After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe at the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a new balance of power. The settlement established in 1815 ushered in the emergence of a genuinely European security culture. In this volume, leading historians offer new insights into the military cooperation, ambassadorial conferences, transnational police networks, and international commissions that helped produce stability. They delve into the lives of diplomats, ministers, police officers and bankers, and many others who were concerned with peace and security on and beyond the European continent. This volume is a crucial contribution to the debates on securitisation and security cultures emerging in response to threats to the international order.

Due to the continuing expansion of the notion of security, various national, regional and international institutions now find themselves addressing contemporary security issues. While institutions may evolve by adjusting themselves to new challenges, they can also fundamentally alter the intricate balance between security and current legal frameworks. This volume explores the tensions that occur when institutions address contemporary security threats, in both public and international law contexts. As part of the Connecting International with Public Law series, it provides important and valuable insights into the legal issues and perspectives which surround the institutional responses to contemporary security challenges. It is essential reading for scholars, practitioners and policy makers seeking to understand the legal significance of security institutions and the implications of their evolution on the rule of law and legitimacy.

Military strategy is concerned with the translation of armed force into intended political effects. As such, it constitutes one of the most important activities of the past two centuries; and yet during this period it has not always been practised very effectively. In this book, John Stone seeks to explain why this has been the case by examining various instances of strategic practice drawn from the period between the eighteenth century and the present day. He contends that, to be truly effective, strategy must faithfully reflect the political context in which it is formulated. Where strategy has failed, it is frequently because its practitioners have paid undue attention to military-technical matters at the expense of politics.

Alliances have shaped grand strategy and warfare since the dawn of civilization. Indeed, it is doubtful that the United States of America would have gained its independence without its Revolutionary War alliance with France. Such alliances may prove even more important to international security in the twenty-first century. Economic and financial difficulties alone will ensure that policy makers attempt to spread the burden of securing vital interests onto other nations through alliances, both formal organizations such as NATO and informal alliances of convenience as developed to wage the Gulf War in 1991. A team of leading historians examine the problems inherent in alliance politics and relationships in the framework of grand strategy through the lens of history. Aimed at not just the military aspects of alliances, the book uncovers the myriad factors that have made such coalitions succeed or fail in the past.

In contrast to previous studies of the South Korea-United States alliance, Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig analyze the bigger picture, including the history, economics, security, alliance structure, politics, and the future of the alliance. Taking alliance theory as a starting point, the authors argue that the alliance provides an ideal case study to examine how the political development and economic growth of junior partners impact an alliance. As South Korea's capabilities and ambitions have grown, the alliance has evolved from an asymmetric regional security relationship to an economic partnership with global interests, while China's rise and North Korea's nuclear development mean that South Korea remains of strategic importance for American interests in East Asia. This book will be read both as a major contribution to Korean studies and the study of alliance politics and theory.

From Russia’s tampering with the US election to the WannaCry hack that temporarily crippled the NHS, cyber has become the weapon of choice for democracies, dictators, and terrorists.

Cheap to acquire, easily deniable, and used for a variety of malicious purposes ― from crippling infrastructure to sowing discord and doubt ― cyberweapons are re-writing the rules of warfare. In less than a decade, they have displaced terrorism and nuclear missiles as the biggest immediate threat to international security and to democracy.

Here, New York Times correspondent David E. Sanger takes us from the White House Situation Room to the dens of Chinese government hackers and the boardrooms of Silicon Valley, piecing together a remarkable picture of a world now coming face-to-face with the most sophisticated ― and arguably most dangerous ― weapon ever invented.

The Perfect Weapon is the dramatic story of a new era of constant sabotage, misinformation, and fear, in which everyone is a target.

As she charts her destiny in lifting her masses from poverty and backwardness, India is also obliged to ward off incessant military aggression from her two near, and most inimical neighbours. Resultantly, she is compelled to spend as much as Rupees three hundred thousand crores annually from her overburdened national income to maintain the world's third largest defence forces. In normal course of state wisdom therefore, one would expect that such a humungous investment would be managed in the most efficient manner to get the maximum purchase out of every paisa. But alas, that is not the case. What else could explain the contradiction that even with so much manpower, hardware and funding committed upon her military power, none of her adversaries are deterred from perpetrating acts of gross military escalation while indulging in brazen acts of sabotaging the Indian nationhood - freely and with immunity. It is also hard to explain as to why must India's massive defence forces have to be left short of their due war wherewithal, burdened with obsolete weaponry and hardware, and saddled with overgrown and over-frigid organisations for higher (mis)management. The answer is straightforward: the Indian military institution is inefficiently managed. The long festering flaw is observed, understood and enthusiastically banished now and then, but corrections are never actually attempted. Solutions are known, more or less, but are held down, diverted and scotched by systemic prejudices, paranoia and partisan machinations, as if by design. The causes of such afflictions too are no secret: political apathy, bureaucratic subterfuge and to some extent, myopic military leadership.This book is devoted to arguments for empowerment of the apex military management system, identification of the hurdles, redress of systemic concerns valid or conjured, and goes on to offer certain options to modernise the system of Indian defence management into an operationally efficient political instrument that would promote the cause of India's sovereignty in a cost-effective manner.

This book provides a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of India's strategic culture in the era of globalization. It examines dominant themes that have governed India's foreign and security policy and events which have shaped India's role in global politics. The author Examines the traditional and new approaches to diplomacy and the state's response to internal and external conflicts; Delineates policy pillars which are required to protect the state's strategic interests and forge new relationships in the current geopolitical climate; Compares the domestic and international security policies followed during the tenures of Narsimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh; and Analyzes how the Narendra Modi era has brought on changes in India's security strategy and the use of soft power and diplomacy. With extensive additions, drawing on recent developments, this edition of the book will be a key text for scholars, teachers and students of defence and strategic studies, international relations, history, political science and South Asian studies.

This book focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy during the period from 1945 to 1964. Based on recently released documents, the book argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.

The sudden transformation of the Cold War security order in 1989 altered the structure of the European state system, and necessitates the striking of a new balance between the economic, political and military requirements of security. This volume focuses on the most important institutions of European security, the European Union and NATO. Both institutions are expanding, especially eastwards, in terms of their respective roles and membership. This double expansion raises many questions; most crucially, whether Europe will be a two-speed security order, which suggests openess, inclusiveness and the emergence of an anarchical society, or a two-tiered security order, which suggests a continued hierachical security system with all of its associated historical liabilities. -- .

While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.

Strategy is not a modern invention. It is an essential and enduring feature of human history that is here to stay. In this original essay, Colin S. Gray, world-renowned scholar of strategic thought, discusses the meaning of strategy and its importance for politicians and the military as a means of achieving desired outcomes in complex, uncertain conditions. Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Great Peloponnesian War to the Second World War, Vietnam, and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gray ably shows how great military thinkers of the past and present have acted strategically in their various ideological, political, geographical and cultural contexts. Looking to the future, he argues that strategy will continue to provide a vital tool-kit for survival and security, but that the global threat posed by nuclear weapons remains an on-going challenge without obvious practical solutions. As Gray boldy asserts, there is no promised land ahead, only hard and dangerous times that will require us to master the theory and practice of strategy to secure our own future.

'Cyber security' is a recent addition to the global security agenda, concerned with protecting states and citizens from the misuse of computer networks for war, terrorism, economic espionage and criminal gain. Many argue that the ubiquity of computer networks calls for robust and pervasive countermeasures, not least governments concerned about their potential effects on national and economic security. Drawing on critical literature in international relations, security studies, political theory and social theory, this is the first book that describes how these visions of future cyber security are sustained in the communities that articulate them. Specifically, it shows that conceptions of time and temporality are foundational to the politics of cyber security. It explores how cyber security communities understand the past, present and future, thereby shaping cyber security as a political practice. Integrating a wide range of conceptual and empirical resources, this innovative book provides insight for scholars, practitioners and policymakers.

Strategy is not a modern invention. It is an essential and enduring feature of human history that is here to stay. In this original essay, Colin S. Gray, world-renowned scholar of strategic thought, discusses the meaning of strategy and its importance for politicians and the military as a means of achieving desired outcomes in complex, uncertain conditions. Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Great Peloponnesian War to the Second World War, Vietnam, and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gray ably shows how great military thinkers of the past and present have acted strategically in their various ideological, political, geographical and cultural contexts. Looking to the future, he argues that strategy will continue to provide a vital tool-kit for survival and security, but that the global threat posed by nuclear weapons remains an on-going challenge without obvious practical solutions. As Gray boldy asserts, there is no promised land ahead, only hard and dangerous times that will require us to master the theory and practice of strategy to secure our own future.

Intelligence and security communities have access to an overwhelming amount of information. More data is better in an information-hungry world, but too much data paralyzes individual and institutional abilities to process and use information effectively. Robert Mandel calls this phenomenon "global data shock." He investigates how information overload affects strategic ambiguity, deception, and surprise, as well as the larger consequences for international security. This book provides not only an accessible framework for understanding global data shock and its consequences, but also a strategy to prepare for and respond to information overload. Global Data Shock explores how information overload facilitates deception, eroding international trust and cooperation in the post-Cold War era. A sweeping array of case studies illustrates the role of data shock in shaping global events from the 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait to Brexit. When strategists try to use an overabundance of data to their advantage, Mandel reveals, it often results in unanticipated and undesirable consequences. Too much information can lead to foreign intelligence failures, security policy incoherence, mass public frustrations, curtailment of democratic freedoms, and even international political anarchy. Global Data Shock addresses the pressing need for improved management of information and its strategic deployment.

After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity.

- When do individuals radicalise? - Can terrorism be rational? - How can we define terrorism? - What is the role of women in terrorism? - Can states be terrorist? World leading experts answer these questions in Contemporary Terrorism Studies, the first textbook to provide a multi-disciplinary, methodologically plural, and richly diverse introduction to terrorism studies. Contemporary Terrorism Studies covers the main approaches in terrorism studies, and is structured into three comprehensive sections. The first on 'The State of Terrorism Studies' maps the development and historical context of the discipline, and looks to the future of terrorism studies. Part two on 'Issues and Debates in Terrorism Studies' examines key contentious questions and debates such as the role of women, technology, and the media in terrorism. The final part, part three on 'Countering Terrorism' focuses specifically on counterterrorism: it's instruments, foreign policy, legal frameworks, and organisations. Overall, text will engage students, and establish a confident understanding of the subject. The textbook has been developed with pedagogical features to help enhance student learning. Each chapter contains case studies to highlight real world examples of political violence, questions for reflection to encourage critical thinking, and suggestions for further reading which provide useful sources for further reading, essays, and exam preparation. Furthermore, a consistent, accessible tone, and jargon-free writing style makes Contemporary Terrorism Studies the clearest guide to understanding terrorism. Digital formats and resources Contemporary Terrorism Studies is available for students and institutions to purchase in a variety of formats, and is supported by online resources. - The e-book offers a mobile experience and convenient access along with hyperlinks to question pointers, and a library of web links, helping you to broaden your knowledge and understanding terrorism studies: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/ebooks - Student resources: additional case studies, guidance on accessing databases, pointers for tackling the questions for reflection, and suggested web links organised by chapter are available online. - Lecturer resources: customisable PowerPoint slides to adapt and use in teaching

Tactics is the art and science of employing all available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the actions taken by a commander to arrange units and activities in relation to each other and the enemy. Filled with diagrams of attack plans, defensive strategies, and troop movements, U.S. Army Tactics Field Manual is the playbook the U.S. Army uses to employ available means to win in combat. This book provides combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army and joint capabilities. This book focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control measures, and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each type and form of combat operation. It is the common reference for all students of the tactical art, both in the field and the Army school system.

This book analyzes both NATO's and the EU's military crisis management operations and provides an explanation for the fact that it is sometimes NATO, sometimes the EU, and sometimes both international organizations that intervene militarily in a conflict. In detailed case studies on Libya, Chad/Central African Republic, and the Horn of Africa, Claudia Fahron-Hussey shows that the capabilities and preferences of the organizations matter most and the organizations' bureaucratic actors influence the decision-making process of the member states.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors-their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment-determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

For the past sixty years, countries have conducted military and civilian activities in space, often for competitive purposes. But they have not yet fought in this environment. This book examines the international politics of the space age from 1957 to the present, the reasons why strategic restraint emerged among the major military powers, and how recent trends toward weaponization may challenge prior norms of conflict avoidance. James Clay Moltz analyzes the competing demands of national interests in space against the shared interests of all spacefarers in preserving the safe use of space in the face of emerging threats, such as man-made orbital debris. This new edition offers analysis of the 2011 to 2018 period, including the second term of President Obama and the beginning of the Trump administration. Focusing on great power competition and cooperation, as well as questions related to the sustainability of current and future national space policies, The Politics of Space Security is an authoritative history of the space age.

Historical research on the German army of the interwar period has concentrated on the development of the so-called 'Blitzkrieg'. However, Matthias Strohn shows that for most of the time the German army, restricted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was too weak to launch an offensive war or even effectively repel an invader. Accordingly, the army focused instead primarily on planning a defensive war against superior enemies, especially France and Poland. Making extensive use of German archival sources, Strohn explores the development of military thought and doctrine for the defence of Germany and shows how these ideas were tested in war games and staff rides. His findings comprehensively revise our understanding of the German army in this period, shedding new light on the ideas of leading figures in the German military and how events, such as the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, influenced military planning.