Over the past twenty years, a revolution has occurred in relations between the American executive and legislative branches. Once a passive observer of the President's decisions on defense policy, the Congress has assumed a more aggressive role in decisions on the defense budget, arms control, war powers, sales of weapons abroad, and covert operations. Based on interviews with members of Congress and their staffs, The Politics of National Security describes and analyzes this fundamental change in the United States political system, concentrating on the political factors behind the Congress' greater assertiveness.

On the 75th anniversary of D-Day, a new history of the momentous Normandy campaign with fresh insights from award-winning historian James Holland D-Day, June 6, 1944, and the seventy-six days of bitter fighting in Normandy that followed the Allied landing, have become the defining episode of World War II in the west--the object of books, films, television series, and documentaries. Yet as familiar as it is, as James Holland makes clear in his definitive history, many parts of the OVERLORD campaign, as it was known, are still shrouded in myth and assumed knowledge. Drawing freshly on widespread archives and on the testimonies of eye-witnesses, Holland relates the extraordinary planning that made Allied victory in France possible; indeed, the story of how hundreds of thousands of men, and mountains of materiel, were transported across the English Channel, is as dramatic a human achievement as any battlefield exploit. The brutal landings on the five beaches and subsequent battles across the plains and through the lanes and hedgerows of Normandy--a campaign that, in terms of daily casualties, was worse than any in World War I--come vividly to life in conferences where the strategic decisions of Eisenhower, Rommel, Montgomery, and other commanders were made, and through the memories of paratrooper Lieutenant Dick Winters of Easy Company, British corporal and tanker Reg Spittles, Thunderbolt pilot Archie Maltbie, German ordnance officer Hans Heinze, French resistance leader Robert Leblanc, and many others. For both sides, the challenges were enormous. The Allies confronted a disciplined German army stretched to its limit, which nonetheless caused tactics to be adjusted on the fly. Ultimately ingenuity, determination, and immense materiel strength--delivered with operational brilliance--made the difference. A stirring narrative by a pre-eminent historian, Normandy '44 offers important new perspective on one of history's most dramatic military engagements and is an invaluable addition to the literature of war.

In the not-too-distant future, an American military commander is preparing to take charge of counterinsurgency operations in the Narabad Province of remote and mountainous Khanastan, an impoverished region scarred by war and ruled by diverse religious and tribal communities. As part of his preparations, he enters a stunningly real conflict-mapping simulation that allows him to see the results of his on-the-ground decisions within hours.
What he learns shocks him.
His initial efforts to take control of the situation--by establishing a secure forward operating base, pressuring the local population to support his soldiers, providing armed escorts to government leaders, and taking the fight to the enemy--lead to chaos, increasing the danger to his troops and making the insurgents more numerous and deadly. He consults with his two mentors, a battlehardened war fighter and a provocative devil's advocate, then rewinds the scenario and tries again. And again. But whatever he does falls short of effective counterinsurgency, leading to more violence and to consequences he never expected. He grows frustrated, unsure if he and his soldiers can do anything at all to defeat the enemy and claim victory. It's only when he discards obsolete strategies and old measures of success and formulates a nontraditional--and more cold-blooded--approach that his efforts gain traction and the insurgency starts to weaken. He begins to see that effective counterinsurgency demands a new way of thinking. And a new way of fighting.
In the tradition of military classics such as "The Defence of Duffer's Drift," this powerful parable illustrates the urgent need for military leaders to rethink how they fight contemporary conflicts. It reads like a thriller, with a cast of vivid characters, even as it puts forward a bold approach to effective counterinsurgency operations and makes a compelling case for change.

• A journey through the mind of a commander as he learns and adapts in a complex, deadly environment.
• One of the world's premier practitioners challenges conventional wisdom about counterinsurgency, using a parable to help leaders develop the mental agility to be successful.
• A fictional commander participates in virtual reality combat situations that illustrate the chaos, complexity, and uncertainty of modern conflict-and he fails repeatedly, learning and adapting with each set of experiences.
• This highly practical parable avoids checklists and formulas; it teaches leaders how to think and how to develop the mental courage to learn, adapt, and make decisions in the face of a deadly and resilient enemy.
• An innovative tool for developing in peacetime the mental agility and adaptability our leaders need to be successful in combat.

This book provides a detailed application of identity theory to contemporary questions of extremism, radicalization and security. The analysis considers how identity forms a central aspect of notions of extremism and security in Western societies, as articulated both by political leaders, the media and the government. It also takes a close and critical look at counter-extremism policy in contemporary Western society. With its detailed and empirical approach to these questions, this book is an accessible and invaluable resource for academics, practitioners, policy-makers and general readers keen to establish a deeper understanding of the key societal security threats of the day.

In this collection of papers, the theory of defensive strategy and the ways of implementing it are explored by scholars and military professionals from East and West. These papers are a result of workshops organised by the Pugwash conferences on science and world affairs.

Although the authors believe that the level of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe should and will be reduced, they do not consider that the military instrument will have lost all of its value in European political affairs. They still see a need to be prepared for tension and conflict.

"Warfighting... is like a primer... the feints, flanks, attacks all apply in other walks of life."--F. Lee Bailey, attorney.

More than forty years of commitment to nuclear weapons may have prepared Britain to take part in Armageddon, but not to defend itself against attack. What made British governments choose this path and how have they justified it? How have they responded to the moral questions it raises? Using material from recently-released official documents, Roger Ruston presents a moral history of British defence policy, from the 'lesson' of Appeasement to the nuclear modernizations of the eighties, and answers many of the questions that governments have avoided. The book will be of great interest to defence historians, moralists, politicians, and general readers who need a clear account of their country's defence predicament as a basis from which to devise workable and morally acceptable alternatives.

This timely and accessible book traces the evolution of the nuclear arms race from its origin in Roosevelt's decision to develop an atomic bomb to Reagan's decision to continue its expansion in the 1980s. As Powaski explains, the United States and the Soviet Union have a combined total of almost 50,000 nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms treaties and agreements are threatening to collapse, he argues, while the proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons throughout the world has given many countries the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Powaski shows how one President after another has promised to do his utmost to end the nuclear weapons competition, yet each one has actually increased the quantity of these weapons in the American arsenal, revealing a startling discrepancy between Presidential words and actions.

Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What military plans were there for using it? This neglected dimension of British nuclear policy is assessed in detail for the first time, using confidential records - including those of the Chiefs of Staff - which have become available for the entire post-war decade. The emergence and evolution of British strategic ideas about nuclear deterrence and targeting are documented and analysed by Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, who also argue that British thinking was distinctive and made a much more substantial impact on nuclear strategy than American accounts would suggest. They reveal that, from a perspective unique to British circumstances and traditions, British officials made a significant contribution to early thinking about nuclear weapons. This study covers the early shift from a 'countervalue' to a damage limitation targeting posture, the assessment of the Soviet threat, the impact of the Korean War, the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the decision to manufacture a hydrogen weapon in 1954, and the inter-service rivalries in the mid-1950s about the nature and size of the British strategic force. As well as providing a survey of British thinking, it is unusual in its focus on strategic comparisons between Britain and the United States.

There is a growing distance between experts and the public on the subject of nuclear strategy; this reader sets the terms for an effective public debate on the issue. It provides the significant essays and excerpts from longer works, from Berbard Brodie and Herman Kahn to Henry Kissinger and Fred Ikle, that have charted the development of American nuclear strategy. Each section is introduced by an essay outlining the major events of the period and relating the excerpts to them. It ends with questions for study and analaysis with suggested further reading.

A review of the full range of recent official and non-official schemes for improving NATO's conventional posture, from exploitation of emerging technologies to non-provocative defences, in the light of prevailing military, political, economic and demographic trends.

Decisions about war have always been made by humans, but now intelligent machines are on the cusp of changing things - with dramatic consequences for international affairs. This book explores the evolutionary origins of human strategy, and makes a provocative argument that Artificial Intelligence will radically transform the nature of war by changing the psychological basis of decision-making about violence. Strategy, Evolution, and War is a cautionary preview of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) will revolutionize strategy more than any development in the last three thousand years of military history. Kenneth Payne describes strategy as an evolved package of conscious and unconscious behaviors with roots in our primate ancestry. Our minds were shaped by the need to think about warfare-a constant threat for early humans. As a result, we developed a sophisticated and strategic intelligence. The implications of AI are profound because they depart radically from the biological basis of human intelligence. Rather than being just another tool of war, AI will dramatically speed up decision making and use very different cognitive processes, including when deciding to launch an attack, or escalate violence. AI will change the essence of strategy, the organization of armed forces, and the international order. This book is a fascinating examination of the psychology of strategy-making from prehistoric times, through the ancient world, and into the modern age.

In this new and fully revised edition Pinar Bilgin provides an accessible yet critical analysis of regional security in the Middle East, analysing the significant developments that have taken place in the past years. Drawing from a wide range of critical approaches to security, the book offers a comprehensive study of pasts, presents, and futures of security in the region. The book distinguishes itself from previous (critical) studies on regional security by opening up both 'region' and 'security'. Different from those approaches that bracket one or the other, this study takes seriously the constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of) security. There is not one Middle East but many, shaped by the insecurities of those who voice them. This book focuses on how present-day insecurities have their roots in practices that have, throughout history, been shaped by 'geopolitical inventions of security'. In doing so, the book lays the contours of a framework for thinking critically about regional security in this part of the world. This second edition of Regional Security in the Middle East is a key resource for students and scholars interested in International Relations and Political Science, Security Studies, and Middle East Studies.

Known as the science of strategy, game theory is a branch of mathematics that has gained broad acceptance as a legitimate methodological tool, and has been widely adapted by a number of other fields. Frank C. Zagare provides an introduction to the application of game theory in the fields of security studies and diplomatic history, demonstrating the advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events and strategic relationships. Comprised of three parts, the first illustrates the basic concepts of game theory, initially with abstract examples but later in the context of real world foreign policy decision-making. The author highlights the methodological problems of using game theory to construct an analytic narrative and the advantages of working around these obstacles. Part II develops three extended case studies that illustrate the theory at work: the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the July Crisis of 1914, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Finally, in Part III, Zagare describes a general theory of interstate conflict initiation, limitation, escalation, and resolution and rebuts criticisms of the methodology. Logically demanding, Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies conveys an intuitive understanding of the theory of games through the use of real-world examples to exemplify the 'theory in action'.

Between 2021 and 2031, the UK government is set to spend over GBP230 billion on its military. Who decides how to use these funds, and how can we be sure that the UK's armed forces can meet the threats of tomorrow? This book provides the answers to these crucial questions. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, it uncovers the factors that underpin the translation of strategic direction into military capability. In a series of interviews, over 30 top admirals, generals and air marshals give their own views on the procurement and maintenance of the nation's current and future military capability. Their unrivalled professional knowledge and experience affords a fascinating insight into the higher management of national defence.

This revised and updated second edition features over twenty new chapters and offers a wide-ranging collection of cutting-edge essays from leading scholars in the field of Security Studies. The field of Security Studies has undergone significant change during the past 20 years, and is now one of the most dynamic sub-disciplines within International Relations. This second edition has been significantly updated to address contemporary and emerging security threats with chapters on organised crime, migration and security, cyber-security, energy security, the Syrian conflict and resilience, amongst many others. Comprising articles by both established and up-and-coming scholars, The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies provides a comprehensive overview of the key contemporary topics of research and debate in the field of Security Studies. The volume is divided into four main parts: * Part I: Theoretical Approaches to Security * Part II: Security Challenges * Part III: Regional (In)Security * Part IV: Security Governance This new edition of the Handbook is a benchmark publication with major importance for both current research and the future of the field. It will be essential reading for all scholars and students of Security Studies, War and Conflict Studies, and International Relations.

Since its formation in 1948, and particularly since the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995, Israel has experienced turbulent political change and numerous ongoing security challenges, including major party splits, collapsed peace talks with the Palestinians and Syria, nuclear threats from Iran, and even the specter of civil war as Israel withdrew from Gaza. This essential survey brings together Israeli and American scholars to provide a much-needed balanced introduction to Israel's domestic politics and foreign policy. Experts tackle this difficult subject in three parts: domestic politics, foreign policy challenges, and strategic challenges. Domestic topics include the Israeli Right and Left; religious, Russian, and Arab parties; the Supreme Court; and the economy. Part two discusses Israel's complicated and often fractious relationships with the Palestinians and the Arab world, as well as its improved relations with Turkey and India and continuing close relationship with the United States. The Israel-Hizbollah War of 2006 and existential threats to Israel, including the threat from Iran, are detailed in part three. This compelling and authoritative coverage provides students with the necessary framework to understand Israel's political past and present, as well as the direction Israel is likely to take in the future.

Contents

1. Introduction (Robert O. Freedman)

Part One: Israeli Domestic Politics
2. The Israeli Right (Ilan Peleg)
3. The Israeli Zionist Left (Mark Rosenblum)
4. Israel's Religious Parties (Shmuel Sander and Aaron Kampinsky)
5. Israel's Russian Parties (Vladimir Ze'ev Khanin)
6. Israel's Arab Parties (Hillel Frisch)
7. Israel's Supreme Court (Pnina Lahav)
8. Israel's Economy (Ofira Seliktar)

Part Two: Israel's Foreign Policy Challenges
9. Israel and the Palestinians (Barry Rubin)
10. Israel and the Arab World (David Lesch)
11. Israel's Strategic Relations with Turkey and India (Efraim Inbar)
12. Israel and the United States (Robert O. Freedman)

Part Three: Israel's Strategic Challenges
13. Existential Threats to Israel (Steven David)
14. Israel's Second Lebanon War (Elli Lieberman)

This new handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the issues facing naval strategy and security in the twenty-first century. Featuring contributions from some of the world's premier researchers and practitioners in the field of naval strategy and security, this handbook covers naval security issues in diverse regions of the world, from the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to the Arctic and the piracy-prone waters off East Africa's coast. It outlines major policy challenges arising from competing claims, transnational organized crime and maritime terrorism, and details national and alliance reactions to these problems. While this volume provides detailed analyses on operational, judicial, and legislative consequences that contemporary maritime security threats pose, it also places a specific emphasis on naval strategy. With a public very much focused on the softer constabulary roles naval forces play (such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, naval diplomacy, maintenance of good order at sea), the overarching hard-power role of navies has been pushed into the background. In fact, navies and seapower have been notably absent from many recent academic discussions and deliberations of maritime security. This handbook provides a much-desired addition to the literature for researchers and analysts in the social sciences on the relationship between security policy and military means on, under, and from the sea. It comprehensively explains the state of naval security in this maritime century and the role of naval forces in it. This book will be of much interest to students of naval security and naval strategy, security studies and IR, as well as practitioners in the field.

As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption.

The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be to knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.

Did the Trump administration have a cybersecurity strategy, or was it hell-bent on dismantling years of consensus-building on how the nation should respond to an existential threat to its digital life blood? Based on insider accounts and exclusive interviews with experts, Cyber in the Age of Trump offers a first-time chronicle and analysis of the Trump administration's approach to cybersecurity, its curious decisions and strategic choices, places where its work has earned applause, and the places where cyber pros see major signs of danger. The new administration came in with a strong faith in technology, a sense that the U.S. could better deploy its cyber weaponry to deter foes, and a willingness to continue popular Obama-era policies on collaborating with industry. But it didn't seem to have a cyber vision, or one that was applied consistently. And in the absence of such a strategic overview, the threat to the nation would only grow. Cyber in the Age of Trump is the first book to examine the impact of President Trump on the nation's greatest long-term strategic challenge and how a "disruptor presidency" has upended consensus and threatened to derail cyber policy.

This book sets out a new analytic methodology: analysis by contrasting narratives (ACN), which states that defining an enemy and attempting to counter threats can contribute to the manifestation of that threat. Peter de Werd applies ACN to the problem the US faced in understanding and responding to the phenomenon of Al Qaeda in the 1990s. He demonstrates how this approach can fill a gap in intelligence studies by enhancing the understanding of complex intelligence problems and strengthening the practice of intelligence analysis. Adopting a reflexivist theoretical stance, the book underlines the importance of an integrated approach to interpretation and action, and of a continuous dialogue between intelligence and policy.