The ideal model of national security decision making, whereby the legislative branch authorizes action to protect national security and the executive branch takes it, has broken down due to the speed and unpredictability of foreign crises and the president's monopoly on foreign intelligence. In response, Congress has ceded the initiative to the president, and then utilized the power of the purse to ratify or restrict what the president has done. This power, by necessity and preference, has become the central congressional tool for participating in national security policy. Inevitably attacks on policy are transformed into attacks on the making and effects of appropriations. In National Security Law and the Power of the Purse, William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen offer a compelling discussion of the constitutional and statutory questions raised by these attacks and in the process suggest answers to these recurring questions. They look at the early history of the power of the purse in national security affairs to illustrate that appropriations for national security have historically played a special substantive role in controlling executive uses of the war power. The authors use this history as a basis for exploring the mechanics and scope of the power of the purse in contemporary national security, presenting Vietnam War appropriations and the Boland Amendments as case studies. National Security Law and the Power of the Purse offers a sophisticated and provocative primer on the power of the purse in national security law. It is essential reading for scholars and students of law and government, public administration, and national security and foreign affairs.

vi of a large number of people due to the enormous quantities of radioactive material that would be required to reach high levels of contamination in mass-produced or distributed supplies. Although, based on data presented at the Workshop concerning the more than 30,000 missing radioactive sources all over the word, the radioactive contamination of food or water is also a scenario that must be taken seriously into consideration. During the last two decades there have been several emerging hazards linked to animal diseases or originating in animal products for example: Avian Influenza (AI), Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), West Nile Fever, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Ebola virus. All these diseases or events directly or indirectly affect food security and/or food safety. Approximately 75% of all emerging diseases are zoonotic by either an association with animal populations or an evolution of the disease in a- mals making it possible to move from animal species to humans. Participants were presented the primary results of the ongoing NATO- SPS Pilot Study on "Food Chain Security." These results focused mainly on (i) an overview of the food system; (ii) prevention, surveillance and detection systems and (iii) response system. The importance of issues such as: vuln- ability assessments, risk communication in risk analysis, risk perception, traceability, preparedness - awareness, communication, have to be cons- ered when working on food chain security.

This hard-hitting analysis of the U.S. missile defense program explains the system's limitations and argues that it is not nearly as effective as Americans have been led to believe. Missile defense has been trumpeted as a way to protect the United States from a massive missile attack, but the reality, this book argues, is that our missile defense is not nearly as effective nor developed as people have been led to believe. In American Missile Defense: A Guide to the Issues Victoria Samson brings a decade of experience to bear in an in-depth examination of missile defense as it has been envisioned and as it is actually being developed, clarifying misconceptions and laying out what a missile defense system can and cannot do. Perhaps more important, she describes how the George W. Bush administration artificially sped up the deployment of the system, choosing, for political reasons, to develop missile defense instead of other more effective programs or policies. The result is a defense program run amok, freed from oversight and many of the reporting and funding requirements all other weapon systems must fulfill. In fact, maintains the author, our focus on missile defense risks re-starting the Cold War. Glossary Dictionary of acronyms

This book looks at the attitudes and policies of the United States and United Kingdom, in the late 1950s, towards the three major alliances in Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia. Drawing upon a wealth of archival material, it analyses both the military relationship between the US and UK and the extent to which these two countries were prepared to cooperate with their allies in countering the threats to Western security.

This volume examines the impact of the arms embargo imposed by the United States against Turkey in 1974. The author concludes that the arms embargo as a tool of influence did not achieve the desired results for two reasons. First, the arms embargo, while widely used by the United States, almost never had the intended effect on the policies of the targeted state. Second, Turkish concerns about the nature of their relationship with the United States were exacerbated by the stress of the embargo. United States insensitivity to Turkish history and culture and Turkey's inability to understand American policies contributed greatly to the difficulties faced by the United States and Turkey in maintaining an alliance relationship during the embargo period.

Covering the transition from the Cold War to an uncertain post-Cold War era, this volume shows policy makers and political leaders grappling with the loss of a paradigm that provided intellectual stability for 50 years. It examines changes in the security landscape, institutions, weapons, and U.S. military actions. The volume includes U.S. government documents from 1987 to 1994 covering national security institutions, changing visions of the international security landscape, post-Cold War East-West relations, nuclear strategy and arms control, and U.S. involvement in Central America, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti. Each chapter begins with an introduction to frame the issues, events, and policy proposals. An introductory chapter establishes a framework for the study of U.S. national security. The concluding chapter is a note on primary research sources on the subject.

This volume establishes a sense of history and perspective in the study and teaching of contemporary national security. A careful reading of these documents should bring insights into the policy process along with the meaning of American values, interests, and national strategy--at least from the perspective of U.S. government officials. In this respect, the primary documents speak for themselves.

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates. Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives. Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

This book tells the story of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the struggle that President Kennedy and his advisers (including the author, who was head of intelligence at the State Department) went through to try to understand why the Soviet Union had put nuclear missiles in Cuba, the alternative policies they debated to deal with the presence of the missiles, the aftermath of the crisis, and the lessons learned about defense and foreign policy in an age dominated by intercontinental missiles tipped with nuclear warheads capable of obliterating the northern hemisphere. The purpose of the book is to focus the world's attention on the fact that something must be done-and soon-if we are to avoid Armageddon. The world has never been as close to nuclear war as it was in November 1962. In this book, Roger Hilsman, head of intelligence at the U.S. State Department at that time, details the struggles that President Kennedy and his advisers went through to understand why the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, describes the debate over alternative policy choices to force the removal of the missiles, and determines how and why each particular course of action was eventually chosen. He relates how the U.S. government dealt with the public and with its allies, and traces the step-by-step negotiations between the Soviets and the United States. In his discussion, Hilsman reveals how Khrushchev chose a back-channel, deniable way of communicating with President Kennedy by sending messages to the head of the KGB in Washington, who passed them to Hilsman, who then took them to the president. This book shows how President Kennedy and his brother Robert used this information to bring about the withdrawal of the missiles without war. This book analyzes the motives behind the massive Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba, which were capable of destroying every major city in the United States except Seattle, backed up by anti-aircraft and ground forces to defend those missiles. One ship could carry 20-to-30 freight-train loads of war materiel and over 100 shiploads were sent-a total of between 2,000 and 3,000 train loads. Hilsman tells the story of how American intelligence found out-just in time-and, in a post-mortem, addresses the question of U.S. success and/or failure. He concludes with an assessment of the significance of the only nuclear crisis in the world's history, pointing out the lessons for humankind about war in a nuclear age. Hilsman's book is one of only two accounts of the Cuban missile crisis written by one of the principals, and has added significance in light of the turbid state and uncertain future of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

This new Handbook is a comprehensive collection of cutting-edge essays on all aspects of Latin American Security by a mix of established and emerging scholars. The Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security identifies the key contemporary topics of research and debate, taking into account that the study of Latin America's comparative and international politics has undergone dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War, the return of democracy and the re-legitimization and re-armament of the military against the background of low-level uses of force short of war. Latin America's security issues have become an important topic in international relations and Latin American studies. This Handbook sets a rigorous agenda for future research and is organised into five key parts: * The Evolution of Security in Latin America * Theoretical Approaches to Security in Latin America * Different 'Securities' * Contemporary Regional Security Challenges * Latin America and Contemporary International Security Challenges With a focus on contemporary challenges and the failures of regional institutions to eliminate the threat of the use of force among Latin Americans, this Handbook will be of great interest to students of Latin American politics, security studies, war and conflict studies and International Relations in general.

The post-Cold War era has witnessed a dramatic transformation in the German political consensus about the legitimacy of the use of force. However, in comparison with its EU and NATO partners, Germany has been reticent to transform its military to meet the challenges of the contemporary security environment. Until 2003 territorial defence rather than crisis-management remained the armed forces' core role and the Bundeswehr continues to retain conscription. The book argues that 'strategic culture' provides only a partial explanation of German military reform. It demonstrates how domestic material factors were of crucial importance in shaping the pace and outcome of reform, despite the impact of 'international structure' and adaptational pressures from the EU and NATO. The domestic politics of base closures, ramifications for social policy, financial restrictions consequent upon German unification and commitment to EMU's Stability and Growth Pact were critical in determining the outcome of reform. The study also draws out the important role of policy leaders in the political management of reform as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto players, shifting the focus in German leadership studies away from a preoccupation with the Chancellor to the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive. Finally, the book contributes to our understanding of the Europeanization of the German political system, arguing that policy leaders played a key role in 'uploading' and 'downloading' processes to and from the EU and that Defence Ministers used 'Atlanticization' and 'Europeanization' in the interests of their domestic political agendas.

"Understanding Homeland Security: Policy, Perspectives, and Paradoxes" provides the first truly comprehensive analysis of the historical, social, psychological, technological, and political aspects that form the broad arena of homeland defense and security. Utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the text provides a view of past events and how they formed the terrain for current events, allowing the audience to gain a detailed knowledge of government response and policy implications. With both the public and private sectors investing heavily in protection efforts, this text offers the essential starting point for the dynamic and emerging homeland defense arena.

This book analyses the new pattern of security concerns of the Central Asian successor states. This region is said to encompass Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan. The main contention of the book is that the security problems of these states are similar to those that faced other 'Third World' countries after they attained independence. That is, due to the arbitrary creation of these states by external powers they lack a certain degree of societal cohesiveness arising from the fact that several ethnic communities reside within their borders. It is this so-called 'insecurity dilemma' of each of the Central Asian states that is therefore examined.

This collection is the first book-length study of NATO's bureaucracy and decision-making after the Cold War and its analytical framework of 'internationalization' draws largely on neo-institutionalist insights.

We live in an age of subterfuge. Spy agencies pour vast resources into hacking, leaking, and forging data, often with the goal of weakening the very foundation of liberal democracy: trust in facts. Thomas Rid, a renowned expert on technology and national security, was one of the first to sound the alarm. Even before the 2016 election, he warned that Russian military intelligence was 'carefully planning and timing a high-stakes political campaign' to disrupt the democratic process. But as crafty as such so-called active measures have become, they are not new. In this astonishing journey through a century of secret psychological war, Rid reveals for the first time some of history's most significant operations - many of them nearly beyond belief. A White Russian ploy backfires and brings down a New York police commissioner; a KGB-engineered, anti-Semitic hate campaign creeps back across the Berlin Wall; the CIA backs a fake publishing empire, run by a former Wehrmacht U-boat commander that produces Germany's best jazz magazine.

This book explains the creation of the European Union's Security and Defence Policy--to this day the most ambitious project of peacetime military integration. Whether hailed as a vital step in the integration of Europe or berated as a wasteful threat to U.S. power, European citizens are increasingly interested in the common defense policy. Today, "European Defence" is more popular than the European Union itself, even in Great Britain.
Merand addresses the fundamental challenge posed by military integration to the way we think about the state in the 21st Century. Looking back over the past 50 years, he shows how statesmen, diplomats and soldiers have converged towards Brussels as a "natural" solution to their concerns but also as something worth fighting over. The actors most closely associated to the formation of nation-states are now shaping a transgovernmental security and defense arena. As a result, defense policy is being denationalized. Exploring the complex relations between the state, the military, and citizenship in today's Europe, Merand argues that European Defence is a symptom, but not a cause, of the transformation of the state.
This book is an original contribution to the theory of European integration. Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Merand develops a political sociology of international relations which seeks to bridge institutionalism and constructivism. His careful study of practices, social representations and power structures sheds new light on security and defence cooperation, but also on European cooperation more generally.

During the presidency of George Bush (1989-93), the proliferation of nuclear chemical and biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, rose greatly in significance as issues on the American security agenda. In the missile field, this became evident by the efforts of certain elements in the executive branch and several congressmen to improve domestic and international implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation examines the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted to determine the outcome of these efforts.

While the Cold War is over, many of the problems it spawned live on. One of the worst of these is the continued presence of vast nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia. How did the thousands of American bombs come into existence and how did they so rapidly become the United States' first line of defence?;Drawing extensively on previously classified material, Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L Rearden have written a history of this crucial period. They show how American policymakers, and least of all President Truman, never expected nuclear weapons to play such a major strategic role. Yet by relying on the atomic bomb time and again to shore up US defences in the face of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, rather than accept seemingly more costly conventional alternatives, Truman found himself ultimately with no other choice.;The authors not only document and analyze the origins and early evolution of US nuclear strategy, but they also demonstrate the close relationship between decisions affecting such diverse matters as foreign policy, new technologies and the budgetary process. The result is an analysis containing new insights and timely reminders of the myriad complications created by reliance on nuclear weapons.

Prepared by the Afghan Study Team of the Combat Studies Institure, U.S. Army, From the foreword by Genral (ret.) David Petraeus: "In 2010, as the scale and tempo of Coalition operations in Afghanistan increased, so did the need for historical accounts of small-unit actions. As commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), I commissioned the Combat Studies Institute to research and write the cases collected in this volume and in those that will follow. By capturing key insights from both lethal and non-lethal operations, I hoped these accounts would be of immediate utility to sergeants and lieutenants at the center of future operations. The eight actions described in these pages take the reader through a wide range of platoon-level operations, from an intense firefight near Kandahar to an intricate civic action project in Kunar Province. Drawing from dozens of Soldier interviews, these accounts vividly depict the actions themselves and offer critical insights of greatest benefit to the small-unit actions leaders of today and tomorrow. The US Army always has prided itself as an institution of constant learning, strongly committed to drawing lessons from its past. This volume from the Combat Studies Institute is an excellent example of that long and honorable tradition. I hope that you will find the actions n Vanguard of Valor to be both instructive and compelling. I am sure that you will find them to be inspirational."