Naval warfare in a typical narrow sea such as the Baltic Sea or the Arabian Gulf includes peculiarities not found in war on the open ocean. Because of the proximity of the landmass, the employment of naval forces and aircraft is far more complex than in war on the open ocean. The outcome of war in a typical narrow sea depends - to a larger degree than on the open ocean - on the course of events on land and in the air. The threat of land-based aircraft, submarines, coastal anti-ship missiles and mines makes the operations of blue-water navies such as the US Navy both more complicated and riskier than on the open ocean.

This book comparatively examines the preferences of four key arms-producing states towards European joint armaments programmes. The European defence market is characterised by a mixture of inter-state competition and European cooperation, and this work assesses why countries sometimes decide to cooperate with their partners, while in other instances they refrain from doing so. In order to shed light on this empirical puzzle, the book focuses on state-defence industry relations in the four major European arms producers: France, Germany, Italy and the UK. The main argument is that the public or private governance of industrial suppliers and market size are the two decisive variables that explain the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition in European defence procurement. Specifically, it argues that in public governance ecosystems, arms industries are able to "capture" the state's decision-making processes to their own advantage. In private governance ecosystems, the state is relatively autonomous from defence industry's influence and able to pursue larger macro-economic and military benefits. Moreover, the strategy pursued by governments and defence firms is decisively shaped by market size because of its importance in determining the relative costs and benefits of collaborative arrangements. This book will be of much interest to students of EU policy, defence studies, European politics and International Relations.

This volume records the transition from planning against any post-war resurgence of German and Japanese militarism to preparations against a possible threat from the Soviet Union. It charts Foreign Office resistance to consideration of even the possibility of Soviet hostility after the war. Changing Direction is likely to remain the standard work of reference on this period, both for scholars and for the wider public.

This book explores Japan's emerging national security policy in relation to China. It considers the rise of nationalism in contemporary Japan, the recent actions of the Abe government to change Japan's security policy course and the importance of domestic views, both elite and popular, about safety and credibility in shaping security policy. It highlights the lack of strong links between China and Japan and the existence in Japan of significant misconceptions about China. It discusses the politics of Japan's alliances, examines the growth of national pride in Japan and of a more confrontational attitude toward China, and concludes by putting forward some scenarios for likely future developments and some policy proposals for a stable Japan-China relationship.

Contents:
Foreword
Preface
Chapter 1. Introduction: Future Vision of Taiwan's Defence Policy: the Challenge of Change
Part I. The External Security Environment
Chapter 2. US Military Security Policy toward the People's Republic of China
Chapter 3. The PLA's Capabilities in the Next Decade: The Crucial Influence of Politics
Part II. The Military Balance Across the Taiwan Strait
Chapter 4. The Evolution and Adaptation of Taiwan's Military Strategy
Chapter 5. Taiwan's Defence Modernisation: Facing the Challenge Ahead Part III. Taiwan's Military Modernisation
Chapter 6. The Modernisation of the Republic of China's Army
Chapter 7. The Republic of China Military Reform: A Case Study of the Taiwanese Navy
Chapter 8. Air Power and Taiwanese Security: Adapting to the Revolution
Part IV. The Cornerstones of Taiwanese Future Defence Vision
Chapter 9. The Evolution of Military-Society Relations in Taiwan: From Militarised Society to Socialised Military
Chapter 10. Revolutionary Trends in the Republic of China's Professional Military Education
Chapter 11. Taiwanese Military and Strategic Culture: What do they mean for Future Taiwanese Defence and Security
Part V. Conlusion
Chapter 12. Taiwan's Security and Defence in a Changing World

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy "works."
The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court.
The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.
The popular idea that, because war occurs in the realm of chance, strategy is characteristically chaotic is considered and - on balance - rejected. Rather, the author concludes, a somewhat chaotic unpredictability about the consequences of strategic behaviour is a defining characteristic of, but not a literally fatal impediment to, strategy.

How have US economic defence policies promoted its security since 1933?
US Policies of Economic Warfare, 1933-1991 concentrates on an important and neglected facet of America's fight for survival in the latter half of the twentieth century. It explains how US policy-makers crafted and used instruments of economic statecraft against states that posed vital threats to the survival of the USA. This study situates economic defence policy within the broad context of US foreign policy and explores its response to the totalitarianism of the 1930s, the Second World War and the complex strategic and political developments of the Cold War.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203402065

Survival, the IISS's bimonthly journal, challenges conventional wisdom and brings fresh, often controversial, perspectives on strategic issues of the moment. In this issue: Nigel Gould-Davies assesses the impact of Western sanctions on Russia, arguing that they represent a major development in economic statecraft In a special colloquium on the North Korean nuclear threat, Jina Kim, John K. Warden, Adam Mount, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Vipin Narang, Ankit Panda, Ian Campbell and Michaela Dodge offer their ideas for deterring Pyongyang Alexander Klimburg warns that CYBERCOM's strategy of 'persistent engagement' is encouraging a cyber arms race And eight more thought-provoking pieces, as well as our regular book reviews and noteworthy column

From 14-17 April 1940, a meeting was held in the Kremlin to examine and analyze the performance of the Red Army in the recent Soviet-Finnish War. T he participants were all the army commanders who had taken part in the campaign, and some members of the Politburo, notably Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov. This book is an English translation of the verbatim record held in the Russian State Socio-Political History Archives in Moscow. Marshals Kliment Voroshilov and Grigory Kulik co-chaired the sessions, but it was Stalin who guided the proceedings. Forty-six regimental, divisional, corps, army and front commanders, and senior Red Army officials delivered their reports and engaged in debate. Stalin gave a long speech at the closing of the last session in which he expounded his views on all aspects of military policy.

This volume identifies and evaluates the relationship between outer-space geography and geographic position (astrogeography), and the evolution of current and future military space strategy. In doing so, it explores five primary propositions. First, many classical geopolitical theories of military development are fully compatible with the realm of outer space. Second, how geographical position relates to new technology. Such evolution has developed through sea, rail and air power. Space power is the logical and apparent heir. Third, the special terrain of solar space dictates specific tactics and strategies for efficient exploitation of space resources. Fourth, the concept of space as a power base in classical, geopolitical thought will easily conform to the use of outer space as an ultimate national power base. Finally, a thorough understanding of the astromechanical and physical demarcations of outer space can prove useful to planners, and will prove critical to military strategists in the future. An optimum deployment of space assets will be essential on the current terrestrial and future-based battlefield.

This provocative critique of Washington's current security policies, draws on the arguments made by an array of non-interventionist and conservative-nationalist scholars. It provides a blueprint for a more restrained and unilateral US role in global affairs.

This book explores the crucial relationship between security and identity in a changing Europe. It covers a series of key policy issues, including NATO enlargement, EU integration, war in the Balkans and Russia's uncertain future. This new agenda is explored through a range of theoretical approaches, from traditional realist to social constructivist and postmodern interpretations. Security and Identity in Europe thus offers an excellent guide to contending theories of international relations and provides innovative insights for students seeking to understand a changing Europe at the beginning of the new millennium.

Armed revolution and civil war gave birth to the Soviet Union, world War II propelled it to global pre-eminence, and the Cold War contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. Given Marxism-Leninism's idological preoccupation with war and threats of war, it is understandable that the spectre of war should play a vital role in the life and fate of the Soviet state. This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the twin pillars of Soviet political-military actions and Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It aims to be not simply a retrospective account of what was, but to form part of the context for what will be in the future.

Reviews of the other editions: "Comprehensive...one must admire the scrupulous treatment"--Choice; "well-written"--International Journal on World Peace; "sound educational tool"--International Peace Studies Newsletter; "a thorough and painstaking study"--The Human Economy Newsletter; "useful...very readable...well written...a treasure house"--Peace Research; "worth reading...a masterful analysis of the war problem"--World Federalist; "recommended"--Transnational Perspectives; "excellent"--Science Books & Films. This updated and revised through 2000 edition of an immensely successful textbook reflects upheavals in the global geopolitical climate, and examines why countries continue to build war arsenals in a time of relative peace. As an increasing number of countries gain nuclear capabilities and the number of intranational and regional conflicts grow, it becomes apparent that the end of the Cold War did not bring an end to the threat of war. The book is broken into four parts. Part One: Introduction to the War Problem discusses the nature of the war problem, the conceptual framework, and the historical framework. Part Two: Causes of War talks about the cause of war, group competition and group identification, other views about causes of war, and the value of war. In Part Three: The Contemporary Situation, the reader will learn about ideological aspects, national-historical aspects, military aspects, institutional aspects, and legal aspects of the contemporary situation. Part Four: Proposals for Solving the War Problem discusses reforming the attitudes of individuals, reforming the internal operation of national governments, reforming the policies of national governments, and reformingthe international system. It also includes maps, illustrations and charts which will be especially helpful to the reader.

On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.

This compelling history brings to life the watershed year of 1948, when the United States reversed its long-standing position of political and military isolation from Europe and agreed to an 'entangling alliance' with ten European nations. Not since 1800, when the United States ended its alliance with France, had the nation made such a commitment. The historic North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, but the often-contentious negotiations stretched throughout the preceding year. Lawrence S. Kaplan, the leading historian of NATO, traces the tortuous and dramatic process, which struggled to reconcile the conflicting concerns on the part of the future partners. Although the allies could agree on the need to cope with the threat of Soviet-led Communism and on the vital importance of an American association with a unified Europe, they differed over the means of achieving these ends. The United States had to contend with domestic isolationist suspicions of Old World intentions, the military's worries about over extension of the nation's resources, and the apparent incompatibility of the projected treaty with the UN charter. For their part, Europeans had to be convinced that American demands to abandon their traditions would provide the sense of security that economic and political recovery from World War II required. Kaplan brings to life the colorful diplomats and politicians arrayed on both sides of the debate. The end result was a remarkably durable treaty and alliance that has linked the fortunes of America and Europe for over fifty years. Despite differences that have persisted and occasionally flared over the past fifty years, NATO continues to bind America and Europe in the twenty-first century. Kaplan's detailed and lively account draws on a wealth of primary sources-newspapers, memoirs, and diplomatic documents-to illuminate how the United States came to assume international obligations it had scrupulously avoided for the previous 150 years.

This work argues that logistics in warfare is crucial to achieving strategic success. The author identifies logistical capabilities as an arbiter of opportunity, which plays a critical role in determining which side will hold the strategic iniative in war. Armies which have secured reliable resources of supply have a great advantage in determining the time and manner in which engagements take place. Often, they can fight in ways their opponents cannot. The author illustrates this point with case studies of British logistics during the Burma campaign in the World War II, American logistical innovations during the Pacific War, Communist supply methods during the American phase of the Vietnam War and the competing logistical systems of both NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces during the Cold War.

On War (1832) is a treatise on the philosophical aspects of warfare by Prussian general, scholar, and strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Published posthumously by the author's wife-who edited his manuscript and wrote the book's introduction-On War is one of history's most important works on warfare and military strategy, and continues to be studied to this day. With a background in art, culture, and history, and with extensive experience as a combat veteran, Clausewitz sought to understand the military success of such figures as Napoleon and Frederick the Great. What interested Clausewitz the most was how these leaders effectively mobilized entire nations to launch military campaigns larger and more violent than any in European history. Although he initially began with the theory that war was one aspect of a population's struggle for survival, he eventually came to believe that war was a method of imposing the will of one state on another. By privileging politics and philosophy in his study of warfare, Clausewitz changed the way military figures, politicians, and scholars thought of and perpetrated the process of war. Most crucially, Clausewitz suggests that war serves no purpose in and of itself, but rather acts as an instrument of a political party or group. In addition, Clausewitz believed that strong moral and political motivations-especially in the case of defense-greatly increased the chance of victory. On War was read and interpreted by Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Dwight Eisenhower, and has, for over a century and a half, continued to shape the concept and conduct of war. With a beautifully designed cover and professionally typeset manuscript, this edition of Carl von Clausewitz's On War is a classic of history, philosophy, and military theory reimagined for modern readers.

On War (1832) is a treatise on the philosophical aspects of warfare by Prussian general, scholar, and strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Published posthumously by the author's wife-who edited his manuscript and wrote the book's introduction-On War is one of history's most important works on warfare and military strategy, and continues to be studied to this day. With a background in art, culture, and history, and with extensive experience as a combat veteran, Clausewitz sought to understand the military success of such figures as Napoleon and Frederick the Great. What interested Clausewitz the most was how these leaders effectively mobilized entire nations to launch military campaigns larger and more violent than any in European history. Although he initially began with the theory that war was one aspect of a population's struggle for survival, he eventually came to believe that war was a method of imposing the will of one state on another. By privileging politics and philosophy in his study of warfare, Clausewitz changed the way military figures, politicians, and scholars thought of and perpetrated the process of war. Most crucially, Clausewitz suggests that war serves no purpose in and of itself, but rather acts as an instrument of a political party or group. In addition, Clausewitz believed that strong moral and political motivations-especially in the case of defense-greatly increased the chance of victory. On War was read and interpreted by Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Dwight Eisenhower, and has, for over a century and a half, continued to shape the concept and conduct of war. With a beautifully designed cover and professionally typeset manuscript, this edition of Carl von Clausewitz's On War is a classic of history, philosophy, and military theory reimagined for modern readers.

This work evaluates the pros and cons of NATO enlargement. It explains why NATO offered membership to three of its Cold War adversaries and makes recommendations about which countries, if any, should be offered membership in the future.

This is a key text on the very topical themes of power, defence and space. Landscapes of Defence is an exciting collection of theoretical and empirical material from very well known contributors, desiged to help students understand how landscapes of defence fit in with some of the broader concepts of space, power and place to which they are introduced in the 1st year. The book is split into four sections, and each section contains an introduction placing the subsequent chapters in context. There is also a comprehensive introduction and afterword to tie the book's broad themes together. 2nd and 3rd year undergraduates in urban and cultural geography will be the key market for this title, as well as strong secondary market in departments of Sociology, Anthropology, Law and Planning.

In The Tank Debate, John Stone highlights the equivocal position that armour has traditionally occupied in Anglo-American thought, and explains why - despite frequent predictions to the contrary - the tank has remained an important instrument of war. This book provides a timely and provocative study of the tank's developmental history, against the changing background of Anglo-American military thought.

This book assesses the evolution of the Soviet approach toward European security policy since the mid-1980s, as seen from the prism of assessments of and policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, examining basic Soviet analyses of West Germany in the period prior to unification.