During the 1930s, war with Germany became increasingly likely. The British Government believed that it would start with massed ranks of enemy planes, dropping bombs and poison gas on civilians in major towns and cities, terrifying them into surrendering. When war broke out, preparations to protect the population were piecemeal and inadequate. As anticipated, people were shocked by the first raids and the response of rescue services was chaotic. But far from breaking morale, the Blitz galvanised public opinion in support of the war. Soon people became hardened by their experiences and attacks from the air became a normal, albeit terrible, part of daily life. Blitz Diary tells the story in a remarkable series of eyewitness accounts from the war's earliest and darkest days through to the end, when the V-2 rockets brought devastation without warning. Preservation of such first-hand accounts has become increasingly important as the Blitz fades from living memory. This expanded edition includes new chapters and new accounts from key eyewitnesses.

A direct consequence of the War on Terror launched after the attacks of September 11, 2001 is an awareness of the need for homeland security. This war is being used to justify a huge expansion of government powers and spending, but funds allocated for homeland security are often for programs far removed from anything that might be termed "defense" or "security." In Homeland Security Scams, James T. Bennett shows that this government spending is doing very little to make us safer, but a great deal to make us poorer, less free, and more dependent on the federal government.

Regardless of the color of the "security alert" issued by the Homeland Security czar, the spending light is always green as pork barrel dollars are showered on programs of dubious worth. Lobbyists lobby for homeland security grants and contracts; corporations and state and local governments are becoming ever more dependent on federal subsidies; the vested interest in prolonging and intensifying the concern about homeland security increases; and lobbyists press for ever more money. As Bennett makes clear, with government money comes government control. Law enforcement and emergency response agencies at all levels of government are being effectively "nationalized." Police power is being concentrated, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) envisions a "surveillance" state that the East German State Police under Communism would have envied.

In this hard-hitting critique, Bennett argues that all the spending and surveillance will not win the War on Terror or preserve us from natural disasters. The foe cannot be beaten (we're having trouble even finding the enemy), cannot surrender, and still has awesome powers to lay waste to American cities and citizens. He argues that we should view terrorism as just one of many other serious threats to individuals and to nations. More sternly, he warns that the War on Terror is also a War on Privacy and a War on Liberty.

Sun Tzu's book of strategy and psychology has as much to tell us today as when it was written 2,500 years ago. Michael Nylan, in her provocative introduction, sees new and unexpected lessons to be learned from The Art of War-in business, relationships, games of skill, academic careers and medical practices. Strategy, like conflict, is woven into society's very roots. Nylan's crisp translation "offers a masterly new evaluation of this classic work, which balances the overtly military content with a profound and thought-provoking analysis" (Olivia Milburn). It proves that Sun Tzu is more relevant than ever, helping us navigate the conflicts we know and those we have yet to endure.

This new volume explores the meaning of security in relation to, and in the context of, ideas that are fundamental to both international and domestic political order.
William Bain argues that the word "security" is devoid of substantive content when divorced from ideas such as sovereignty, war, diplomacy, self-determination, globalization, cultural diversity, intervention, and trusteeship. In other words, "security" cannot be made to yield a real core or an intrinsic content because it discloses no essence that awaits discovery. This clear and accessible book draws on an impressive range of history, philosophy, and law to investigate these and other questions:
- What is the relationship between the ethics of security and the legal institution of state sovereignty? Does security necessarily follow from the mutual recognition of identity?
- Are all states, great and small, of equal moral weight?
- Does the enjoyment of security require cultural homogeneity?
- Is the body of international law that addresses question of intervention still relevant in the new circumstances of a post September 11 world?
- How might security be understood in light of wars that are fought in order to kill rather than to achieve known political aims?
This book will be of particular interest to those conducting empirical and normative research on questions of security. This is also an excellent resource for students to develop an understanding of security in contemporary world affairs.

In the first book to focus on civil-military tensions after American wars, Thomas Langston challenges conventional theory by arguing that neither civilian nor military elites deserve victory in this perennial struggle. What is needed instead, he concludes, is balance.

In America's worst postwar episodes, those that followed the Civil War and the Vietnam War, balance was conspicuously absent. In the late 1860s and into the 1870s, the military became the tool of a divisive partisan program. As a result, when Reconstruction ended, so did popular support of the military. After the Vietnam War, military leaders were "too" successful in defending their institution against civilian commanders, leading some observers to declare a crisis in civil-military relations even before Bill Clinton became commander-in-chief.

Is American military policy balanced today? No, but it may well be headed in that direction. At the end of the 1990s there was still no clear direction in military policy. The officer corps stubbornly clung to a Cold War force structure. A civilian-minded commander-in-chief, meanwhile, stretched a shrinking force across the globe. With the shocking events of September 11, 2001, clarifying the seriousness of the post-Cold War military policy, we may at last be moving toward a true realignment of civilian and military imperatives.

Why do states who are committed to the principle of civilian immunity and the protection of non-combatants end up killing and injuring large numbers of civilians during their military operations? Bugsplat explains this paradox through an in-depth examination of five conflicts fought by Western powers since 1989. It argues that despite the efforts of Western military organizations to comply with the laws of armed conflict, the level of collateral damage produced by Western military operations is the inevitable outcome of the strategies and methods through which their military organizations fight wars. Drawing on their superior technology and the strategic advantage of not having to fight on their own territory, such states employ highly-concentrated and overwhelming military force against a wide variety of political, economic, and military targets under conditions likely to produce high civilian casualties. As a result, collateral damage in western-fought wars is largely both foreseeable and preventable. The book title is derived from the name of a computer program that had been used by the Pentagon to calculate probable civilian casualties prior to launching air attacks.

Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.

One of three volumes in honour of the teaching and scholarship of the late Michael I. Handel, this book details the universal logic of strategy and the ability of liberal-democratic governments to address this logic rationally. Treating war as an extension of politics, the diverse contributors (drawn from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Israel) explore the difficulties in matching strategy to policy, especially in free societies. Several of the chapters explore the classic works of Thucydides, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu. Others investigate such major political and strategic problems as war termination; how weak powers defeat strong powers; the difficulty of deriving meaningful military lessons from history; the links and tensions between policy, strategy, and operations; the uses and abuses of attrition; and the extent to which military strategy is applicable to other fields, such as sport. While others focus on concrete cases of British strategy before and during World War I, and Israeli and US strategy today.

A comprehensive account of Israel's doctrine of national security, this study examines to what degree security theories have proven valid and suggests an updated security doctrine for the next century. Beginning with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Israeli defense planners have faced a daunting task. General Tal describes the history of the Israel-Arab wars from the War of Independence onward and presents a security theory specific to Israel from which the fighting doctrines of the Israeli military derive. He also to categorizes the levels of security various nations enjoy as a result of their differing geo-political situations, their power, and the conflicts of interests that they face with their neighbors. This volume clarifies topics in the area of national security, the art of war, principles of war, and lessons learned from past conflicts. Tal concludes that previous security theory proved valid because it was based upon a decision to allocate the great portion of available resources, both intellectual and material, to secure national defense. However, this theory is no longer valid due to political changes in the Middle East and the development of modern military technologies. He asserts a new approach that rests upon mutual strategic deterrence throughout the region.

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy "works."
The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court.
The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.
The popular idea that, because war occurs in the realm of chance, strategy is characteristically chaotic is considered and - on balance - rejected. Rather, the author concludes, a somewhat chaotic unpredictability about the consequences of strategic behaviour is a defining characteristic of, but not a literally fatal impediment to, strategy.

Prominent experts in biodefense research-many from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases-authoritatively delineate the universe of scientific, medical, and legal issues facing the biodefense research community. Regarding medical countermeasures and decontamination, the authors describe the treatment and pathogenesis of a variety of established pathogens (anthrax, plague, smallpox, Brucellosis, Glanders, and Coxiella burnettii) and review what is known about the aerosol route of infection and decontamination processes. They also examine how to discover the presence of these agents, or other previously unknown biological weapons, and detail the ongoing efforts to counter these agents, including proteomic and genomic analysis as a gateway to better diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccinations, genotyping, and forensics. Additional chapters discuss the development and use technology to identify and characterize these infectious organisms, emerging threats, and the development of countermeasures.

Spurred by their commanders during the Korean War to be "tigers," aggressive and tenacious American fighter pilots charged headlong into packs of fireball-spewing enemy MiGs, relying on their keen eyesight, piloting finesse, and steady trigger fingers to achieve victory. But by the 1980s, American fighter pilots vanquished their foes by focusing on a four-inch-square cockpit display, manipulating electromagnetic waves, and launching rocket-propelled guided missiles from miles away. In this new era of automated, long-range air combat, can fighter pilots still be considered tigers? Aimed at scholars of technology and airpower aficionados alike, Steven A. Fino's Tiger Check offers a detailed study of air-to-air combat focusing on three of the US Air Force's most famed aircraft: the F-86E Sabre, the F-4C Phantom II, and the F-15A Eagle. Fino argues that increasing fire control automation altered what fighter pilots actually did during air-to-air combat. Drawing on an array of sources, as well as his own decade of experience as an F-15C fighter pilot, Fino unpacks not just the technological black box of fighter fire control equipment, but also fighter pilots' attitudes toward their profession and their evolving aircraft. He describes how pilots grappled with the new technologies, acutely aware that the very systems that promised to simplify their jobs while increasing their lethality in the air also threatened to rob them of the quintessential-albeit mythic-fighter pilot experience. Finally, Fino explains that these new systems often required new, unique skills that took time for the pilots to identify and then develop. Eschewing the typical "great machine" or "great pilot" perspectives that dominate aviation historiography, Tiger Check provides a richer perspective on humans and machines working and evolving together in the air. The book illuminates the complex interactions between human and machine that accompany advancing automation in the workplace.

A TLS and a Prospect Book of the Year A revelatory, explosive new analysis of the military today. Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, Britain has changed enormously. During this time, the British Army fought two campaigns, in Iraq and Afghanistan, at considerable financial and human cost. Yet neither war achieved its objectives. This book questions why, and provides challenging but necessary answers. Composed from assiduous documentary research, field reportage, and hundreds of interviews with many soldiers and officers who served, as well as the politicians who directed them, the allies who accompanied them, and the family members who loved and - on occasion - lost them, it is a strikingly rich, nuanced portrait of one of our pivotal national institutions in a time of great stress. Award-winning journalist Simon Akam, who spent a year in the army when he was 18, returned a decade later to see how the institution had changed. His book examines the relevance of the armed forces today - their social, economic, political, and cultural role. This is as much a book about Britain, and about the politics of failure, as it is about the military.

An indispensable guide to how wars are fought, James F. Dunnigan's classic text has been enormously popular with citizens, professional soldiers, and journalists alike. Now, it's been revised to include a stunning array of new subjects. From the cutting edge of cyberwar to the current concern about terrorism, How to Make War presents a clear picture of complex weapons, armed forces, and tactics.

Describing a new world order, one with a greater number of equipped players than the "Big Two" (the United States and the former Soviet Union), this updated edition features all the elements of traditional warfare, along with a discussion of terrorist techniques; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and Third World ballistic missiles. Past editions of How to Make War were chillingly accurate in assessing and predicting the outcomes of all the major conflicts in the past two decades. Loaded with expertise and the latest information, this edition is an essential reference for any military library -- and a work that forewarns, and forearms, the Free World for the conflicts ahead.

This volume brings together contributions by eleven noted specialists on peace and security issues in the Caribbean. All chapters are based on recent research on the radically transformed regional situation in the post Cold-War context. Particular emphasis is placed on the formulation of security policies by the most relevant security actors, including both external powers present in the region, independent states and subregional groupings. This discussion is placed in the framework of post Cold-War security outlooks which focus on 'non-traditional' threats, mainly drugs and illegal migration.

A critical look into how and why the U.S. military needs to become more adaptable. Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat. Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.

Military Strategy of Middle Powers explores to what degree twenty-first-century middle powers adjust their military strategies due to changes in the international order, such as the decline in US power. The overarching objective of the book is to explain continuity and change in the strategies of a group of middle powers during the twenty-first century. These strategies are described, compared, and explained through the lens of Realism. In order to find potential explanations for change or continuity within the cases, as well as for similarities and differences between the cases, the strategies of 11 'middle' powers are analysed (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, India, Japan, and South Korea). This group of countries are considered similar in several important aspects, primarily regarding relative power capacity. When searching for potential explanations for different strategic behaviours among the middle powers, their unique regional characteristics are a key focus and, consequently, the impact of the structure and polarity, as well as the patterns of amity and enmity, of the regional context are analysed. The empirical investigation is focused on security strategies used since the terrorist attacks 9/11 2001, which was one of the first major challenges to US hegemony. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

Intriguing, real-life espionage stories bring to life a comparative history of the Allies' efforts to seize, control, and exploit German science and technology after the Second World War. During the Second World War, German science and technology posed a terrifying threat to the Allied nations. These advanced weapons, which included rockets, V-2 missiles, tanks, submarines, and jet airplanes, gave troubling credence to Nazi propaganda about forthcoming "wonder-weapons" that would turn the war decisively in favor of the Axis. After the war ended, the Allied powers raced to seize "intellectual reparations" from almost every field of industrial technology and academic science in occupied Germany. It was likely the largest-scale technology transfer in history. In Taking Nazi Technology, Douglas M. O'Reagan describes how the Western Allies gathered teams of experts to scour defeated Germany, seeking industrial secrets and the technical personnel who could explain them. Swarms of investigators invaded Germany's factories and research institutions, seizing or copying all kinds of documents, from patent applications to factory production data to science journals. They questioned, hired, and sometimes even kidnapped hundreds of scientists, engineers, and other technical personnel. They studied technologies from aeronautics to audiotapes, toy making to machine tools, chemicals to carpentry equipment. They took over academic libraries, jealously competed over chemists, and schemed to deny the fruits of German invention to any other land-including that of other Allied nations. Drawing on declassified records, O'Reagan looks at which techniques worked for these very different nations, as well as which failed-and why. Most importantly, he shows why securing this technology, how the Allies did it, and when still matters today. He also argues that these programs did far more than spread German industrial science: they forced businessmen and policymakers around the world to rethink how science and technology fit into diplomacy, business, and society itself.

Welcome to cyberspace - where all your computing and connection needs are on demand, and where security threats have never been more massive.A world without the advantages and convenience provided by cyberspace and the internet of things is now unimaginable. But do we truly grasp the threats to this massive, interconnected system? And do we really understand how to secure it? After all, cyber security is no longer just a technology problem; the effort to secure systems and society are now one and the same.This book discusses cyber security and cyber policy in an effort to improve the use and acceptance of security services. It argues that a substantive dialogue around cyberspace, cyber security and cyber policy is critical to a better understanding of the serious security issues we face.

For over a decade now, thinking on regional relations in the Gulf has focused on the competition for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Today, this perspective is outdated. The smaller Gulf Arab states, led by the United Arab Emirates, are calling for their own goals and interests to be considered and a new regional order has emerged. This book asesses the UAE's increasing power and the future challenges to security it poses. It is a contemporary history and analysis of the changing role of the UAE. Dina Esfandiary argues that the UAE has become more assertive in the pursuit of its own interests in the region and beyond - even when this puts it at odds with its regional allies. This behavior includes the build-up of its military and non-military capabilities, the diversification of its partners, and its willingness to use these resources. The book examines the regional causes of the UAE's growing assertiveness - especially the 2011 Arab Uprisings - as well as the international context such as the impact of the US-announced 'Pivot to Asia', the perceptions of waning US power in the Middle East, and the 2015 nuclear deal. The UAE's changing role in the region will profoundly affect regional security. This book points towards how smaller states in the region will interact with regional hegemons in the long term, as they learn from the UAE's assertiveness and seek to imitate it.

Western interests in the Asia-Pacific region have dramatically expanded over the last few years; particularly in terms of economic relationships and commercial investment. While economic development is predicted to continue in the region, the assumption of political stability on which it depends is clouded major security uncertainties lurking in the background, these could undermine the relative stability the region has come to expect, and new strains and fissures could develop in the region that would likely reverberate elsewhere. Featuring nineteen individual country profiles, which makes a unique contribution to the existing literature, this volume seeks to shed light on the key political and security factors and geopolitical trends that bear monitoring and to point out new trends that have greater significance in the post-Cold War environment.

This Handbook brings together 30 state-of-the-art essays covering the essential aspects of global security research and practice for the 21st century. * Embraces a broad definition of security that extends beyond the threat of foreign military attack to cover new risks for violence * Offers comprehensive coverage framed around key security concepts, risks, policy tools, and global security actors * Discusses pressing contemporary issues including terrorism, disarmament, genocide, sustainability, international peacekeeping, state-building, natural disasters, energy and food security, climate change, and cyber warfare * Includes insightful and accessible contributions from around the world aimed at a broad base of scholars, students, practitioners, and policymakers

Although the West won the Cold War, the continuation of the status quo is not a foregone conclusion. The former Soviet-aligned regions outside of Russia -- Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, and others -- sit atop decaying armed forces while Russian behavior has grown more and more aggressive, as evidenced by its intervention in Ukraine in recent years. Thomas Young delves into the state of these defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, whose resources have declined at a faster rate than their Western neighbors' due to social and fiscal circumstances at home and shifting attitudes in the wider international community. With rigorous attention to the nuances of each region's politics and policies, he documents the status of reform of these armed forces and the role that Western nations have played since the Cold War, as well as identifying barriers to success and which management practices have been most effective in both Western and Eastern capitals. This is essential reading for undergraduates and graduates studying the recent history of Europe in the post-Soviet era, as well as those professionally involved in defense governance in the region.