This book is a follow-up volume to the editors' acclaimed The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion. The editors have assembled a number of leading experts on the Persian Gulf to reflect on factors affecting security there in the 21st century. Most contributors are from the region itself and for the first time share the results of ongoing research with an outside audience. The chapters profile the diverse society in the Gulf and the historical pattern of Gulf security before focusing on current security concerns between Iran and the Arab states. They explore the mutual perceptions of the peoples of the Gulf today and the role of the new generation in shaping its future.

This definitive reference resource on cyber warfare covers all aspects of this headline topic, providing historical context of cyber warfare and an examination its rapid development into a potent technological weapon of the 21st century. Today, cyber warfare affects everyone-from governments that need to protect sensitive political and military information, to businesses small and large that stand to collectively lose trillions of dollars each year to cyber crime, to individuals whose privacy, assets, and identities are subject to intrusion and theft. The problem is monumental and growing exponentially. Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare provides a complete overview of cyber warfare, which has been used with increasing frequency in recent years by such countries as China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and the United States. Readers will gain an understanding of the origins and development of cyber warfare and of how it has become a major strategic element in warfare for countries throughout the world. The encyclopedia's entries cover all of the most significant cyber attacks to date, including the Stuxnet worm that successfully disabled centrifuges in Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility; the attack on Israel's internet infrastructure during its January 2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip; the worldwide "Red October" cyber attack that stole information from embassies, research firms, military installations, and nuclear and other energy infrastructures; and cyber attacks on private corporations like Sony. Provides comprehensive coverage of the major individuals, organizations, impacts, and issues related to cyber warfare that enables readers to better understanding of the impact of cyber warfare on modern conflicts Includes a detailed chronology that documents the evolution and use of cyber warfare over the past few decades Supplies further readings and a lengthy bibliography that offer a wealth of options to students conducting extensive research on the subject

This book examines how the United States uses limited military force and other means to influence adversaries and potential adversaries. It reviews when limited force can and cannot work and examines a range of current challenges, including those of guerrilla groups or minor powers armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. It also looks at the complications arising from domestic politics and the difficulties of using force in an alliance.

For three decades the analysis of strategic coercion has been dominated by two landmark books: Tom Schelling's Arms and Influence and Alex George's Strategic Diplomacy, both of which addressed the requirements of American foreign policy during the cold war. This book argues for a reappraisal of the role of strategic coercion - defined as the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices. It emphasizes the importance of drawing on the experiences of countries other than the United States, and of considering the new circumstances of the post cold war world. An international team of scholars, led by Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, provides critical commentaries on the work of Schelling and George and a series of fascinating case studies. These cover most regions of the world, a variety of different actors - including terrorist groups - and different forms of coercion - including the use of economic sanctions.

Over the past decade the Caspian Sea region has risen from relative obscurity to considerable prominence in global affairs. Located at the crossroads of traditional trade routes between Europe and Asia and possessing vast natural resources, oil and natural gas among them, it attracts widespread international interest. The emergence of new sovereign states in the region has fundamentally transformed its political landscape. The future of the Caspian region is far from certain, however, as it is challenged by a wide variety of political, socio-economic and military threats which include the declining living standards of vast segments of local populations, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions and conflicts, militant separatism, international terrorism, and illegal trade in arms and drugs. The security of the region is also affected by the intensifying strategic competition among major outside powers over establishing their political and economic influence in regional affairs. The book offers a competent analysis of the major political, economic and security developments in the region by a diverse group of highly qualified experts from the Caspian littoral states, the USA and the European Union.

Unbeknownst to just about all observers of international affairs, America's decision in 1991 to provide air defense to oppressed Kurds in Iraq after the Gulf War had ended ushered in an entirely new era in American foreign policy. Until that moment, the United States used military power to defend against threats (real and perceived) that its leaders thought would either weaken America's position in the world order or-in the worst case-threaten the homeland. For the first time ever, the United States militarily was now actively involved in states that represented no threat, and with missions that were largely humanitarian and socio-political. After establishing the Kurdish no-fly zone, the US in quick succession intervened in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. Even after 9/11, it decided that it had a duty to not just invade Iraq, but reconstruct Iraqi society along Western lines. In Mission Failure, the eminent international relations scholar Michael Mandelbaum provides a sweeping interpretive history of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era to show why this new approach was doomed to failure. America had always adhered to a mission-based foreign policy, but in the post-Cold War era it swung away from security concerns to a near-exclusive emphasis on implanting Western institutions wherever it could. Many good things happened in this era, including a broad expansion of democracy and strong growth in the global economy. But the U.S. never had either the capacity or the will to change societies that were dramatically different from our own. Over two decades later, we can see the wreckage: a broken Iraq a teetering Afghanistan, a China that laughs at our demands that they adopt a human rights regime, and a still-impoverished Haiti. Mandelbaum does not deny that American foreign policy has always had a strong ideological component. Instead, he argues that emphasizing that particular feature generally leads to mission failure. We are able to defend ourselves well and effectively project power, but we have very little capacity to change other societies. If nothing else, that is what the last quarter century has taught us.

The emerging trends of terrorism in Asia have in the recent past challenged the conventional wisdom that dictated and defined violence by non-state actors. This, as the chapters in this volume suggest, is illustrated by its distinct characteristics, forcing the world at large to grapple with these threats, including volunteers from countries that had remained isolated from the contagion until now. Various facets of the challenge from the Islamic State (IS) and the unfolding contours of terrorism in Asia, have been analysed and written about in the past. Most of the perspectives have, however, been Western, with a sprinkling of Asian views. The present volume is a modest attempt to join the discourse on Asian terrorism from an Indian perspective. It is hoped that these essays will enliven and enrich the debate on the challenge of terrorism in Asia that is increasingly threatening peace and stability as well as values and ideals. The volume has been organised in four sections. The first deals with the ideological and technological aspects as well as the funding, communication and weapons of the IS and other terror groupings. The remaining three sections focus on West and Central Asia, South Asia, as well as China and Southeast Asia.

Sun Tzu's book of strategy and psychology has as much to tell us today as when it was written 2,500 years ago. Michael Nylan, in her provocative introduction, sees new and unexpected lessons to be learned from The Art of War-in business, relationships, games of skill, academic careers and medical practices. Strategy, like conflict, is woven into society's very roots. Nylan's crisp translation "offers a masterly new evaluation of this classic work, which balances the overtly military content with a profound and thought-provoking analysis" (Olivia Milburn). It proves that Sun Tzu is more relevant than ever, helping us navigate the conflicts we know and those we have yet to endure.

The Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda was organized by SIPRI to consider how arms control can contribute to creating a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. The proceedings of the symposium include comprehensive discussions of the new normative and structural elements of the post-cold war global security system and the objectives and limits of arms control within that evolving system.

World-renowned political thinkers and scientists write on nuclear weapons and war in the twenty-first century. The contributors include Mikhail Gorbachev, who first declared 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought', Robert McNamara, US Defense Secretary at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War; and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to resign from the Manhattan Project, where the world's first nuclear weapons were produced.

Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. "Mars Learning" closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps' small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the "Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual" and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

At the end of World War II, Britain faced enormous financial and economic problems, made more intractable by the heavy defence expenditure demanded by colonial presence in Asia, Africa and the Middle East and the decision to go ahead with producing a British atomic bomb in the light of a growing Soviet threat.This book looks at how British defence policy has balanced the country's need to maintain the status of an independent nuclear power with its diminishing role in world politics, generally, concentrating on how that policy was applied in key events such as the Korean War, the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Falklands. It will provide a clearly written and accessible analysis of the main currents of and developments in British defence policy since 1945. This book is aimed at students (including upper forms in schools, first-year undergraduates) of politics and history and general readers.

The contributors to this overview of the changes in security studies reflect critically on the past decades since the 1980s and consider what the future holds, in a select few areas of security studies. In spite of the individuality of the approaches and spread of topics, the authors conclude that analysts and policy-makers have not been able to respond well to the changes that have occurred and that they must revise their approach is they are to meet the challenges of the future.

The development of a European security architecture comprising NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE exemplifies the redefinition of Western values and institutions in the post-Cold War era. Gülnur Aybet examines the precedents for legitimate intervention in upholding democracy, free markets, and human rights in the post-Cold war era from the perspectives of international law and Gramscian-derived concepts of legitimacy. The author also focuses on the acceptance of military power by civil society.

In light of the intertwining logics of military competition and economic interdependence at play in US-China relations, Trading with the Enemy examines how the United States has balanced its potentially conflicting national security and economic interests in its relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). To do so, Hugo Meijer investigates a strategically sensitive yet under-explored facet of US-China relations: the making of American export control policy on military-related technology transfers to China since 1979. Trading with the Enemy is the first monograph on this dimension of the US-China relationship in the post-Cold War. Based on 199 interviews, declassified documents, and diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks, two major findings emerge from this book. First, the US is no longer able to apply a strategy of military/technology containment of China in the same way it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is because of the erosion of its capacity to restrict the transfer of military-related technology to the PRC. Secondly, a growing number of actors in Washington have reassessed the nexus between national security and economic interests at stake in the US-China relationship by moving beyond the Cold War trade-off between the two in order to maintain American military preeminence vis-a-vis its strategic rivals. By focusing on how states manage the heterogeneous and potentially competing security and economic interests at stake in a bilateral relationship, this book seeks to shed light on the evolving character of interstate rivalry in a globalized economy, where rivals in the military realm are also economically interdependent.

Only several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear security issues are again at the forefront of international concern. This timely collection addresses issues of cleanup at Chernobyl and other sites of nuclear disasters, nuclear smuggling, safety concerns in the Ukrainian and Russian nuclear industries, and Ukraine's negotiations with Russia and the West regarding the transference of its nuclear weapons to Russia. Preeminent scholars in their fields, the contributors provide up-to-the-minute information and fresh insights into questions critical to the future of the former Soviet Union and to Russian and Ukrainian relations with the West.

In the summer of 793 AD Viking raiders attacked and looted the monastic island of Lindisfarne, off the coast of Northumberland. This assault was only the beginning, within 18 months huge areas of the British coast was being devastated by the terrifying shi

The Transatlantic Relationship , written by a group of experts drawn from both sides of the Atlantic, examines the security, trade, and cultural aspects of the United States - European Union relationship. It focuses in particular on the politics of alliance reconfigurations, especially with regard to NATO, the NACC, and the OSCE; the new issues in the new World Trade Organization; the structural factors affecting NAFTA-EU relations; and the cultural dimensions of the relationship.

Many books and articles have been written on wars in narrow seas. However, none deals in any comprehensive manner with the problems of strategy and conduct of naval operations. The aim of this book is to explain in some detail the characteristics of a war fought in narrow seas and to compare and contrast strategy and major operations in narrow seas and naval warfare in the open ocean..

The book examines the Anglo-American relationship in the early postwar period through a case study of the American military assistance programme launched in 1949. It analyses the degree and changing nature of interdependence between the two states under this programme from 1949 to 1956. It focuses in particular on the tensions in US policy between Congress and the Administration, the differing conceptions of the Anglo-American relationship held by the two institutions and the problems this posed for Britain.

This text takes issue with arguments that security studies is a discipline of limited use in making sense of the post-Cold War world. It argues that many of the most interesting theoretical issues in international relations can most usefully be studied through a prism labelled "security studies." The book combines chapters which provide a variety of critical perspectives on the discipline and address a diverse range of theoretical concerns, with chapters that examine such substantive issues as weapons proliferation and the changing meaning of "security" for actors in the erstwhile conflict between East and West.

Two historians--one American and one British--examine the ways in which rivalries and personality conflicts among Allied commanders adversely affected the D-Day invasion and its aftermath.In anticipation of the 75th anniversary of D-Day comes this fresh perspective on the Normandy invasion -- -the beginning of the end of World War II. The book highlights the conflicting egos, national rivalries, and professional abilities of the principal D-Day commanders who planned and executed the OVERLORD Operation and its aftermath. Two historians, one American and one British, show how lack of cooperation and bad decisions lengthened the war, increased casualties, and allowed the later Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.From their in-depth analysis of past D-Day literature, primary and archival sources, the authors provide insightful answers to the many controversies that have long surrounded the OVERLORD campaign. Among the questions addressed are: What caused the two-month delay for the Allied breakout from the Normandy beachhead. Why did the bulk of the German army escape from the Falaise Pocket? Who stopped Patton's August 1944 advance into Germany? Why did it take so long to open the Port of Antwerp needed for securing the required supplies for the Allied advance into Germany?The evidence presented in this book makes it clear that the problems raised by these questions and many other difficulties could have been avoided if the Allied commanders had been less contentious, a factor that sometimes led to catastrophic battlefield outcomes. Complete with maps that illustrate the campaign's progression and photographs of the commanders and the forbidding battlefield terrain, this new examination of the war in Europe makes a major contribution to our understanding of the decision-making behind these pivotal historic events.

Whatever happened to the post-Cold War "peace dividend"? Why does military spending continue to escape federal budget reductions? Why, despite the nearly universal desire to reduce government waste and budget deficits, is the United States still saddled with a costly, bloated military-industrial complex? The answer, says Sanford Gottlieb, is the debilitating dependence of a key sector of the American economy on defense jobs and profits. Defense Addiction is based on hundreds of interviews with defense contractors, union representatives, members of Congress, state and federal officials, lobbyists, economic development professionals, and local activists. Gottlieb explains how these groups and individuals cope with defense dependence, competition for federal funds, and budget and job cuts-painting a sobering picture of how this addiction hampers the nation's ability to deal effectively with a host of domestic and global problems. Gottlieb's engaging and jargon-free volume points to civilian public investments, reduced military spending, strengthened international peacekeeping, and other measures that could help our country kick the defense habit. His book also provides guidance to companies and communities struggling to break free in the face of inadequate government policies.

The question of burden sharing has always been important in NATO - it has in fact resulted a "crisis literature" on NATO - but it has an acute relevance today because the US will cut its defence budget over a ten-year period and is no longer automatically willing to lead military operations. The Libya mission 'Unified Protector' is a case in point: the US did not want to lead, but was forced to "lead from behind" because allies lacked some of the necessary capacities. Thus, even if Europeans are politically willing, as in this case, they may not be militarily able to use force.
This edited collection asks whether Europe, in a current situation of economic austerity and postmodern political values, can play a key role in regional and global security and defence. Hitherto Europeans have been called upon to rise to the occasion of matching the US with minor contributions, ranging from "showing the flag" to militarily important contributions. But when the US signals that its lead role no longer is automatic, what about the European allies? Can they and will they undertake sharp operations on their own, assuming leading roles? Which of NATO's European allies are able militarily, and willing politically, to undertake "sharp operations" and to actually use force for the purpose of policy? This issue is of key importance for policy as well as for scholarship on NATO. In this volume, the ability and willingness to use force for political purposes amongst NATO's European members are explored, firstly considering the important drivers for the use of force, namely history, political culture, economy and threat perceptions, and then scrutinising the use of force in eight European NATO countries: the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Denmark and Norway.