Sooner or later, if the world keeps following its current course, there will be a nuclear war. Roger Hilsman, who played a significant role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, is convinced that the only way to prevent an eventual nuclear conflict is to abolish war itself. This study examines and critiques all of the various proposals to date for incorporating nuclear weapons into strategic doctrine and concludes that these efforts have failed. Plans for abolishing only nuclear weapons are, according to Hilsman, good-intentioned but ill-advised attempts to rehabilitate war. Instead, he proposes a gradual transition to world government, which will perform the traditional social and political functions that were in the past served only by war.

War will not disappear immediately. The world must still be prepared to deal with three types of war: wars that have the potential for escalating to a nuclear World War III; wars that are self-confining; and civil wars that cry out for peacekeeping intervention on humanitarian grounds. While the United States will have to be responsible for dealing with potentially nuclear wars, an entirely new force structure will be necessary. Self-confining wars, such as Bosnia, pose a particular problem as far as world public opinion for intervention is concerned; this study proposes solutions to such dilemmas. Finally, because national forces are ill-suited to peacekeeping missions in countries ravaged by civil war, the UN must recruit and maintain an international force along the lines of the French Foreign Legion.

This book examines US recourse to military force in the post-9/11 era. In particular, it evaluates the extent to which the Bush and Obama administrations viewed legitimizing the greater use-of-force as a necessary solution to thwart the security threat presented by global terrorist networks and WMD proliferation.

The Civil War and the World War II stand as the two great cataclysms of American history. They were our two costliest wars, with well over a million casualties suffered in each. And they were transforming moments in our history as well, times when the life of the nation and the great experiment in democracy--government of the people, by the people, for the people--seemed to hang in the balance. Now, in War Comes Again, eleven eminent historians--including three Pulitzer Prize winners, all veterans of the Second World War--offer an illuminating comparison of these two epic events in our national life.
The range of essays here is remarkable, the level of insight consistently high, and the quality of the writing is superb. For instance, Stephen Ambrose, the bestselling author of D-Day, June 6th, 1944, offers an intriguing comparison of the two great military leaders of each war--Grant and Eisenhower. Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Robert V. Bruce takes a revealing look at the events that foreshadowed the two wars. Gerald Linderman, author of Embattled Courage, examines the two wars from the point of view of the combat soldier. And Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., describes how both Lincoln and FDR went around strict observance of the Constitution in order to preserve the Constitution. There is, in addition, a fascinating discussion of the crucial role played by spying during the two wars, by Peter Maslowski; a look at the diplomacy of Lincoln and Roosevelt, by Howard Jones; and essays on the impact of the wars on women and on African Americans, by D'Ann Campbell, Richard Jensen, and Ira Berlin. In perhaps the most gripping piece in the book, Michael C.C. Adams offers an unflinching look at war's destructiveness, as he argues that the evils we associate with "bad wars" (such as Vietnam) are equally true of "good wars." And finally, in perhaps the most provocative essay in the book, Russell Weigley, one of America's most eminent military historians, maps the evolution of American attitudes toward war to our present belief that the only acceptable war is one that is short, inexpensive, and certain of victory. Would any great commander, Weigley asks, would a Lee or a Grant or a Marshall, refuse to fight unless he knew he couldn't lose? "Is not a willingness to run risks for the sake of cherished values and interests close to the heart of what defines greatness in a human being or in a nation?"
Another Pulitzer winner and World War II veteran, Don E. Fehrenbacher, concludes War Comes Again with a very personal look at two common soldiers who have no monuments, who have not been mentioned in previous histories, but who point at the essence of these two wars and are "embedded in the very structure of the enduring nation and the world we live in."

The quest to limit nuclear weapons was a notable feature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in what history may come to judge as the Clinton administration's greatest foreign-policy achievement, an agreement was reached with key former Soviet republics to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Ellis provides a timely and authoritative analysis of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which removed nuclear arsenals equivalent to the combined stockpiles of Britain, France, and China, and ultimately made a significant contribution to U.S. national security at a relatively small cost.

In a fascinating examination of the interplay of domestic and foreign policy, Ellis traces the debates within Congress and the foreign policy establishment, as well as the situation on the ground in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and he details the implementation of the CTR program. He concludes with a look at the current challenges, especially the thousands of non-strategic nuclear warheads still in Russian possession, and prospects of ongoing CTR efforts.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply tothe problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the "New Soviet Thinking" and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

The uncertain Arab-Israeli peace process has scarcely put an end to the threat of war in the Middle East. Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors remain tense, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a problem for the entire region, and the Israeli-Palestinian fighting that began in September 2000 shows that the peace process can suddenly become a war process. Renowned Middle East military expert Anthony Cordesman provides up-to-the-minute analysis in this richly detailed guide to one of the most complicated, and dangerous, regions in the world.

Cordesman covers every significant aspect of military and strategic issues in the region, including conventional forces, arms transfers, force quality and morale, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the dynamics of specific ongoing conflicts, and the outcome of possible future conflicts. He carefully weighs the political factors against what is known about actual military capabilities to shed light on the range of strategic options likely to be considered by each of the major regional actors, including Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority. He finds no easy answers, concluding that while the balance of conventional forces has stabilized significantly in recent years, the risks from unconventional warfare have escalated considerably and that any major new peace agreement is likely to unleash a whole new set of military concerns that have the potential to disrupt diplomatic agreements. Always mindful of the complexities of the region, "Peace and War" is the definitive guide to strategic developments in this vital part of the world.

The book explores how small states adjust their military strategies in response to external shocks. Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor. This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

Scholars and policymakers in European Union foreign policy lament the European Union's inability to assert itself on the world stage. This book explains this weakness by arguing that European Union foreign policy is burdened by various internal functions, and systemizes the analysis of internal functionality, pushing the study beyond the concern with effectiveness.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, humanitarian relief operations in Southeast Asia, Pakistan and Louisiana have catapulted the military onto front pages and TV reports everywhere and every day. While the military's unique mission is to defend freedom by "fighting and winning the nation's wars," it has increasingly been charged with non-warfighting and foreign policy responsibilities. Because the military has been so active in so many places and with such a variety of missions, "Inside Defense" brings together scholars, policy experts and practitioners to provide a comprehensive view of the U.S. military to understand the military's role in international politics and its relationship with domestic institutions and society.

Fearing the loss of Korea and Vietnam would touch off a chain reaction of other countries turning communist, the United States fought two major wars in the hinterlands of Asia. What accounts for such exaggerated alarm, and what were its consequences? Is a fear of the domino effect permanently rooted in the American strategic psyche, or has the United States now adopted a less alarmist approach? The essays in this book address these questions by examining domino thinking in United States and Soviet Cold War strategy, and in earlier historic settings. Combining theory and history in analyzing issues relevant to current public policy, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the extent to which domino fears were a rational response, a psychological reaction, or a tactic in domestic politics.

A Chronology of European Security and Defence 1945-2006 is a unique and authoritative source of reference for all those with an interest in European defense and security over the last 60 years. An extensively annotated chronology, the book offers a blow-by-blow account of the events that have shaped the Europe of today. The book carefully places each event in context, explaining what happened, where, when, and why. Month-by-month, year-by-year Europe's recent past is laid out and explained. With its accessible layout, rich detail, and balanced analysis, the book will be essential reading and reference for scholars, students, policy-makers and policy-analysts alike.

The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which the end of the Cold War led to Europeanisation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The analysis takes into consideration previous studies on Europeanisation and its impact on the transformation of national security and defence, and attempts to account for the development of Europeanisation and related mechanisms. These mechanisms, which have been described as framing mechanisms and negative integration, incorporate all the major relevant factors identified here (i.e. a common Strategic Culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base and defence-spending decline) that contributed to the realisation of the CSDP. The relevance of these factors for CSDP Europeanisation is examined through an historical and empirical analysis, and the relationship between the CSDP and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is also explored. This approach facilitates analysis of the debate concerning the emergence of the CSDP and throws light on the political shift that led European Union (EU) leaders to support the CSDP. Another aspect of this study is the empirical examination of the dynamics and limitations of the European defence sector. The changes which took place in this sector facilitated the emergence of the CSDP and are therefore analysed in the light of globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy, new security strategy and Research and Development (R&D) impact. This book will be of interest to students of European security, EU politics, defence studies and International Relations.

Of all the violent disputes that have flared across the former Soviet Union since the late 1980s, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is the only one to pose a genuine threat to peace and security throughout Eurasia. By right of its strategic location and oil resources, the Transcaucasus has been and will continue to be a source of interest for external powers competing to advance their geopolitical influence in the region. Under such conditions, the possibility will remain for the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to reignite and expand to include other powers.

The ten-year conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been one of the bloodiest and most intractable disputes to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Animosity that developed between the Armenians and Azeris under czarist Russian rule was fueled by the rise of a dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region for which both peoples feel an intense nationalistic affinity. The attachment of the region to Azerbaijan by Stalin in 1923 became a source of deep resentment for the Armenians, and during the rule of Gorbachev, a campaign was begun to achieve the peaceful unification of Armenia and Karabakh. Azerbaijan resisted the move as a threat to its territorial integrity, and clashes that broke out soon escalated into a full-scale war that outlived the USSR itself.

Although a cease-fire has been observed since May, 1994, a peaceful settlement to the conflict has been elusive. Meanwhile, by right of both the strategic location and resources and the unique security characteristics of the Transcaucasus, major external powers--Russia, Turkey, and Iran--have sought to influence the dispute according to their geopolitical interests. With the growth of interest in the oil riches of the Caspian Sea and the increasing engagement of Western countries, including the United States, the risks and implications of renewed violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan will grow. This major study will be of interest to students, scholars, and policymakers involved with international relations, military affairs, and the Transcaucasus.

This study is an account explaining how the British and Indian armies adapted to the peculiar demands of fighting an irregular tribal opponent in the mountainous no man's land between India and Afghanistan. It does so by discussing how a tactical doctrine of frontier fighting was developed and "passed on" to succeeding generations of soldiers. The book demonstrates that this form of colonial warfare always exerted a powerful influence on the organization, equipment, training and ethos of the army in India.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Distinguished historians and political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, are the contributors to No End to Alliance . The book focuses on some crucial issues in transatlantic relations in the past, present, and future, with emphasis on America's relations with West Germany, Britain, France, and Scandinavia. While the contributors hold somewhat different views, the emphasis is on the remarkable strength and duration of the Atlantic alliance.

This book examines Nordic relations with the superpowers, 1947-61, within the context of regional integration and cooperation theory. The Nordic region balanced security through a combination of NATO ties, neutralism, and special treaties, and low-voltage diplomacy to keep both superpowers at length. The book uses materials from U.S. and Norwegian archives, summarizes the findings of Nordic secondary literature on security, and utilizes concepts borrowed from international relations theory in order to describe Nordic regional security cooperation and to provide a useful model of peaceful security. To test for applicability in the Third World, the Nordic model is then compared to the regional integration system in Southeast Asia--the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

For the majority of the post-Cold War era, Russian maritime power has hardly featured in the Euro-Atlantic community’s thinking. But in the mid-2010s, the idea that the Russian navy poses a threat to NATO began to gain ground. It took very real form in February 2022, when Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine. This book presents the first sustained examination of Russian maritime power in the period since the Cold War. It brings together leading specialists from public policy and academia to reflect on historical and contemporary aspects of Russia's naval strategy and capacities. At a time of mounting tensions, which some observers have named the ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic’, the book offers an informed and nuanced discussion, taking into account the view from Moscow and how this differs from western perspectives. It sketches a trajectory of Russia’s power at sea and reflects on current capabilities and problems, as well as Moscow’s strategic planning for the future. -- .

Part of a series of books which provides practitioners and scholars with up-to-date analyses of historical case material, insights based on field experience and imaginative applications for future third-party roles in Third World conflicts. "Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters" features articles on the use of soldiers in disasters by Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss, the role of military forces by John Mackinlay and the UN capacity for humanitarian support organizations by James Jonah.

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. From 2002 China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.