This book provides a detailed analysis of the complicated relations between Iran and its Arab neighbours. Arab perceptions of Iran, its regional policies and role in the Arab region, have never been more complicated than today. How is one to make sense of the increasingly complex and at times tense relationship between Iran and its Arab neighbours? Given the strategic significance of this sub-region and the importance of relations between its states to international security, this edited volume systematically accounts for each Arab neighbour's perception, policies and approach towards the Islamic republic, for the first time providing a clear and detailed comparative analysis of these relationships. This book, bringing together a group of leading scholars of the region, not only provides a clear lens for the policy community through which to gauge the causes of change and the reasons for continuity in relations, but also offers an invaluable tool for scholars of the wider region and the growing community of researchers focusing on this sub-region.

The work examines the rise of the movements against globalization, modernization, and Western dominance that followed the collapse of the bipolar world and the end of the Cold War and that culminated with today's global jihadist movements. It describes how the U.S. had to adapt to this new, asymmetrical world of conflict with its strategic, doctrinal and theoretical responses to the threats of terrorism and insurgency that defined the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Unique in the breadth of its scope, the book connects movements from the Zapatista uprising to Al Qaeda's global jihad within a broader historical framework, connecting pre and post-9/11 conflicts under the unifying theme of a struggle against the forces of modernization. Featuring the works of key theorists such as John Arquilla, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Arthur K. Cebrowski, Jim Gant, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert D. Kaplan, David J. Kilcullen, William H. McRaven, and David Ronfeldt, this book bridges the fields of counterinsurgency, homeland security, counterterrorism, cyberwarfare, and technology of war, and will be a must-read for academics, policymakers and strategists.

This latest study in the Brookings series on U.S. defense strategy and the defense budget reviews current American military capabilities and offers suggestions for the new administration and Congress. Michael O'Hanlon makes sense of the hot political topic of military readiness, questions the continued relevance of the current two-war framework for structuring most conventional combat forces, and challenges the wisdom of current plans for the procurement of advanced jet fighters, helicopters, and submarines. The book also focuses on missile defense, other means of homeland defense, the so-called revolution in military affairs, and possible conflicts between Taiwan and China that could involve U.S. forces. Throughout, the author looks for ways to close the gap between the cost of projected U.S. defense forces and the budget actually available to the Pentagon.

Will current strategic planning give the United States the sort of military capabilities that are needed to counter threats likely to occur in the future? Using first-hand experience at the Pentagon and an army background, Lieutenant Colonel Peters outlines serious problems, offers fresh insights into the defense planning process, and makes suggestions for developing an optimal force structure for the year 2000. This analysis utilizes case studies of the Gulf War, departing from recent studies about military reform. Policymakers, experts in political and military strategy, and political scientists interested in the inner workings of government agencies will find this study a provocative one. Peters assesses the global security environment in this post-Cold War era and defines the risks and consequences likely to confront us. Employing the lens of organizational theory, he points to disjunctures between military and political policies and dysfunctional practices in the Defense Department. He describes the basic components in a force structure that would make the nation more secure militarily by the turn of the century.

Written in China more than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu's classic The Art of War is the first known study of the planning and conduct of military operations. These terse, aphoristic essays are unsurpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding, examining not only battlefield maneuvers, but also relevant economic, political, and psychological factors. Indeed, the precepts outlined by Sun Tzu can be applied outside the realm of military theory. It is read avidly by Japanese businessmen and in fact was touted in the movie Wall Street as the corporate raider's bible.

The Impact of the First World War on U.S. Policymakers: American Strategic and Foreign Policy Formulation, 1938 1942 is designed to recount the formulation of foreign and defense policies through an examination of the background of the policymakers, with specific emphasis on the World War I experience. The introduction provides an analysis of the literature of the history of this American World War II policy formulation. The events and factors that led to the reorientation of priorities in 1938-1939 are examined. From that base, Michael Carew reviews the unfolding events of the European and Japanese degeneration into war through the spring of 1940, and their perception for the American policy-makers. He also recounts the tectonic shifts of the subsequent eighteen months and the scramble for an American response. The immediate consequences of Pearl Harbor brought the policymaking to a crisis, and the Casablanca conference of January 1943 signified the completion of the formulation of American foreign policy and naval-military strategy. Carew emphasizes the leadership of President Roosevelt and his cadre of planners in the policy formulation realm, the assertion of leadership of the alliance, and Roosevelt's specific tasks in managing the American war effort. These presidential tasks included the industrial mobilization of the American economy, the domestic political leadership of the war, the persuasion of the alliance to the propriety of American policy, and the defeat of the Axis."

"Desert Battle" is a study of the nature of desert warfare with special attention to the evolution of weaponry, the organization of forces, the impact of the desert environment on the ability of those forces to sustain battle, and the influences of the desert on battle tactics. The work concentrates on seven campaigns, from Bonaparte's adventure in Egypt in 1798-1799 to the 1991 Gulf War. Each campaign is discussed in relation to its political-military background, with focus on leadership, the forces available, and the weapons at their disposal. A narration of each campaign follows, ending with an evaluation in relative degrees of the leadership, weapons, and tactics and the long-run consequences of the campaign.

Watson's study opens with a description and analysis of Erwin Rommel's first advance in North Africa in April of 1941, but his emphasis is not on Rommel's magnificent achievements but on the creation of the Rommel legend and its effect on our understanding of desert warfare. That opening chapter is followed by an examination of deserts as a physical context for battle--the nature of the environment and who fights in deserts and why. Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, 1798-1799, is discussed in the context of desert campaigns. British operations along India's Northwest Frontier from 1849-1852 follow. The Tigris campaign of World War I is particularly notable because it introduced armored cars, thereby increasing an army's mobility in desert sands. The British counterattack against the Italians in North Africa from late 1940 to early 1941 demonstrates how a small army, utilizing surprise, indirect attack, and high mobility, were able to offset the Italians' numerical superiority. Post-World War II battle is illustrated by the Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1973. The final campaign discussed is the 1991 Gulf War. Watson's original conclusions about the nature of desert battle and the constants that determine the outcome of battles in that hostile environment are surprising and illuminating. They constitute a real contribution to the study of desert warfare.

No foreign policy decision in recent history has had greater repercussions than President George W. Bush's decision to invade and occupy Iraq. It launched a new doctrine of preemptive war, mired the American military in an intractable armed conflict, disrupted world petroleum supplies, cost the United States hundreds of billions of dollars, and damaged or ended the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans and Iraqis. Its impact on international politics and America's standing in the world remains incalculable.
The Iraq Papers offers a compelling documentary narrative and interpretation of this momentous conflict. With keen editing and incisive commentary, the book weaves together original documents that range from presidential addresses to redacted memos, carrying us from the ideology behind the invasion to negotiations for withdrawal. These papers trace the rise of the neoconservatives and reveal the role of strategic thinking about oil supplies. In moving to the planning for the war itself, the authors not only provide Congressional resolutions and speeches by President Bush, but internal security papers, Pentagon planning documents, the report of the Future of Iraq Project, and eloquent opposition statements by Senator Robert Byrd, other world governments, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the World Council of Churches. This collection addresses every aspect of the conflict, from the military's evolving counterinsurgency strategy to declarations by Iraqi resisters and political figures-from Coalition Provisional Authority orders to Donald Rumsfeld's dismissal of the insurgents as "dead-enders" and Iraqi discussions of state- and nationbuilding under the shadow of occupation. The economics of petroleum, the legal and ethical questions surrounding terrorism and torture, international agreements, the theory of the "unitary presidency," and the Bush administration's use of presidential signing statements all receive in-depth coverage.
The Iraq War has reshaped the domestic and international landscape. The Iraq Papers offers the authoritative one-volume source for understanding the conflict and its many repercussions.

Schwab examines America's decision to "stand in Vietnam" with a fresh perspective provided by new archival materials and the intellectual synthesis of institutional, political, and diplomatic history. Vietnam policy is shown at many different levels, from the presidency down to the level of CIA operatives in the field and public opinion specialists on the White House staff. The views of State Department officers, foreign public opinion, editorials in major U.S. newspapers, and the powerful leaders of both Congressional houses reveal an informed and highly conflicted public leadership well before American combat troops were committed in large numbers in the summer of 1965. The study begins with John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961 and proceeds to show the decision-making rocess regarding Vietnam and Indochina through the several critical events that led to Johnson's famous press conference speech of 1965. The author contends that responsibility for the war and its tragic consequences should not be placed upon individuals, but rather at the levels of the state, society, and the international system. This view of agency existing at a higher level than the presidency challenges the dominant view of most diplomatic historians and other writers who have focused on the blunders and misperceptions of policy makers.

The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.

This book examines changes in the Persian Gulf security complex following the United States (US) invasion of Iraq in 2003, focusing on threats to the collective identities of two religious sects - Shia and Sunni. Although there is a growing body of literature examining security in the Persian Gulf, little focus has been given to the theoretical and methodological aspects of the problem. In this volume, Shayan analyses the causes behind the security changes which occurred in the region since 2003 and demonstrates how regional security dynamics are interlinked to perceived sectarian threats on the Shia and Sunni religious identities. This text is essential reading for political scientists, policy makers and scholars of international relations.

As the sole remaining superpower, shouldn't the United States be able to call the tune on establishing a secure world to our liking? While most international strategists conjure up history and theory of international relations from the past to examine such a question, Sy Deitchman, in "On Being a Superpower, " focuses on today's changing conditions and attitudes. He starts by addressing hypothetical situations that keep US international security experts awake at night. What would the United States do, he asks, if, in Saudi Arabia, an armed rebellion by Islamic fundamentalists were about to topple the House of Saud while demanding that the US get out of the Middle East? Would the United States go to war to try stop China's invasion of a democratic Taiwan that declares its independence? Could the US really win such a war against a determined country that has over a billion people and nuclear weapons? If a Central American drug cartel gained de facto control of the Panama canal and turned it into a smuggling lynchpin, what would the United States do?Deitchman examines these and other scenarios and then pictures how the US would likely respond, based on our society's current moral concerns, political rhetoric, and overall world view. After reviewing the challenges the world will present to us and examining the current state of our nation and its armed forces, Deitchman describes the strategy for preserving US security that appears to be emerging without explicit planning. He shows how trends in the armed forces parallel the trends in society, and how our argumentative political system is affecting our ability to build and use military power to support our strategy. Deitchman's synthesis of all these themes shows that the existing trends in the nation and the world are not favorable for our future security. Can they be changed? And if so, how? That's the conundrum readers of this book are invited to ponder.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and "deep operations". The military requirements of armaments and industrial production in the event of war was a central parameter in Stalinist industrialization. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid 1920s until 1941. It presents a new framework for estimating the Soviet war economic preparations, drastically underestimated by contemporaries.

Andrew A. Michta examines the security of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the aftermath of the 1989 collapse of communism and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. He reviews the old geopolitical dilemmas in the region as well as the new conditions in Europe as it approaches the remainder of the decade, and offers a country-by-country discussion of security policies and military reforms underway in the region. The analysis is set against a background discussion of the region's history as well as a review of the key events leading to the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, including the reformulation of Soviet security policy in the late 1980s. Michta concludes with an assessment of security challenges facing the Triangle states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as they work to join Western Europe by the end of the decade. He argues that the Triangle will remain in a gray security zone in Europe for the foreseeable future, with an implicit security commitment from NATO, but without explicit formal security guarantees.

These essays, written by a multinational and interdisciplinary group of contributors, seek to provide a profile of the strategic cultures of the states of the Asia Pacific region. Strategic culture consists of the traditional cultural, historical, political and societal factors that help shape the defence policies and strategic behaviour of countries. As such, it is a necessary element in understanding the security issues of this changing and increasingly significant region in world politics. In addition to contributing to a better understanding of the security problems and prospects of the Asia Pacific, the book also aims to give additional empirical weight to the developing concept of strategic culture and also relates it to the prospects for conflict management in the region, as well as military strategy.

Examining the evolving nature of national and international security in the post-Cold War era, this work focuses on non-military threat potentials and how these may best be countered. Six specific issues are discussed: terrorism, the heroin and cocaine trade, piracy, environmental degradation, the spread of disease and uncontrolled migration. The book concludes that greater national co-ordination, inter-agency co-operation and international collaboration is needed if these problems are going to be dealt with effectively.

The proverbial Soviet enigma has never seemed more elusive to Western analysts than now. General Secretary GorbacheV's demonstrated willingness to reallocate resources, the upheavals in the internal Soviet system wrought by perestroika and glasnost, and a new strategic reliance on defensive sufficiency may all have profound implications for U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. In this volume, distinguished academics, researchers, and government and military strategists look ahead to the 1990s and examine probable trends in the superpower relationship over the course of the next decade. An excellent source of readings for courses in international relations, national security, and foreign policy, the book focuses particularly on the strategic and military aspects of the relationship.

The book is divided into four parts and begins by addressing concepts of strategy. The contributors outline U.S. strategic practice and Soviet global objectives in the context of nuclear deterrence and major conventional wars. In Part II, three chapters discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet threat in terms of U.S. strategy for war in Europe, strategic defense policies, and technology and policy choices. Low intensity conflicts, both unconventional conflicts and Third World involvements, are the subject of Part III. Finally, the contributors assess Soviet military power and U.S. defense resources, examining the question of which nation is currently better prepared to outlast the other in a protracted conflict. A concluding chapter ties the readings together by examining whether the Soviet challenge of the 1990s can best be characterized as peacefully offensive or as operational entrapment.

This comprehensive analytical biography is the definitive work on the life and writings of history's most significant counterinsurgency doctrinaire, David Galula, elucidating the context for his reflections and examining the present and future applicability of his treatise for scholars and practitioners alike. The product of years of extensive research made possible by exclusive access to Galula's personal papers as well as first-hand accounts from colleagues, family members, and friends, this book traces Galula's life from early childhood until death, describing his upbringing, education, and military career in the tumultuous historical context of his era. The author-a former counterinsurgency practitioner himself-pays particular attention to how the Chinese Revolution and the Algerian War affected Galula's views, and identifies Galula's mentors and the schools of thought within the French military that greatly influenced his writings. A conclusion illuminates the contemporary and likely future validity of his works. In the epilogue, the author speaks to Galula's influence over modern military thought and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This book is essential reading for individuals with an interest in counterinsurgency, Galula's writings, or Galula himself, such as military officers and civilian administrators undertaking counterinsurgency courses and training.

Practical case-based guide illustrating the challenges and solutions of adopting IoT in both secure and hostile environments IoT for Defense and National Security covers topics on IoT security, architecture, robotics, sensing, policy, operations, and more, presenting the latest results from the U.S. Army's Internet of Battle Things and the U.S. Defense Department's premier IoT research initiative. The text discusses organizational challenges in converting defense industrial operations to IoT and summarizes policy challenges and recommendations for controlling government use of IoT in free societies. As a modern reference, this book covers multiple technologies in IoT solution deployment that include KepServerEX for edge connectivity to industrial protocols, AWS IoT Core for IoT data processing, Amazon S3 for scalable storage of IoT Data, and more. To aid in reader comprehension, the text uses case studies illustrating the challenges and solutions for using robotic devices in defense applications, plus case studies on using IoT for a defense industrial base. Witten by leading researchers and practitioners of IoT technology for defense and national security, IoT for Defense and National Security also includes information on: IoT resource allocation via mixed discrete/continuous optimization (monitoring existing resources and reallocating them in response to adversarial actions) Principles of robust learning and inference for Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBTs), covering methodologies to make machine learning models provably robust AI-enabled processing of environmental sounds in commercial and defense environments, such as detecting faults in industrial manufacturing Vulnerabilities in tactical IoT systems that come about due to the intrinsic nature of building networks using several devices and components For application engineers from security and defense-related companies and professors and students in military courses, IoT for Defense and National Security is a one-of-a-kind resource of the topic, providing expansive coverage of an important yet sensitive topic that is often shielded from the public due to classified or restricted distributions.

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model.

A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.