In the first book to focus on civil-military tensions after American wars, Thomas Langston challenges conventional theory by arguing that neither civilian nor military elites deserve victory in this perennial struggle. What is needed instead, he concludes, is balance.

In America's worst postwar episodes, those that followed the Civil War and the Vietnam War, balance was conspicuously absent. In the late 1860s and into the 1870s, the military became the tool of a divisive partisan program. As a result, when Reconstruction ended, so did popular support of the military. After the Vietnam War, military leaders were "too" successful in defending their institution against civilian commanders, leading some observers to declare a crisis in civil-military relations even before Bill Clinton became commander-in-chief.

Is American military policy balanced today? No, but it may well be headed in that direction. At the end of the 1990s there was still no clear direction in military policy. The officer corps stubbornly clung to a Cold War force structure. A civilian-minded commander-in-chief, meanwhile, stretched a shrinking force across the globe. With the shocking events of September 11, 2001, clarifying the seriousness of the post-Cold War military policy, we may at last be moving toward a true realignment of civilian and military imperatives.

'Compelling' Sunday Times 'A triumph' Daily Mirror 'Gripping' Jonathan Dimbleby 1941. The Battle of the Atlantic is a disaster. Thousands of supply ships ferrying vital food and fuel from North America to Britain are being torpedoed by German U-boats. Britain is only weeks away from starvation - and with that, crushing defeat. In the first week of 1942 a group of unlikely heroes - a retired naval captain and a clutch of brilliant young women - gather to form a secret strategy unit. On the top floor of a bomb-bruised HQ in Liverpool, the Western Approaches Tactical Unit spends days and nights designing and playing wargames in an effort to crack the U-boat tactics. As the U-boat wolfpacks continue to prey upon the supply ships, the Wrens race against time to save Britain. With novelistic flair, investigative journalist Simon Parkin shines a light on Operation Raspberry and these unsung heroines in this riveting true story of war at sea. 'History writing at its best' Booklist 'Splendid . . . Simon Parkin's book rips along at full sail and is full of personality and personalities' Sunday Express 'Vivid, engaging' New Yorker

On August 6 and August 9, 1945, the world became aware of the destructiveness of nuclear energy when the U.S. Army Air Corps dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even before the bombs were detonated, though, President Harry Truman had directed his thoughts toward non-military uses of the atom, recognizing that the atomic bomb had given man a new understanding of the forces of nature. This book examines the history and development of nuclear power from the perspective of the U.S. Army's nuclear power program, telling its story from the creation of the Office of Research and Development through the program's days of growth,and on to its eventual decline. This history examines the development of the United States Army's nuclear power program from its inception, through the development and operation of six small nuclear power plants throughout the Western Hemisphere, to its evolution into a military support agency. The Manhattan Project District Engineer, General Kenneth Nichols, who generated the idea for the program, worked for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. From the initial plans to develop nuclear power plants at remote bases, the book traces the path the Army took in getting its proposals approved by the Atomic Energy Commission, formally organizing the nuclear program, and building a prototype of a nuclear power plant. Separate chapters are devoted to Fort Greely, the nuclear program at the height of its success and accomplishment, and its subsequent decline and transitional period. With its list of suggestions for further reading and a comprehensive index, this volume will be a valuable resource for courses in military history, energy issues, and the development of atomic power. It will also represent an important addition to college, university, and public libraries.

Why do states who are committed to the principle of civilian immunity and the protection of non-combatants end up killing and injuring large numbers of civilians during their military operations? Bugsplat explains this paradox through an in-depth examination of five conflicts fought by Western powers since 1989. It argues that despite the efforts of Western military organizations to comply with the laws of armed conflict, the level of collateral damage produced by Western military operations is the inevitable outcome of the strategies and methods through which their military organizations fight wars. Drawing on their superior technology and the strategic advantage of not having to fight on their own territory, such states employ highly-concentrated and overwhelming military force against a wide variety of political, economic, and military targets under conditions likely to produce high civilian casualties. As a result, collateral damage in western-fought wars is largely both foreseeable and preventable. The book title is derived from the name of a computer program that had been used by the Pentagon to calculate probable civilian casualties prior to launching air attacks.

Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.

The perspectives of academics and practitioners are brought together in this insightful work, which examines the war on terrorism, the Iraq war and the roles of NATO and the EU. The book analyzes the new threats posed by terrorist strikes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction despite the total failure of Cold War conceptions of deterrence. It also delineates the key issues and problems that have arisen from the NATO and EU double enlargement and from the new NATO-Russian relationship. Casting light on the global and regional ramifications of the crisis, as well as the tensions in the transatlantic relationship caused by the war with Iraq, NATO and the European Union addresses the key policy questions that concern the maintenance of global peace and security.

Governments recognise that national security in the turbulent conditions of the early twenty-first century must centre on the creation of public confidence that normal life can continue even in the face of threats such as terrorism and proliferation, and of natural hazards such as pandemics and climate change. Based on his own experience in government, David Omand argues that while public security is vital for good government, the effects of bad government will result from failure to maintain the right relationship between justice, liberty, privacy, civic harmony and security measures. His book examines in detail how secret intelligence helps governments to deliver security, but also risks raising public concern over its methods. A set of ethical principles is proposed to guide intelligence and security work within the framework of human rights. Securing the State provides a new way of thinking about the cycle of activities that generates secret intelligence, examines the issues that arise from the way that modern intelligence uses technology to access new sources of information, and discusses how the meaning of intelligence can best be elucidated. The limits of intelligence in enabling greater security are explored, especially in guiding government in a world in which we must learn not to be surprised by surprise. Illustrated throughout by historical examples, David Omand provides new perspectives for practitioners and those teaching security and intelligence studies and for a wider readership offers an accessible introduction to pressing issues of public policy.

One of three volumes in honour of the teaching and scholarship of the late Michael I. Handel, this book details the universal logic of strategy and the ability of liberal-democratic governments to address this logic rationally. Treating war as an extension of politics, the diverse contributors (drawn from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Israel) explore the difficulties in matching strategy to policy, especially in free societies. Several of the chapters explore the classic works of Thucydides, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu. Others investigate such major political and strategic problems as war termination; how weak powers defeat strong powers; the difficulty of deriving meaningful military lessons from history; the links and tensions between policy, strategy, and operations; the uses and abuses of attrition; and the extent to which military strategy is applicable to other fields, such as sport. While others focus on concrete cases of British strategy before and during World War I, and Israeli and US strategy today.

Leading global experts, brought together by Johns Hopkins University, discuss national and international trends in a post-COVID-19 world. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has killed hundreds of thousands of people and infected millions while also devastating the world economy. The consequences of the pandemic, however, go much further: they threaten the fabric of national and international politics around the world. As Henry Kissinger warned, "The coronavirus epidemic will forever alter the world order." What will be the consequences of the pandemic, and what will a post-COVID world order look like? No institution is better suited to address these issues than Johns Hopkins University, which has convened experts from within and outside of the university to discuss world order after COVID-19. In a series of essays, international experts in public health and medicine, economics, international security, technology, ethics, democracy, and governance imagine a bold new vision for our future. Essayists include: Graham Allison, Anne Applebaum, Philip Bobbitt, Hal Brands, Elizabeth Economy, Jessica Fanzo, Henry Farrell, Peter Feaver, Niall Ferguson, Christine Fox , Jeremy A. Greene, Hahrie Han, Kathleen H. Hicks, William Inboden, Tom Inglesby, Jeffrey P. Kahn, John Lipsky, Margaret MacMillan, Anna C. Mastroianni, Lainie Rutkow, Kori Schake, Eric Schmidt, Thayer Scott, Benn Steil, Janice Gross Stein, James B. Steinberg, Johannes Urpelainen, Dora Vargha, Sridhar Venkatapuram, and Thomas Wright. In collaboration with and appreciation of the book's co-editors, Professors Hal Brands and Francis J. Gavin of the Johns Hopkins SAIS Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University Press is pleased to donate funds to the Maryland Food Bank, in support of the university's food distribution efforts in East Baltimore during this period of food insecurity due to COVID-19 pandemic hardships.

This edited collection brings together leading scholars to comparatively investigate national security, surveillance and terror in the early 21st century in two major western jurisdictions, Canada and Australia. Observing that much debate about these topics is dominated by US and UK perspectives, the volume provides penetrating analysis of national security and surveillance practices in two under-studied countries that reveals critical insights into current trends. Written by a wide range of experts in their respective fields, this book addresses a fascinating array of timely questions about the relationship among national security, privacy and terror in the two countries and beyond. Chapters include critical assessments of topics such as: National Security Intelligence Collection since 9/11, The Border as Checkpoint in an Age of Hemispheric Security and Surveillance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Law Enforcement, as well as Federal Government Departments and Security Regimes. An engaging and empirically driven study, this collection will be of great interest to scholars of security and surveillance studies, policing, and comparative criminology.

Prominent experts in biodefense research-many from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases-authoritatively delineate the universe of scientific, medical, and legal issues facing the biodefense research community. Regarding medical countermeasures and decontamination, the authors describe the treatment and pathogenesis of a variety of established pathogens (anthrax, plague, smallpox, Brucellosis, Glanders, and Coxiella burnettii) and review what is known about the aerosol route of infection and decontamination processes. They also examine how to discover the presence of these agents, or other previously unknown biological weapons, and detail the ongoing efforts to counter these agents, including proteomic and genomic analysis as a gateway to better diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccinations, genotyping, and forensics. Additional chapters discuss the development and use technology to identify and characterize these infectious organisms, emerging threats, and the development of countermeasures.

For more than fifty years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the wider nuclear nonproliferation regime have worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Analysts and pundits have often viewed the regime with skepticism, repeatedly warning that it is on the brink of collapse, and the NPT lacks many of the characteristics usually seen in effective international institutions. Nevertheless, the treaty continues to enjoy near-universal membership and high levels of compliance. This is the first book to explain why the nonproliferation regime has been so successful, bringing to bear declassified documents, new data on regime membership and weapons pursuit, and a variety of analytic approaches. It offers important new insights for scholars of nuclear proliferation and international security institutions, and for policymakers seeking to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and tighten international constraints on the spread of nuclear weapons.

Known as the science of strategy, game theory is a branch of mathematics that has gained broad acceptance as a legitimate methodological tool, and has been widely adapted by a number of other fields. Frank C. Zagare provides an introduction to the application of game theory in the fields of security studies and diplomatic history, demonstrating the advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events and strategic relationships. Comprised of three parts, the first illustrates the basic concepts of game theory, initially with abstract examples but later in the context of real world foreign policy decision-making. The author highlights the methodological problems of using game theory to construct an analytic narrative and the advantages of working around these obstacles. Part II develops three extended case studies that illustrate the theory at work: the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the July Crisis of 1914, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Finally, in Part III, Zagare describes a general theory of interstate conflict initiation, limitation, escalation, and resolution and rebuts criticisms of the methodology. Logically demanding, Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies conveys an intuitive understanding of the theory of games through the use of real-world examples to exemplify the 'theory in action'.

This book of contributed chapters by subject matter expertly provides an overview and analysis of salient contemporary and historical military subjects from the military geographer 's perspective. Factors of geography have had a compelling influence on battles and campaigns throughout history; however, geography and military affairs have gained heightened attention during the past two decades, and military geography is the discipline best situated to explain them. Hence, the premise of this book and its contents are founded on the principle that geographical knowledge of space, place, people, and scale provide essential insights into contemporary security issues and promotes the idea that such insight is critical to understanding and managing significant military problems at local, regional, and global scales.

This volume brings together contributions by eleven noted specialists on peace and security issues in the Caribbean. All chapters are based on recent research on the radically transformed regional situation in the post Cold-War context. Particular emphasis is placed on the formulation of security policies by the most relevant security actors, including both external powers present in the region, independent states and subregional groupings. This discussion is placed in the framework of post Cold-War security outlooks which focus on 'non-traditional' threats, mainly drugs and illegal migration.

In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778-81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War - and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire. Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis's operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists' support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command. Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter's analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.

This study analyzes the readiness of the British military establishment for war in 1899 and its performance in the South African War (1899-1902). It focuses on the career of Field Marshal Paul Sanford, 3rd Baron Methuen, whose traditional military training, used so effectively in Queen Victoria's small wars, was put to the test by the modern challenges of the South African War. A subsidiary aim of this work is to correct and refine the historical consensus that Methuen's campaing in the South African War was plagued by practical errors and poor judgement. The South African War was a crucial transitional episode in the history of the British army. Unlike Great Britain's other expeditions, it required the concentrated resources of the entire empire. It was a modern war in the sense that it employed the technology, the weaponry, the communications, and the transportation of the second industrial revolution.

An indispensable guide to how wars are fought, James F. Dunnigan's classic text has been enormously popular with citizens, professional soldiers, and journalists alike. Now, it's been revised to include a stunning array of new subjects. From the cutting edge of cyberwar to the current concern about terrorism, How to Make War presents a clear picture of complex weapons, armed forces, and tactics.

Describing a new world order, one with a greater number of equipped players than the "Big Two" (the United States and the former Soviet Union), this updated edition features all the elements of traditional warfare, along with a discussion of terrorist techniques; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and Third World ballistic missiles. Past editions of How to Make War were chillingly accurate in assessing and predicting the outcomes of all the major conflicts in the past two decades. Loaded with expertise and the latest information, this edition is an essential reference for any military library -- and a work that forewarns, and forearms, the Free World for the conflicts ahead.

This book provides an introduction to the theory and practice of diplomacy and its vital role in an era of increasing international uncertainty.

The work employs a distinctive "diplomatic perspective" on international relations and argues that the experience of conducting diplomacy gives rise to a set of priorities: first, the peaceful resolution of disputes; second, the avoidance of unwanted conflict; and, third, the minimization of the intensity of violent conflict where it has become unavoidable. It argues that changes in the international system require a shift in priorities from the diplomacy of problem-solving by building institutionalized cooperation, to the diplomacy of managing relationships between people. Divided into three sections, the first examines what is meant when we talk about diplomacy, why we need diplomats, and the operations of the modern diplomatic system of states. The second discusses the "three bads," about which people generally worry: bad leaders, bad media, and bad followers. The idea of "bad" is considered in terms of the moral character, professional competence, and the consequences of what people do for us. The final section discusses diplomacy and bad diplomats, reviewing what people can do to help themselves and the professionals be good diplomats.

This book is intended as a primary text for courses in international diplomacy and as a supplementary text for courses on contemporary issues in international relations.

Table of Contents

Part I: Diplomacy and Diplomats

1. Introduction: What are we talking about when we talk about diplomacy?

2. Why we need diplomacy and diplomats

3. The modern diplomatic system of states

Part II: Diplomacy and "The Three Bads" of International Relations

4. Diplomacy and bad leaders

5. Diplomacy and bad media

6. Diplomacy and bad followers

Part III: Conclusions

7. Diplomacy and bad diplomats

European Security in the New Political Environment provides a thorough analysis of the detail and nature of post-Cold War security issues, from both traditional and new security agendas, assessing the current efficacy of current institutions and policies to address these issues.

In November 1983, Soviet nuclear forces went on high alert when intelligence reported alarming activity on US bases. In response, the Soviets planned for a nuclear strike by NATO on Eastern Europe. And then Able Archer 83, a vast NATO war game exercise, ended. What the West didn't know was that the Soviets thought Operation Able Archer 83 was real and were preparing for a surprise missile attack from NATO. This close scrape with Armageddon was unknown until 2015, when the US released an analysis. Able Archer 83 vividly recreates the atmosphere that nearly unleashed nuclear war.

The Instant New York Times Bestseller "I could not put this extraordinary book down. Three Days at the Brink is a masterpiece: elegantly written, brilliantly conceived, and impeccably researched. This book not only sparkles but is destined to be a classic!" -Jay Winik, bestselling author From the #1 bestselling author and award-winning anchor of Special Report with Bret Baier, comes the gripping lost history of the Tehran Conference, where FDR, Churchill, and Stalin plotted D-Day and the Second World War's endgame. With the fate of World War II in doubt and rumors of a Nazi assassination plot swirling, Franklin Roosevelt risked everything at a clandestine meeting that would change the course of history. November 1943: The Nazis and their Axis allies controlled nearly the entire European continent. Japan dominated the Pacific. Allied successes at Sicily and Guadalcanal had gained them modest ground but at an extraordinary cost. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet Red Army had been bled white. The path of history walked a knife's edge. That same month a daring gambit was hatched that would alter everything. The "Big Three"-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin-secretly met for the first time to chart a strategy for defeating Adolf Hitler. Over three days in Tehran, Iran, this trio-strange bedfellows united by their mutual responsibility as heads of the Allied powers-made essential decisions that would direct the final years of the war and its aftermath. Meanwhile, looming over the covert meeting was the possible threat of a Nazi assassination plot, code-named Operation Long Jump. Before they left Tehran, the three leaders agreed to open a second front in the West, spearheaded by Operation Overload and the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy the following June. They also discussed what might come after the war, including dividing Germany and establishing the United Nations-plans that laid the groundwork for the postwar world order and the Cold War. Bestselling author and Fox News Channel anchor Bret Baier's new epic history, Three Days at the Brink, centers on these crucial days in Tehran, the medieval Persian city on the edge of the desert. Baier makes clear the importance of Roosevelt, who stood apart as the sole leader of a democracy, recognizing him as the lead strategist for the globe's future-the one man who could ultimately allow or deny the others their place in history. With new details discovered in rarely seen transcripts, oral histories, and declassified State Department and presidential documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Baier illuminates the complex character of Roosevelt, revealing a man who grew into his role and accepted the greatest challenge any American president since Lincoln had faced.

Georgii Samoilovich Isserson (1898-1976) was one of the most prescient and prolific authors on military science in the years preceding World War II. His theories greatly influenced the Red Army's operations and were instrumental in achieving victory over Germany. This book gathers together for the first time English translations of Isserson's most influential works, including some that are still classified. His writings on the preparation and conduct of ""deep operations""--the deployment of tanks, mechanized infantry, air power and airborne troops to penetrate echeloned defenses-also serve as a primer on how to construct a position to defeat such an attack. His well argued defense of deep operations based on an examination of later wars, and his reminiscences about the people and events that shaped Soviet military theory in the 1930s are included.