Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

This book describes how the growing awareness of the strategic importance of science in the 1930s caused the Allied and German leadership to build scientific information supply systems that survived into the postwar era. Using archival materials from five countries, Richards traces the successes and failures of these early scientific intelligence agencies. She focuses on the OSS unit supplying copy for the US government's wartime program to reprint current German scientific journals. She describes as well the methods used by the OSS to spirit individual journal issues from inside the Reich to microfilm squads on Germany's periphery, and gives special attention to the Allied quest for information about the mythical German atomic bomb. Richards also describes the supply system set up by the Nazi government, and how its increasing desperation for Allied scientific news led in the last year of the war to a submarine landing of Abwehr agents on the U.S. coast to microfilm periodicals at the New York Public Library. The final chapter of her book looks at how the wartime experience with scientific information influenced postwar patterns of scientific documentation and librarianship in each country.

Fear and ignorance have colored the perception of chemical and biological (CB) warfare both in the public and military spheres. Media coverage following the alleged gassing of sheep at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 has led most people to believe that CB warfare is an unstoppable doomsday weapon of mass destruction. Yet, in 1972, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, attempted to disestablish the Chemical Corps because he saw no need for it. Had that decision not been reversed in 1976, there would not have been any chemical defense specialists or equipment available for Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

This study tracks events relating to the Department of Defense's CB warfare program between 1968 and 1990, as it evolved up to the Gulf War. It also details how the military develops and procures CB defense equipment to protect today's soldiers. Mauroni draws parallels between the development of binary chemical weapons, the chemical demilitarization program, and the DoD CB terrorism response efforts, as each has very similar issues and solutions. He seeks to educate leading officials and the general public about the facts behind CB warfare and the options for coping with it in the future. With proper training and equipment, the challenge of CB warfare can be met and dealt with on the modern battlefield.

Why do Britain, France, and Italy provide or refuse military support for U.S.-led uses of force? This book provides a unique, multiple-case study analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing. Sixty original interviews with top policymakers and analysts provide insight into allies' decisions regarding the Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). The cases show that neoclassical realist factors--alliance value, threat, prestige, and electoral politics--explain allies' decisions better than constructivist factors--identity and norms. The book briefly covers additional cases (Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia) and concludes with recommendations for increasing future allied military support.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a great deal of debate about what U.S. foreign policy should be and how priorities should be reordered. This comprehensive, well-written, provocative assessment has set out to provide answers to key questions. Written by leading experts on their respective regions, who also are professors of national security policy at the National War College in Washington, D.C., this book charts a path for post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Each chapter follows a common framework and research design and is informed by a team teaching method, as well as by long experience in policymaking and in academic institutions. The survey consists of chapters dealing with each of the major geopolitical regions of the world and asks a set of common questions: What are the dynamic changes that have occurred in the region? How have security and foreign policy issues changed since the Cold War? What is the history of U.S. policy in the region? How must U.S. policy change to adjust to new realities? An introduction and conclusion point to issues of comparison and sum up conclusions reached by the different contributors. This short overview is intended for courses in U.S. foreign policy and world affairs and for the use of upper-level undergraduate and graduate students, teachers, policymakers, and general readers in political science, world history, and military studies.

The United States must devise entirely new military and political strategies because threats to the nation's security have shifted so markedly. This work provides the first comparative analysis of unconventional conflicts, using Malaya and Vietnam as lessons for developing effective policies and operations to counter strife, drug wars, and new types of Third World conflict today. This text for students, experts, and policymakers in military studies, history, and international relations combines insights from primary and secondary sources, participant-observer experiences, and scholarly and professional thinking in order to formulate practical recommendations for future policy. Sarkesian provides a comparative framework for analyzing unconventional conflicts, describing past strategies used by Great Britain, France, and the United States. He defines the military posture and nature of conflict, leadership, and indigenous situations in Malaya and Vietnam. He analyzes the nature of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary systems. Sarkesian describes a new U.S. national security agenda to deal with a transformed geostrategic world landscape. A lengthy bibliography adds to the usefulness of this provocative text for classes in contemporary military studies, world history, war and peace, U.S. foreign policy, and conflict management.

This comparative work examines the political role played by armed forces in South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The work brings together theory and empirical study, analyzing how security threats have shaped the military's organization, doctrine, and domestic political role at various stages of political development, from the state-building period to today's post-democratization era. Using four representative case studies, Woo sets to answer: What determines the armed forces' political influence? How does it affect political development? How do democratically elected leaders establish civilian control over them? The book first looks at how security threats led to military expansion and authoritarianism at the onset of the Cold War. Next, it examines military dictatorial rule, followed by a study of the military's withdrawal process during democratization. Lastly, it focuses on contemporary civil-military dynamics in the four countries, discussing the obstacles faced by civilian authority and what maybe the most desirable model for civil-military relations in post-democratization Asian societies. "Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia" will be an essential resource for anyone studying Asian political development, civil-military relations, and comparative democratization.

In the late 19th century, the United States began a period of increased engagement in the Western Pacific--a situation that continues to this day. Nimmo provides a study of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific from the late 1800s to 1945. In addition to interaction with China, Korea, and Japan, the book includes U.S. involvement in Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. This one-volume treatment, ranging from the Spanish American War to the Second World War, examines the continuity in U.S. policy during this crucial period. Particular attention is devoted to the U.S. response to Japan's territorial aggression during this period, primarily its undeclared wars against China, in Manchuria in 1931, and in North and Central China from 1937 to 1945.

This examination counters revisionist claims that the United States led Japan into war in 1941 and that war could have been avoided by the pursuit of a more conciliatory policy on the part of the U.S. It explores why it was necessary for the U.S. to demand unconditional surrender and refutes claims that Japan was a victim of the war. The acquisition of U.S. territory in the Pacific initially began with the annexation of Hawaii and continued with the former possessions of Spain, ceded in the Spanish American War. Nimmo follows this story through the Philippine War, efforts to promote Philippine independence, the Commonwealth era, and finally independence in 1946.

ASEAN's role as a security provider remains largely a matter of scholarly debate. Through the lens of the concept of regional security partnership, this book uncovers a more nuanced understanding of ASEAN capacity, highlighting both its merits and fragilities in coping with traditional and emerging security problems.

The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence is a state-of-the-art work on intelligence and national security. Edited by Loch Johnson, one of the world's leading authorities on the subject, the handbook examines the topic in full, beginning with an examination of the major theories of intelligence. It then shifts its focus to how intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems that come with transforming "raw" information into credible analysis, and the difficulties in disseminating intelligence to policymakers. It also considers the balance between secrecy and public accountability, and the ethical dilemmas that covert and counterintelligence operations routinely present to intelligence agencies. Throughout, contributors factor in broader historical and political contexts that are integral to understanding how intelligence agencies function in our information-dominated age.
The book is organized into the following sections: theories and methods of intelligence studies; historical background; the collection and processing of intelligence; the analysis and production of intelligence; the challenges of intelligence dissemination; counterintelligence and counterterrorism; covert action; intelligence and accountability; and strategic intelligence in other nations.

Knife / Counter-Knife Combatives by W. Hock Hochheim describes offensive and defensive knife fighting tactics in all ranges of combat including standing, sitting and on the ground. This is a complete survival tactical manual for all aspects of knife combat. W. Hock Hochheim is known worldwide as an authority on knife fighting tactics and strategies. He's the author of more than a dozen books and more than 200 dvds on a broad range of self-defense subjects. He teaches military, police and citizens in 9 countries annually.

This study examines three major bomber aircraft acquisition programs: the B-36, the B-52, and the B-2. The central question for each of these programs is whether they were chosen to fit national strategic objectives or to meet the more narrow political and economic needs of the so-called military-industrial complex. The book concludes that U.S. Air Force senior leadership acquired better bombers than did civilian defense leaders. The extensive use of original documents in this book reveals that Air Force generals were less concerned about defending their own interests than previous research has implied.

Since the end of the Cold War and re-unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union has undergone significant changes. Once a model 'Europeanist', Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory and providing an in-depth analysis of both refugee and security policy, the book develops an innovative framework for analysis that is capable of accounting for an incremental 'de-Europeanization' in Germany's EU policy.

The Changing Politics of European Security explores the key security challenges confronting Europe, from relations with the US and Russia to the use of military force and the struggle against terrorism. In the future, the authors conclude, European states will act alone, independent of America, on security matters.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of the EU in international security through five detailed case studies and in doing so fills a distinct gap in the scholarship on European security and policy-making. Significantly, it offers a broadened conceptualization of the EU as an international security actor, including JHA policy. Furthermore, case studies which explore, amongst other things, EU responses to piracy off the coast of Somalia, climate change and terrorism offers a fresh insight into EU policy on contemporary security challenges. As such, this book constitutes an important and original input in the debate on European security after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and is a must-read for students and scholars of EU Politics, Security Studies and International Relations.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic "On War," introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.

Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

This study begins with a set of strategic assumptions--most notably that the risks of U.S.-Russian war are and will remain extremely low and that the U.S. military remains a stabilizing influence in many geographic theaters. O'Hanlon then shows that the United States' interests in the Third World, while nowhere truly vital, are sufficiently important to justify a measured degree of global military presence and engagement. Historical, political, and military analysis suggests that these interests can be protected efficiently and effectively with a U.S. military reduced in size by roughly 40 to 50 percent in most types of major combat forces, and by 95 percent in nuclear forces. In the realm of conventional forces, these cuts would be about twice as deep as those planned by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney; in the nuclear realm they would be much deeper than those approved by the Bush administration. By contrast, analysis suggests that U.S. capabilities should be largely held constant--or in some cases even expanded--in logistics, intelligence and communications, R&D, and special forces. The resulting force posture would cost about $200 billion in 1991 dollars through the early years of the next century, and perhaps $230 billion annually thereafter. O'Hanlon's is one of the first in-depth studies of how the U.S. military might be reconfigured for the post-Cold War world. This study will prove useful for defense policy makers at the specialized levels and for students of the guns vs. butter policy issues and debates.

The availability of food is an especially significant issue in zones of conflict because conflict nearly always impinges on the production and the distribution of food, and causes increased competition for food, land and resources Controlling the production of and access to food can also be used as a weapon by protagonists in conflict. The logistics of supply of food to military personnel operating in conflict zones is another important issue. These themes unite this collection, the chapters of which span different geographic areas. This volume will appeal to scholars in a number of different disciplines, including anthropology, nutrition, political science, development studies and international relations, as well as practitioners working in the private and public sectors, who are currently concerned with food-related issues in the field.

2012 Winner of the Shapiro Award for the Best Book in Israel Studies, presented by the Association for Israel Studies Whose life is worth more? That is the question that states inevitably face during wartime. Which troops are thrown to the first lines of battle and which ones remain relatively intact? How can various categories of civilian populations be protected? And when front and rear are porous, whose life should receive priority, those of soldiers or those of civilians? In Israel's Death Hierarchy, Yagil Levy uses Israel as a compelling case study to explore the global dynamics and security implications of casualty sensitivity. Israel, Levy argues, originally chose to risk soldiers mobilized from privileged classes, more than civilians and other soldiers. However, with the mounting of casualty sensitivity, the state gradually restructured what Levy calls its "death hierarchy" to favor privileged soldiers over soldiers drawn from lower classes and civilians, and later to place enemy civilians at the bottom of the hierarchy by the use of heavy firepower. The state thus shifted risk from soldiers to civilians. As the Gaza offensive of 2009 demonstrates, this new death hierarchy has opened Israel to global criticism.

This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR.

There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

The transformation of the European Community into a single market in 1992/3, together with the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, have given new life to Jean Monnet's grand ambitions for European integration. The essays in this volume examine some of the key issues facing the EC in the 1990s, focusing on three important areas - the politics of integration; economics, education, and science, and foreign policy and defense.

It was logical to expect that the European Economic and Monetary Union would lead ineluctably to an autonomous European defense; the very size of the European Union seems to demand it. The EU eventually will reach the point where its economic and demographic weight will far exceed that of the United States. Can it not be expected too that the EU will seek to make this weight felt internationally? Cogan tracks the halting creation of an independent European military structure, a third way between national armies and ATO, since the Iron Curtain's fall.

With the Cold War's end and subsequent western engagements in Central and Eastern Europe, it is no longer a question of whether NATO and the EU compare; they now must relate. They have to coordinate their planning and force postures so as to avoid duplication of resources and efforts. Although NATO's integrated command structure theoretically was an anomaly with the end of the Cold War, it nevertheless turned out to be the case in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, that nothing was possible until the Americans intervened. The virtue of integrated command -- American participation and know-how -- was once again seen as crucially important, despite the increasingly anachronistic deficit of sovereignty for Western Europe in defense matters. In the long run, Europe's economic power must be balanced by its military and diplomatic might.

A thoroughly up-to-date expert analysis of national security issues in the United States, focusing on the dramatic changes brought about by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Written by one of the nation's foremost security policy analysts, the second edition of U.S. National Security: A Reference Handbook follows the trajectory of American security policy from the Cold War to the World Trade Center attacks to the Bush Administration. It brings the distinctive clarity and objectivity of the first edition to the study of a vastly different world. With over 75 percent new material, U.S. National Security, Second Edition provides an up-to-date assessment of security challenges facing the United States today incorporates the full range of viewpoints on the appropriate responses to specific issues. For readers looking for a clear-eyed assessment of the state of our security, the policies that have and haven't worked, and the opportunities and threats that lie ahead, there is no more essential resource available. A chronology of the post-Cold War period with overwhelming emphasis on the post-9/11 era and profiles of the new personalities at home and abroad affecting U.S. national security A thorough bibliography of media on national security, including online resources, websites, media offerings, and books

This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency wars for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them. In this compelling study, Eland questions the core assumptions of the American foreign policy and defense establishments that call for military interventions around the world and high and increasing defense budgets at home. He outlines a security policy more appropriate to the sober realities of the post-Cold War era. This is an approach that calls for military restraint overseas, taking advantage of the already secure U.S. geostrategic position, while safeguarding vital national interests. Eland details the military force structure needed for this new role and calculates the reduced defense budget required to pay for these forces. This book is a timely wake-up call to those who make American foreign and defense policies. It demands a badly needed re-thinking of America's national interests. In the author's view, America's natural geostrategic position places it at a natural advantage, rendering unnecessary a forward defense posture. A non-interventionist foreign policy would save money by requiring lower defense budgets. An America less willing to get involved in complex overseas disputes unrelated to U.S vital interests would also be less likely to make enemies around the world.