Proliferation poses a broad range of threats to the United States, as well as to our allies and coalition partners. Intercontinental missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction are one of these threats, and it has become obvious that rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea may be acquiring the capability to build such missiles as well as the ability to arm them with nuclear or lethal biological weapons. While such threats are now only potential ones, these shifts in technological and manufacturing capability mean that these rogue nations may be able to pose serious dangers to the American homeland, possibly as early as during the next five years. Cordesman argues that an effective defense against these threats will require linking an effective national missile defense program to an ambitious counterproliferation strategy, a strengthened homeland defense program, and a realistic approach to arms control and national security options.

Cordesman argues that these threats may create a near- to mid-term need for national missile defense (NMD), widely discussed during the Clinton Administration and which seems to be emerging as a priority for the Bush Administration. This work analyzes the options available to the United States and how they relate to the delicate balance of deterrence in the post-Cold War era. As the debate on NMD escalates, this work could not be more timely.

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.

Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

This book reintroduces readers to the lives and writings of the greatest military minds of the modern era, writers whose ideas and teachings continue to shape the conduct of war in the 21st century. The word "strategy" only came into usage in West European languages after the work of a Byzantine emperor was translated around the time of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, there was writing on strategy – relating political aims to the use of the military – also in Western Europe, well before this. This book surveys and analyzes the existing literature. It presents commented excerpts of the work of the Elizabethan writer Matthew Sutcliffe (who wrote the first modern comprehensive strategic concept) and translations into English of excerpts from the writing of the Machiavelli-admirer the Seigneur de Fourquevaux (1548) and his French compatriot Bertrand de Loque, who also went by the name of François de Saillans (1589); the Spanish diplomats and military officers Don Bernardino de Mendoza (1595) and the Third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1724-1730); the Frenchmen Paul Hay du Chastelet (1668) and Count Guibert (1770); and the Prussian contemporary of Clausewitz, Rühle von Lilienstern (1816). Key concepts such as preventive war, the fight for the hearts and minds of the population to combat insurgents, the "democratic peace theory," and debates such as the preference for defense or the offensive, the desirability of battle, the purpose and function of war, the advantages of conscript or professional soldiers, can thus be shown to go back far longer than generally assumed and appear in a new light.

This book describes how the growing awareness of the strategic importance of science in the 1930s caused the Allied and German leadership to build scientific information supply systems that survived into the postwar era. Using archival materials from five countries, Richards traces the successes and failures of these early scientific intelligence agencies. She focuses on the OSS unit supplying copy for the US government's wartime program to reprint current German scientific journals. She describes as well the methods used by the OSS to spirit individual journal issues from inside the Reich to microfilm squads on Germany's periphery, and gives special attention to the Allied quest for information about the mythical German atomic bomb. Richards also describes the supply system set up by the Nazi government, and how its increasing desperation for Allied scientific news led in the last year of the war to a submarine landing of Abwehr agents on the U.S. coast to microfilm periodicals at the New York Public Library. The final chapter of her book looks at how the wartime experience with scientific information influenced postwar patterns of scientific documentation and librarianship in each country.

Fear and ignorance have colored the perception of chemical and biological (CB) warfare both in the public and military spheres. Media coverage following the alleged gassing of sheep at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 has led most people to believe that CB warfare is an unstoppable doomsday weapon of mass destruction. Yet, in 1972, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, attempted to disestablish the Chemical Corps because he saw no need for it. Had that decision not been reversed in 1976, there would not have been any chemical defense specialists or equipment available for Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

This study tracks events relating to the Department of Defense's CB warfare program between 1968 and 1990, as it evolved up to the Gulf War. It also details how the military develops and procures CB defense equipment to protect today's soldiers. Mauroni draws parallels between the development of binary chemical weapons, the chemical demilitarization program, and the DoD CB terrorism response efforts, as each has very similar issues and solutions. He seeks to educate leading officials and the general public about the facts behind CB warfare and the options for coping with it in the future. With proper training and equipment, the challenge of CB warfare can be met and dealt with on the modern battlefield.

The United States must devise entirely new military and political strategies because threats to the nation's security have shifted so markedly. This work provides the first comparative analysis of unconventional conflicts, using Malaya and Vietnam as lessons for developing effective policies and operations to counter strife, drug wars, and new types of Third World conflict today. This text for students, experts, and policymakers in military studies, history, and international relations combines insights from primary and secondary sources, participant-observer experiences, and scholarly and professional thinking in order to formulate practical recommendations for future policy. Sarkesian provides a comparative framework for analyzing unconventional conflicts, describing past strategies used by Great Britain, France, and the United States. He defines the military posture and nature of conflict, leadership, and indigenous situations in Malaya and Vietnam. He analyzes the nature of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary systems. Sarkesian describes a new U.S. national security agenda to deal with a transformed geostrategic world landscape. A lengthy bibliography adds to the usefulness of this provocative text for classes in contemporary military studies, world history, war and peace, U.S. foreign policy, and conflict management.

Why do Britain, France, and Italy provide or refuse military support for U.S.-led uses of force? This book provides a unique, multiple-case study analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing. Sixty original interviews with top policymakers and analysts provide insight into allies' decisions regarding the Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). The cases show that neoclassical realist factors--alliance value, threat, prestige, and electoral politics--explain allies' decisions better than constructivist factors--identity and norms. The book briefly covers additional cases (Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia) and concludes with recommendations for increasing future allied military support.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a great deal of debate about what U.S. foreign policy should be and how priorities should be reordered. This comprehensive, well-written, provocative assessment has set out to provide answers to key questions. Written by leading experts on their respective regions, who also are professors of national security policy at the National War College in Washington, D.C., this book charts a path for post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Each chapter follows a common framework and research design and is informed by a team teaching method, as well as by long experience in policymaking and in academic institutions. The survey consists of chapters dealing with each of the major geopolitical regions of the world and asks a set of common questions: What are the dynamic changes that have occurred in the region? How have security and foreign policy issues changed since the Cold War? What is the history of U.S. policy in the region? How must U.S. policy change to adjust to new realities? An introduction and conclusion point to issues of comparison and sum up conclusions reached by the different contributors. This short overview is intended for courses in U.S. foreign policy and world affairs and for the use of upper-level undergraduate and graduate students, teachers, policymakers, and general readers in political science, world history, and military studies.

ASEAN's role as a security provider remains largely a matter of scholarly debate. Through the lens of the concept of regional security partnership, this book uncovers a more nuanced understanding of ASEAN capacity, highlighting both its merits and fragilities in coping with traditional and emerging security problems.

The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence is a state-of-the-art work on intelligence and national security. Edited by Loch Johnson, one of the world's leading authorities on the subject, the handbook examines the topic in full, beginning with an examination of the major theories of intelligence. It then shifts its focus to how intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems that come with transforming "raw" information into credible analysis, and the difficulties in disseminating intelligence to policymakers. It also considers the balance between secrecy and public accountability, and the ethical dilemmas that covert and counterintelligence operations routinely present to intelligence agencies. Throughout, contributors factor in broader historical and political contexts that are integral to understanding how intelligence agencies function in our information-dominated age.
The book is organized into the following sections: theories and methods of intelligence studies; historical background; the collection and processing of intelligence; the analysis and production of intelligence; the challenges of intelligence dissemination; counterintelligence and counterterrorism; covert action; intelligence and accountability; and strategic intelligence in other nations.

In the late 19th century, the United States began a period of increased engagement in the Western Pacific--a situation that continues to this day. Nimmo provides a study of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific from the late 1800s to 1945. In addition to interaction with China, Korea, and Japan, the book includes U.S. involvement in Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. This one-volume treatment, ranging from the Spanish American War to the Second World War, examines the continuity in U.S. policy during this crucial period. Particular attention is devoted to the U.S. response to Japan's territorial aggression during this period, primarily its undeclared wars against China, in Manchuria in 1931, and in North and Central China from 1937 to 1945.

This examination counters revisionist claims that the United States led Japan into war in 1941 and that war could have been avoided by the pursuit of a more conciliatory policy on the part of the U.S. It explores why it was necessary for the U.S. to demand unconditional surrender and refutes claims that Japan was a victim of the war. The acquisition of U.S. territory in the Pacific initially began with the annexation of Hawaii and continued with the former possessions of Spain, ceded in the Spanish American War. Nimmo follows this story through the Philippine War, efforts to promote Philippine independence, the Commonwealth era, and finally independence in 1946.

This comparative work examines the political role played by armed forces in South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The work brings together theory and empirical study, analyzing how security threats have shaped the military's organization, doctrine, and domestic political role at various stages of political development, from the state-building period to today's post-democratization era. Using four representative case studies, Woo sets to answer: What determines the armed forces' political influence? How does it affect political development? How do democratically elected leaders establish civilian control over them? The book first looks at how security threats led to military expansion and authoritarianism at the onset of the Cold War. Next, it examines military dictatorial rule, followed by a study of the military's withdrawal process during democratization. Lastly, it focuses on contemporary civil-military dynamics in the four countries, discussing the obstacles faced by civilian authority and what maybe the most desirable model for civil-military relations in post-democratization Asian societies. "Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia" will be an essential resource for anyone studying Asian political development, civil-military relations, and comparative democratization.

Knife / Counter-Knife Combatives by W. Hock Hochheim describes offensive and defensive knife fighting tactics in all ranges of combat including standing, sitting and on the ground. This is a complete survival tactical manual for all aspects of knife combat. W. Hock Hochheim is known worldwide as an authority on knife fighting tactics and strategies. He's the author of more than a dozen books and more than 200 dvds on a broad range of self-defense subjects. He teaches military, police and citizens in 9 countries annually.

Since the end of the Cold War and re-unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union has undergone significant changes. Once a model 'Europeanist', Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory and providing an in-depth analysis of both refugee and security policy, the book develops an innovative framework for analysis that is capable of accounting for an incremental 'de-Europeanization' in Germany's EU policy.

This study examines three major bomber aircraft acquisition programs: the B-36, the B-52, and the B-2. The central question for each of these programs is whether they were chosen to fit national strategic objectives or to meet the more narrow political and economic needs of the so-called military-industrial complex. The book concludes that U.S. Air Force senior leadership acquired better bombers than did civilian defense leaders. The extensive use of original documents in this book reveals that Air Force generals were less concerned about defending their own interests than previous research has implied.

The Changing Politics of European Security explores the key security challenges confronting Europe, from relations with the US and Russia to the use of military force and the struggle against terrorism. In the future, the authors conclude, European states will act alone, independent of America, on security matters.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic "On War," introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.

Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

This study begins with a set of strategic assumptions--most notably that the risks of U.S.-Russian war are and will remain extremely low and that the U.S. military remains a stabilizing influence in many geographic theaters. O'Hanlon then shows that the United States' interests in the Third World, while nowhere truly vital, are sufficiently important to justify a measured degree of global military presence and engagement. Historical, political, and military analysis suggests that these interests can be protected efficiently and effectively with a U.S. military reduced in size by roughly 40 to 50 percent in most types of major combat forces, and by 95 percent in nuclear forces. In the realm of conventional forces, these cuts would be about twice as deep as those planned by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney; in the nuclear realm they would be much deeper than those approved by the Bush administration. By contrast, analysis suggests that U.S. capabilities should be largely held constant--or in some cases even expanded--in logistics, intelligence and communications, R&D, and special forces. The resulting force posture would cost about $200 billion in 1991 dollars through the early years of the next century, and perhaps $230 billion annually thereafter. O'Hanlon's is one of the first in-depth studies of how the U.S. military might be reconfigured for the post-Cold War world. This study will prove useful for defense policy makers at the specialized levels and for students of the guns vs. butter policy issues and debates.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of the EU in international security through five detailed case studies and in doing so fills a distinct gap in the scholarship on European security and policy-making. Significantly, it offers a broadened conceptualization of the EU as an international security actor, including JHA policy. Furthermore, case studies which explore, amongst other things, EU responses to piracy off the coast of Somalia, climate change and terrorism offers a fresh insight into EU policy on contemporary security challenges. As such, this book constitutes an important and original input in the debate on European security after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and is a must-read for students and scholars of EU Politics, Security Studies and International Relations.

The availability of food is an especially significant issue in zones of conflict because conflict nearly always impinges on the production and the distribution of food, and causes increased competition for food, land and resources Controlling the production of and access to food can also be used as a weapon by protagonists in conflict. The logistics of supply of food to military personnel operating in conflict zones is another important issue. These themes unite this collection, the chapters of which span different geographic areas. This volume will appeal to scholars in a number of different disciplines, including anthropology, nutrition, political science, development studies and international relations, as well as practitioners working in the private and public sectors, who are currently concerned with food-related issues in the field.

2012 Winner of the Shapiro Award for the Best Book in Israel Studies, presented by the Association for Israel Studies Whose life is worth more? That is the question that states inevitably face during wartime. Which troops are thrown to the first lines of battle and which ones remain relatively intact? How can various categories of civilian populations be protected? And when front and rear are porous, whose life should receive priority, those of soldiers or those of civilians? In Israel's Death Hierarchy, Yagil Levy uses Israel as a compelling case study to explore the global dynamics and security implications of casualty sensitivity. Israel, Levy argues, originally chose to risk soldiers mobilized from privileged classes, more than civilians and other soldiers. However, with the mounting of casualty sensitivity, the state gradually restructured what Levy calls its "death hierarchy" to favor privileged soldiers over soldiers drawn from lower classes and civilians, and later to place enemy civilians at the bottom of the hierarchy by the use of heavy firepower. The state thus shifted risk from soldiers to civilians. As the Gaza offensive of 2009 demonstrates, this new death hierarchy has opened Israel to global criticism.