Although the authors believe that the level of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe should and will be reduced, they do not consider that the military instrument will have lost all of its value in European political affairs. They still see a need to be prepared for tension and conflict.

During the Second World War, a secret department was formed at Britain's Air Ministry to co-ordinate a strategy to defeat German bombing by means of deception. With the help of leading technicians from the film industry, ingeniously designed decoy airfields, towns and military bases were built throughout the island. This campaign of illusion, masterminded by the charismatic Colonel John Fisher Turner, did more to protect Britain's forces and civilians from the Nazi threat than, at the time, they were allowed to know. This is the only detailed study of Britain's bombing decoys, both at war, through their design, locations and operations, and at peace, through their fragmentary survival as enigmatic features in today's landscape. It draws upon a wealth of new research into wartime documents, and includes detailed maps and data showing the patterns of decoy sites across the country. Compiled in support of English Heritage's initiatives to study and preserve Britain's wartime remains, "Fields of Deception" explores the history and the legacy of one of the least-known aspects of Britain at war.

More than forty years of commitment to nuclear weapons may have prepared Britain to take part in Armageddon, but not to defend itself against attack. What made British governments choose this path and how have they justified it? How have they responded to the moral questions it raises? Using material from recently-released official documents, Roger Ruston presents a moral history of British defence policy, from the 'lesson' of Appeasement to the nuclear modernizations of the eighties, and answers many of the questions that governments have avoided. The book will be of great interest to defence historians, moralists, politicians, and general readers who need a clear account of their country's defence predicament as a basis from which to devise workable and morally acceptable alternatives.

This timely and accessible book traces the evolution of the nuclear arms race from its origin in Roosevelt's decision to develop an atomic bomb to Reagan's decision to continue its expansion in the 1980s. As Powaski explains, the United States and the Soviet Union have a combined total of almost 50,000 nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms treaties and agreements are threatening to collapse, he argues, while the proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons throughout the world has given many countries the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Powaski shows how one President after another has promised to do his utmost to end the nuclear weapons competition, yet each one has actually increased the quantity of these weapons in the American arsenal, revealing a startling discrepancy between Presidential words and actions.

Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What military plans were there for using it? This neglected dimension of British nuclear policy is assessed in detail for the first time, using confidential records - including those of the Chiefs of Staff - which have become available for the entire post-war decade. The emergence and evolution of British strategic ideas about nuclear deterrence and targeting are documented and analysed by Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, who also argue that British thinking was distinctive and made a much more substantial impact on nuclear strategy than American accounts would suggest. They reveal that, from a perspective unique to British circumstances and traditions, British officials made a significant contribution to early thinking about nuclear weapons. This study covers the early shift from a 'countervalue' to a damage limitation targeting posture, the assessment of the Soviet threat, the impact of the Korean War, the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the decision to manufacture a hydrogen weapon in 1954, and the inter-service rivalries in the mid-1950s about the nature and size of the British strategic force. As well as providing a survey of British thinking, it is unusual in its focus on strategic comparisons between Britain and the United States.

There is a growing distance between experts and the public on the subject of nuclear strategy; this reader sets the terms for an effective public debate on the issue. It provides the significant essays and excerpts from longer works, from Berbard Brodie and Herman Kahn to Henry Kissinger and Fred Ikle, that have charted the development of American nuclear strategy. Each section is introduced by an essay outlining the major events of the period and relating the excerpts to them. It ends with questions for study and analaysis with suggested further reading.

A review of the full range of recent official and non-official schemes for improving NATO's conventional posture, from exploitation of emerging technologies to non-provocative defences, in the light of prevailing military, political, economic and demographic trends.

Decisions about war have always been made by humans, but now intelligent machines are on the cusp of changing things - with dramatic consequences for international affairs. This book explores the evolutionary origins of human strategy, and makes a provocative argument that Artificial Intelligence will radically transform the nature of war by changing the psychological basis of decision-making about violence. Strategy, Evolution, and War is a cautionary preview of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) will revolutionize strategy more than any development in the last three thousand years of military history. Kenneth Payne describes strategy as an evolved package of conscious and unconscious behaviors with roots in our primate ancestry. Our minds were shaped by the need to think about warfare-a constant threat for early humans. As a result, we developed a sophisticated and strategic intelligence. The implications of AI are profound because they depart radically from the biological basis of human intelligence. Rather than being just another tool of war, AI will dramatically speed up decision making and use very different cognitive processes, including when deciding to launch an attack, or escalate violence. AI will change the essence of strategy, the organization of armed forces, and the international order. This book is a fascinating examination of the psychology of strategy-making from prehistoric times, through the ancient world, and into the modern age.

This book explores citizens' perceptions and experiences of security threats in contemporary Britain, based on twenty focus groups and a large sample survey conducted between April and September 2012. The data is used to investigate the extent to which a diverse public shares government framings of the most pressing security threats, to assess the origins of perceptions of security threats, to investigate what makes some people feel more threatened than others, to examine the effects of threats on other areas of politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of government messages about security threats. We demonstrate widespread heterogeneity in perceptions of issues as security threats and in their origins, with implications for the extent to which shared understandings of threats are an attainable goal. While this study focuses on the British case, it seeks to make broader theoretical and methodological contributions to Political Science, International Relations, Political Psychology, and Security Studies. -- .

In this new and fully revised edition Pinar Bilgin provides an accessible yet critical analysis of regional security in the Middle East, analysing the significant developments that have taken place in the past years. Drawing from a wide range of critical approaches to security, the book offers a comprehensive study of pasts, presents, and futures of security in the region. The book distinguishes itself from previous (critical) studies on regional security by opening up both 'region' and 'security'. Different from those approaches that bracket one or the other, this study takes seriously the constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of) security. There is not one Middle East but many, shaped by the insecurities of those who voice them. This book focuses on how present-day insecurities have their roots in practices that have, throughout history, been shaped by 'geopolitical inventions of security'. In doing so, the book lays the contours of a framework for thinking critically about regional security in this part of the world. This second edition of Regional Security in the Middle East is a key resource for students and scholars interested in International Relations and Political Science, Security Studies, and Middle East Studies.

This revised and updated second edition features over twenty new chapters and offers a wide-ranging collection of cutting-edge essays from leading scholars in the field of Security Studies. The field of Security Studies has undergone significant change during the past 20 years, and is now one of the most dynamic sub-disciplines within International Relations. This second edition has been significantly updated to address contemporary and emerging security threats with chapters on organised crime, migration and security, cyber-security, energy security, the Syrian conflict and resilience, amongst many others. Comprising articles by both established and up-and-coming scholars, The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies provides a comprehensive overview of the key contemporary topics of research and debate in the field of Security Studies. The volume is divided into four main parts: * Part I: Theoretical Approaches to Security * Part II: Security Challenges * Part III: Regional (In)Security * Part IV: Security Governance This new edition of the Handbook is a benchmark publication with major importance for both current research and the future of the field. It will be essential reading for all scholars and students of Security Studies, War and Conflict Studies, and International Relations.

The most significant challenge to the post-Cold War international order is the growing power of ambitious states opposed to the West. Iran, Russia and China each view the global structure through the prism of historical experience. Rejecting the universality of Western liberal values, these states and their governments each consider the relative decline of Western economic hegemony as an opportunity. Yet cooperation between them remains fragmentary. The end of Western sanctions and the Iranian nuclear deal; the Syrian conflict; new institutions in Central and East Asia: in all these areas and beyond, the potential for unity or divergence is striking. In this comprehensive study, Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary address the substance of this `triple axis' in the realms of energy, trade, and military security. In particular they scrutinise Iran-Russia and the often overlooked field of Iran-China relations. Their argument - that interactions between the three will shape the world stage for decades to come - will be of interest to anyone looking to understand the contemporary international security puzzle.

Since its formation in 1948, and particularly since the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995, Israel has experienced turbulent political change and numerous ongoing security challenges, including major party splits, collapsed peace talks with the Palestinians and Syria, nuclear threats from Iran, and even the specter of civil war as Israel withdrew from Gaza. This essential survey brings together Israeli and American scholars to provide a much-needed balanced introduction to Israel's domestic politics and foreign policy. Experts tackle this difficult subject in three parts: domestic politics, foreign policy challenges, and strategic challenges. Domestic topics include the Israeli Right and Left; religious, Russian, and Arab parties; the Supreme Court; and the economy. Part two discusses Israel's complicated and often fractious relationships with the Palestinians and the Arab world, as well as its improved relations with Turkey and India and continuing close relationship with the United States. The Israel-Hizbollah War of 2006 and existential threats to Israel, including the threat from Iran, are detailed in part three. This compelling and authoritative coverage provides students with the necessary framework to understand Israel's political past and present, as well as the direction Israel is likely to take in the future.

Contents

1. Introduction (Robert O. Freedman)

Part One: Israeli Domestic Politics
2. The Israeli Right (Ilan Peleg)
3. The Israeli Zionist Left (Mark Rosenblum)
4. Israel's Religious Parties (Shmuel Sander and Aaron Kampinsky)
5. Israel's Russian Parties (Vladimir Ze'ev Khanin)
6. Israel's Arab Parties (Hillel Frisch)
7. Israel's Supreme Court (Pnina Lahav)
8. Israel's Economy (Ofira Seliktar)

Part Two: Israel's Foreign Policy Challenges
9. Israel and the Palestinians (Barry Rubin)
10. Israel and the Arab World (David Lesch)
11. Israel's Strategic Relations with Turkey and India (Efraim Inbar)
12. Israel and the United States (Robert O. Freedman)

Part Three: Israel's Strategic Challenges
13. Existential Threats to Israel (Steven David)
14. Israel's Second Lebanon War (Elli Lieberman)

As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption.

The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be to knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.

This new handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the issues facing naval strategy and security in the twenty-first century. Featuring contributions from some of the world's premier researchers and practitioners in the field of naval strategy and security, this handbook covers naval security issues in diverse regions of the world, from the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to the Arctic and the piracy-prone waters off East Africa's coast. It outlines major policy challenges arising from competing claims, transnational organized crime and maritime terrorism, and details national and alliance reactions to these problems. While this volume provides detailed analyses on operational, judicial, and legislative consequences that contemporary maritime security threats pose, it also places a specific emphasis on naval strategy. With a public very much focused on the softer constabulary roles naval forces play (such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, naval diplomacy, maintenance of good order at sea), the overarching hard-power role of navies has been pushed into the background. In fact, navies and seapower have been notably absent from many recent academic discussions and deliberations of maritime security. This handbook provides a much-desired addition to the literature for researchers and analysts in the social sciences on the relationship between security policy and military means on, under, and from the sea. It comprehensively explains the state of naval security in this maritime century and the role of naval forces in it. This book will be of much interest to students of naval security and naval strategy, security studies and IR, as well as practitioners in the field.

Between 2021 and 2031, the UK government is set to spend over GBP230 billion on its military. Who decides how to use these funds, and how can we be sure that the UK's armed forces can meet the threats of tomorrow? This book provides the answers to these crucial questions. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, it uncovers the factors that underpin the translation of strategic direction into military capability. In a series of interviews, over 30 top admirals, generals and air marshals give their own views on the procurement and maintenance of the nation's current and future military capability. Their unrivalled professional knowledge and experience affords a fascinating insight into the higher management of national defence.

Did the Trump administration have a cybersecurity strategy, or was it hell-bent on dismantling years of consensus-building on how the nation should respond to an existential threat to its digital life blood? Based on insider accounts and exclusive interviews with experts, Cyber in the Age of Trump offers a first-time chronicle and analysis of the Trump administration's approach to cybersecurity, its curious decisions and strategic choices, places where its work has earned applause, and the places where cyber pros see major signs of danger. The new administration came in with a strong faith in technology, a sense that the U.S. could better deploy its cyber weaponry to deter foes, and a willingness to continue popular Obama-era policies on collaborating with industry. But it didn't seem to have a cyber vision, or one that was applied consistently. And in the absence of such a strategic overview, the threat to the nation would only grow. Cyber in the Age of Trump is the first book to examine the impact of President Trump on the nation's greatest long-term strategic challenge and how a "disruptor presidency" has upended consensus and threatened to derail cyber policy.

On the 75th anniversary of D-Day, a new history of the momentous Normandy campaign with fresh insights from award-winning historian James Holland D-Day, June 6, 1944, and the seventy-six days of bitter fighting in Normandy that followed the Allied landing, have become the defining episode of World War II in the west--the object of books, films, television series, and documentaries. Yet as familiar as it is, as James Holland makes clear in his definitive history, many parts of the OVERLORD campaign, as it was known, are still shrouded in myth and assumed knowledge. Drawing freshly on widespread archives and on the testimonies of eye-witnesses, Holland relates the extraordinary planning that made Allied victory in France possible; indeed, the story of how hundreds of thousands of men, and mountains of materiel, were transported across the English Channel, is as dramatic a human achievement as any battlefield exploit. The brutal landings on the five beaches and subsequent battles across the plains and through the lanes and hedgerows of Normandy--a campaign that, in terms of daily casualties, was worse than any in World War I--come vividly to life in conferences where the strategic decisions of Eisenhower, Rommel, Montgomery, and other commanders were made, and through the memories of paratrooper Lieutenant Dick Winters of Easy Company, British corporal and tanker Reg Spittles, Thunderbolt pilot Archie Maltbie, German ordnance officer Hans Heinze, French resistance leader Robert Leblanc, and many others. For both sides, the challenges were enormous. The Allies confronted a disciplined German army stretched to its limit, which nonetheless caused tactics to be adjusted on the fly. Ultimately ingenuity, determination, and immense materiel strength--delivered with operational brilliance--made the difference. A stirring narrative by a pre-eminent historian, Normandy '44 offers important new perspective on one of history's most dramatic military engagements and is an invaluable addition to the literature of war.

During the Cold War the concept of international security was understood in military terms as the threat or use of force by states. The end of EastDWest hostilities, however, brought critical perspectives to the fore as scholars sought to explain the emergence of new challenges to international stability, such as environmental degradation, immigration and terrorism. The second edition of this popular and highly respected text offers a wide-ranging and comprehensive analysis of the growing field of critical security studies. All the chapters have been fully revised and updated to map the on-going evolution of debates about international security since 1989, including the more recent shift in emphasis from critiques of the realist practices of states to those of global liberal governance. Topics covered include the relationship between security and change, identity, the production of danger, fear and trauma, human insecurity and emancipation. The book explores the meaning and use of these concepts and their relevance to real-life situations ranging from the War on Terror to the Arab Spring, migration, suffering in war, failed states and state-building, and the changing landscape of the international system, with the emergence of a multipolar world and the escalation of global climate change. Written with verve and clarity and incorporating new seminar activities and questions for class discussion, this book will be an invaluable resource for students of international relations and security studies.

This collection of essays combines historical research with cutting-edge strategic analysis and makes a significant contribution to the study of the early history of strategic thinking. There is a debate as to whether strategy in its modern definition existed before Napoleon and Clausewitz. The case studies featured in this book show that strategic thinking did indeed exist before the last century, and that there was strategy making, even if there was no commonly agreed word for it. The volume uses a variety of approaches. First, it explores the strategy making of three monarchs whose biographers have claimed to have identified strategic reasoning in their warfare: Edward III of England, Philip II of Spain and Louis XIV of France. The book then analyses a number of famous strategic thinkers and practitioners, including Christine de Pizan, Lazarus Schwendi, Matthew Sutcliffe, Raimondo Montecuccoli and Count Guibert, concluding with the ideas that Clausewitz derived from other authors. Several chapters deal with reflections on naval strategy long thought not to have existed before the nineteenth century. Combining in-depth historical documentary research with strategic analysis, the book illustrates that despite social, economic, political, cultural and linguistic differences, our forebears connected warfare and the aims and considerations of statecraft just as we do today. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic history and theory, military history and IR in general.

This collection of essays combines historical research with cutting-edge strategic analysis and makes a significant contribution to the study of the early history of strategic thinking. There is a debate as to whether strategy in its modern definition existed before Napoleon and Clausewitz. The case studies featured in this book show that strategic thinking did indeed exist before the last century, and that there was strategy making, even if there was no commonly agreed word for it. The volume uses a variety of approaches. First, it explores the strategy making of three monarchs whose biographers have claimed to have identified strategic reasoning in their warfare: Edward III of England, Philip II of Spain and Louis XIV of France. The book then analyses a number of famous strategic thinkers and practitioners, including Christine de Pizan, Lazarus Schwendi, Matthew Sutcliffe, Raimondo Montecuccoli and Count Guibert, concluding with the ideas that Clausewitz derived from other authors. Several chapters deal with reflections on naval strategy long thought not to have existed before the nineteenth century. Combining in-depth historical documentary research with strategic analysis, the book illustrates that despite social, economic, political, cultural and linguistic differences, our forebears connected warfare and the aims and considerations of statecraft just as we do today. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic history and theory, military history and IR in general.

In a time where US deployments are uncertain, this book shows how US service members can either build the necessary support to sustain their presence or create added animosity towards the military presence. The United States stands at a crossroads in international security. The backbone of its international position for the last 70 years has been the massive network of overseas military deployments. However, the US now faces pressures to limit its overseas presence and spending. In Beyond the Wire, Michael Allen, Michael Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers argue that the US has entered into a "Domain of Competitive Consent" where the longevity of overseas deployments relies upon the buy-in from host-state populations and what other major powers offer in security guarantees. Drawing from three years of surveys and interviews across fourteen countries, they demonstrate that a key component of building support for the US mission is the service members themselves as they interact with local community members. Highlighting both the positive contact and economic benefits that flow from military deployments and the negative interactions like crime and anti-base protests, this book shows in the most rigorous and concrete way possible how US policy on the ground shapes its ability to advance its foreign policy goals.

Many historians of U.S. foreign relations think of the post-World War II period as a time when the United States, as an anti-colonial power, advocated collective security through the United Nations and denounced territorial aggrandizement. Yet between 1945 and 1947, the United States violated its wartime rhetoric and instead sought an imperial solution to its postwar security problems in East Asia by acquiring unilateral control of the western Pacific Islands and dominating influence throughout the entire Pacific Basin. This detailed study examines American foreign policy from the beginning of the Truman Administration to the implementation of Containment in the summer and fall of 1947. As a case study of the Truman Administration's Early Cold War efforts, it explores pre-Containment policy in light of U.S. security concerns vis-a-vis the Pearl Harbor Syndrome.

The American pursuit of a secure Pacific Basin was inconsistent at the time with its foreign policy toward other areas of the world. Thus, the consolidation of power in this region was an exception to the avowed goal of a multilateral response to the policies of the Soviet Union. This example of national or strategic security went much further than simple military control; it included the cultural assimilation of the indigenous population and the unilateral exclusion of all other powers. Analyzing traditional archival records in a new light, Friedman also investigates the persisting American notions of a Westward moving frontier that stretches beyond North American territorial bounds.