their commanders during the Korean War to be "tigers," aggressive and tenacious American fighter pilots charged headlong into packs of fireball-spewing enemy MiGs, relying on their keen eyesight, piloting finesse, and steady trigger fingers to achieve victory. But by the 1980s, American fighter pilots vanquished their foes by focusing on a four-inch-square cockpit display, manipulating electromagnetic waves, and launching rocket-propelled guided missiles from miles away. In this new era of automated, long-range air combat, can fighter pilots still be considered tigers? Aimed at scholars of technology and airpower aficionados alike, Steven A. Fino's Tiger Check offers a detailed study of air-to-air combat focusing on three of the US Air Force's most famed aircraft: the F-86E Sabre, the F-4C Phantom II, and the F-15A Eagle. Fino argues that increasing fire control automation altered what fighter pilots actually did during air-to-air combat. Drawing on an array of sources, as well as his own decade of experience as an F-15C fighter pilot, Fino unpacks not just the technological black box of fighter fire control equipment, but also fighter pilots' attitudes toward their profession and their evolving aircraft. He describes how pilots grappled with the new technologies, acutely aware that the very systems that promised to simplify their jobs while increasing their lethality in the air also threatened to rob them of the quintessential-albeit mythic-fighter pilot experience. Finally, Fino explains that these new systems often required new, unique skills that took time for the pilots to identify and then develop. Eschewing the typical "great machine" or "great pilot" perspectives that dominate aviation historiography, Tiger Check provides a richer perspective on humans and machines working and evolving together in the air. The book illuminates the complex interactions between human and machine that accompany advancing automation in the workplace.

Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc focuses on four former Soviet sub-regions (the Baltic Sea region, the Slavic republics, the Black Sea region, and Central Asia) to explore the degree to which 'democratic security', which includes de-politicisation of, and civilian oversight of, the military, resolution of conflicts by international cooperation, and involvement in international organisations. It examines how far states in these regions have developed cooperative foreign and security policies towards their immediate neighbours and key Western states and organisations, explores the interplay between internal and external aspects of democratic security building, and uses case-study examples to show how inter-state bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations are developing.

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.

The essays in this volume are concerned with armed conflicts in South Asia and the conflict management efforts made to mitigate them. Articles in the volume study conflict management, look at the direction armed conflict is likely to take and provide a set of alternative measures that could be perused by the actors. It addresses five key issues: history of the armed conflict, identifying the principal actors of the conflict, describing the course of the conflict and its major trends, evaluating conflict management measures undertaken, if any, presenting appropriate conclusions. It also includes additional chapters on Naxalism and sectarian strife in Pakistan. Designed as an annual series, this important collection discusses India's geo-strategic importance including its common borders with its neighbours; the psychological and economic costs of violence, and the problem of refugee migrants; treaties and ceasefire agreements signed across countries; the role of the UN and other peacekeeping forces; and the future of failed and failing democracies. The book makes an important contribution to analysing armed conflicts and conflict resolution.

Military affairs have been affected by major changes in recent years. The bipolar world of two superpowers has gone. The Cold War and the global military confrontation that accompanied it have ended. A new military and political order has emerged in the world, but the world has not become more stable; indeed, wars and armed conflict have become much more common. Forecasting the contours of future armed conflict is no easy task at such times, but this is the primary objective of If War Comes Tomorrow? Focusing on the impact of new technologies, General Gareev considers whether war is still a continuation of politics by other means' or whether the political, ideological, and technical transformation have broken that connection. He explores the linkage between threats to Russian national interests and war as an instrument of policy in great detail and concludes that there is very little prospect either of nuclear war or widespread conventional war. However, he does see local armed conflicts and local wars increasing, with greater emphasis on subversion. He argues that coming decades will see a shift towards a reliance upon indirect means to accomplish limited political ends, and analyses both information warfare and the revolution in military affairs from this perspective.

This book provides a state of the art discussion of the royal prerogative over war powers in the UK. This issue has received particular attention over proposed military strikes against the Syrian regime and it was claimed by many observers and scholars that parliament now controls decisions in war. However, the record has been mixed- and the most recent decision by Prime Minister May on Syria in 2018 shows that the executive can re-assert prerogative powers and effectively sidestep parliament. The author argues that these dynamics should be seen in the context of the declining authority of the executive and the legislature and in terms of a policy solution, and ultimately she suggests a War Powers Act as a firmer foundation for Britain's war powers.

This volume brings together many of the world's leading experts in the development of new imaging methodologies to detect, identify, and counter security threats to society. It covers three broadly defined but interrelated areas: the mathematics and computer science of automatic detection and identification; image processing techniques for radar and sonar; and detection of anomalies in biomedical and chemical images.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War had a traumatic effect on the Middle East and its implications were particularly serious for Israel, which felt obliged to reassess its strategic and military perspectives. This is an examination of the lessons that the Gulf War holds for Israel.

This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.

Published in 1996, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.

Assessing trends toward creating innovative forms of political, economic and security co-operation in Southeast Asia, this text discusses the international dynamics of Southeast Asian security, and its impact on such external factors as the US, China and Japan.

Assessing trends toward creating innovative forms of political, economic and security co-operation in Southeast Asia, this text discusses the international dynamics of Southeast Asian security, and its impact on such external factors as the US, China and Japan.

This text prepares the ground - both for US policy makers and America's allies in Asia - for the time in the not too distant future when the United States will no longer be in a position to guarantee the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by its unilateral actions and forward military presence. Arguing that the US-dominated system of Asian security from the Cold war era needs a fundamental transformation over the next ten years, the authors recommend a number of steps the US can take to help develop a moderate multipolar balance of power in Asia.

A distinguished group of strategists assesses the balance of opportunities confronting Israel at this critical juncture in its history and offers possible solutions to its pressing dilemmas. The contributors address such issues as the economic consequences of peace for Israeli security, the implications of the new world order for Israel's strategic interests, Israel's nuclear weapons and the operational and strategic challenges posed by the future Middle Eastern battlefield.

This collection of essays by a distinguished group of Israeli, American and British strategists assesses the balance of opportunities and risks confronting Israel at this critical juncture in her history and offers possible solutions to her pressing dilemmas. Among the issues discussed in this volume: the economic consequences of peace for Israeli security; the implications of the New World Order for Israel's strategic interests; military and strategic risks attending the land-for-peace formula and possible solutions; Israel's nuclear weapons and the problem of regional non-conventional proliferation; Israeli-Palestinian water conflicts and ways for their resolution; and, finally, the operational and strategic challenges posed by the Middle Eastern future battlefield.

In May 1998, in reaction to India's nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum 'credible' deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan's nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region's changed/changing strategic environment. After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan's nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan's doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence. Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan's post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research.

The Civil War and the World War II stand as the two great cataclysms of American history. They were our two costliest wars, with well over a million casualties suffered in each. And they were transforming moments in our history as well, times when the life of the nation and the great experiment in democracy--government of the people, by the people, for the people--seemed to hang in the balance. Now, in War Comes Again, eleven eminent historians--including three Pulitzer Prize winners, all veterans of the Second World War--offer an illuminating comparison of these two epic events in our national life.
The range of essays here is remarkable, the level of insight consistently high, and the quality of the writing is superb. For instance, Stephen Ambrose, the bestselling author of D-Day, June 6th, 1944, offers an intriguing comparison of the two great military leaders of each war--Grant and Eisenhower. Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Robert V. Bruce takes a revealing look at the events that foreshadowed the two wars. Gerald Linderman, author of Embattled Courage, examines the two wars from the point of view of the combat soldier. And Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., describes how both Lincoln and FDR went around strict observance of the Constitution in order to preserve the Constitution. There is, in addition, a fascinating discussion of the crucial role played by spying during the two wars, by Peter Maslowski; a look at the diplomacy of Lincoln and Roosevelt, by Howard Jones; and essays on the impact of the wars on women and on African Americans, by D'Ann Campbell, Richard Jensen, and Ira Berlin. In perhaps the most gripping piece in the book, Michael C.C. Adams offers an unflinching look at war's destructiveness, as he argues that the evils we associate with "bad wars" (such as Vietnam) are equally true of "good wars." And finally, in perhaps the most provocative essay in the book, Russell Weigley, one of America's most eminent military historians, maps the evolution of American attitudes toward war to our present belief that the only acceptable war is one that is short, inexpensive, and certain of victory. Would any great commander, Weigley asks, would a Lee or a Grant or a Marshall, refuse to fight unless he knew he couldn't lose? "Is not a willingness to run risks for the sake of cherished values and interests close to the heart of what defines greatness in a human being or in a nation?"
Another Pulitzer winner and World War II veteran, Don E. Fehrenbacher, concludes War Comes Again with a very personal look at two common soldiers who have no monuments, who have not been mentioned in previous histories, but who point at the essence of these two wars and are "embedded in the very structure of the enduring nation and the world we live in."

Contributions to this book question the concept of the clash of cultures. The challenge to the West does not lie in the monolith of Islam turning aggressively outward to Europe and the US, but in the rivalries between regimes ruling over societies divided by an imbalance in wealth and power.

Contributions to this book question the concept of the clash of cultures. The challenge to the West does not lie in the monolith of Islam turning aggressively outward to Europe and the US, but in the rivalries between regimes ruling over societies divided by an imbalance in wealth and power.

Japanese defence and security policies have often been at odds with international norms. When one considers the war renouncing constitution, the popular response to the 1990-1 Gulf crisis, or the limitations on Japanese self-defence-forces when taking part in United Nations peace keeping operations in the early 1990s, Japan appears to be an anomoly in the international community. This study seeks to explain the nature of Japanese defence and security policies by taking account of how the people have responded to militarization and demilitarization processes in the postwar period, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. The author shows the Japan is moving towards being a "normal" military state and explains how, even 50 years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the promulgation of an anti-militaristic constitution a few years later, the Japanese people are still influenced in their responses to defence and security policies by these twin experiences. This study challenges many of the preconceived notions on Japanese defense and security policies and the policy making process in Japan.

This ambitious ten-volume series develops a comprehensive analysis of the evolving world role of the post-Soviet successor states. Each volume considers a different factor influencing the relationship between internal politics and international relations in Russia and the western and southern tiers of newly independent states. The contributors were chosen not only for their recognized expertise but also to ensure a stimulating diversity of perspectives and a dynamic mix of approaches.

In this volume, international experts analyse the politics of conventional military policy and military relations among the Soviet successor states. The work analyses various national perspectives on security and approaches to military affairs.

The main aim of this book is to argue that the use of private force by states has been restricted by a norm against mercenary use. The book traces the evolution of this norm, from mercenaries in medieval Europe through to private security companies in modern day Iraq, telling a story about how the mercenaries of yesterday have evolved into those of today in the process.
The norm against mercenaries has two components. First, mercenaries are considered to be immoral because they use force outside legitimate, authoritative control. Second, mercenaries are considered to be morally problematic because they fight wars for selfish, financial reasons as opposed to fighting for some kind of larger conception of the common good.
The book examines four puzzles about mercenary use, and argues that they can only be explained by understanding the norm against mercenaries. First, the book argues that moral disapproval of mercenaries led to the disappearance of independent mercenaries from medieval Europe. Second, the transition from armies composed of mercenaries to citizen armies in the nineteenth century can only be understood with attention to the norm against mercenaries. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law regarding mercenaries, created in the 1970s and 1980s, is so ineffective without understanding the norm. Finally, the disappearance of companies like Executive Outcomes and Sandline and the development of today's private security industry cannot be understood without the norm.
This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

This fourteenth volume of India's National Security Annual Review intensively analyses India's national security with respect to the changing internal and external dynamics. In the global environment, the situation is characterised by rising tensions between United States and Russia, intensified rivalry between United States (US) and China, and increasing cooperation between China and Russia. For India which seeks peaceful growth to emerge as a major power, this poses severe diplomatic challenges. This volume discusses the complexity of these challenges and the deftness with which India gets the best out of its strategic partnerships with the US and Russia while warding off the transgressions of a mighty adversary like China. It also studies the impact of internal convulsions and external intrusions on India's security from South Asian nations such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Examining the field of internal security, the essays carry rare insights into the causes of expansion of Naxalite violence in tribal areas and the dynamics of conflict resolution in the Northeast, as well as India's deep concern as a growing power with its economic slowdown in the recent past, and energy and cyber security. Bringing together contributions from eminent scholars and diplomats, the volume will be indispensable for policymakers, government think tanks, defence and strategic studies experts, as well as students and researchers of international relations, foreign policy and political science.

The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. "Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age" takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest--twenty-two essays--are new.

The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.