Developments in the Soviet Union necessitate a radical restructuring of U.S.-Soviet relations and the security system that underpins them. Marshall Brement succinctly and masterfully chronicles the history of this relationship and offers a prescription for change in this important book. The United States can influence the power struggle within the USSR by holding out the prospect of going beyond the wary cooperation that our government espouses, to a relationship that embodies comprehensive partnership. It is only through such a relationship that we can achieve a genuine new world order guaranteeing security for decades to come and at the same time sloughing off the burden of excessive defense costs that this nation can no longer afford. The new grand strategy outlined here would demand much of the Soviets, but also offers much. It has a nuclear component, a conventional arms component, an economic component, a Third World component, and a Western Europe component. It sets out clear benchmarks and a method for moving ahead.

Past Soviet and American security policies are so interrelated that they must be changed together, not separately or in sequence. To accomplish this change, the fear doctrine of nuclear deterrence that underlies our entire defense philosophy must be abandoned. The sophistication and power of modern conventional weapons makes it possible for both sides to reduce, even eliminate, nuclear weapons. While establishing a program to eliminate nuclear weapons, we must concurrently lay down benchmarks as to what exactly will be required from both Moscow and Washington to make such a transformation possible, restructure our armed forces to make them less threatening to each other, and engage in a broad-ranging program of economic investment and cooperation in solving critical global problems. These proposals are radical, even visionary. Nevertheless, only through a comprehensive program can a fundamentally different U.S.-Soviet relationship be achieved. This book is addressed not only to the specialist in Soviet and security affairs, but also to a general audience of informed citizens.

This book is a critical analysis of the issues and problems in the U.S. domestic arena and how these affect and interplay with the formulation and implementation of U.S. national security. The threats and challenges of the external environment are examined and analyzed with respect to their impact on the domestic political-social environment. Special attention is placed on the national security establishment. The result is a book that identifies major linkages between the domestic and national security agendas, showing how these agendas affect each other, and what such linkages mean in terms of national security policy and the ability of the United States to design and implement a national security policy that will be appropriate for the 21st century.

After briefly dealing with arguments for and against NATO's enlargement as far as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the author shows why the enlargement process must be carried forward to include, in the near future, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Ukraine. Inclusion of the Baltic States and of Ukraine in NATO would stabilize the region by helping the Russian democrats to concentrate on building a genuinely democratic, market-oriented Russian national state, instead of succumbing to the temptation to restore the Soviet Union. Ukraine could also contribute to NATO a sizable conventional military force and a prime strategic area; the Baltic States offer a prime location and an indomitable spirit. The Balts and Ukraine will help NATO when finally admitted as full members.

Using polling data, printed material, and interviews with Lithuanian and Ukrainian diplomats, the book convincingly shows the soundness of the Baltic and Ukrainian security goals without glossing over some difficulties, both internal and external.

As a small nation in a hostile region, Israel has made defense a top priority. Tzalel takes a critical look at the naval branch of Israel's defense forces to consider its history, its performance, and its overall importance to maintaining national security. From a motley collection of illegal immigrant ships operated prior to the birth of the state, the Israelis have since the 1960s established a modern navy. However, Tzalel argues, the modernization and expansion of the Israeli navy has been driven more by an excess of funds and the lack of clearly defined priorities than by any real necessity. Like most small countries, Israel has no need to command the sea during peace or in wartime. The author examines each step of naval development by direct correlation to the perceived need for each new phase and the circumstances that led naval and military leaders to make specific choices, and he discusses the benefits of these choices on the field of battle. He hopes to map the complex relationship between the navy men, the Israeli government, and public sentiment. Although the nation has managed to create a new and impressive class of warship, the Sa'ar FAC(M) and its larger derivatives, Tzalel contends that the military logic behind such naval construction was faulty and that the nation's submarine flotilla constitutes a sheer waste of monetary and human resources.

Startling changes are taking place in Western Europe; this study argues that the U.S. strategic response should be no less dramatic. Michael J. Collins describes a creation of a new type of political organization--a new way for nations to integrate themselves politically in Western Europe--and contends that this new model is dynamic enough to rival older historical paradigms. Western Europeans are making massive changes in their international arrangements, with each other and the outside world, to permit a natural evolution of national cultures along with the development of an intra-European culture. This changing political and economic situation in Europe has already affected the way the United States looks at the world diplomatically, and it may soon alter the general thrust of U.S. military strategy with regard to NATO. Europeans and Americans alike are questioning how much longer a united Europe can expect American troops to defend them against the Soviet Union, now that the Cold War era has ended. U.S. military strategy must change because the world is changing, and the increasing power of Western Europe is a major factor in the equation.

Collins concludes that the Common Market Countries can no longer be understood as a simple collection of nation-states joined in a cartel or economic alliance, calling for a change in U.S. foreign policy and strategy. Chapter 1 describes the developments in Western Europe since World War II. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss how the new Western European alliance interacts along both military and political lines. Chapter Four describes the character of Western Europe and the replacement of the nation-state concept with a new flexibility in dealing with each other and the surrender of sovereignty by the constituent states in limited but decisive areas. The final two chapters suggest possible policy and strategic responses by the United States. A chapter on strategic implications is bound to be controversial, particularly to traditional military strategists. These thought-provoking analyses and policy implementations will interest scholars and students of European History and Politics, Comparative Politics, United States Foreign Policy and Defense, as well as government policy makers and decision makers in international business.

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

This book will appeal to persons interested in national security issues and, more specifically, to those who may want to know more about the manpower and recruiting problems facing the military of the future. The authors come from a wide variety of backgrounds and academic disciplines--including economics, political science, psychology, sociology, operations research, education, and public administration. This book will also appeal to persons interested in human resource issues beyond the military, as well as those interested in tracking trends in the labor force, public opinion, education, youth attitudes, or society in general.

This study offers a new perspective on the origins of the Second World War by comparing and contrasting military planning in seven nations in the two decades before 1939 (and, in the case of the United States and Soviet Russia, before 1941). Developing themes over time and across military cultures allows the authors to provide a comparative framework in which to survey how military planning and foreign policy were interwoven and how these connections produced divergent national strategies in the context of differing nationalities, military organizations, and societies. The contributors to this volume have consciously employed a wide interpretation of military history by emphasizing the interplay of social, political, diplomatic, and economic factors with military concerns, as well as the relationship between war and society.

For example, the German army developed its concept of "blitzkrieg" by examining military theory generated within the General Staff before 1918, and by considering the new political circumstances in which the Weimar state and its Nazi successor found themselves as a result of the Versailles Treaty. Despite its ultimate success, the German concept was merely abstract and theoretical until the combined use of armor and air power was employed effectively in Poland in the autumn of 1939 and in Western Europe during the spring of 1940. In contrast, the French defensive strategy built around the use of the Maginot Line was illustrative of a mainly defensive foreign policy, while British appeasement policy reflected the diminished level of military preparedness that was possible throughout the 1930s.

An engaging assessment of the theoretical debates on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The contributions to this volume bring together sophisticated theoretical frameworks and extensive empirical research. Pluralistic in its approach, the volume emphasizes the role of conceptual diversity for better explaining the EU's CSDP.

Based upon exhaustive research in numerous archival sources, including the personal papers of the major British military and political leaders of the day, this is a comprehensive study of British military planning during a period in which long-successful defense and military strategies had to be reappraised in light of new technological advances. As Michael Partridge notes, Britain emerged victorious in 1814 after twenty-two years of war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France; however various technical and international developments--particularly the invention of the steam engine--gravely undermined Britain's security between 1814 and 1870. Because steam power enabled ships to maneuver independently of wind and tide, Britain was now vulnerable to attack from all sides, forcing her to devise new defensive strategies to repel invasion. Partridge thoroughly examines Britain's response to the advent of steam power as well as the special military defense problems faced by the country as a result of its geographical position and contemporary political realities. Following a brief introduction, Partridge offers an overview of Britain's strategic position in the years following the war with France. Subsequent chapters examine each aspect of the country's military planning in detail, beginning with an exploration of the decline of the Royal Navy--at one time the unchallenged mistress of the seas and far larger than any rival's naval force. Partridge then addresses the internal machinery of defense planning, the political constraints placed upon defense planners, the effects of popular aversion to a standing army, and the new awareness of Britain's strategic vulnerability. Individual chapters are devoted to the three major prongs of Britain's land defenses: the regular army, fortifications, and the militia, yeomanry, and volunteers. A bibliography is included for those who wish to pursue further research in this area. Indispensable for students of military history, this study offers important new insights into Britain's ability to adapt to the new military and technological realities of the early Nineteenth-Century.

There is more continuity than discontinuity in US national security policy under President Obama, despite widespread expectations for change and misperceptions of fundamental changes having been wrought. This project brings together US and non-US experts to assess continuities and changes in US national security policy in the Obama era.

The New European Security Disorder presents a clear and comprehensive overview of the main actors, institutions and changes in European security since the end of the Cold War. Special emphasis is put on the assessment of threats to Europe's security, the lack of coherent leadershop in Bosnia and elsewhere, and the need for pan-European security institutions.

These are extraordinary times in U.S. national security policy. America remains engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan while facing a global economic downturn. Homeland security concerns still abound in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Even as the financial crisis places considerable pressure on the U.S. budget, President Obama will have to spend a great deal of time and money on national security, hard power, and war. How should these competing demands be prioritized? How much money will be needed? How much will be available, and how should it be spent?

"Budgeting for Hard Power" continues the long and proud tradition of Brookings analysis on defense spending. As with previous volumes, this book examines the budgets of the Pentagon and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons programs. But Michael O'Hanlon takes his analysis further, addressing the wide range of activities crucial for American security as a result of 9/11 and the ongoing wars. He considers homeland security resources and selected parts of the State Department and foreign operations budgets --offering a more complete overall look at the elements that make up America's "hard power" budget, a concept that he and Kurt Campbell wrote about in "Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security" (2006).

With future federal deficits projected to top $1 trillion, O'Hanlon calls for Defense, State, and Homeland Security budgets to be as frugal as possible. At the same time, he recognizes that resources should be selectively increased in certain areas to compensate for years of systematic underfunding, especially in certain areas of homeland security, diplomacy, and foreign assistance. In his typically clear and concise manner, O'Hanlon shows policymakers how to wrestle with the resource allocation decisions affecting the national security of the United States.

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.

In this surprising reinterpretation of Hitler's impact on the outcome of World War II, James Duffy reveals that the war was not won through American strength and ingenuity alone. Rather, it was lost due to Hitler's phenomenal military blunders. Challenging popular American views, the author shows how Nazi Germany at first substantially won the war in Europe. Yet Hitler proceeded to lose it even before the United States had entered the conflict. "Hitler Slept Late" sets the stage for each of Hitler's major errors, uncovering why each was made, what happened as a result, and how the outcome of the war might have been different had Hitler followed the advice of others. Duffy shows how Hitler's conquest of Europe ultimately failed due to two glaring faults--his inability to develop a concrete long-range plan and his maniacal belief in the strength of his own will. Offering new insight into Hitler as a military leader, this provocative study provides a clear view of Hitler's strengths and weaknesses and looks at what might have happened had he not blundered so often at vital times during the war.

Duffy begins with a look at Hitler's early victories in the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. These victories, achieved through swift surprise attacks, worked because of the indecisiveness and reluctance to act exhibited by the British and French. Hitler's most egregious errors included his belief in his own infallibility as a military leader, his failure to heed the warnings of advisers, and his ultimate decision to surround himself with yes men. Fatal strategic errors include allowing the British army to escape from Dunkirk, failing to invade Great Britain immediately after Dunkirk, and not recognizing the primary importance of Moscow as a target in the Soviet invasion. These character flaws and leadership foibles, as described and analyzed in "Hitler Slept Late," vividly illustrate the words of Sir Christopher Foxley Norris, retired Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Air Force: Had it not been for Hitler, the Germans] would have won.

Why do Britain, France, and Italy provide or refuse military support for U.S.-led uses of force? This book provides a unique, multiple-case study analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing. Sixty original interviews with top policymakers and analysts provide insight into allies' decisions regarding the Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). The cases show that neoclassical realist factors--alliance value, threat, prestige, and electoral politics--explain allies' decisions better than constructivist factors--identity and norms. The book briefly covers additional cases (Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia) and concludes with recommendations for increasing future allied military support.

Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

Formulating a military strategy is a complex interaction between politicians, strategic commanders and generals. Formulating such a strategy within a multinational organization is even more complex. In this book, Edstrom and Gyllensporre explore a range of case studies, based on UN documents, and individually analyse their de facto military strategy in terms of ends, ways, means, and the interaction between the political strategic level (UN Security Council) and the military strategic level (UN Secretary General). Some 100,000 UN soldiers deployed all over the world not only deserve but need to be properly directed. Military strategy is hence a necessity, not an option. Moreover the military strategy should be percieved as a complementary effort to a robust integrated mission concept, including other instruments than the military."

This book describes how the growing awareness of the strategic importance of science in the 1930s caused the Allied and German leadership to build scientific information supply systems that survived into the postwar era. Using archival materials from five countries, Richards traces the successes and failures of these early scientific intelligence agencies. She focuses on the OSS unit supplying copy for the US government's wartime program to reprint current German scientific journals. She describes as well the methods used by the OSS to spirit individual journal issues from inside the Reich to microfilm squads on Germany's periphery, and gives special attention to the Allied quest for information about the mythical German atomic bomb. Richards also describes the supply system set up by the Nazi government, and how its increasing desperation for Allied scientific news led in the last year of the war to a submarine landing of Abwehr agents on the U.S. coast to microfilm periodicals at the New York Public Library. The final chapter of her book looks at how the wartime experience with scientific information influenced postwar patterns of scientific documentation and librarianship in each country.