In the spring of 1987, the father of China's strategic missile program, Qian Xuesen, told colleagues that China must steel itself for a century of sustained "intellectual warfare." His use of a military metaphor was not a linguistic quirk, but reflected the central role of the military in China's emergence as a modern state, especially in the period since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Over the course of the Communist era, a uniquely military approach to China's development became embedded in the ideologies of the country's political leadership, in policy choices about national security and economic development, and in the organizational solutions adopted to put these policies into practice.
This book tells the story of how and why the Chinese military came to play such a powerful role in China's economic and institutional development. It weaves together four stories: Chinese views of technology since 1950, the role of the military in China's political and economic life, the evolution of open and flexible conceptions of public management in China, and the technological dimensions of the rise of Chinese power.
But the book primarily explores and explains a paradox. This military approach to technology and development emerged during China's period of greatest external threat, 1950-69. Yet these policies and management methods persist even as China enjoys perhaps its most benign strategic environment since the 1840s.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors-their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment-determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

This book is a follow-up volume to the editors' acclaimed The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion. The editors have assembled a number of leading experts on the Persian Gulf to reflect on factors affecting security there in the 21st century. Most contributors are from the region itself and for the first time share the results of ongoing research with an outside audience. The chapters profile the diverse society in the Gulf and the historical pattern of Gulf security before focusing on current security concerns between Iran and the Arab states. They explore the mutual perceptions of the peoples of the Gulf today and the role of the new generation in shaping its future.

Over the past decade the Caspian Sea region has risen from relative obscurity to considerable prominence in global affairs. Located at the crossroads of traditional trade routes between Europe and Asia and possessing vast natural resources, oil and natural gas among them, it attracts widespread international interest. The emergence of new sovereign states in the region has fundamentally transformed its political landscape. The future of the Caspian region is far from certain, however, as it is challenged by a wide variety of political, socio-economic and military threats which include the declining living standards of vast segments of local populations, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions and conflicts, militant separatism, international terrorism, and illegal trade in arms and drugs. The security of the region is also affected by the intensifying strategic competition among major outside powers over establishing their political and economic influence in regional affairs. The book offers a competent analysis of the major political, economic and security developments in the region by a diverse group of highly qualified experts from the Caspian littoral states, the USA and the European Union.

This is the first serious analysis of the combat capability of the British army in the Second World War. It sweeps away the myth that the army suffered from poor morale, and that it only won its battles through the use of 'brute force' and by reverting to the techniques of the First World War. Few soldiers were actively eager to close with the enemy, but the morale of the army never collapsed and its combat capability steadily improved from 1942 onwards.

The Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda was organized by SIPRI to consider how arms control can contribute to creating a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. The proceedings of the symposium include comprehensive discussions of the new normative and structural elements of the post-cold war global security system and the objectives and limits of arms control within that evolving system.

The Soviet Union remains a superpower with global security interests and ambitions. The doctrines, practices, and capabilities of its still formidable armed forces are shaping world politics just at the same time that the future of the country that created them is in doubt. This book, first published in 1991, analyses the unprecedented changes, as well as the troubling continuities, that characterized Soviet military thinking during the early 1990s. The authors - a group of leading analysts in the US national security community - confront the range of Soviet military strengths, including intercontinental nuclear power, conventional ground, and naval forces and special operations. They address questions of Soviet weapons research and development, military planning and policy making, and the role of civilian critics on Soviet military objectives. Other chapters explore the Red Army's erosion in Eastern Europe as well as the lessons of Afghanistan.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.

World-renowned political thinkers and scientists write on nuclear weapons and war in the twenty-first century. The contributors include Mikhail Gorbachev, who first declared 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought', Robert McNamara, US Defense Secretary at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War; and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to resign from the Manhattan Project, where the world's first nuclear weapons were produced.

This definitive reference resource on cyber warfare covers all aspects of this headline topic, providing historical context of cyber warfare and an examination its rapid development into a potent technological weapon of the 21st century. Today, cyber warfare affects everyone-from governments that need to protect sensitive political and military information, to businesses small and large that stand to collectively lose trillions of dollars each year to cyber crime, to individuals whose privacy, assets, and identities are subject to intrusion and theft. The problem is monumental and growing exponentially. Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare provides a complete overview of cyber warfare, which has been used with increasing frequency in recent years by such countries as China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and the United States. Readers will gain an understanding of the origins and development of cyber warfare and of how it has become a major strategic element in warfare for countries throughout the world. The encyclopedia's entries cover all of the most significant cyber attacks to date, including the Stuxnet worm that successfully disabled centrifuges in Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility; the attack on Israel's internet infrastructure during its January 2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip; the worldwide "Red October" cyber attack that stole information from embassies, research firms, military installations, and nuclear and other energy infrastructures; and cyber attacks on private corporations like Sony. Provides comprehensive coverage of the major individuals, organizations, impacts, and issues related to cyber warfare that enables readers to better understanding of the impact of cyber warfare on modern conflicts Includes a detailed chronology that documents the evolution and use of cyber warfare over the past few decades Supplies further readings and a lengthy bibliography that offer a wealth of options to students conducting extensive research on the subject

The development of a European security architecture comprising NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE exemplifies the redefinition of Western values and institutions in the post-Cold War era. Gülnur Aybet examines the precedents for legitimate intervention in upholding democracy, free markets, and human rights in the post-Cold war era from the perspectives of international law and Gramscian-derived concepts of legitimacy. The author also focuses on the acceptance of military power by civil society.

The establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency was the result of a confluence of long-term and short-term trends. Seen over the long duration, the creation of DIA was a part of the extended process of centralisation in the Department of Defense that had been taking place since the National Security Act created the department. This book is designed to provide an understanding of the Defense Intelligence Agency's participation in military and intelligence developments of the last half century. While history does not repeat itself, it does provide context, guideposts, and a framework for understanding the present. In some ways, the challenges discussed in this book and confronting today's Intelligence Community personnel are similar to those faced by their cohorts from earlier generations.

The contributors to this overview of the changes in security studies reflect critically on the past decades since the 1980s and consider what the future holds, in a select few areas of security studies. In spite of the individuality of the approaches and spread of topics, the authors conclude that analysts and policy-makers have not been able to respond well to the changes that have occurred and that they must revise their approach is they are to meet the challenges of the future.

Only several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear security issues are again at the forefront of international concern. This timely collection addresses issues of cleanup at Chernobyl and other sites of nuclear disasters, nuclear smuggling, safety concerns in the Ukrainian and Russian nuclear industries, and Ukraine's negotiations with Russia and the West regarding the transference of its nuclear weapons to Russia. Preeminent scholars in their fields, the contributors provide up-to-the-minute information and fresh insights into questions critical to the future of the former Soviet Union and to Russian and Ukrainian relations with the West.

Drawing together the work of eight experts on the arms trade and Asia-Pacific security affairs, Arms Trade, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia presents analysis and extensive data related to the arms trade and defence policy transparency mechanisms in South-East Asia. It also includes a de facto regional arms register for South-East Asia covering the period 1970-96, and will prove useful to security analysts and policy-makers seeking new approaches to transparency and confidence-building in South-East Asia.

Many books and articles have been written on wars in narrow seas. However, none deals in any comprehensive manner with the problems of strategy and conduct of naval operations. The aim of this book is to explain in some detail the characteristics of a war fought in narrow seas and to compare and contrast strategy and major operations in narrow seas and naval warfare in the open ocean..

The Transatlantic Relationship , written by a group of experts drawn from both sides of the Atlantic, examines the security, trade, and cultural aspects of the United States - European Union relationship. It focuses in particular on the politics of alliance reconfigurations, especially with regard to NATO, the NACC, and the OSCE; the new issues in the new World Trade Organization; the structural factors affecting NAFTA-EU relations; and the cultural dimensions of the relationship.

This book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars. This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and how this interaction has had significant consequences historically. Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone. Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not) why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies and war and conflict studies.

Using major new documentary sources, the authors tell the story of why and how China built its nuclear submarine flotilla and the impact of that development on the nation's politics, technology, industry, and strategy.

Discerning the early stages of the rebirth of a new Russian empire from the ashes of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival argues that Russia's recent overtly aggressive actions and foreign policy doctrines have signaled a renewal of the Cold War. At the least, Russia's actions represent the potential for renewal. This book explains these developments in a historical context. The book begins by describing Russia's initial policy of rapprochement after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its development into a foreign policy of threatened or actual armed aggression. It identifies today's Russia as a nation determined to re-establish itself as a political and military force. As a prominent figure in the development and continuation of its current foreign policy, Vladimir Putin plays a central role in the topics covered. Previous literature often treats Putin as an individual phenomenon examining his connections to corruption or the secret police, but here David E. McNabb examines him as the latest in a long history of Russian despots who followed similar expansionist policies. He details some of the tactics Putin uses to instill fear and dominate political policies of republics newly independent from Russia. These tactics include the use of energy as a weapon, cyber terrorism, and military support for ethnic Russian separatists in other sovereign nations, most recently exemplified by Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine via armed invasion. In an attempt to demystify Russia's re-emergence as an international political force, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival grounds its analyses in history. It explores as far back as the establishment of the first Russian empire, and regards Putin as a leader determined to establish a fifth imperial incarnation. It provides a nuanced understanding of how Russia arrived at its current position through recent and distant internal and international events.

Whatever happened to the post-Cold War "peace dividend"? Why does military spending continue to escape federal budget reductions? Why, despite the nearly universal desire to reduce government waste and budget deficits, is the United States still saddled with a costly, bloated military-industrial complex? The answer, says Sanford Gottlieb, is the debilitating dependence of a key sector of the American economy on defense jobs and profits. Defense Addiction is based on hundreds of interviews with defense contractors, union representatives, members of Congress, state and federal officials, lobbyists, economic development professionals, and local activists. Gottlieb explains how these groups and individuals cope with defense dependence, competition for federal funds, and budget and job cuts-painting a sobering picture of how this addiction hampers the nation's ability to deal effectively with a host of domestic and global problems. Gottlieb's engaging and jargon-free volume points to civilian public investments, reduced military spending, strengthened international peacekeeping, and other measures that could help our country kick the defense habit. His book also provides guidance to companies and communities struggling to break free in the face of inadequate government policies.

Today's North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with nearly thirty members and a global reach, differs strikingly from the alliance of twelve created in 1949 to "keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." These differences are not simply the result of the Cold War's end, 9/11, or recent twenty-first-century developments but represent a more general pattern of adaptability first seen in the incorporation of Germany as a full member of the alliance in the early 1950s. Unlike other enduring post-World War II institutions that continue to reflect the international politics of their founding era, NATO stands out for the boldness and frequency of its transformations over the past seventy years. In this compelling book, Seth A. Johnston presents readers with a detailed examination of how NATO adapts. Nearly every aspect of NATO-including its missions, functional scope, size, and membership-is profoundly different than at the organization's founding. Using a theoretical framework of "critical junctures" to explain changes in NATO's organization and strategy throughout its history, Johnston argues that the alliance's own bureaucratic actors played important and often overlooked roles in these adaptations. Touching on renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, which has reignited the debate about NATO's relevance, as well as a quarter century of post-Cold War rapprochement and more than a decade of expeditionary effort in Afghanistan, How NATO Adapts explores how crises from Ukraine to Syria have again made NATO's capacity for adaptation a defining aspect of European and international security. Students, scholars, and policy practitioners will find this a useful resource for understanding NATO, transatlantic relations, and security in Europe and North America, as well as theories about change in international institutions.