This book provides an introduction to the theory and practice of diplomacy and its vital role in an era of increasing international uncertainty.

The work employs a distinctive "diplomatic perspective" on international relations and argues that the experience of conducting diplomacy gives rise to a set of priorities: first, the peaceful resolution of disputes; second, the avoidance of unwanted conflict; and, third, the minimization of the intensity of violent conflict where it has become unavoidable. It argues that changes in the international system require a shift in priorities from the diplomacy of problem-solving by building institutionalized cooperation, to the diplomacy of managing relationships between people. Divided into three sections, the first examines what is meant when we talk about diplomacy, why we need diplomats, and the operations of the modern diplomatic system of states. The second discusses the "three bads," about which people generally worry: bad leaders, bad media, and bad followers. The idea of "bad" is considered in terms of the moral character, professional competence, and the consequences of what people do for us. The final section discusses diplomacy and bad diplomats, reviewing what people can do to help themselves and the professionals be good diplomats.

This book is intended as a primary text for courses in international diplomacy and as a supplementary text for courses on contemporary issues in international relations.

Table of Contents

Part I: Diplomacy and Diplomats

1. Introduction: What are we talking about when we talk about diplomacy?

2. Why we need diplomacy and diplomats

3. The modern diplomatic system of states

Part II: Diplomacy and "The Three Bads" of International Relations

4. Diplomacy and bad leaders

5. Diplomacy and bad media

6. Diplomacy and bad followers

Part III: Conclusions

7. Diplomacy and bad diplomats

Germany's Schlieffen Plan of the First World War is much talked of but little understood. Translations of primary sources recently available clarify the issues involved. The great deficiency in the discussion of German war planning prior to the Great War has been the dearth of reliable primary sources. Practically nothing was made public before the German Reichsarchiv was destroyed in April 1945,and this problem is compounded for Anglophone historians by the fact that the most interesting secondary literature was printed in German periodicals in the early 1920s. This book makes available in English translationmany of the documents concerning German war planning before 1914 that survived the war, but were kept closely guarded by the East German army archives, and only became available with the fall of the wall. Included are the only archival history of German war planning, Wilhelm Dieckmann's Der Schlieffenplan, Hellmuth Greiner's secret history of the German west front intelligence estimate from 1885 to 1914, and two of the younger Moltke's General Staff exercises. The book also presents other little-known documents found in other German archives as well as the most important parts of the 1920s literature concerning the debate on the German war plan. The picture ofGerman war planning which now emerges is both more complex and more credible than the previous single-minded emphasis on the 'Schlieffenplan'. TERENCE ZUBER has also written Inventing the Schlieffen Plan and The Moltke Myth; born in Cleveland, Ohio, he is currently living in Wurzburg, Germany.

The Instant New York Times Bestseller "I could not put this extraordinary book down. Three Days at the Brink is a masterpiece: elegantly written, brilliantly conceived, and impeccably researched. This book not only sparkles but is destined to be a classic!" -Jay Winik, bestselling author From the #1 bestselling author and award-winning anchor of Special Report with Bret Baier, comes the gripping lost history of the Tehran Conference, where FDR, Churchill, and Stalin plotted D-Day and the Second World War's endgame. With the fate of World War II in doubt and rumors of a Nazi assassination plot swirling, Franklin Roosevelt risked everything at a clandestine meeting that would change the course of history. November 1943: The Nazis and their Axis allies controlled nearly the entire European continent. Japan dominated the Pacific. Allied successes at Sicily and Guadalcanal had gained them modest ground but at an extraordinary cost. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet Red Army had been bled white. The path of history walked a knife's edge. That same month a daring gambit was hatched that would alter everything. The "Big Three"-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin-secretly met for the first time to chart a strategy for defeating Adolf Hitler. Over three days in Tehran, Iran, this trio-strange bedfellows united by their mutual responsibility as heads of the Allied powers-made essential decisions that would direct the final years of the war and its aftermath. Meanwhile, looming over the covert meeting was the possible threat of a Nazi assassination plot, code-named Operation Long Jump. Before they left Tehran, the three leaders agreed to open a second front in the West, spearheaded by Operation Overload and the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy the following June. They also discussed what might come after the war, including dividing Germany and establishing the United Nations-plans that laid the groundwork for the postwar world order and the Cold War. Bestselling author and Fox News Channel anchor Bret Baier's new epic history, Three Days at the Brink, centers on these crucial days in Tehran, the medieval Persian city on the edge of the desert. Baier makes clear the importance of Roosevelt, who stood apart as the sole leader of a democracy, recognizing him as the lead strategist for the globe's future-the one man who could ultimately allow or deny the others their place in history. With new details discovered in rarely seen transcripts, oral histories, and declassified State Department and presidential documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Baier illuminates the complex character of Roosevelt, revealing a man who grew into his role and accepted the greatest challenge any American president since Lincoln had faced.

An indispensable guide to how wars are fought, James F. Dunnigan's classic text has been enormously popular with citizens, professional soldiers, and journalists alike. Now, it's been revised to include a stunning array of new subjects. From the cutting edge of cyberwar to the current concern about terrorism, How to Make War presents a clear picture of complex weapons, armed forces, and tactics.

Describing a new world order, one with a greater number of equipped players than the "Big Two" (the United States and the former Soviet Union), this updated edition features all the elements of traditional warfare, along with a discussion of terrorist techniques; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and Third World ballistic missiles. Past editions of How to Make War were chillingly accurate in assessing and predicting the outcomes of all the major conflicts in the past two decades. Loaded with expertise and the latest information, this edition is an essential reference for any military library -- and a work that forewarns, and forearms, the Free World for the conflicts ahead.

The key roles played by the Royal Observer Corps in the Second World War have, all too often, been overshadowed by more glamourous arms of the defence forces. The teams in the Sector Stations, plotting the battles raging above, and the Spitfires and Hurricanes swooping upon the formations of enemy fighters and bombers, present easily-imagined and dramatic scenes. Yet between the radar stations, detecting the German aircraft approaching over the Channel, and the Sector Controls were the little sand-bagged posts of the Observer Corps that provided over-land tracking of the enemy formations. The Royal Observer Corps (the Royal' prefix being approved in 1941) proved a vital link in the communication chain in the defence of the UK, particularly in the Battle of Britain, as it provided the only means of tracking enemy aircraft once they had crossed the coastline. The highly-skilled Observers were also able to identify and count the enemy aircraft, turning blips on a screen into actual types and numbers of German machines. Even after the threat from the Luftwaffe receded after the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the ROC again came to the fore when the V1s opened a new reign of terror in 1944. Because these small, fast weapons were so hard to detect the RAF's fighter controllers moved into the ROC's operations rooms so that they could respond to the V-1 threat more rapidly. In this official history of the ROC written shortly after the war, the corps' operations throughout the conflict are set out in great detail. This includes a section on the last flight of Rudolf Hess, as well as one detailing the work of those who were selected for employment as Seaborne Observers on ships during the D-Day landings, where their specialist identification skills were used to prevent the all-too prevalent instances of friendly fire'.

European Security in the New Political Environment provides a thorough analysis of the detail and nature of post-Cold War security issues, from both traditional and new security agendas, assessing the current efficacy of current institutions and policies to address these issues.

In November 1983, Soviet nuclear forces went on high alert when intelligence reported alarming activity on US bases. In response, the Soviets planned for a nuclear strike by NATO on Eastern Europe. And then Able Archer 83, a vast NATO war game exercise, ended. What the West didn't know was that the Soviets thought Operation Able Archer 83 was real and were preparing for a surprise missile attack from NATO. This close scrape with Armageddon was unknown until 2015, when the US released an analysis. Able Archer 83 vividly recreates the atmosphere that nearly unleashed nuclear war.

The armed forces of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan are in dire need of reform to address a plethora of problems including inadequate training, low morale, poor public perception, and low recruitment numbers. This book uses the postmodern military model to measure how public perception of the military is influenced by self-identification in Taiwan, and it shows that the public has little confidence or trust in their military, even as they remain acutely aware of the threat posed by an increasingly belligerent China and its ever-growing People's Liberation Army. While there has been much analysis as to what strategies and weapons systems should be adopted by ROC defense planners, relatively little has been written on how to create a more relevant military within Taiwan society. Ultimately, this book addresses these matters and provides policymakers within the ROC government and military, as well as researchers of Asia Pacific security, with an understanding of the current relationship between military and society, to assist in the creation of a more accountable military.

In this unique, interactive story, you are the leader of a U.S. Army M1 Abrams tank platoon. Throughout the text, you will have an opportunity to make life-or-death decisions, and the events that unfold will be dictated by the choices you make. As you progress through the book, you will learn important tactical and operational lessons. Whether or not you are – or want to be – a tank platoon leader you will find this book highly entertaining and instructive. There are two operations to survive – an assault and a counter-reconnaissance mission. In each you must bring your knowledge and judgment to bear on the scenario in order to achieve the objective. If you choose wrong, defeat and even death may be your fate. If you succeed, you can savor the taste of victory and live to fight another day. The scenarios are highly realistic, and there are maps and appendices with detailed specifications of the hardware involved to help you make informed decisions. Written before Operation Desert Storm, and published in 1991, the military technology in Armor Attacks may be dated by today’s standards, but the need for human leadership and effective, rapid decision-making has not changed. Armor Attacks was recognised as an invaluable teaching tool by United States Military Academy, West Point and used to teach cadets the essential skills of leadership, decision-marking and tactics – a decade of USMA leaders trained with this book. To supplement the original text, this new edition includes the West Point instructor reference guide, which explains and amplifies the teaching points of each scenario encountered. Want to know more? Click here to hear John Antal discuss all things gaming - from tabletop war-gaming to WWII video games.

A critical look into how and why the U.S. military needs to become more adaptable. Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat. Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.

The words of the ancient Chinese sages are as timeless as they are wise. The words of ancient Chinese philosophers have influenced other thinkers across the world for more than 2,000 years, and continue to shape our ideas today. The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy includes translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War, Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, the teachings of the master sage Confucius, and the writings of Mencius. From insights on warfare and diplomacy to advice on how to deal with one's neighbors and colleagues, this collection of classical Eastern philosophy will provide readers with countless nuggets of wisdom. IBPA Benjamin Franklin Gold Award Winner 2017!

Although the West won the Cold War, the continuation of the status quo is not a foregone conclusion. The former Soviet-aligned regions outside of Russia -- Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, and others -- sit atop decaying armed forces while Russian behavior has grown more and more aggressive, as evidenced by its intervention in Ukraine in recent years. Thomas Young delves into the state of these defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, whose resources have declined at a faster rate than their Western neighbors' due to social and fiscal circumstances at home and shifting attitudes in the wider international community. With rigorous attention to the nuances of each region's politics and policies, he documents the status of reform of these armed forces and the role that Western nations have played since the Cold War, as well as identifying barriers to success and which management practices have been most effective in both Western and Eastern capitals. This is essential reading for undergraduates and graduates studying the recent history of Europe in the post-Soviet era, as well as those professionally involved in defense governance in the region.

This Handbook brings together 30 state-of-the-art essays covering the essential aspects of global security research and practice for the 21st century. * Embraces a broad definition of security that extends beyond the threat of foreign military attack to cover new risks for violence * Offers comprehensive coverage framed around key security concepts, risks, policy tools, and global security actors * Discusses pressing contemporary issues including terrorism, disarmament, genocide, sustainability, international peacekeeping, state-building, natural disasters, energy and food security, climate change, and cyber warfare * Includes insightful and accessible contributions from around the world aimed at a broad base of scholars, students, practitioners, and policymakers

Based on extensive Japanese-language materials, this book is the first to examine the development of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. It addresses: how the GSDF was able to emerge as the post-war successor of the Imperial Japanese Army despite Japan's anti-militarist constitution; how the GSDF, despite the public skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, built domestic and international legitimacy; and how the GSDF has responded to changes in international and domestic environments. This path-breaking study of the world's third-largest-economic power's ground army is timely for two reasons. First, the resurgence of tensions in Northeast Asia over territorial disputes, and the emphasis recent Japanese governments have placed on using the GSDF for defending Japan's outlying islands is driving media coverage and specialist interest in the GSDF. Second, the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has focused global attention on the GSDF as Japan's lead disaster relief organization. This highly informative and thoroughly researched book provides insight for policy makers and academics interested in Japanese foreign and defense policies.

The Korean War was the first armed engagement for the newly formed U.S. Air Force, but far from the type of conflict it expected or wanted to fight. As the first air war of the nuclear age, it posed a major challenge to the service to define and successfully carry out its mission by stretching the constraints of limited war while avoiding the excesses of total war. Conrad Crane analyzes both the successes and failures of the air force in Korea, offering a balanced treatment of how the air war in Korea actually unfolded. He examines the Air Force's contention that it could play a decisive role in a non-nuclear regional war but shows that the fledgling service was held to unrealistically high expectations based on airpower's performance in World War II, despite being constrained by the limited nature of the Korean conflict. Crane exposes the tensions and rivalries between services, showing that emphasis on strategic bombing came at the expense of air support for ground troops, and he tells how interactions between army and air force generals shaped the air force's mission and strategy. He also addresses misunderstandings about plans to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the war and includes new information from pilot correspondence about the informal policy of "hot pursuit" over the Yalu that existed at the end of the war. The book considers not only the actual air effort in Korea but also its ramifications. The air force doubled in size during the war and used that growth to secure its position in the defense establishment, but it wagered its future on its ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict-a position that left it unprepared to fight the next limited war in Vietnam. As America observes the fiftieth anniversary of its initial engagement in Korea, Crane's book is an important reminder of the lessons learned there. And as airpower continues to be a cornerstone of American defense, this examination of its uses in Korea provides new insights about the air force's capabilities and limitations. Conrad C. Crane is professor of history at the United States Military Academy and the author of Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II.

At first sight it seems that there is little in common between the security dynamics of Northeast Asia and South Asia. They are geographically situated in different parts of Eurasia. Their threat perceptions are different, being informed by their unique historical experience. These geo-strategic particularities have molded their security postures. Both these regions are distinguished by the presence of adversarial dyads- North Korea-South Korea and Pakistan-India. These countries have single-mindedly pursued their quest for nuclear weapons, except for South Korea, that was dissuaded in its own nuclear endeavor by the by the United States.

The Strategic Survey 2014 is the annual review of world affairs from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It argues that changing patterns in international relations make it vital for the world's businesses to carry out geopolitical due diligence. The resurgence of major-power geopolitics was the striking feature of international affairs in the year to mid-2014. Russia and Europe competed for influence in Ukraine, where a revolution in support of closer integration with Europe was followed by Moscow's annexation of Crimea and a pro-Russian insurgency in eastern regions. Tensions rose between China and Japan as the leaders of both countries stepped up their assertive nationalism. However, progress was made in nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world's major powers. The year's developments heralded a period of heightened strategic change that would sharpen the challenges facing the United States in maintaining global influence. Strategic Survey 2014: The Annual Review of World Affairs analyses the events and themes of the year region by region. It includes essays on cybersecurity and privacy, on assessing drivers of strategic change, and on hybrid forms of insecurity in the developing world. The Strategic Geography section includes maps on the humanitarian disaster in Syria, France's role in Africa and the Pacific Alliance trade bloc in Latin America. The book contains a chronology of key events around the world. It is an invaluable tool for interpreting world-wide strategic developments and has, since 1966, provided essential analysis of the year's key events in international relations for government policy makers, journalists, business leaders and academics.

Intriguing, real-life espionage stories bring to life a comparative history of the Allies' efforts to seize, control, and exploit German science and technology after the Second World War. During the Second World War, German science and technology posed a terrifying threat to the Allied nations. These advanced weapons, which included rockets, V-2 missiles, tanks, submarines, and jet airplanes, gave troubling credence to Nazi propaganda about forthcoming "wonder-weapons" that would turn the war decisively in favor of the Axis. After the war ended, the Allied powers raced to seize "intellectual reparations" from almost every field of industrial technology and academic science in occupied Germany. It was likely the largest-scale technology transfer in history. In Taking Nazi Technology, Douglas M. O'Reagan describes how the Western Allies gathered teams of experts to scour defeated Germany, seeking industrial secrets and the technical personnel who could explain them. Swarms of investigators invaded Germany's factories and research institutions, seizing or copying all kinds of documents, from patent applications to factory production data to science journals. They questioned, hired, and sometimes even kidnapped hundreds of scientists, engineers, and other technical personnel. They studied technologies from aeronautics to audiotapes, toy making to machine tools, chemicals to carpentry equipment. They took over academic libraries, jealously competed over chemists, and schemed to deny the fruits of German invention to any other land-including that of other Allied nations. Drawing on declassified records, O'Reagan looks at which techniques worked for these very different nations, as well as which failed-and why. Most importantly, he shows why securing this technology, how the Allies did it, and when still matters today. He also argues that these programs did far more than spread German industrial science: they forced businessmen and policymakers around the world to rethink how science and technology fit into diplomacy, business, and society itself.

This book offers a discursive analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy on Humanitarian Interventions (HI) and the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Across the chapters the author addresses important questions, such as: what is the position of the HI and R2P in the Turkish foreign policy discourse? Is there any variation between cases when it comes to the use of these concepts? How do these discourses shape/change/transform or sustain the Turkish identity? Despite the tendency in some countries to incorporate HI and R2P principles into their foreign policy (UK, Netherlands, Canada, Japan), and the fact that some countries are lobbying to make these principles a part of international or UN law, in the developing world these policies and concepts have not gained widespread recognition or approval. Countries like China, Brazil and India approach these concepts with suspicion or with reservation. The same tendency can be observed in the MENA region and in some parts of Africa and Asia. In this book, the author looks at the reasons behind these differences in approach and explores how the concept of identity affects Turkish foreign policy specifically. This study is invaluable for researchers and students of R2P and HI and foreign policy discourse in general.

Military Strategy of Middle Powers explores to what degree twenty-first-century middle powers adjust their military strategies due to changes in the international order, such as the decline in US power. The overarching objective of the book is to explain continuity and change in the strategies of a group of middle powers during the twenty-first century. These strategies are described, compared, and explained through the lens of Realism. In order to find potential explanations for change or continuity within the cases, as well as for similarities and differences between the cases, the strategies of 11 'middle' powers are analysed (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, India, Japan, and South Korea). This group of countries are considered similar in several important aspects, primarily regarding relative power capacity. When searching for potential explanations for different strategic behaviours among the middle powers, their unique regional characteristics are a key focus and, consequently, the impact of the structure and polarity, as well as the patterns of amity and enmity, of the regional context are analysed. The empirical investigation is focused on security strategies used since the terrorist attacks 9/11 2001, which was one of the first major challenges to US hegemony. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

In this study, first published in 1966, Quester analyzes pre-nuclear age theories of deterrence to equip us with perspective and data by which current theories can be evaluated. Quester presents a forceful argument in support of the relevance of history to discussions of military strategy.

Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be wrong. In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman shows how foreign policy officials often try to avoid the challenge of assessing uncertainty, and argues that this behavior undermines high-stakes decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination of historical and experimental evidence, he explains how foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international politics, and shows how placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate. A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.

Churchill has gone down in history as one of the greatest leaders the world has ever known. From the day the Second World War was declared he stood out as the only man wanting to take offensive action. But is this accolade deserved? The first few years of the war were nothing short of disastrous, and author Stephen Napier shows how Churchill's strategies - and his desire not to be the first British prime minister to surrender the nation - brought the war effort to the brink of ruin and back again. Did his series of retaliatory raids in response to a German accidental bombing help cause the Blitz? Were plans already at large for the US to join the war, with Churchill as the primary puppet master? Napier explores all this and more in a shocking examination of Churchill's leadership using first-person accounts from his peers and his electorate.