This text presents a comparative, international study of commissions of inquiry that have been convened in response to extraordinary failures and scandals. In recent years, commissions of inquiry have been common to the politics of the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. Recent years have seen a much wider range of states establish commissions of inquiry into intelligence and security issues, and they have also played important roles in transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Commissions of inquiry are no longer even the exclusive preserve of states, as transnational institutions such as the United Nations and European Union have begun to convoke them. This groundbreaking book comprehensively examines commissions of inquiry around the world, which have become important and increasingly invoked tools to discover truth, curb abuses, and reconcile national security imperatives with the constraints of law and human rights. It offers timely insights for national security analysts, government officials, diplomats, lawyers, scholars, human rights monitors, students, and citizens.

This volume contains Kipling's collected of essays, poems, theories, and reminisciences on sea warfare, from submarines to destroyers, with the personal and philosophical touches that mark all of his best works. Includes "The Fringes of the Fleet," "Tales of 'the Trade'," and "Destroyers at Jutland."

Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.

Security perceptions in Europe have changed drastically in the last decade due to the effects of globalization. As a result, the EU's relations with Turkey and the security policies of the EU and Turkey have become increasingly important. In light of recent developments -- not least the controversial issue of Turkey's EU candidacy -- this book attempts to answer two main questions: "Is there a gap between EU and Turkish security cultures?" and "To what extent is Turkey an advantage for Europe?." Cigdem Ustun here examines Turkey's crucial role with NATO and details its relations and priorities in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Black Sea regions, comparing these with EU relations and priorities. This comparison illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of including Turkey in European security policies and will be essential reading for all those involved in security studies and policy.

The Korean War was the first armed engagement for the newly formed U.S. Air Force, but far from the type of conflict it expected or wanted to fight. As the first air war of the nuclear age, it posed a major challenge to the service to define and successfully carry out its mission by stretching the constraints of limited war while avoiding the excesses of total war. Conrad Crane analyzes both the successes and failures of the air force in Korea, offering a balanced treatment of how the air war in Korea actually unfolded. He examines the Air Force's contention that it could play a decisive role in a non-nuclear regional war but shows that the fledgling service was held to unrealistically high expectations based on airpower's performance in World War II, despite being constrained by the limited nature of the Korean conflict. Crane exposes the tensions and rivalries between services, showing that emphasis on strategic bombing came at the expense of air support for ground troops, and he tells how interactions between army and air force generals shaped the air force's mission and strategy. He also addresses misunderstandings about plans to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the war and includes new information from pilot correspondence about the informal policy of "hot pursuit" over the Yalu that existed at the end of the war. The book considers not only the actual air effort in Korea but also its ramifications. The air force doubled in size during the war and used that growth to secure its position in the defense establishment, but it wagered its future on its ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict-a position that left it unprepared to fight the next limited war in Vietnam. As America observes the fiftieth anniversary of its initial engagement in Korea, Crane's book is an important reminder of the lessons learned there. And as airpower continues to be a cornerstone of American defense, this examination of its uses in Korea provides new insights about the air force's capabilities and limitations. Conrad C. Crane is professor of history at the United States Military Academy and the author of Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II.

This book examines the development of collective security by regional organizations particularly after the Cold War. It analyzes the various constitutional developments that have occurred within regional arrangements such as ECOWAS, African Union, SADC, OAS, and NATO, and critically analyzes how these developments have propelled regional organizations to depart from the normative framework of regional arrangement contained in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Through a comprehensive examination of practice, the book evaluates the impact of regional organizations newly asserted powers to authorize enforcement action and determine when situations within member states warrant their intervention. It inquires into the legal justifications for these developments both from within the UN Charter and regional treaties and practice and asks whether consensual intervention, that is the use of force by regional organizations on the basis of their members consent, impinges on, or constitutes an exception to, the prohibition of the use or threat of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter. The book also analyzes the regime of complimentarity between the UN and regional organizations.

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.

A staggering number of post-World War II White House and agency records pertaining to national security are stored in repositories nationwide, but researchers often find it impossible to locate and access these records. This book provides considerable detail on the quantity, nature, and public accessibility of the records at the National Archives, Federal records centers, the agencies themselves, presidential libraries, and smaller repositories. The author also discusses the critical importance of federal records management policies, classification and declassification policies, and the need for improved compliance with these policies.

The public has never had a comprehensive guide to assist in identifying, locating, and gaining access to agency and White House national security records. The author tells the reader where national security-related records are located, which ones are accessible to the public, and which ones are not. He also discusses the vital role of federal records management policies in determining the ultimate disposition of records and where the records are stored. In addition, he sets forth the policies governing the classification and declassification of records and the reasons the vast majority of records are still inaccessible to the public. Both beginning and experienced researchers will find this work to be of great assistance.

This book, written with unique access to official archives, tells the secret story of Britain's H-bomb - the scientific and strategic background, the government's policy decision, the work of the remarkable men who created the bomb, the four weapon trials at a remote Pacific atoll in 1957-58, and the historic consequences.

As the world moves further into the Information Age and the ensuing increased levels of globalization, the ability to harness all of the elements of national power in an integrated, coordinated, and synchronized manner will be even more critical for the United States to successfully defend itself. Gerstein argues that the United States as a nation is largely unprepared to reap the full benefits of the Information Age and unable to address an increasing threat level because its methods, procedures, and ways of thinking remain anchored to the Industrial Age that is rapidly being left behind. To understand and adapt to this emerging environment, the United States must re-examine the development and the implementation of national security strategy. Gerstein examines the history of U.S. national security strategy, and he analyzes the results and conclusions of several capstone documents, including the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Homeland Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Commission of National Security/21st Century, and the 9/11 Commission Report. After evaluating the execution of U.S. national security strategy, Gerstein maintains that U.S. efforts today are more heavily weighted to the use of "hard power"--political, military, and intelligence resources--for achieving strategic goals and objectives. A strategy that incorporates more fully the elements of national power, including "soft power" such as economic, social, cultural, and informational capabilities will better serve the interests of the nation. In addition, Gerstein proposes a new way of looking at strategy. Typically, strategy has been defined as the linking of ways and means toachieve ends while mitigating risk. In the future, we must factor environment into any discussion.

The history of "strategic bombing" is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of "strategic" bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.

This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.

Using recently released French official documents and a variety of other sources, this study explains how the French Army, so recently defeated by the Viet Minh insurgents in Indochina, was able to successfully defeat the Algerian nationalist rebels on the battlefield, while nevertheless losing the war at the conference table. This French success, between 1954 and 1962, was due in large part to the superior logistical system of the French Army and the use of the helicopter to enhance French operational mobility. French counter-mobility measures, particularly the construction of heavily defended interdiction zones on the eastern and western borders of Algeria, proved highly effective against the rebels. Such methods essentially cut off the rebel forces from their bases and from sources of supply located outside Algeria, and consequently strangled and destroyed the rebel forces within Algeria.

No other work on the Algerian War focuses upon the role of logistics in the outcome of the conflict. The detailed statistical data and comprehensive description and analysis of the logistical organizations and methods of both the French and the nationalist rebels are supplemented by excellent maps. This study also provides useful insights into the nature of the wars of national liberation and counter-insurgency doctrines that dominated military affairs in the mid-20th century.

The relationship between Britain and Greece, situated at the opposite ends of Europe has been close and troubled, especially since the emergence of Greece as an independent state in the 1830s. The essays in this book, some previously unpublished, focus on aspects of British-Greek relations, military, diplomatic and academic, during the 20th century. A particular area of interest is the Second World War, when British involvement in Greek affairs reached it climax, just before she surrendered her role as Greece's principal external patron to the United States.

Great Strategic Rivalries explores the histories and implications of past strategic rivalries so as to bring forth lessons pertinent to today's geopolitical world. The starting assumption is that each of these rivalries holds a number of areas of commonality from which one can determine pitfalls as well as opportunities (many of them missed). For instance, even a cursory glance at history's great strategic rivals indicates that virtually all of them began as "commercial rivalries" and then transitioned into a strategic rivalry centered on military power. One could even claim a commercial interest was at the heart of the US-USSR rivalry, but this time rather than a contest over global markets each power aimed at ensuring its economic ideology (Communism vs. Capitalism) was triumphant. In addition, history tells us that such enduring strategic rivalries typically end in one of three ways: a series of exhausting conflicts in which one side eventually prevails (Rome vs. Carthage), a peaceful and hopefully orderly transition (Great Britain vs. the US at the turn of the 20th century), or a one-sided collapse (Soviet Union in 1991). The first work covering a key element of the strategic relationship between states from ancient history to the late 20th century, Great Strategic Rivalries fills a major gap in the historiography of state relations. Each chapter provides an accessible narrative of an historically significant rivalry, comprehensively covering all aspects (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) of its history. The authors - including Barry Strauss, Geoffrey Parker, Williamson Murray, and Geoffrey Wawro - are all renowned historians and recognized experts in their selected topics.

Planning by civil governments, businesses, and the military services has been considered separately in both theory and practice. Those concerned with each of these applications have had little contact with those in the others, despite the common concerns and characteristics of their respective practices.

A leading figure in the research and education in planning, Branch draws upon his experience in civil, corporate, and military planning to provide a comprehensive guide to the key aspects of planning. This text is invaluable to those engaged in governmental and business planning and to students working toward careers in urban and regional planning, public administration, business management, and other fields concerned with planning.

Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.

Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West-including combat records of early engagements-David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns--and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.

"Stumbling Colossus" describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.

At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness-and willingness-to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, "Stumbling Colossus" is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.