Immerse yourself in the world of the Samurai with this classic text. Code of the Samurai is the 350-year-old summary of the rules and expectations embodied in Bushido--the ancient Japanese "Way of the Warrior." Written by Taira Shigesuke, a Samurai and prominent teacher of military techniques, it was published posthumously in 1834. This influential book was intended as a training manual for young Samurai, outlining personal and professional standards. This accessible and enjoyable translation is by Thomas Cleary, the foremost translator of Asian martial classics, accompanied by the powerful line drawings of master illustrator Oscar Ratti. A new foreword by Alexander Bennett, a leading expert on Samurai history, explains the lasting importance of this classic work and its place within the canon of Japanese literature.

Developing solid, thorough infrastructure security assessments in diverse sectors

Drawing on the collective experience of many experts, this definitive reference presents the best methods, techniques, and measurements to help security analysts conduct objective security assessments. It helps readers understand advanced security assessment concepts in today's high-risk world and identify, measure, and prioritize security risks. A comprehensive, practical guide, this resource:

Describes a practical, proven approach that has been used in over 3,000 security assessments in thirty countries

Features three primary sections: an introduction that helps analysts understand today's challenging environment; an overview of security assessment methodology broken down into five specific elements; and details on tailoring the methodology to specific industries

Defines the purpose of the security assessment process, the behavioral and physical sciences brought into play, the techniques used, and measurement and evaluation tools and standards

Presents an S3E comprehensive, system-integrated methodology supported by user-friendly, step-by-step guidance that is complemented by a series of S3E Security Assessment Methodology matrices

Includes chapters dedicated to specific infrastructure sectors: water; energy; transportation; chemical industry and hazardous materials; agriculture and food; banking and finance; and telecommunications

Provides worksheets that facilitate the cataloging and documenting of research data

This book gives consultants, security practitioners, corporate security managers and directors, and others a reliable, hands-on "briefcase" reference to use in theoffice as well as in the field. It's also an ideal text for upper-level students in related courses.

Intriguing, real-life espionage stories bring to life a comparative history of the Allies' efforts to seize, control, and exploit German science and technology after the Second World War. During the Second World War, German science and technology posed a terrifying threat to the Allied nations. These advanced weapons, which included rockets, V-2 missiles, tanks, submarines, and jet airplanes, gave troubling credence to Nazi propaganda about forthcoming "wonder-weapons" that would turn the war decisively in favor of the Axis. After the war ended, the Allied powers raced to seize "intellectual reparations" from almost every field of industrial technology and academic science in occupied Germany. It was likely the largest-scale technology transfer in history. In Taking Nazi Technology, Douglas M. O'Reagan describes how the Western Allies gathered teams of experts to scour defeated Germany, seeking industrial secrets and the technical personnel who could explain them. Swarms of investigators invaded Germany's factories and research institutions, seizing or copying all kinds of documents, from patent applications to factory production data to science journals. They questioned, hired, and sometimes even kidnapped hundreds of scientists, engineers, and other technical personnel. They studied technologies from aeronautics to audiotapes, toy making to machine tools, chemicals to carpentry equipment. They took over academic libraries, jealously competed over chemists, and schemed to deny the fruits of German invention to any other land-including that of other Allied nations. Drawing on declassified records, O'Reagan looks at which techniques worked for these very different nations, as well as which failed-and why. Most importantly, he shows why securing this technology, how the Allies did it, and when still matters today. He also argues that these programs did far more than spread German industrial science: they forced businessmen and policymakers around the world to rethink how science and technology fit into diplomacy, business, and society itself.

This book offers an analysis of key individuals who have contributed to both the theory and the practice of counterinsurgency (COIN). Insurgencies have become the dominant form of armed conflict around the world today. The perceptible degeneration of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan into insurgent quagmires has sparked a renewal of academic and military interest in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. In light of this, this book provides a rigorous analysis of those individuals who have contributed to both the theory and practice of counterinsurgency: 'warrior-scholars'. These are soldiers who have bridged the academic-military divide by influencing doctrinal and intellectual debates about irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is notoriously difficult for the military, and scholarly understanding about this type of warfare is also problematic; especially given the residual anti-intellectualism within Western militaries. Thus, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare is dedicated to analysing the best perceivable bridge between these two worlds. The authors explore the theoretical and practical contributions made by a selection of warrior-scholars of different nationalities, from periods ranging from the French colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century to the Israeli experiences in the Middle East; from contributions to American counter-insurgency made during the Iraq War, to the thinkers who shaped the US war in Vietnam. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, strategic studies, defence studies, war studies and security studies in general.

Much of the literature on the African philosophy of education juxtaposes two philosophical strands as mutually exclusive entities; traditional ethnophilosophy on the one hand, and 'scientific' African philosophy on the other. While traditional ethnophilosophy is associated with the cultural artefacts, narratives, folklore and music of Africa's people, 'scientific' African philosophy is primarily concerned with the explanations, interpretations and justifications of African thought and practice along the lines of critical and transformative reasoning. These two alternative strands of African philosophy invariably impact understandings of education in different ways: education constituted by cultural action is perceived to be mutually independent from education constituted by reasoned action. Yusef Waghid argues for an African philosophy of education guided by communitarian, reasonable and culture dependent action in order to bridge the conceptual and practical divide between African ethnophilosophy and 'scientific' African philosophy. Unlike those who argue that African philosophy of education cannot exist because it does not invoke reason, or that reasoned African philosophy of education is just not possible, Waghid suggests an African philosophy of education constituted by reasoned, culture-dependent action. This book provides an African philosophy aimed at developing a conception of education that can contribute towards imagination, deliberation, and responsibility - actions that can help to enhance justice in educative relations, both in Africa and throughout the world. This book will be essential reading for researchers and academics in the field of the philosophy of education, especially those wanting to learn from the African tradition.

This yearbook continues SIPRI's annual analyses of developments in major armed conflicts, in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and in peacekeeping, developments in chemical and biological weapons, new military technology, world military expenditure, nuclear explosions, arms production, the arms trade, and nuclear, chemical, and biological arms control. Special Studies in this volume: BL area studies of the Middle East, Russia, and Europe BL armed conflict prevention, management and resolution BL information on multilateral observer, peacekeeping and electoral operations BL the comprehensive test ban treaty BL multilateral military-related export control measures BL the trade in major conventional weapons and conventional arms control

The prizewinning historian and internationally bestselling author of D-Day reconstructs the devastating airborne battle of Arnhem in this gripping new account. On September 17, 1944, General Kurt Student, the founder of Nazi Germany's parachute forces, heard the groaning roar of airplane engines. He went out onto his balcony above the flat landscape of southern Holland to watch the air armada of Dakotas and gliders, carrying the legendary American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions and the British 1st Airborne Division. Operation Market Garden, the plan to end the war by capturing the bridges leading to the Lower Rhine and beyond, was a bold concept, but could it have ever worked? The cost of failure was horrendous, above all for the Dutch who risked everything to help. German reprisals were pitiless and cruel, and lasted until the end of the war. Antony Beevor, using often overlooked sources from Dutch, American, British, Polish, and German archives, has reconstructed the terrible reality of the fighting, which General Student called "The Last German Victory." Yet The Battle of Arnhem, written with Beevor's inimitable style and gripping narrative, is about much more than a single dramatic battle--it looks into the very heart of war.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

James H. Lebovic explores the logic of seeking peace in an arms race. Flawed Logics offers a compelling intellectual history of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty - from the Truman to the Obama administration - is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic's controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control.

The Instant New York Times Bestseller "I could not put this extraordinary book down. Three Days at the Brink is a masterpiece: elegantly written, brilliantly conceived, and impeccably researched. This book not only sparkles but is destined to be a classic!" -Jay Winik, bestselling author From the #1 bestselling author and award-winning anchor of Special Report with Bret Baier, comes the gripping lost history of the Tehran Conference, where FDR, Churchill, and Stalin plotted D-Day and the Second World War's endgame. With the fate of World War II in doubt and rumors of a Nazi assassination plot swirling, Franklin Roosevelt risked everything at a clandestine meeting that would change the course of history. November 1943: The Nazis and their Axis allies controlled nearly the entire European continent. Japan dominated the Pacific. Allied successes at Sicily and Guadalcanal had gained them modest ground but at an extraordinary cost. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet Red Army had been bled white. The path of history walked a knife's edge. That same month a daring gambit was hatched that would alter everything. The "Big Three"-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin-secretly met for the first time to chart a strategy for defeating Adolf Hitler. Over three days in Tehran, Iran, this trio-strange bedfellows united by their mutual responsibility as heads of the Allied powers-made essential decisions that would direct the final years of the war and its aftermath. Meanwhile, looming over the covert meeting was the possible threat of a Nazi assassination plot, code-named Operation Long Jump. Before they left Tehran, the three leaders agreed to open a second front in the West, spearheaded by Operation Overload and the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy the following June. They also discussed what might come after the war, including dividing Germany and establishing the United Nations-plans that laid the groundwork for the postwar world order and the Cold War. Bestselling author and Fox News Channel anchor Bret Baier's new epic history, Three Days at the Brink, centers on these crucial days in Tehran, the medieval Persian city on the edge of the desert. Baier makes clear the importance of Roosevelt, who stood apart as the sole leader of a democracy, recognizing him as the lead strategist for the globe's future-the one man who could ultimately allow or deny the others their place in history. With new details discovered in rarely seen transcripts, oral histories, and declassified State Department and presidential documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Baier illuminates the complex character of Roosevelt, revealing a man who grew into his role and accepted the greatest challenge any American president since Lincoln had faced.

After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity.

During the past decade, armed drones have entered the American military arsenal as a core tactic for countering terrorism. When coupled with access to reliable information, they make it possible to deploy lethal force accurately across borders while keeping one's own soldiers out of harm's way. The potential to direct force with great precision also offers the possibility of reducing harm to civilians. At the same time, because drones eliminate some of the traditional constraints on the use of force like the need to gain political support for full mobilization they lower the threshold for launching military strikes. The development of drone use capacity across dozens of countries increases the need for global standards on the use of these weapons to assure that their deployment is strategically wise and ethically and legally sound. Presenting a robust conversation among leading scholars in the areas of international legal standards, counterterrorism strategy, humanitarian law, and the ethics of force, Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict takes account of current American drone campaigns and the developing legal, ethical, and strategic implications of this new way of warfare. Among the contributions to this volume are a thorough examination of the American government's legal justifications for the targeting of enemies using drones, an analysis of American drone campaigns' notable successes and failures, and a discussion of the linked issues of human rights, freedom of information, and government accountability.

This book focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy during the period from 1945 to 1964. Based on recently released documents, the book argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.

When we talk about globalization, we tend to focus on its social and economic benefits. In Governance in the New Global Disorder, the political philosopher Daniel Innerarity considers its unsettling and largely unacknowledged consequences. The "opening" of different societies to new ideas, products, and forms of prosperity has introduced a persistent uncertainty, or disorder, into everyday life. Multinational corporations have weakened sovereignty. We no longer know who is in control or who is responsible. Economies can collapse without sufficient warning, and the effort to rebuild can drag on for years. Piracy is everywhere. Is there any way to balance the interests of state, marketplace, and society in this new construct of power? Since national economies have become deterritorialized and political interdependencies aggravate our common vulnerabilities, Innerarity contends that there is no other solution except to move toward global governance and a denationalization of justice. Globalization tries to unify the world through technologies, the economy, and cultural products and styles, but it cannot articulate or regulate political and legal equivalents. Everyone faces the same risks to their security, food supply, health, financial stability, and environment, and these risks demand a new global politics of humanity. In her foreword, the sociologist Saskia Sassen isolates the key takeaways from Innerarity's argument and the solutions they present to growing global tensions.

Learning, innovation and adaptation are not concepts that we necessarily associate with the British army of the First World War. Yet the need to learn from mistakes, to exploit new opportunities and to adapt to complex situations are enduring and timeless. This revealing work is the first institutional examination of the army's process for learning during the First World War. Drawing on organisational learning and management theories, Aimee Fox critiques existing approaches to military learning in wartime. Focused around a series of case studies, the book ranges across multiple operational theatres and positions the army within a broader context in terms of its relationships with allies and civilians to reveal that learning was more complex and thoroughgoing than initially thought. It grapples with the army's failings and shortcomings, explores its successes and acknowledges the inherent difficulties of learning in a desperate and lethally competitive environment.

The United States Department of Defense Law of War Manual: Commentary and Critique provides an irreplaceable resource for any politician, international expert, or military practitioner who wishes to understand the approach taken by the American military in the complex range of modern conflicts. Readers will understand the strengths and weaknesses of US legal and policy pronouncements and the reasons behind the modern American way of war, whether US forces deploy alone or in coalitions. This book provides unprecedented and precise analysis of the US approach to the most pressing problems in modern wars, including controversies surrounding use of human shields, fighting in urban areas, the use of cyberwar and modern weaponry, expanding understanding of human rights, and the rise of ISIS. This group of authors, including academics and military practitioners, provides a wealth of expertise that demystifies overlapping threads of law and policy amidst the world's seemingly intractable conflicts.

This book provides a short and accessible introduction to the theory of strategy, examines the general theory of strategy in accordance with 23 key Principles and explains its nature, functions, and intended consequences. Theory of Strategy makes the radical argument that the familiar structure of strategy's general theory (political ends, strategic ways, military means - and assumptions) holds as sound for security at all times and in all places, of human necessity. Strategy is ever-varying in its character, but not in its nature, which is unchanging.

The fifteen essays in this volume offer a comprehensive look at the role of American military forces in Germany. The American military forces in the Federal Republic of Germany after WWII played an important role not just in the NATO military alliance but also in German-American relations as a whole. Around twenty-two-million US servicemen and their dependants have been stationed in Germany since WWII, and their presence has contributed to one of the few successful American attempts at democratic nation building in the twentieth century. In the social and cultural realm the GIs helped to Americanize Germany, and their own German experiences influenced the US civil rights movement and soldier radicalism. The US military presence also served as a bellwether for overall relations between the two countries.

Against the background of globalization, borders have not only become increasingly permeable but also have conceptually evolved and have become important security issues on national and global agendas. In large parts of the world, particularly in Europe and North America, borders are no more national defence lines but a supranational space crucial in combating perceived threats from transnational organised crime, international terrorism, and unregulated migration. At the same time, the means and mechanisms of accountability of the state organs responsible for border management must respond to the realities if they are to be effective and legitimate. The contributors of this book provide insights on comparative border control developments in North America and in Europe, changes in risks and threats at the borders, and the extension of border protection functions to a variety of actors that increasingly include private and corporate companies. The first part of the book provides a discussion of the key themes and issues concerning border management. The second part offers comprehensive studies on recent developments in the European Union border management regime, followed in the third part of the book by case studies on transnational crime, terrorism, and interagency cooperation in the NAFTA region.

"Marina Caparini" is senior fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). "Otwin Marenin" is professor of political science and criminal justice at Washington State University.

Focusing on top civilian and military advisors within the national security establishment, this significant book looks at four case studies with a focus on civil-military relations within the US Department of Defense. It investigates whether balanced approaches produce more effective policies and outcomes than dominating structures. The culmination of Gibson's treatise is the advancement of the 'Madisonian approach' to civilian control of the military, a normative framework designed to replace Samuel Huntington's 'Objective Control' model and also the 'Subjective Control' model, initially practised by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and most recently by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The Madisonian approach calls for changes in US law and new norms to guide the interactions of key participants who populate the civil-military nexus. This book is destined to influence US strategic thinking and should be added to the syllabus of courses in civil-military relations, strategic studies and military history. Given the struggling US policy in Iraq, the time is right for a critical review of US civil-military relations and this book provides the departure point for analysis and a potential way forward.

Since the unprecedentedly effective performance of the allied air campaign against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, the role of American air power in future wars has become a topic of often heated public debate. In this balanced appraisal of air power's newly realized strengths in joint warfare, Benjamin Lambeth, a defense analyst and civilian pilot who has flown in most of the equipment described in this book, explores the extent to which the United States can now rely on air-delivered precision weapons in lieu of ground forces to achieve strategic objectives and minimize American casualties.

Beginning with the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia and detailing how failures there set the stage for a sweeping refurbishment of the nation's air warfare capability, Lambeth reviews the recent history of American air power, including its role in the Gulf War and in later operations over Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia. He examines improvements in areas ranging from hardware development to aircrew skills and organizational adaptability.

Lambeth acknowledges that the question of whether air power should operate independently or continue to support land operations is likely to remain contentious. He concludes, however, that air power, its strategic effectiveness proven, can now set the conditions for victory even from the outset of combat if applied to its fullest potential.

The 37th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses developments in 2005 in o Security and conflicts o Military spending and armaments o Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament The SIPRI Yearbook contains extensive annexes on the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements and a chronology of events during the year in the area of security and arms control. The annual accounts and analyses are extensively footnoted, providing a comprehensive bibliography in each subject area.

'Compelling' Sunday Times 'A triumph' Daily Mirror 'Gripping' Jonathan Dimbleby 1941. The Battle of the Atlantic is a disaster. Thousands of supply ships ferrying vital food and fuel from North America to Britain are being torpedoed by German U-boats. Britain is only weeks away from starvation - and with that, crushing defeat. In the first week of 1942 a group of unlikely heroes - a retired naval captain and a clutch of brilliant young women - gather to form a secret strategy unit. On the top floor of a bomb-bruised HQ in Liverpool, the Western Approaches Tactical Unit spends days and nights designing and playing wargames in an effort to crack the U-boat tactics. As the U-boat wolfpacks continue to prey upon the supply ships, the Wrens race against time to save Britain. With novelistic flair, investigative journalist Simon Parkin shines a light on Operation Raspberry and these unsung heroines in this riveting true story of war at sea. 'History writing at its best' Booklist 'Splendid . . . Simon Parkin's book rips along at full sail and is full of personality and personalities' Sunday Express 'Vivid, engaging' New Yorker

Why are democracies pursuing more military conflicts, but achieving worse results? Democratic Militarism shows that a combination of economic inequality and military technical change enables an average voter to pay very little of the costs of large militaries and armed conflict, in terms of both death and taxes. Jonathan Caverley provides an original statistical analysis of public opinion and international aggression, combined with historical evidence from the late Victorian British Empire, the US Vietnam War effort, and Israel's Second Lebanon War. This book undermines conventional wisdom regarding democracy's exceptional foreign policy characteristics, and challenges elite-centered explanations for poor foreign policy. This accessible and wide ranging book offers a new account of democratic warfare, and will help readers to understand the implications of the revolution in military affairs.