This book highlights recent advances in the development of effective modeling and solution approaches to enhance the performance of military logistics. It seeks to further research in global defense-related topics, including military operations, governmental operations and security, as well as nation support. Additionally its purpose is to promote the global exchange of information and ideas amongst developers and users of military operations research tools and techniques. Over the course of its nine chapters, this edited volume addresses significant issues in military logistics including: a) Restructuring processes via OR methods aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the military logistics, b) Sense-and-Respond logistics prediction and coordination techniques that provide competitive advantage, spanning the full range of military operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, c) Procurement and auctioning, d) Inventory and stock control theories and applications, e) Military transport and logistical equipment, and, f) Maintenance, repair and overhaul on operational capability in general and equipment availability. The book aims to bridge the gap between the abundant literature on commercial logistics and its scarce defense & combat counterpart. This collection of useful insights into new trends and research will offer an ideal reference for practitioners and army related personnel interested in integrating scientific rigor to improve logistics management within defense organizations & agencies. Ultimately this book should provide a relevant platform for the latest contributions of operations management, operations research, and computational intelligence towards the enhancement of military logistics.

Developments in the Soviet Union necessitate a radical restructuring of U.S.-Soviet relations and the security system that underpins them. Marshall Brement succinctly and masterfully chronicles the history of this relationship and offers a prescription for change in this important book. The United States can influence the power struggle within the USSR by holding out the prospect of going beyond the wary cooperation that our government espouses, to a relationship that embodies comprehensive partnership. It is only through such a relationship that we can achieve a genuine new world order guaranteeing security for decades to come and at the same time sloughing off the burden of excessive defense costs that this nation can no longer afford. The new grand strategy outlined here would demand much of the Soviets, but also offers much. It has a nuclear component, a conventional arms component, an economic component, a Third World component, and a Western Europe component. It sets out clear benchmarks and a method for moving ahead.

Past Soviet and American security policies are so interrelated that they must be changed together, not separately or in sequence. To accomplish this change, the fear doctrine of nuclear deterrence that underlies our entire defense philosophy must be abandoned. The sophistication and power of modern conventional weapons makes it possible for both sides to reduce, even eliminate, nuclear weapons. While establishing a program to eliminate nuclear weapons, we must concurrently lay down benchmarks as to what exactly will be required from both Moscow and Washington to make such a transformation possible, restructure our armed forces to make them less threatening to each other, and engage in a broad-ranging program of economic investment and cooperation in solving critical global problems. These proposals are radical, even visionary. Nevertheless, only through a comprehensive program can a fundamentally different U.S.-Soviet relationship be achieved. This book is addressed not only to the specialist in Soviet and security affairs, but also to a general audience of informed citizens.

Offering a new perspective on the widely discussed debate on how the international community would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran, this critical research challenges the prevailing wisdom that a nuclear Iran would provoke a nuclear proliferation cascade in the Middle East.Hobbs and Moran assess the proliferation calculus of four key countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Syria, as well exploring the possibility that Iran would transfer nuclear materials to terrorists groups. The authors conclude that a nuclear domino effect would be highly unlikely, even in the face of an Iranian bomb, thus undermining one of the major arguments used in support of pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.A range of policy measures are outlined, that could be enacted by the international community to further reduce the risk of a regional proliferation cascade, making this text a must-read for policy makers, security and international relations scholars and all those with an interest in the Middle East.

This book is a critical analysis of the issues and problems in the U.S. domestic arena and how these affect and interplay with the formulation and implementation of U.S. national security. The threats and challenges of the external environment are examined and analyzed with respect to their impact on the domestic political-social environment. Special attention is placed on the national security establishment. The result is a book that identifies major linkages between the domestic and national security agendas, showing how these agendas affect each other, and what such linkages mean in terms of national security policy and the ability of the United States to design and implement a national security policy that will be appropriate for the 21st century.

The ebbs and flows of Indian history can also be charted through the country's "maritime blindness" - its onset and the national endeavour to overcome it. The story of developing India's maritime capacity, since independence, is also about the kind of international and regional footprint it needs to have. In this book, the author discusses India's new and old maritime challenges and contextualises them in terms of its inherent institutional strengths to cope with their bewildering complexity. Their complexity is not just due to their sheer scale; the degrading institutional capacities, within countries and internationally, act as threat multipliers. The dynamics of global geopolitics, the seismic perturbations of global economy, and the dizzying pace of technology belie presuppositions for global future; all strategic analysts recognise our current, persisting conundrums. Taking into account the country's critical strategic weight in the maritime domain, the author suggests an approach - about the right 'mix' of the 'traditional' and the 'non-traditional' threats - in the institutional agendas of various governance mechanisms concerning different water bodies, especially the Indian Ocean Region, which also demands of India both hardware and software capacities, including diplomatic. He concludes that the effect of such an approach would be stabilising, consonant with the civilisational vision of the founders of the modern Indian nation.

This book uncovers how US-India relations have changed and intensified during the administrations of Bill Clinton, George Bush Jr., and Barack Obama. Throughout the Cold War, US-India relations were often distant and volatile as India mostly received attention at times of grave international crises, but from the late 1990s onwards, the US showed a more sustained interest in India. How was this shift possible? While previous scholarship has focused on the civilian nuclear deal as a turning point, this book presents an alternative account for this change by analyzing how India's identity has been constructed in different terms after the Cold War. It examines the underlying discourse and explains how this enables or constrains US foreign policymakers when they establish security policies with India and improve US-India relations.

After briefly dealing with arguments for and against NATO's enlargement as far as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the author shows why the enlargement process must be carried forward to include, in the near future, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Ukraine. Inclusion of the Baltic States and of Ukraine in NATO would stabilize the region by helping the Russian democrats to concentrate on building a genuinely democratic, market-oriented Russian national state, instead of succumbing to the temptation to restore the Soviet Union. Ukraine could also contribute to NATO a sizable conventional military force and a prime strategic area; the Baltic States offer a prime location and an indomitable spirit. The Balts and Ukraine will help NATO when finally admitted as full members.

Using polling data, printed material, and interviews with Lithuanian and Ukrainian diplomats, the book convincingly shows the soundness of the Baltic and Ukrainian security goals without glossing over some difficulties, both internal and external.

As a small nation in a hostile region, Israel has made defense a top priority. Tzalel takes a critical look at the naval branch of Israel's defense forces to consider its history, its performance, and its overall importance to maintaining national security. From a motley collection of illegal immigrant ships operated prior to the birth of the state, the Israelis have since the 1960s established a modern navy. However, Tzalel argues, the modernization and expansion of the Israeli navy has been driven more by an excess of funds and the lack of clearly defined priorities than by any real necessity. Like most small countries, Israel has no need to command the sea during peace or in wartime. The author examines each step of naval development by direct correlation to the perceived need for each new phase and the circumstances that led naval and military leaders to make specific choices, and he discusses the benefits of these choices on the field of battle. He hopes to map the complex relationship between the navy men, the Israeli government, and public sentiment. Although the nation has managed to create a new and impressive class of warship, the Sa'ar FAC(M) and its larger derivatives, Tzalel contends that the military logic behind such naval construction was faulty and that the nation's submarine flotilla constitutes a sheer waste of monetary and human resources.

Startling changes are taking place in Western Europe; this study argues that the U.S. strategic response should be no less dramatic. Michael J. Collins describes a creation of a new type of political organization--a new way for nations to integrate themselves politically in Western Europe--and contends that this new model is dynamic enough to rival older historical paradigms. Western Europeans are making massive changes in their international arrangements, with each other and the outside world, to permit a natural evolution of national cultures along with the development of an intra-European culture. This changing political and economic situation in Europe has already affected the way the United States looks at the world diplomatically, and it may soon alter the general thrust of U.S. military strategy with regard to NATO. Europeans and Americans alike are questioning how much longer a united Europe can expect American troops to defend them against the Soviet Union, now that the Cold War era has ended. U.S. military strategy must change because the world is changing, and the increasing power of Western Europe is a major factor in the equation.

Collins concludes that the Common Market Countries can no longer be understood as a simple collection of nation-states joined in a cartel or economic alliance, calling for a change in U.S. foreign policy and strategy. Chapter 1 describes the developments in Western Europe since World War II. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss how the new Western European alliance interacts along both military and political lines. Chapter Four describes the character of Western Europe and the replacement of the nation-state concept with a new flexibility in dealing with each other and the surrender of sovereignty by the constituent states in limited but decisive areas. The final two chapters suggest possible policy and strategic responses by the United States. A chapter on strategic implications is bound to be controversial, particularly to traditional military strategists. These thought-provoking analyses and policy implementations will interest scholars and students of European History and Politics, Comparative Politics, United States Foreign Policy and Defense, as well as government policy makers and decision makers in international business.

This book will appeal to persons interested in national security issues and, more specifically, to those who may want to know more about the manpower and recruiting problems facing the military of the future. The authors come from a wide variety of backgrounds and academic disciplines--including economics, political science, psychology, sociology, operations research, education, and public administration. This book will also appeal to persons interested in human resource issues beyond the military, as well as those interested in tracking trends in the labor force, public opinion, education, youth attitudes, or society in general.

This study offers a new perspective on the origins of the Second World War by comparing and contrasting military planning in seven nations in the two decades before 1939 (and, in the case of the United States and Soviet Russia, before 1941). Developing themes over time and across military cultures allows the authors to provide a comparative framework in which to survey how military planning and foreign policy were interwoven and how these connections produced divergent national strategies in the context of differing nationalities, military organizations, and societies. The contributors to this volume have consciously employed a wide interpretation of military history by emphasizing the interplay of social, political, diplomatic, and economic factors with military concerns, as well as the relationship between war and society.

For example, the German army developed its concept of "blitzkrieg" by examining military theory generated within the General Staff before 1918, and by considering the new political circumstances in which the Weimar state and its Nazi successor found themselves as a result of the Versailles Treaty. Despite its ultimate success, the German concept was merely abstract and theoretical until the combined use of armor and air power was employed effectively in Poland in the autumn of 1939 and in Western Europe during the spring of 1940. In contrast, the French defensive strategy built around the use of the Maginot Line was illustrative of a mainly defensive foreign policy, while British appeasement policy reflected the diminished level of military preparedness that was possible throughout the 1930s.

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

Based upon exhaustive research in numerous archival sources, including the personal papers of the major British military and political leaders of the day, this is a comprehensive study of British military planning during a period in which long-successful defense and military strategies had to be reappraised in light of new technological advances. As Michael Partridge notes, Britain emerged victorious in 1814 after twenty-two years of war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France; however various technical and international developments--particularly the invention of the steam engine--gravely undermined Britain's security between 1814 and 1870. Because steam power enabled ships to maneuver independently of wind and tide, Britain was now vulnerable to attack from all sides, forcing her to devise new defensive strategies to repel invasion. Partridge thoroughly examines Britain's response to the advent of steam power as well as the special military defense problems faced by the country as a result of its geographical position and contemporary political realities. Following a brief introduction, Partridge offers an overview of Britain's strategic position in the years following the war with France. Subsequent chapters examine each aspect of the country's military planning in detail, beginning with an exploration of the decline of the Royal Navy--at one time the unchallenged mistress of the seas and far larger than any rival's naval force. Partridge then addresses the internal machinery of defense planning, the political constraints placed upon defense planners, the effects of popular aversion to a standing army, and the new awareness of Britain's strategic vulnerability. Individual chapters are devoted to the three major prongs of Britain's land defenses: the regular army, fortifications, and the militia, yeomanry, and volunteers. A bibliography is included for those who wish to pursue further research in this area. Indispensable for students of military history, this study offers important new insights into Britain's ability to adapt to the new military and technological realities of the early Nineteenth-Century.

From 2003 to 2008, the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq posed a key challenge to political stability in the country and to Coalition objectives there. This paper explains the onset, composition and evolution of this insurgency. It begins by addressing both its immediate and deeper sociopolitical origins, and goes on to examine the multiple ideological strands within the insurgency and their often conflicting methods and goals. Despite organisational incoherence due to the existence of a large number of competing groups, the insurgency in Iraq sustained a particularly high tempo of operations between 2004 and 2006, causing considerable military and civilian casualties. Some insurgent groups focused on attempting to foment civil war between two of Iraq's major communities, the Sunni and Shia Arabs and, by late 2006, they had come close to unravelling Iraq and presenting the Coalition with a major defeat. The adoption of a new approach by the US in 2007 helped reduce the level of violence in Iraq. In addition, deep fissures within the insurgency itself, between those fighting for more practical, immediate goals and the transnational Islamists and their local allies fighting for wider-reaching goals - including the promotion of sectarian strife - contributed to the insurgency's diminution. It remains to be seen whether there will be a widespread recognition among Sunni Iraqis of the need to work with the Coalition to facilitate their community's reintegration into the new Iraqi body politic.

An engaging assessment of the theoretical debates on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The contributions to this volume bring together sophisticated theoretical frameworks and extensive empirical research. Pluralistic in its approach, the volume emphasizes the role of conceptual diversity for better explaining the EU's CSDP.

The New European Security Disorder presents a clear and comprehensive overview of the main actors, institutions and changes in European security since the end of the Cold War. Special emphasis is put on the assessment of threats to Europe's security, the lack of coherent leadershop in Bosnia and elsewhere, and the need for pan-European security institutions.

There is more continuity than discontinuity in US national security policy under President Obama, despite widespread expectations for change and misperceptions of fundamental changes having been wrought. This project brings together US and non-US experts to assess continuities and changes in US national security policy in the Obama era.

In this surprising reinterpretation of Hitler's impact on the outcome of World War II, James Duffy reveals that the war was not won through American strength and ingenuity alone. Rather, it was lost due to Hitler's phenomenal military blunders. Challenging popular American views, the author shows how Nazi Germany at first substantially won the war in Europe. Yet Hitler proceeded to lose it even before the United States had entered the conflict. "Hitler Slept Late" sets the stage for each of Hitler's major errors, uncovering why each was made, what happened as a result, and how the outcome of the war might have been different had Hitler followed the advice of others. Duffy shows how Hitler's conquest of Europe ultimately failed due to two glaring faults--his inability to develop a concrete long-range plan and his maniacal belief in the strength of his own will. Offering new insight into Hitler as a military leader, this provocative study provides a clear view of Hitler's strengths and weaknesses and looks at what might have happened had he not blundered so often at vital times during the war.

Duffy begins with a look at Hitler's early victories in the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. These victories, achieved through swift surprise attacks, worked because of the indecisiveness and reluctance to act exhibited by the British and French. Hitler's most egregious errors included his belief in his own infallibility as a military leader, his failure to heed the warnings of advisers, and his ultimate decision to surround himself with yes men. Fatal strategic errors include allowing the British army to escape from Dunkirk, failing to invade Great Britain immediately after Dunkirk, and not recognizing the primary importance of Moscow as a target in the Soviet invasion. These character flaws and leadership foibles, as described and analyzed in "Hitler Slept Late," vividly illustrate the words of Sir Christopher Foxley Norris, retired Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Air Force: Had it not been for Hitler, the Germans] would have won.

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.