Prior to World War II, the United States's war plans were code-named by color. Japan was Orange and the United States was Blue. Miller (a retired business executive) spent over 15 years researching the plan that was used to defeat Japan. He states that the plan was . . . history's most successful war plan . . . . The prewar plans of other great powers proved, by and large, to be costly failures. Miller also gives insights into the impact of the officers who hammered out War Plan Orange: the realists and adventurists, or the cautionaries and thrusters. This is an important book for anyone wishing to understand the methods of American war planning, and it is the only book on War Plan Orange. Miller's writing style and lucid explanations make the book suitable for most readers, even though it is clearly for scholars and specialists in the field. Recommended for most academic libraries and for public libraries where there is a strong interest in World War II in the Pacific.

Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett tells the story of how the German Army, having survived the disaster of 1918, proceeded to dominate the political life of the German Republic, exercising a virtually paramount degree of power and influence by its very withdrawal from the active arena of politics: and of how, when later it was mistaken enough to play politics instead of controlling them, it began a descent which only ended in abject defeat - militarily, politically and spiritually. The author reveals the extent of the responsibility of the Army for bringing the Nazi regime to power, for tolerating the infamies of that regime once it had attained power, and for not taking the measures - at a time when only the Army could have taken them - to remove it from power. In this second edition a new foreword by Professor Richard Overy sets Wheeler-Bennett's classic text in a modern context.

Japan's post-war armed forces are a paradox, both embarrassing remnants of the past and valuable repositories of experience. This book charts the development of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) from 1954 as both unorthodox military institutions and servants of a civil society that decries militarism. Investigating JSDF contributions to Japanese and global security, the evolution of such contributions during and after the Cold War, and their possible reconfiguration for Japan's security needs ahead, Garren Mulloy offers insight into the Forces' past, present and future. He explores the characteristics and contradictions of Japanese policy, including novel approaches in response to an increasingly assertive China, the latent threat of North Korea and contributory pressure from the US. Though the American alliance remains the core of Japanese security, new partnerships and international overtures will also shape the Forces' place in Prime Minister Abe's new vision of 'proactive contributions to peace'. Defenders of Japan deconstructs how the JSDF have adapted and will continue to adapt within domestic norms, caught between unresolved legacies of Japan's imperial past and a dynamically shifting balance of future global power.

In this work, two senior naval historians analyze the discussions held in leading Soviet political, military, and naval circles concerning naval strategy and the decisions taken for warship-building programmes. They describe the reconstitution of the fleet under difficult conditions from the end of the Civil War up to the mid-1920s, leading to a change from classical naval strategy to a Jeune ecole model in the first two Five-Year Plans, including efforts to obtain foreign assistance in the design of warships and submarines. Their aim is to explain the reasons for the sudden change in 1935 to begin building a big ocean-going fleet. After a period of co-operation with Germany from 1939-41, the plans came to a halt when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Finally, this work covers the reopening of the naval planning processes in 1944 and 1945 and the discussions of the naval leadership with Stalin, the party and government officials about the direction of the new building programmes as the Cold War began.

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (1915-2005) was a brilliant military leader, a scholar and, most of all, an exceptional presidential adviser who served under seven successive administrations. A respected strategist, he participated at the highest levels of government in many of the most important decisions of the second half of the twentieth century. As President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary, he was the de facto originator of the National Security Council process and served as a mentor and role model to his successors down to the present day. He was involved in many security challenges, such as establishing and sustaining NATO, planning for nuclear weapons and arms control, and implementing detente. He developed a collaborative method of approaching national security affairs -a style that reflected a strong capacity to engage effectively the necessary people to work together to achieve the best possible outcomes. In doing so, he learned and taught best practices in national security that still influence decision making today. This biography shows the importance of experienced soldier-scholars with high integrity on national security teams and provides the first systematic mining of the documents Goodpaster wrote on national security. Organized chronologically, it demonstrates how Goodpaster was able to adapt best practices to a constantly changing political, military, economic and technological environment. It also explains why he was so frequently selected as an insider in national security decision making. His life and work reveal how best to approach complex national security problems and the kind of collaborative leadership needed to get the job done. Still today, his method confirms General Scowcroft's view that Goodpaster is "too important to ignore."

Strategic Survey 2020 The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics The worst pandemic in a century tested governments, strained societies and frayed international ties during the year to mid-2020. But there was much more to this period than COVID-19. Climate change - another severe global challenge - grew more critical. US President Donald Trump was impeached, the United Kingdom left the European Union, and Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani was killed. Strategic Survey 2020 provides a comprehensive overview of major developments in every region of the world, and in-depth analysis of key geopolitical and geo-economic issues: War The US-Taliban agreement to end the United States' longest war; the persistence of other complex armed con flicts. Power China's growing in fluence, especially in Europe and the South Paci fic; Turkey's force projection in the Middle East and beyond; the EU's quest for strategic autonomy; the new geopolitics of the Red Sea; the implications of Ethiopia's giant dam for relations between Nile states; the increasing use of economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft. Rules The decline of multilateralism; prospects for arms control; key gaps in international law; Central Asia's connectivity; changes in the status of Jammu and Kashmir; dual legitimacy in Venezuela. Strategic Survey 2020 also assesses a diverse range of political leaders: Progress of three ambitious reforming presidents: Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of Mexico. Foreign-policy legacies of two veteran leaders: Angela Merkel and Abe Shinzo. Trump's challenges to both the transatlantic relationship and China. Evolution of and prospects for Vladimir Putin's presidency. Strategic Survey 2020 is the indispensable guide to the events, actors and forces that de ned an exceptionally complex year. It highlights the geopolitical issues that will shape the international agenda in 2021.

The Lost Art of War by Sun Tzu II (commonly known as Sun Bin) was unearthed in 1972 in an ancient Chinese tomb. Translated into English for the first time, this stunning discovery has been hailed as a worthy sequel to The Art of War. Packed with precise strategies and detailed tactics that can be adapted to any organization, this sophisticated manual builds upon Sun Tzu’s phenomenally popular teachings and offers powerful insights into such principles as strategic manoeuvring, tactical formation, and adaptation.Renowned scholar Thomas Cleary brings the sometimes cryptic meanings of Sun Tzu II’s ancient Chinese wisdom to life. Like his translation of The Art of War, Cleary’s rendering of The Lost Art of War is an absorbing and practical work, whose military metaphors can be adapted to the complexities of business, government, diplomacy, relationships, and social action.

‘It is extraordinary how reluctant the British soldier is to show cunning. We try to play the game of war as if it had rules for fair play like cricket and football.’ ‘If you want to make your spell of duty pass quickly, concentrate on prowling properly.’ ‘By Jove, look! There is a suspicious-looking man creeping under those bushes. It will be heaven help that rough chap if he makes a break!’ First published in the 1940s for the newly-recruited British Home Guard, The Art of Prowling showed recruits how to sneak up on the enemy without being seen, how to avoid attracting attention, and why they should never underestimate a German spy. Will you be awarded the Good Prowler’s Badge?

Over the past decade the Caspian Sea region has risen from relative obscurity to considerable prominence in global affairs. Located at the crossroads of traditional trade routes between Europe and Asia and possessing vast natural resources, oil and natural gas among them, it attracts widespread international interest. The emergence of new sovereign states in the region has fundamentally transformed its political landscape. The future of the Caspian region is far from certain, however, as it is challenged by a wide variety of political, socio-economic and military threats which include the declining living standards of vast segments of local populations, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions and conflicts, militant separatism, international terrorism, and illegal trade in arms and drugs. The security of the region is also affected by the intensifying strategic competition among major outside powers over establishing their political and economic influence in regional affairs. The book offers a competent analysis of the major political, economic and security developments in the region by a diverse group of highly qualified experts from the Caspian littoral states, the USA and the European Union.

This book is a follow-up volume to the editors' acclaimed The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion. The editors have assembled a number of leading experts on the Persian Gulf to reflect on factors affecting security there in the 21st century. Most contributors are from the region itself and for the first time share the results of ongoing research with an outside audience. The chapters profile the diverse society in the Gulf and the historical pattern of Gulf security before focusing on current security concerns between Iran and the Arab states. They explore the mutual perceptions of the peoples of the Gulf today and the role of the new generation in shaping its future.

This is the first serious analysis of the combat capability of the British army in the Second World War. It sweeps away the myth that the army suffered from poor morale, and that it only won its battles through the use of 'brute force' and by reverting to the techniques of the First World War. Few soldiers were actively eager to close with the enemy, but the morale of the army never collapsed and its combat capability steadily improved from 1942 onwards.

The Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda was organized by SIPRI to consider how arms control can contribute to creating a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. The proceedings of the symposium include comprehensive discussions of the new normative and structural elements of the post-cold war global security system and the objectives and limits of arms control within that evolving system.

The Soviet Union remains a superpower with global security interests and ambitions. The doctrines, practices, and capabilities of its still formidable armed forces are shaping world politics just at the same time that the future of the country that created them is in doubt. This book, first published in 1991, analyses the unprecedented changes, as well as the troubling continuities, that characterized Soviet military thinking during the early 1990s. The authors - a group of leading analysts in the US national security community - confront the range of Soviet military strengths, including intercontinental nuclear power, conventional ground, and naval forces and special operations. They address questions of Soviet weapons research and development, military planning and policy making, and the role of civilian critics on Soviet military objectives. Other chapters explore the Red Army's erosion in Eastern Europe as well as the lessons of Afghanistan.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.

Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. "Mars Learning" closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps' small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the "Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual" and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

World-renowned political thinkers and scientists write on nuclear weapons and war in the twenty-first century. The contributors include Mikhail Gorbachev, who first declared 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought', Robert McNamara, US Defense Secretary at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War; and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to resign from the Manhattan Project, where the world's first nuclear weapons were produced.

This definitive reference resource on cyber warfare covers all aspects of this headline topic, providing historical context of cyber warfare and an examination its rapid development into a potent technological weapon of the 21st century. Today, cyber warfare affects everyone-from governments that need to protect sensitive political and military information, to businesses small and large that stand to collectively lose trillions of dollars each year to cyber crime, to individuals whose privacy, assets, and identities are subject to intrusion and theft. The problem is monumental and growing exponentially. Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare provides a complete overview of cyber warfare, which has been used with increasing frequency in recent years by such countries as China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and the United States. Readers will gain an understanding of the origins and development of cyber warfare and of how it has become a major strategic element in warfare for countries throughout the world. The encyclopedia's entries cover all of the most significant cyber attacks to date, including the Stuxnet worm that successfully disabled centrifuges in Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility; the attack on Israel's internet infrastructure during its January 2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip; the worldwide "Red October" cyber attack that stole information from embassies, research firms, military installations, and nuclear and other energy infrastructures; and cyber attacks on private corporations like Sony. Provides comprehensive coverage of the major individuals, organizations, impacts, and issues related to cyber warfare that enables readers to better understanding of the impact of cyber warfare on modern conflicts Includes a detailed chronology that documents the evolution and use of cyber warfare over the past few decades Supplies further readings and a lengthy bibliography that offer a wealth of options to students conducting extensive research on the subject

The contributors to this overview of the changes in security studies reflect critically on the past decades since the 1980s and consider what the future holds, in a select few areas of security studies. In spite of the individuality of the approaches and spread of topics, the authors conclude that analysts and policy-makers have not been able to respond well to the changes that have occurred and that they must revise their approach is they are to meet the challenges of the future.

Only several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear security issues are again at the forefront of international concern. This timely collection addresses issues of cleanup at Chernobyl and other sites of nuclear disasters, nuclear smuggling, safety concerns in the Ukrainian and Russian nuclear industries, and Ukraine's negotiations with Russia and the West regarding the transference of its nuclear weapons to Russia. Preeminent scholars in their fields, the contributors provide up-to-the-minute information and fresh insights into questions critical to the future of the former Soviet Union and to Russian and Ukrainian relations with the West.

The development of a European security architecture comprising NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE exemplifies the redefinition of Western values and institutions in the post-Cold War era. Gülnur Aybet examines the precedents for legitimate intervention in upholding democracy, free markets, and human rights in the post-Cold war era from the perspectives of international law and Gramscian-derived concepts of legitimacy. The author also focuses on the acceptance of military power by civil society.

Drawing together the work of eight experts on the arms trade and Asia-Pacific security affairs, Arms Trade, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia presents analysis and extensive data related to the arms trade and defence policy transparency mechanisms in South-East Asia. It also includes a de facto regional arms register for South-East Asia covering the period 1970-96, and will prove useful to security analysts and policy-makers seeking new approaches to transparency and confidence-building in South-East Asia.