The journalist William Howard Russell (1820 1907) is sometimes regarded as being the first war correspondent, and his reports from the conflict in the Crimea are also credited with being a cause of reforms in the British military system. This account of his time there, first published in 1858 and expanded in this 1895 edition, explains how Russell was sent by The Times of London in 1854 to join British troops stationed in Malta. He spent the next two years witnessing some of the key moments of the war, including the battle of Balaclava and the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade. His newspaper reports of the fighting and of the living conditions for the troops were widely read and very influential. In this retrospective work, Russell gives a more personal narrative of his experiences, making this an important account of one the most brutal wars of the nineteenth century.

The journalist William Howard Russell (1820 1907) is sometimes regarded as being the first war correspondent, and his reports from the conflict in the Crimea are also credited with being a cause of reforms made to the British military system. This 1865 book began as a review in The Times of the five-volume work of General Eduard Todleben (or Totleben), the military engineer and Russian Army General, whose work in creating and continually adapting the land defences of Sevastopol in 1854 5 made him a hero and enabled the fortress to hold out against British bombardment for a whole year. Russell added extracts from the original book to his review, and enlarged his commentary on the Russian text, producing a thorough and accurate synthesis, but always highlighting the central importance of the Russian work to any student of the history of the Sevastopol siege.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

This book comprises the Lees Knowles Lectures for 1946, originally delivered by A. H. Burne at the University of Cambridge. Burne begins by introducing the principles of military strategy, and then applies those principles to examples of land operations in Poland, Dunkirk and Russia, Africa and Italy, and Japan and north-west Europe during the Second World War.

This book explores the question of why a significant difference in the frequency and intensity with which Great Britain and Germany used military force since 1990 persists despite reunification and the end of the Cold War. Based on the theoretical framework of moderate constructivism, this thesis argues that differences in strategic culture can explain this puzzle. To this end, it analyses opinion polls and military interventions abroad and then compares decision processes and debates leading to military interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan.

Since the end of the Cold War the number of interstate wars has remained relatively low, although whilst states may be more secure than ever this does not mean that individual human beings are too. This has led to a growing recognition of the importance of human security, in contrast to the traditional realist focus on state security. This book explores human security in East Asia, focusing in particular on the challenges to collaboration among actors involved in the process of human security promotion. It examines the theoretical complexities of conceptual arguments about human security, drawing on the ideas of scholars from Asia and the West, to provide a global perspective on what causes human insecurity and how security can best be achieved. It considers in detail case studies of military interventions in East Asia, in particular East Timor, and assesses how successful collaborative efforts have been in providing human security. It also explores case studies of non-military intervention, including international criminal justice in Cambodia and East Timor. It discusses the relationship of regional great powers such as China and Japan to human security promotion, arguing that it will be better served if these powers engage less in the traditional game of geopolitics and if human security objectives do not work against actors' interests. It shows how interventions to uphold human security have not always succeeded to the extent that was hoped, despite the best of intentions, and considers how improved collaboration can be achieved, so that future interventions enjoy more consistent success.

This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

Arms Procurement Decision-Making Processes is a comparative analysis of the arms procurement decision-making processes in five countries China, India, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. It examines whether or not national arms procurement processes, even as they involve sensitive security issues and complex systems, can become more responsive to the broader objectives of security and public accountability. The country case studies are based to a large extent on original research papers written by experts from the respective national academic and defence procurement communities.

When does the legitimate application of military technology to the problem of national defence become needlessly provocative? What obstacles must developing countries overcome if they hope to use military technology effectively? And when might military technology itself become a cause of conflict? Eric Arnett addresses these questions in the context of four particularly important Asian states - China, India, Pakistan, and Iran - from the perspectives of regional specialists and experts in technology and military affairs. The resulting analyses demonstrate the link between military technology and conflict, which is more palpable in southern Asia than elsewhere, while suggesting that it must be approached in a more nuanced way than has been the case so far in discussions of the region.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

Why has U.S. security policy scarcely changed from the Bush to the Obama administrations? The theory of "double government" posed by the 19th century English scholar Walter Bagehot suggests a disquieting answer that is extensively discussed in National Security and Double Government. Michael J. Glennon challenges the myth that U.S. security policy is made through the visible, "Madisonian institutions"-the President, Congress, and the courts, proposing that their roles are largely illusory. Presidential control is nominal, congressional oversight is dysfunctional, and judicial review is negligible. He argues that security policy is really made by the managers of the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies- a concealed "Trumanite network" of several hundred members who are responsible for protecting the nation, and who are primarily immune from constitutional restraints. As such, this new system of "double government" will not correct itself, as to do so would require those branches to exercise the very power that they lack. Glennon suggests that the main problem is political ignorance, which is becoming more acute as public influence on security policy declines. This book aims to inform and enlighten the reader about the Trumanite network, and highlight the restraints on the Constitution, which operates primarily upon the hollowed-out Madisonian institutions, and poses a grave threat to democratic accountability.

How a new understanding of warfare can help the military fight today's conflicts more effectively The way wars are fought has changed starkly over the past sixty years. International military campaigns used to play out between armies at central fronts. Today's conflicts find major powers facing rebel insurgencies deploying elusive methods, from improvised explosives to terrorist attacks. Presenting a transformative understanding of these contemporary confrontations, Small Wars, Big Data shows that a revolution in the study of conflict yields new insights into terrorism, civil wars, and foreign interventions. Modern warfare is not about struggles over territory but over people; civilians-and the information they might provide-can turn the tide at critical junctures. Drawing lessons from conflicts in locations around the world, Small Wars, Big Data provides groundbreaking perspectives for how small wars can be better strategized and favorably won.

The ebbs and flows of Indian history can also be charted through the country's "maritime blindness" - its onset and the national endeavour to overcome it. The story of developing India's maritime capacity, since independence, is also about the kind of international and regional footprint it needs to have. In this book, the author discusses India's new and old maritime challenges and contextualises them in terms of its inherent institutional strengths to cope with their bewildering complexity. Their complexity is not just due to their sheer scale; the degrading institutional capacities, within countries and internationally, act as threat multipliers. The dynamics of global geopolitics, the seismic perturbations of global economy, and the dizzying pace of technology belie presuppositions for global future; all strategic analysts recognise our current, persisting conundrums. Taking into account the country's critical strategic weight in the maritime domain, the author suggests an approach - about the right 'mix' of the 'traditional' and the 'non-traditional' threats - in the institutional agendas of various governance mechanisms concerning different water bodies, especially the Indian Ocean Region, which also demands of India both hardware and software capacities, including diplomatic. He concludes that the effect of such an approach would be stabilising, consonant with the civilisational vision of the founders of the modern Indian nation.

Major General Sir Wilkinson Dent Bird (1869 1943) saw active service in campaigns from the Niger Campaign in 1897 to the opening of the First World War, when he served in France. In 1923 he was appointed head of a committee to analyse wartime experiences and propose changes intended to modernise the British army. First published in 1920 and issued in an enlarged second edition in 1925, this book provides a comprehensive study of military strategy current at the time of publication, using historical examples to illustrate key concepts. Bird focuses primarily on land battles, with a chapter for naval battles and a small section for aerial combat. Originally intended as a guide to current strategic thinking, his book provides valuable analyses of historical battles with insights into the development of British military strategy after the First World War. This reissue is of the 1925 edition.

Bringing together experts from across the globe to provide a comprehensive introduction to strategic studies, this is the only overview to critically engage with both enduring and contemporary issues that dominate strategy. Throughout the chapters, readers are encouraged to explore key debates and alternative perspectives. A debates feature considers key controversies and presents opposing arguments, helping students to build critical thinking skills and reflect upon a wide range of perspectives. The new edition has been thoroughly updated to incorporate the latest developments in the field of strategic studies. Four new chapters feature in-depth coverage of cyber power and conflict, strategic culture, the evolution of grand strategy in China, and the relationship between military technology and warfare. Digital formats and resources The seventh edition is available for students and institutions to purchase in a variety of formats, and is supported by online resources - The e-book offers a mobile experience and convenient access along with functionality tools, navigation features and links that offer extra learning support: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/ebooks - Online resources for students include: case studies that help to contextualise and deepen understanding of key issues; web links and further reading that provide students with opportunities to deepen their understanding of main topics and explore further areas of research interest; and multiple choice questions that test students' knowledge of the chapters and provide instant feedback. - Online resources for lecturers include: customisable PowerPoint slides to ensure clarity of explanation of key concepts and debates; and a test-bank of questions to reinforce key concepts and test students' understanding.

Security concerns have mushroomed. Increasingly numerous areas of life are governed by security policies and technologies. Security Unbound argues that when insecurities pervade how we relate to our neighbours, how we perceive international politics, how governments formulate policies, at stake is not our security but our democracy. Security is not in the first instance a right or value but a practice that challenges democratic institutions and actions. We are familiar with emergency policies in the name of national security challenging parliamentary processes, the space for political dissent, and fundamental rights. Yet, security practice and technology pervade society heavily in very mundane ways without raising national security crises, in particular through surveillance technology and the management of risks and uncertainties in many areas of life. These more diffuse security practices create societies in which suspicion becomes a default way of relating and governing relations, ranging from neighbourhood relations over financial transactions to cross border mobility. Security Unbound demonstrates that governing through suspicion poses serious challenges to democratic practice. Some of these challenges are familiar, such as the erosion of the right to privacy; others are less so, such as the post-human challenge to citizenship. Security unbound provokes us to see that the democratic political stake today is not our security but preventing insecurity from becoming the organising principle of political and social life.

In 1993 the first Clinton administration declared environmental security a national security issue, but by the end of the Bush administrations environmental security had vanished from the government's agenda. This book uses changing US environmental security policy to propose a revised securitisation theory, one that both allows insights into the intentions of key actors and enables moral evaluations in the environmental sector of security. Security and the Environment brings together the subject of environmental security and the Copenhagen School s securitisation theory. Drawing on original interviews with former key players in United States environmental security, Rita Floyd makes a significant and original contribution to environmental security studies and security studies more generally. This book will be of interest to international relations scholars and political practitioners concerned with security, as well as students of international environmental politics and US policy-making.

Many saw the United States' decisive victory in Desert Storm (1991) as not only vindication of American defense policy since Vietnam but also confirmation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Just as information-age technologies were revolutionizing civilian life, the Gulf War appeared to reflect similarly profound changes in warfare. A debate has raged ever since about a contemporary RMA and its implications for American defense policy. Addressing these issues, The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution is a comprehensive study of the Iraq Wars in the context of the RMA debate. Focusing on the creation of a reconnaissance-strike complex and conceptions of parallel or nonlinear warfare, Keith L. Shimko finds a persuasive case for a contemporary RMA while recognizing its limitations as well as promise.

Using major new documentary sources, the authors tell the story of why and how China built its nuclear submarine flotilla and the impact of that development on the nation's politics, technology, industry, and strategy.

Recent years have seen a growing role for private military contractors in national and international security. To understand the reasons for this, Elke Krahmann examines changing models of the state, the citizen and the soldier in the UK, the US and Germany. She focuses on both the national differences with regard to the outsourcing of military services to private companies and their specific consequences for the democratic control over the legitimate use of armed force. Tracing developments and debates from the late eighteenth century to the present, she explains the transition from the centralized warfare state of the Cold War era to the privatized and fragmented security governance, and the different national attitudes to the privatization of force.

President Bill Clinton, speaking as might any commander-in-chief, on the eve of his decision to deploy ground troops to Bosnia in 1995, declared he had ""no responsibility more grave than putting soldiers in harm's way [and, it should be noted, in today's operational environment this means civilians as well]."" Such a statement suggests that a study of the decision-making process associated with the weighty matters of using force would be enlightening. Indeed, it is. The decision-making process is far from standardised nor is it simple. While all individuals associated with important decisions about national security and the lives of America's service members take their responsibilities seriously, the processes by which they reach their conclusions are varied and complicated. This book traces traditional and emerging theories of decision-making by first explaining the components of each model and then analysing its practical application through three case studies. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of the utility and explanatory power of the particular theory. Because even at their very best a particular decision-making theory can only explain some cases, the chapter then segues to another theory with different characteristics.

Governments recognise that national security in the turbulent conditions of the early twenty-first century must centre on the creation of public confidence that normal life can continue even in the face of threats such as terrorism and proliferation, and of natural hazards such as pandemics and climate change. Based on his own experience in government, David Omand argues that while public security is vital for good government, the effects of bad government will result from failure to maintain the right relationship between justice, liberty, privacy, civic harmony and security measures. His book examines in detail how secret intelligence helps governments to deliver security, but also risks raising public concern over its methods. A set of ethical principles is proposed to guide intelligence and security work within the framework of human rights. Securing the State provides a new way of thinking about the cycle of activities that generates secret intelligence, examines the issues that arise from the way that modern intelligence uses technology to access new sources of information, and discusses how the meaning of intelligence can best be elucidated. The limits of intelligence in enabling greater security are explored, especially in guiding government in a world in which we must learn not to be surprised by surprise. Illustrated throughout by historical examples, David Omand provides new perspectives for practitioners and those teaching security and intelligence studies and for a wider readership offers an accessible introduction to pressing issues of public policy.