Schwab examines America's decision to "stand in Vietnam" with a fresh perspective provided by new archival materials and the intellectual synthesis of institutional, political, and diplomatic history. Vietnam policy is shown at many different levels, from the presidency down to the level of CIA operatives in the field and public opinion specialists on the White House staff. The views of State Department officers, foreign public opinion, editorials in major U.S. newspapers, and the powerful leaders of both Congressional houses reveal an informed and highly conflicted public leadership well before American combat troops were committed in large numbers in the summer of 1965. The study begins with John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961 and proceeds to show the decision-making rocess regarding Vietnam and Indochina through the several critical events that led to Johnson's famous press conference speech of 1965. The author contends that responsibility for the war and its tragic consequences should not be placed upon individuals, but rather at the levels of the state, society, and the international system. This view of agency existing at a higher level than the presidency challenges the dominant view of most diplomatic historians and other writers who have focused on the blunders and misperceptions of policy makers.

Are the relationships that the United States forged with North and Central Europe during the Cold War still viable today? As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declines and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) emerges, can the United States and Europe bridge the transatlantic fissures that opened when the United States prepared to go to war with Iraq? In a post-9/11 world, North and Central Europe have had to adapt their national security policies and rethink their relationship with the United States. In an in-depth look at the security policies of the states in North and Central Europe, Andrew Michta highlights how historical legacies, regional geostrategic constraints, and individual capabilities have shaped their response to the new environment. Michta raises the broad question of whether traditional alliances and NATO are still viable ways to deal with new security concerns. The two key questions that arise from this discussion are to what extent NATO still matters to the United States, beyond its political utility, and whether the European Union as a whole can become a partner for the United States in a new security environment. The Limits of Alliance argues that, although NATO will continue to exist in the coming decade, the hollowing-out of the alliance will be accompanied by a shift in transatlantic security relations toward bilateralism determined by regional security considerations.

This volume explores the importance of the West Bank for Israel's security. The author assumes that a political solution to the West Bank issue will be negotiated between Israel and the Jordanians and Palestinians, and that the talks thereafter will focus on the question of security. He examines various security topics based on the current political agreement, and considers alternative political solutions and the security risks they would entail for Israel. In particular, he analyzes the possible military risks of attacks against Israel, launched from or through the West Bank region if it is not under Israeli control, and the ways in which these risks could be minimized.

Are the relationships that the United States forged with North and Central Europe during the Cold War still viable today? As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declines and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) emerges, can the United States and Europe bridge the transatlantic fissures that opened when the United States prepared to go to war with Iraq? In a post-9/11 world, North and Central Europe have had to adapt their national security policies and rethink their relationship with the United States. In an in-depth look at the security policies of the states in North and Central Europe, Andrew Michta highlights how historical legacies, regional geostrategic constraints, and individual capabilities have shaped their response to the new environment. Michta raises the broad question of whether traditional alliances and NATO are still viable ways to deal with new security concerns. The two key questions that arise from this discussion are to what extent NATO still matters to the United States, beyond its political utility, and whether the European Union as a whole can become a partner for the United States in a new security environment. The Limits of Alliance argues that, although NATO will continue to exist in the coming decade, the hollowing-out of the alliance will be accompanied by a shift in transatlantic security relations toward bilateralism determined by regional security considerations.

This book examines changes in the Persian Gulf security complex following the United States (US) invasion of Iraq in 2003, focusing on threats to the collective identities of two religious sects - Shia and Sunni. Although there is a growing body of literature examining security in the Persian Gulf, little focus has been given to the theoretical and methodological aspects of the problem. In this volume, Shayan analyses the causes behind the security changes which occurred in the region since 2003 and demonstrates how regional security dynamics are interlinked to perceived sectarian threats on the Shia and Sunni religious identities. This text is essential reading for political scientists, policy makers and scholars of international relations.

As the sole remaining superpower, shouldn't the United States be able to call the tune on establishing a secure world to our liking? While most international strategists conjure up history and theory of international relations from the past to examine such a question, Sy Deitchman, in "On Being a Superpower, " focuses on today's changing conditions and attitudes. He starts by addressing hypothetical situations that keep US international security experts awake at night. What would the United States do, he asks, if, in Saudi Arabia, an armed rebellion by Islamic fundamentalists were about to topple the House of Saud while demanding that the US get out of the Middle East? Would the United States go to war to try stop China's invasion of a democratic Taiwan that declares its independence? Could the US really win such a war against a determined country that has over a billion people and nuclear weapons? If a Central American drug cartel gained de facto control of the Panama canal and turned it into a smuggling lynchpin, what would the United States do?Deitchman examines these and other scenarios and then pictures how the US would likely respond, based on our society's current moral concerns, political rhetoric, and overall world view. After reviewing the challenges the world will present to us and examining the current state of our nation and its armed forces, Deitchman describes the strategy for preserving US security that appears to be emerging without explicit planning. He shows how trends in the armed forces parallel the trends in society, and how our argumentative political system is affecting our ability to build and use military power to support our strategy. Deitchman's synthesis of all these themes shows that the existing trends in the nation and the world are not favorable for our future security. Can they be changed? And if so, how? That's the conundrum readers of this book are invited to ponder.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and "deep operations". The military requirements of armaments and industrial production in the event of war was a central parameter in Stalinist industrialization. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid 1920s until 1941. It presents a new framework for estimating the Soviet war economic preparations, drastically underestimated by contemporaries.

These essays, written by a multinational and interdisciplinary group of contributors, seek to provide a profile of the strategic cultures of the states of the Asia Pacific region. Strategic culture consists of the traditional cultural, historical, political and societal factors that help shape the defence policies and strategic behaviour of countries. As such, it is a necessary element in understanding the security issues of this changing and increasingly significant region in world politics. In addition to contributing to a better understanding of the security problems and prospects of the Asia Pacific, the book also aims to give additional empirical weight to the developing concept of strategic culture and also relates it to the prospects for conflict management in the region, as well as military strategy.

Examining the evolving nature of national and international security in the post-Cold War era, this work focuses on non-military threat potentials and how these may best be countered. Six specific issues are discussed: terrorism, the heroin and cocaine trade, piracy, environmental degradation, the spread of disease and uncontrolled migration. The book concludes that greater national co-ordination, inter-agency co-operation and international collaboration is needed if these problems are going to be dealt with effectively.

This comprehensive analytical biography is the definitive work on the life and writings of history's most significant counterinsurgency doctrinaire, David Galula, elucidating the context for his reflections and examining the present and future applicability of his treatise for scholars and practitioners alike. The product of years of extensive research made possible by exclusive access to Galula's personal papers as well as first-hand accounts from colleagues, family members, and friends, this book traces Galula's life from early childhood until death, describing his upbringing, education, and military career in the tumultuous historical context of his era. The author-a former counterinsurgency practitioner himself-pays particular attention to how the Chinese Revolution and the Algerian War affected Galula's views, and identifies Galula's mentors and the schools of thought within the French military that greatly influenced his writings. A conclusion illuminates the contemporary and likely future validity of his works. In the epilogue, the author speaks to Galula's influence over modern military thought and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This book is essential reading for individuals with an interest in counterinsurgency, Galula's writings, or Galula himself, such as military officers and civilian administrators undertaking counterinsurgency courses and training.

The proverbial Soviet enigma has never seemed more elusive to Western analysts than now. General Secretary GorbacheV's demonstrated willingness to reallocate resources, the upheavals in the internal Soviet system wrought by perestroika and glasnost, and a new strategic reliance on defensive sufficiency may all have profound implications for U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. In this volume, distinguished academics, researchers, and government and military strategists look ahead to the 1990s and examine probable trends in the superpower relationship over the course of the next decade. An excellent source of readings for courses in international relations, national security, and foreign policy, the book focuses particularly on the strategic and military aspects of the relationship.

The book is divided into four parts and begins by addressing concepts of strategy. The contributors outline U.S. strategic practice and Soviet global objectives in the context of nuclear deterrence and major conventional wars. In Part II, three chapters discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet threat in terms of U.S. strategy for war in Europe, strategic defense policies, and technology and policy choices. Low intensity conflicts, both unconventional conflicts and Third World involvements, are the subject of Part III. Finally, the contributors assess Soviet military power and U.S. defense resources, examining the question of which nation is currently better prepared to outlast the other in a protracted conflict. A concluding chapter ties the readings together by examining whether the Soviet challenge of the 1990s can best be characterized as peacefully offensive or as operational entrapment.

Practical case-based guide illustrating the challenges and solutions of adopting IoT in both secure and hostile environments IoT for Defense and National Security covers topics on IoT security, architecture, robotics, sensing, policy, operations, and more, presenting the latest results from the U.S. Army's Internet of Battle Things and the U.S. Defense Department's premier IoT research initiative. The text discusses organizational challenges in converting defense industrial operations to IoT and summarizes policy challenges and recommendations for controlling government use of IoT in free societies. As a modern reference, this book covers multiple technologies in IoT solution deployment that include KepServerEX for edge connectivity to industrial protocols, AWS IoT Core for IoT data processing, Amazon S3 for scalable storage of IoT Data, and more. To aid in reader comprehension, the text uses case studies illustrating the challenges and solutions for using robotic devices in defense applications, plus case studies on using IoT for a defense industrial base. Witten by leading researchers and practitioners of IoT technology for defense and national security, IoT for Defense and National Security also includes information on: IoT resource allocation via mixed discrete/continuous optimization (monitoring existing resources and reallocating them in response to adversarial actions) Principles of robust learning and inference for Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBTs), covering methodologies to make machine learning models provably robust AI-enabled processing of environmental sounds in commercial and defense environments, such as detecting faults in industrial manufacturing Vulnerabilities in tactical IoT systems that come about due to the intrinsic nature of building networks using several devices and components For application engineers from security and defense-related companies and professors and students in military courses, IoT for Defense and National Security is a one-of-a-kind resource of the topic, providing expansive coverage of an important yet sensitive topic that is often shielded from the public due to classified or restricted distributions.

One of the most controversial aspects of United States foreign policy centers about its response to unconventional conflict--that is, revolutions, counterrevolutions, and terrorism--in and from a number of Third World countries. Examining the current U.S. political-military posture, this critical study assesses the challenges posed to open systems by these conflicts and proposes guidelines for creating a more effective U.S. response. The author first explores the nature of unconventional conflicts, then turns to the U.S. response to the challenges unconditional conflicts present. Urging the need for a "new realism" based on a more accurate picture of present political conditions and U.S. interests, he concludes with a series of suggested guidelines for designing U.S. policy, strategy, doctrine and organizational strategies as a means of developing a more viable approach to the challenges of contemporary military and political conflict.

This work is a critical examination of the dangers which confront the United States in the current era of global instability with historical examples of past crises and prescriptive suggestions for the future. America enters the post-Cold War world as a superpower, but one whose future security, and perhaps even survival, cannot be taken for granted. Only three times in modern history has the world seen such potential instability; in two of those instances, the result was total war. In the coming millennium, major crises and wars are inevitable. Whether or not the United States successfully negotiates such conflicts will depend upon decisions made today.

Only careful analysis and planning can help to assure that the United States will preserve its independence and prosperity. This study includes historical examples which illustrate why the current global situation is exceptionally dangerous and how America should prepare to avoid and survive crises, maintain freedom of action, and improve strategic decision-making. The author reviews the most dangerous strategic shortcomings and makes twenty-six recommendations for the future on such topics as military force structure, foreign policy goals, and domestic policy.

Noted scholars and practitioners describe how America's military strategy is being developed in a post-Cold War eolitical environment to meet future needs confronting the sole surviving world superpower. In defining the domestic constraints and the intense political process that is tied into the formulation of military strategy, they show how difficult it is to build a consensus for American military leadership in a multipolar world. This evaluation of strategic concepts and their application to issues about conventional and nuclear deterrence, technological requirements, and collective security should be required reading for staff officers, civilians in national security bureaucracies, policymakers, and students and scholars concerned with military and security policy.

Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question of why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the US in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened - over Berlin and Cuba - the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgement brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.

Wallach provides a pioneering study of coalition warfare. Using World War I as a case study, Wallach examines such important aspects as Allied pre-war planning; the particularistic interests of coalition partners; human relations; the framework for coordination mechanisms within coalitions; the application of such concepts as a general reserve, unified command, and amalgamation of forces; logistical problems; war finance; and the transition from war to peace.

In the process, Wallach shows that coalition warfare is among the most difficult forms to develop and maintain successfully. Unfortunately, as recent post-Cold War experiences illustrate, coalition warfare is an ongoing military issue. As such, this book will be of great interest to military planners as well as students of the history of World War I.

This is the most important book ever written about warfare and conflict. Lionel Giles' translation is the definitive edition. The Art of War can be used and adapted in every facet of your life. This book explains when and how to go to war, as well as when not to. Learn how to win any conflict whether it be on the battlefield or in the boardroom. This deluxe edition contains two versions of The Art of War. The first has no commentary so that you can immerse yourself directly in Sun Tzu's work. The second version includes Lionel Giles' indispensable commentary.

From grassroots terrorism to the nuclear ambitions of hostile nations, the United States faces increasingly complex threats to its national security, and combating these threats continues to demand a reshaping of the nation's security structure, military forces and defense expenditures. In this study, Anthony Cordesman offers a detailed analysis of critical challenges affecting U.S. national security and how failures in adapting to these challenges have exacerbated the strains on available resources. He systematically identifies the most glaring obstacles to successful national security planning and proposes constructive and practical ways to proceed in the future. Cordesman focuses on ten specific challenges, and each is addressed within the context of the Iraq War, Afghan War, War on Terrorism, and the risk of conflict over the Taiwan Straits. Out of the lessons drawn from these experiences, he examines the future of international coalitions, asymmetric warfare, nation building, and stability operations, and concludes that perhaps the most pressing area for change is the need for accountability among civilian and military policymakers.

Since the buildup of U.S. armed forces peaked under Reagan in 1987, many changes have occurred in all four services, including reductions in both human and material resources. This study traces these trends and details the government's vision of how the military will look in the year 2015. Changes in the global security environment and pressure to decrease federal spending have resulted in force restructuring, eliminating major units, and displacing military and civilian personnel. Other consequences include base closures and reduced major weapon system inventories. Brasher discusses the implications of these new policies and assesses their current and future impact on American defense capabilities. The media has focussed considerable attention on the downsizing of U.S. forces. It predicted that base closures would have catastrophic effects on local communities, and it warned that women and minorities would see fewer opportunities for advancement within the military. Brasher chronicles the effects of base closures on many communities and determines that original fears were exaggerated. Women and minorities have also fared better than initially anticipated. In fact, especially in terms of relative combat power, the new military is even stronger than it was in 1987.

This book is based on a conference addressing the relationship between the environment and security in the post-Cold War world. It brings together scholars and practitioners from a variety of different disciplines and perspectives in an effort to both explore the complexities of the relationship between environmental variables and security conditions, and re-focus the debate within the environmental community. The book combines analytical frameworks and case study material with proposals for addressing environmental challenges and enhancing the security and welfare of peoples, states and regions.

Rhetoric, Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Windt argue, is central to shaping both political consciousness and political culture. In this important new contribution to Praeger's Series in Political Communication, they examine how the rhetoric of the early Cold War years was used to create and develop a national and international reality. The pervasive political view of events, motives, actions, and policy was largely created in the years between 1945 and 1950 and grew from a pre-existing set of rhetorical beliefs as well as from the political speeches and pronouncements of the time. Hinds and Windt focus their study on American rhetoric applied to Soviet-American relations, centering essentially on Europe. They offer a brief outline of the theoretical principles used in their analysis, and follow with a look at certain images of the USSR selected for use by American politicians. In subsequent chapters, the authors trace developments from the end of World War II to Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, thoroughly explore the British leader's address and its effect in dividing the world into two warring camps, analyze the writing and presentation of the 1947 Truman Doctrine and its suggestion of two ways of life, and detail the Truman Loyalty Program and the 1947 House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings in Hollywood. The remaining chapters discuss George Marshall's address originating the European Recovery Act, George Kennan's Sources of Soviet Conduct, contemporary critics, and such proofs as the Korean War, which showed the rhetoric to be correct. This work will be an important reference tool for courses in political communication, American history, political science, and presidential studies, and a useful addition to library collections.