A light cavalry regiment at war against Napoleonic France
This the second volume of C. R. B Barrett's in depth history of the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars. Whilst the first volume dealt with the regiment's service as dragoons during the continental wars of the eighteenth century in this volume the regiment has developed into a light cavalry unit-first as light dragoons and then as fully styled hussars. The regiment took part in the campaign in the Netherlands and the Helder before it's posting to Spain and the ultimately disastrous Corunna campaign. Further service in the Peninsula followed to the close of the war with France. Napoleon's escape from Elba brought the regiment to battle once more during the formidable campaign of 1815 where it saw intense action at Genappe and Waterloo. This book is filled with vital detail and is enhanced by several first hand accounts by soldiers of the 7th. Volume three of this history deals with the regiment through Queen Victoria's colonial wars of the nineteenth century and the fourth and final volume concerns uniform, equipment and the services of notable regimental members.

Based on many years of applied research, modeling and educating future decision makers, the authors have selected the critical set of mathematical modeling skills for decision analysis to include in this book. The book focuses on the model formulation and modeling building skills, as well as the technology to support decision analysis. The authors cover many of the main techniques that have been incorporated into their three-course sequence in mathematical modeling for decision making in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. The primary objective of this book is illustrative in nature. It begins with an introduction to mathematical modeling and a process for formally thinking about difficult problems, illustrating many scenarios and illustrative examples. The book incorporates the necessary mathematical foundations for solving these problems with military applications and related military processes to reinforce the applied nature of the mathematical modeling process.

An important history of a famous British cavalry regiment
This book is the first volume of an essential four volume work covering the history of the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars to the beginning of the Great War of 1914-18. C. R. B. Bennett's work is a study in considerable depth-concentrating not merely on the close activities of the regiment-but also on the tactical issues in which it took immediate part and the broader span of the engagements and campaigns in which it was involved. As such it is virtually a history of the British cavalry arm over more than two centuries. It is full of the detail much appreciated by students of military history including many first hand accounts. This volume concerns the regiment's time as dragoons-mostly during the eighteenth century-and includes famous actions such as Dettingen, Fontenoy, Warburg, Vellinghausen, Wilhelmsthal and others. The second volume covers the Napoleonic period including the regiment's experiences at Waterloo. The third volume covers the remainder of the nineteenth century including service in India and Africa, whilst the fourth volume gives much valuable information about equipment, uniforms and the services of individual members of the 7th.

The work examines the rise of the movements against globalization, modernization, and Western dominance that followed the collapse of the bipolar world and the end of the Cold War and that culminated with today's global jihadist movements. It describes how the U.S. had to adapt to this new, asymmetrical world of conflict with its strategic, doctrinal and theoretical responses to the threats of terrorism and insurgency that defined the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Unique in the breadth of its scope, the book connects movements from the Zapatista uprising to Al Qaeda's global jihad within a broader historical framework, connecting pre and post-9/11 conflicts under the unifying theme of a struggle against the forces of modernization. Featuring the works of key theorists such as John Arquilla, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Arthur K. Cebrowski, Jim Gant, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert D. Kaplan, David J. Kilcullen, William H. McRaven, and David Ronfeldt, this book bridges the fields of counterinsurgency, homeland security, counterterrorism, cyberwarfare, and technology of war, and will be a must-read for academics, policymakers and strategists.

This innovative new text focuses on the politics of international security: how and why issues are interpreted as threats to international security and how such threats are managed. After a brief introduction to the field and its major theories and approaches, the core chapters systematically analyze the major issues on the contemporary international security agenda. Each is examined according to a common framework that brings out the nature of the threat and the responses open to policy makers. From war, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, through environmental and economic crises, to epidemics, cyber-war and piracy, the twenty-first century world seems beset by a daunting range of international security problems. At the same time, the academic study of security has become more fragmented and contested than ever before as new actors, issues and theories increasingly challenge traditional concepts and approaches. This new edition has been heavily revised to discuss for the failings of the Obama admiration and its strategic partners on a number of different security issues, and the constant, evolving instances of turmoil the world has experienced since, whilst providing the skills students need to conduct their own research of international security issues occurring outside of this text, and for issues yet to occur. Cyber security, the 'Arab Spring' revolutions, the Ebola outbreak, and the refugee crisis are just some examples of the plethora of subjects that Smith analyses within this text. This textbook is an essential for those studying international security, whether at undergraduate or postgraduate level as part of a degree in international relations, politics, and other social sciences more generally. New to this Edition: - Chapter on cyber security - Up-to-date issues and field coverage - New 'mini-case studies' in each chapter - Updated analytical/pedagogical framework Pioneering framework for students to apply theory and empirical evidence correctly to tackle analytical and comparative tasks concerning both traditional and non-traditional security issues

A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations.

Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.

In this work, an expert on biological weapons offers a thoughtful examination of the political and technical issues that have affected the implementation of arms control agreements from the 1960s to the present. Arms Control Policy: A Guide to the Issues examines the history of the major arms control treaties since the early 1960s. It offers readers a broad understanding of the ways in which arms control agreements were negotiated and implemented during the Cold War, the international and national events that affected treaty negotiation and implementation, and how the arms control landscape has changed in the war's aftermath. Specifically, the handbook overviews the obligations contained in bilateral U.S.-Soviet/Russian and multilateral arms control agreements covering nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. It also treats such agreements as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty to Ban Land Mines, and the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions. The book concludes with a look at the current challenges in the implementation of arms control agreements and the future of arms control. Primary documents and biographical sketches of key figures support the text Offers a chronology of arms control agreements from the 1960s to the present Maps show placement of land mines in Bosnia and elsewhere Photographs depict the effects of different weapons Includes a glossary of technical arms control terms and acronyms Provides a bibliography including significant materials from history, political science, and public policy

Will current strategic planning give the United States the sort of military capabilities that are needed to counter threats likely to occur in the future? Using first-hand experience at the Pentagon and an army background, Lieutenant Colonel Peters outlines serious problems, offers fresh insights into the defense planning process, and makes suggestions for developing an optimal force structure for the year 2000. This analysis utilizes case studies of the Gulf War, departing from recent studies about military reform. Policymakers, experts in political and military strategy, and political scientists interested in the inner workings of government agencies will find this study a provocative one. Peters assesses the global security environment in this post-Cold War era and defines the risks and consequences likely to confront us. Employing the lens of organizational theory, he points to disjunctures between military and political policies and dysfunctional practices in the Defense Department. He describes the basic components in a force structure that would make the nation more secure militarily by the turn of the century.

"Desert Battle" is a study of the nature of desert warfare with special attention to the evolution of weaponry, the organization of forces, the impact of the desert environment on the ability of those forces to sustain battle, and the influences of the desert on battle tactics. The work concentrates on seven campaigns, from Bonaparte's adventure in Egypt in 1798-1799 to the 1991 Gulf War. Each campaign is discussed in relation to its political-military background, with focus on leadership, the forces available, and the weapons at their disposal. A narration of each campaign follows, ending with an evaluation in relative degrees of the leadership, weapons, and tactics and the long-run consequences of the campaign.

Watson's study opens with a description and analysis of Erwin Rommel's first advance in North Africa in April of 1941, but his emphasis is not on Rommel's magnificent achievements but on the creation of the Rommel legend and its effect on our understanding of desert warfare. That opening chapter is followed by an examination of deserts as a physical context for battle--the nature of the environment and who fights in deserts and why. Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, 1798-1799, is discussed in the context of desert campaigns. British operations along India's Northwest Frontier from 1849-1852 follow. The Tigris campaign of World War I is particularly notable because it introduced armored cars, thereby increasing an army's mobility in desert sands. The British counterattack against the Italians in North Africa from late 1940 to early 1941 demonstrates how a small army, utilizing surprise, indirect attack, and high mobility, were able to offset the Italians' numerical superiority. Post-World War II battle is illustrated by the Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1973. The final campaign discussed is the 1991 Gulf War. Watson's original conclusions about the nature of desert battle and the constants that determine the outcome of battles in that hostile environment are surprising and illuminating. They constitute a real contribution to the study of desert warfare.

The United States and its allies have been fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for a decade in a war that either side could still win. While a gradual drawdown has begun, significant numbers of US combat troops will remain in Afghanistan until at least 2014, perhaps longer, depending on the situation on the ground and the outcome of the US presidential election in 2012. Given the realities of the Taliban's persistence and the desire of US policymakers - and the public - to find a way out, what can and should be the goals of the US and its allies in Afghanistan? "Afghan Endgames" brings together some of the finest minds in the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to provide a clear, balanced, and comprehensive assessment of the alternatives for restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Presenting a range of options - from immediate withdrawal of all coalition forces to the maintenance of an open-ended, but greatly reduced military presence - the contributors weigh the many costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative. This important book boldly pursues several strands of thought suggesting that a strong, legitimate central government is far from likely to emerge in Kabul; that fewer coalition forces, used in creative ways, may have better effects on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that, even though Pakistan should not be pushed too hard, so as to avoid sparking social chaos there, Afghanistan's other neighbors can and should be encouraged to become more actively involved. The volume's editors conclude that while there may never be complete peace in Afghanistan, a self-sustaining security system able to restore order swiftly in the wake of violence is attainable.

Written in China more than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu's classic The Art of War is the first known study of the planning and conduct of military operations. These terse, aphoristic essays are unsurpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding, examining not only battlefield maneuvers, but also relevant economic, political, and psychological factors. Indeed, the precepts outlined by Sun Tzu can be applied outside the realm of military theory. It is read avidly by Japanese businessmen and in fact was touted in the movie Wall Street as the corporate raider's bible.

Schwab examines America's decision to "stand in Vietnam" with a fresh perspective provided by new archival materials and the intellectual synthesis of institutional, political, and diplomatic history. Vietnam policy is shown at many different levels, from the presidency down to the level of CIA operatives in the field and public opinion specialists on the White House staff. The views of State Department officers, foreign public opinion, editorials in major U.S. newspapers, and the powerful leaders of both Congressional houses reveal an informed and highly conflicted public leadership well before American combat troops were committed in large numbers in the summer of 1965. The study begins with John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961 and proceeds to show the decision-making rocess regarding Vietnam and Indochina through the several critical events that led to Johnson's famous press conference speech of 1965. The author contends that responsibility for the war and its tragic consequences should not be placed upon individuals, but rather at the levels of the state, society, and the international system. This view of agency existing at a higher level than the presidency challenges the dominant view of most diplomatic historians and other writers who have focused on the blunders and misperceptions of policy makers.

The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.

As the sole remaining superpower, shouldn't the United States be able to call the tune on establishing a secure world to our liking? While most international strategists conjure up history and theory of international relations from the past to examine such a question, Sy Deitchman, in "On Being a Superpower, " focuses on today's changing conditions and attitudes. He starts by addressing hypothetical situations that keep US international security experts awake at night. What would the United States do, he asks, if, in Saudi Arabia, an armed rebellion by Islamic fundamentalists were about to topple the House of Saud while demanding that the US get out of the Middle East? Would the United States go to war to try stop China's invasion of a democratic Taiwan that declares its independence? Could the US really win such a war against a determined country that has over a billion people and nuclear weapons? If a Central American drug cartel gained de facto control of the Panama canal and turned it into a smuggling lynchpin, what would the United States do?Deitchman examines these and other scenarios and then pictures how the US would likely respond, based on our society's current moral concerns, political rhetoric, and overall world view. After reviewing the challenges the world will present to us and examining the current state of our nation and its armed forces, Deitchman describes the strategy for preserving US security that appears to be emerging without explicit planning. He shows how trends in the armed forces parallel the trends in society, and how our argumentative political system is affecting our ability to build and use military power to support our strategy. Deitchman's synthesis of all these themes shows that the existing trends in the nation and the world are not favorable for our future security. Can they be changed? And if so, how? That's the conundrum readers of this book are invited to ponder.

Practical case-based guide illustrating the challenges and solutions of adopting IoT in both secure and hostile environments IoT for Defense and National Security covers topics on IoT security, architecture, robotics, sensing, policy, operations, and more, presenting the latest results from the U.S. Army's Internet of Battle Things and the U.S. Defense Department's premier IoT research initiative. The text discusses organizational challenges in converting defense industrial operations to IoT and summarizes policy challenges and recommendations for controlling government use of IoT in free societies. As a modern reference, this book covers multiple technologies in IoT solution deployment that include KepServerEX for edge connectivity to industrial protocols, AWS IoT Core for IoT data processing, Amazon S3 for scalable storage of IoT Data, and more. To aid in reader comprehension, the text uses case studies illustrating the challenges and solutions for using robotic devices in defense applications, plus case studies on using IoT for a defense industrial base. Witten by leading researchers and practitioners of IoT technology for defense and national security, IoT for Defense and National Security also includes information on: IoT resource allocation via mixed discrete/continuous optimization (monitoring existing resources and reallocating them in response to adversarial actions) Principles of robust learning and inference for Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBTs), covering methodologies to make machine learning models provably robust AI-enabled processing of environmental sounds in commercial and defense environments, such as detecting faults in industrial manufacturing Vulnerabilities in tactical IoT systems that come about due to the intrinsic nature of building networks using several devices and components For application engineers from security and defense-related companies and professors and students in military courses, IoT for Defense and National Security is a one-of-a-kind resource of the topic, providing expansive coverage of an important yet sensitive topic that is often shielded from the public due to classified or restricted distributions.

The proverbial Soviet enigma has never seemed more elusive to Western analysts than now. General Secretary GorbacheV's demonstrated willingness to reallocate resources, the upheavals in the internal Soviet system wrought by perestroika and glasnost, and a new strategic reliance on defensive sufficiency may all have profound implications for U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. In this volume, distinguished academics, researchers, and government and military strategists look ahead to the 1990s and examine probable trends in the superpower relationship over the course of the next decade. An excellent source of readings for courses in international relations, national security, and foreign policy, the book focuses particularly on the strategic and military aspects of the relationship.

The book is divided into four parts and begins by addressing concepts of strategy. The contributors outline U.S. strategic practice and Soviet global objectives in the context of nuclear deterrence and major conventional wars. In Part II, three chapters discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet threat in terms of U.S. strategy for war in Europe, strategic defense policies, and technology and policy choices. Low intensity conflicts, both unconventional conflicts and Third World involvements, are the subject of Part III. Finally, the contributors assess Soviet military power and U.S. defense resources, examining the question of which nation is currently better prepared to outlast the other in a protracted conflict. A concluding chapter ties the readings together by examining whether the Soviet challenge of the 1990s can best be characterized as peacefully offensive or as operational entrapment.

Examining the evolving nature of national and international security in the post-Cold War era, this work focuses on non-military threat potentials and how these may best be countered. Six specific issues are discussed: terrorism, the heroin and cocaine trade, piracy, environmental degradation, the spread of disease and uncontrolled migration. The book concludes that greater national co-ordination, inter-agency co-operation and international collaboration is needed if these problems are going to be dealt with effectively.

One of the most controversial aspects of United States foreign policy centers about its response to unconventional conflict--that is, revolutions, counterrevolutions, and terrorism--in and from a number of Third World countries. Examining the current U.S. political-military posture, this critical study assesses the challenges posed to open systems by these conflicts and proposes guidelines for creating a more effective U.S. response. The author first explores the nature of unconventional conflicts, then turns to the U.S. response to the challenges unconditional conflicts present. Urging the need for a "new realism" based on a more accurate picture of present political conditions and U.S. interests, he concludes with a series of suggested guidelines for designing U.S. policy, strategy, doctrine and organizational strategies as a means of developing a more viable approach to the challenges of contemporary military and political conflict.

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model.

A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.

American fortunes were at a low point in the winter of 1777-78. The British had beaten the Continental Army at Brandywine and Germantown, seized the colonial capital of Philadelphia, and driven Washington's soldiers into barren Valley Forge. But, as Stephen Taaffe reveals, the Philadelphia Campaign marked a turning point in the American Revolution despite these setbacks.

Occurring in the middle of the war in the heart of the colonies, this key but overlooked campaign dwarfed all others in the war in terms of numbers of combatants involved, battles fought, and casualties sustained. For the first time, British and American armies engaged out in the open on relatively equal terms. Although the British won all the major battles, they were unable to crush the rebellion.

Taaffe presents a new narrative history of this campaign that took place not only in the hills and woods surrounding Philadelphia, but also in east central New Jersey and along the Delaware River. He uses the campaign to analyze British and American strategies, evaluate Washington's leadership, and assess the role of subordinate officers such as Nathanael Greene and Anthony Wayne. He also offers new insights into eighteenth-century warfare and shows how Washington transcended traditional military thinking to fashion a strategy that accommodated American social, political, and economic realities.

During this campaign Washington came into his own as a commander of colonial forces and an astute military strategist, and Taaffe demonstrates that Washington used the fighting around Philadelphia as a proving ground for strategies that he applied later in the war. Taaffe also scrutinizes Washington's relationship with the militia, whose failure to carry out its missions contributed to the general's problems.

Still, by enduring their losses and continuing to fight, the Americans exacted a heavy toll on Britain's resources, helped to convince France to enter the war, and put the redcoats on the defensive. As Taaffe shows, far from being inconclusive, the Philadelphia Campaign contributed more to American victory than the colonists recognized at the time.