The history of "strategic bombing" is inextricably intertwined with
the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question
of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian
analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its
strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than
review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine
the fundamental principles of "strategic" bombing, the RAF adopted
a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of
strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process
resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of
doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic
bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the
necessary doctrine.
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