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Books > Law > Jurisprudence & general issues
The North Dakota State Constitution provides one of the most
comprehensive studies of the North Dakota Constitution and the
legal decisions which have helped to create and shape it.
In The Ohio State Constitution, Steven Steinglass and Gino
Scarselli provide a comprehensive and accessible resource on the
history of constitutional development and law in Ohio. This
essential volume begins with an introductory essay outlining the
history of the Ohio State Constitution and includes a detailed
section-by-section commentary, providing insight and analysis on
the case law, politics and cultural changes that have shaped Ohio's
governing document. A complete list of all proposed amendments to
the Constitution from 1851 to the present and relevant cases are
included in easy-to-reference tables along with a bibliographical
essay that aids further research. Previously published by
Greenwood, this title has been brought back in to circulation by
Oxford University Press with new verve. Re-printed with
standardization of content organization in order to facilitate
research across the series, this title, as with all titles in the
series, is set to join the dynamic revision cycle of The Oxford
Commentaries on the State Constitutions of the United States.
The emergence of Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) presents an object lesson in the dangers that lie at the intersection of science and criminal law. As often occurs in the context of scientific knowledge, understandings of SBS have evolved. We now know that the diagnostic triad alone does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an infant was abused, or that the last person with the baby was responsible for the babys condition. Nevertheless, our legal system has failed to absorb this new consensus. As a result, innocent parents and caregivers remain incarcerated and, perhaps more perplexingly, triad-only prosecutions continue even to this day. Flawed Convictions: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Inertia of Injustice is the first book to survey the scientific, cultural, and legal history of Shaken Baby Syndrome from inception to formal dissolution. It exposes extraordinary failings in the criminal justice systems treatment of what is, in essence, a medical diagnosis of murder. The story of SBS highlights fundamental inadequacies in the legal response to science dependent prosecution. A proposed restructuring of the law contends with the uncertainty of scientific knowledge.
Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated by an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts.
Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, written in 1780-2, is the continuation of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, and thus part of the introduction to the projected penal code on which Bentham worked in the late 1770s and early 1780s. The work emerged from Bentham's attempt to distinguish between civil and penal law, which led him into an exposition of the nature and scope of an individual law and an analysis of such key legal terms as power, duty, right, property, contract, and conveyance. Bentham addresses the relationship between different 'aspects' of the legislator's will, such as command, prohibition, and permission, and in so doing develops a 'logic of the will' which anticipates modern deontic logic. He explains that the disposition of the people to obey constitutes the basis of political and legal power, and distinguishes between law addressed to the sovereign and law addressed to the people. Dealing with some of the most fundamental problems in jurisprudence and the theory of human action, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence is a work of outstanding originality and seminal importance in the field of legal philosophy. The volume contains an Editorial Introduction which explains the provenance of the text, and the method of presentation. The text is fully annotated with textual and historical notes, and the volume is completed with detailed subject and name indices. This edition of Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence supersedes Of Laws in General, edited by H.L.A. Hart and published by the Athlone Press in 1970, as a volume in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham.
Over 4,000 lawyers lost their positions at major American law firms
in 2008 and 2009. In The Vanishing American Lawyer, Professor
Thomas Morgan discusses the legal profession and the need for both
law students and lawyers to adapt to the needs and expectations of
clients in the future. The world needs people who understand
institutions that create laws and how to access those institutions'
works, but lawyers are no longer part of a profession that is
uniquely qualified to advise on a broad range of distinctly legal
questions. Clients will need advisors who are more specialized than
many lawyers are today and who have more expertise in non-legal
issues. Many of today's lawyers do not have a special ability to
provide such services.
Rhode Island has a long history of constitutional governance.
Beginning in 1636, Rhode Island's constitution has been shaped by
revolution, nation-building, tumult, and further changes wrought by
everything from neo-liberalism to gay rights. The result has been a
living document reflecting conflicting and changing values, making
the Rhode Island constitution an essential resource for
understanding the cultural history of this state.
Focusing on the key role of the English medieval parliament in
hearing and determining the requests of the king's subjects, this
ground-breaking new study examines the private petition and its
place in the late medieval English parliament (c.1270-1450). Until
now, historians have focussed on the political and financial
significance of the English medieval parliament; this book offers
an important re-evaluation placing the emphasis on parliament as a
crucial element in the provision of royal government and justice.
It looks at the nature of medieval petitioning, how requests were
written and how and why petitioners sought redress specifically in
parliament. It also sheds new light on the concept of royal grace
and its practical application to parliamentary petitions that
required the king's personal intervention.
The Maryland State Constitution is the only comprehensive analysis
of Maryland's constitution. Dan Friedman provides an outstanding
historical account of the state's governing charter along with an
in-depth, section-by-section analysis of the entire constitution,
detailing the many signifigant changes that have been made since
its initial drafting in 1867. In-depth commentary on the
constitutional interpretation offers tremendous political and
economic insight into each of the constitution's provisions.
Previously published by Greenwood, this title has been brought back
in to circulation by Oxford University Press with new verve.
Re-printed with standardization of content organization in order to
facilitate research across the series, this title, as with all
titles in the series, is set to join the dynamic revision cycle of
The Oxford Commentaries on the State Constitutions of theUnited
States.
Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context is the first book ever published in English to provide an international examination of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC), offering a comprehensive analysis of its principal lines of jurisprudence, historical origins, organization, procedures, and its current engagement with transnational European law. The ItCC represents one of the strongest and most successful examples of constitutional judicial review, and is distinctive in its structure, institutional dimensions, and well-developed jurisprudence. Moreover, the ItCC has developed a distinctive voice among global constitutional actors in its adjudication of a broad range of topics from fundamental rights and liberties to the allocations of governmental power and regionalism. Nevertheless, in global constitutional dialog, the voice of the ItCC has been almost entirely absent due to a relative lack of both English translations of its decisions and of focused scholarly commentary in English. This book describes the "Italian Style" in global constitutional adjudication, and aims to elevate Italian constitutional jurisprudence to an active participant role in global constitutional discourse. The authors have carefully structured the work to allow the ItCC's own voice to emerge. It presents broad syntheses of major areas of the Court's case law, provides excerpts from notable decisions in a narrative and analytical context, addresses the tension between the ItCC and the Court of Cassation, and positions the development, character, and importance of the ItCC's jurisprudence in the larger arc of global judicial dialog.
Law was central to the ancient Roman's conception of themselves and their empire. Yet what happened to Roman law and the position it occupied ideologically during the turbulent years of the Iconoclast era, c.680-850, is seldom explored and little understood. The numerous legal texts of this period, long ignored or misused by scholars, shed new light on this murky but crucial era, when the Byzantine world emerged from the Roman Empire. Law, Power, and Imperial Ideology in the Iconoclast Era uses Roman law and canon law to chart the various responses to these changing times, especially the rise of Islam, from Justinian II's Christocentric monarchy to the Old Testament-inspired Isaurian dynasty. The Isaurian emperors sought to impose their control and morally purge the empire through the just application of law, sponsoring the creation of a series of concise, utilitarian texts that punished crime, upheld marriage, and protected property. This volume explores how such legal reforms were part of a reformulation of ideology and state structures that underpinned the transformation from the late antique Roman Empire to medieval Byzantium.
In The Massachusetts State Constitution, Lawrence Friedman and
Lynnea Thody present a comprehensive and accessible survey of
Massachusetts constitutional history and constitutional law. The
Massachusetts Constitution is the oldest state constitution and has
remained essentially unchanged since it was drafted in 1780. It
served as a model for the United States Constitution and many of
the state constitutions that followed.
When a legal rule requires us to drive on the right, notarize our wills, or refrain from selling bootleg liquor, how are we to describe and understand that requirement? In particular, how does the logical form of such a requirement relate to the logical form of other requirements, such as moral requirements, or the requirements of logic itself? When a general legal rule is applied or distinguished in a particular case, how can we describe that process in logical form? Such questions have come to preoccupy modern legal philosophy as its methodology, drawing on the philosophy of logic, becomes ever more sophisticated. This collection gathers together some of the most prominent legal philosophers in the Anglo-American and civil law traditions to analyse the logical structure of legal norms. They focus on the issue of defeasibility, which has become a central concern for both logicians and legal philosophers in recent years. The book is divided into four parts. The first section is devoted to unravelling the basic concepts related to legal defeasibility and the logical structure of legal norms, focusing on the idea that law, or its components, are liable to implicit exceptions, which cannot be specified before the law's application to particular cases. Part two aims to disentangle the main relations between the issue of legal defeasibility and the issue of legal interpretation, exploring the topic of defeasibility as a product of certain argumentative techniques in the law. Section 3 of the volume is dedicated to one of the most problematic issues in the history of jurisprudence: the connections between law and morality. Finally, section 4 of the volume is devoted to analysing the relationships between defeasibility and legal adjudication.
Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought and the reasons that thought marshals. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behaviour.
The question of tolerance and Islam is not a new one. Polemicists are certain that Islam is not a tolerant religion. As evidence they point to the rules governing the treatment of non-Muslim permanent residents in Muslim lands, namely the dhimmi rules that are at the center of this study. These rules, when read in isolation, are certainly discriminatory in nature. They legitimate discriminatory treatment on grounds of what could be said to be religious faith and religious difference. The dhimmi rules are often invoked as proof-positive of the inherent intolerance of the Islamic faith (and thereby of any believing Muslim) toward the non-Muslim. This book addresses the problem of the concept of 'tolerance' for understanding the significance of the dhimmi rules that governed and regulated non-Muslim permanent residents in Islamic lands. In doing so, it suggests that the Islamic legal treatment of non-Muslims is symptomatic of the more general challenge of governing a diverse polity. Far from being constitutive of an Islamic ethos, the dhimmi rules raise important thematic questions about Rule of Law, governance, and how the pursuit of pluralism through the institutions of law and governance is a messy business. As argued throughout this book, an inescapable, and all-too-often painful, bottom line in the pursuit of pluralism is that it requires impositions and limitations on freedoms that are considered central and fundamental to an individual's well-being, but which must be limited for some people in some circumstances for reasons extending well beyond the claims of a given individual. A comparison to recent cases from the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Court of Human Rights reveals that however different and distant premodern Islamic and modern democratic societies may be in terms of time, space, and values, legal systems face similar challenges when governing a populace in which minority and majority groups diverge on the meaning and implication of values deemed fundamental to a particular polity.
This book proposes a general theory of the nature of law based on the idea that law exists in all human communities before it is ever posited or in any other sense formally expressed. According to the theory, the nature of law is not captured in what is variously called 'positive law', 'conventional law', 'state law' or 'human law'. The theory holds that a living law is an omnipresent feature of human community. By 'living law' is meant primarily those normative judgments and choices that are generally accepted and approved in a particular community. The book begins by exploring the origins of civil society and the function of law. The authors adopt the Roman law definition of justice as the willingness to give each what is due, and they examine the mutual rights or entitlements that must be for the most part honoured for any society to survive. In addition to distinguishing natural justice from conventional justice, and setting out in detail the distinction between distributive justice, rectificatory justice and reciprocal justice, the study analyses justice and the trading order; adjudication and interpretation; the relationship between morality, law and legislation; natural law; rights; law and coercion; and the authority and legitimacy of law. While the authors invoke several classical and medieval sources, their account of law and justice in community is innovative and contemporary. It will be of interest to students of philosophy, social anthropology, political science, and those involved in the jurisprudential or sociological study of law.
What are the rights of religious institutions? Should those rights extend to for-profit corporations? Houses of worship have claimed they should be free from anti-discrimination laws in hiring and firing ministers and other employees. Faith-based institutions, including hospitals and universities, have sought exemptions from requirements to provide contraception. Now, in a surprising development, large for-profit corporations have succeeded in asserting rights to religious free exercise. The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty explores this "corporate" turn in law and religion. Drawing on a broad range perspectives, this book examines the idea of "freedom of the church," the rights of for-profit corporations, and the implications of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby for debates on anti-discrimination law, same-sex marriage, health care, and religious freedom.
Access to justice is a fundamental democratic right for all citizens. In order to exercise this right people need lawyers or other legal professionals to translate their everyday problems and conflicts to the distant legal world and to translate legal language into the ordinary language of the average (potential) litigant. In both countries the legal aid system is under pressure partly due to the economic crisis, partly because of the increasing demand for and use of legal aid. We live in times of austerity and the legal aid system is considered to be too expensive. In both Belgium and the Netherlands we see cutbacks and proposals to reform the legal aid system. Legal Aid in the Low Countries deals with the system of legal aid in Belgium and the Netherlands. Central questions in the book are whether the conditions for a sound legal aid system are met, especially in the fields of law that mainly concern the 'have nots'; the main ethical considerations that legal aid providers have to take into account; and the alternatives for legal aid and complementary solutions to enhance access to justice. The approaches to legal aid are very varied: the socio-legal approach, the policy approach, the critical approach, the legal approach, etc. Legal Aid in the Low Countries is unique in how it brings these disciplines together. It broadens the debate on legal aid and sheds light on these questions from the perspectives of all these disciplines. The book is written for everyone who is professionally or scientifically interested in legal aid.
Modern states claim rights of jurisdiction and control over particular geographical areas and their associated natural resources. Boundaries of Authority explores the possible moral bases for such territorial claims by states, in the process arguing that many of these territorial claims in fact lack any moral justification. The book maintains throughout that the requirement of states' justified authority over persons has normative priority over, and as a result severely restricts, the kinds of territorial rights that states can justifiably claim, and it argues that the mere effective administration of justice within a geographical area is insufficient to ground moral authority over residents of that area. The book argues that only a theory of territorial rights that takes seriously the morality of the actual history of states' acquisitions of power over land and the land's residents can adequately explain the nature and extent of states' moral rights over particular territories. Part I of the book examines the interconnections between states' claimed rights of authority over particular sets of subject persons and states' claimed authority to control particular territories. It contains an extended critique of the dominant "Kantian functionalist " approach to such issues. Part II organizes, explains, and criticizes the full range of extant theories of states' territorial rights, arguing that a little-appreciated Lockean approach to territorial rights is in fact far better able to meet the principal desiderata for such theories. Where the first two parts of the book concern primarily states' claims to jurisdiction over territories, Part III of the book looks closely at the more property-like territorial rights that states claim - in particular, their claimed rights to control over the natural resources on and beneath their territories and their claimed rights to control and restrict movement across (including immigration over) their territorial borders.
In this newly revised work, Michael Bowers presents an historical
overview of constitutional development in the state of Nevada. The
Nevada State Constitution provides a comprehensive
section-by-section analysis of the state constitution. In addition,
a thorough bibliographic essay notes the seminal works relating to
the constitution, and a list of cases enumerates the landmark
federal and state court decisions interpreting the state's
constitution and the more than one hundred amendments to it. This
one-of-a-kind treatment of the Nevada Constitution is essential
reading for those interested in the historical development and
contemporary meaning of the Sagebrush State's oldest and most
foundational legal document.
The emergence of a pan-European contract law is one of the most
significant legal developments in Europe today. The Emergence of EU
Contract Law: Exploring Europeanization examines the origins of the
discipline and its subsequent evolution. It brings the discussion
up-to-date with full analysis of the debate on the Common Frame of
Reference and the future that this ambiguous instrument may have in
the contemporary European legal framework.
Mexican Law provides an overview of the Mexican legal system. In addition to setting forth rules and legal doctrines (with reference to the practical application of the law), this volume surveys the key institutions that make and enforce the law in Mexico, and places them in their historical and cultural context. The book makes frequent comparisons to United States legal doctrines and institutions, and provides a foundation for understanding the roles of law and legal institutions in shaping public and private life in Mexico.
This book examines the contribution that petitioning and litigation made to the maintenance of the social order in Roman Egypt between 30 BC and AD 284. Through the analysis of the many hundreds of documents surviving on papyrus, especially petitions, reports of court proceedings, and letters, Kelly focuses on how the legal system achieved its formal goals (that is, the resolution of disputes through judgments), and discusses in detail the contribution made by the litigation process to informal methods of social control. With particular emphasis on the roles that this process played in the transmission of political ideologies, such as the maintenance of family solidarity and the fostering of 'private' mechanisms of dispute resolution, the book argues that although the legal system was less than successful when judged by its formal aims, it did have a real social impact by indirectly contributing to some of the informal mechanisms that ensured order in this province of the Roman Empire. However, arguing that, on occasion, one can also see petitioning and litigation being abused for the pursuit of feud and vengeance, Kelly also recognizes that the social impacts of petitioning and litigation were multifaceted, and in some senses even contradictory.
Realising the Right to Basic Education examines the crucial roles of civil society and the courts in developing the right to education in South Africa amid substantial and persistent inequalities in education provisioning. Unlike other socio-economic rights in the Constitution, the right to basic education is framed as an unqualified right - it is not subject to qualifiers such as 'progressive realisation' and 'within the state's available resources'. Yet, two and a half decades into South Africa's constitutional democracy, the apartheid legacy of unequal education still lingers. Poor, predominantly black learners continue to attend historically disadvantaged schools that are often severely under-resourced, producing poor learner outcomes. This has given rise to a wave of civil society activism since around 2008 - and organisations have been utilising legal mobilisation as a key tool to effect change in historically disadvantaged schools. The litigation initiated by these organisations has contributed to a rich and evolving jurisprudence on the right to basic education as a substantive right. However, in a significant number of these cases, the relevant education departments have not complied with court orders, requiring litigants to seek increasingly innovative, experimentalist and even coercive remedies to ensure that judgments are implemented. Realising the Right to Basic Education presents an overview of these education-provisioning cases and the roles played by civil society and the courts. It analyses the contribution of these two role-players in the normative development of the right to basic education. The book also aims to identify a viable framework for interpreting the right to basic education - one that can guide South Africa towards adequate education provisioning and, ultimately, facilitate transformation of basic education in South Africa's historically disadvantaged schools.
The close connection between philosophy of language and philosophy of law has been recognized for decades through the work of many influential legal philosophers. This volume brings recent advances in philosophy of language to bear on contemporary debates about the nature of law and legal interpretation. The book builds on recent work in pragmatics and speech-act theory to explain how, and to what extent, legal content is determined by linguistic considerations. At the same time, the analysis shows that some of the unique features of communication in the legal domain - in particular, its strategic nature - can be employed to put pressure on certain assumptions in philosophy of language. This enables a more nuanced picture of how semantic and pragmatic determinants of communication work in complex and large-scale systems such as law. Chapters build on explanations of key elements of statutory language, such as the distinction between what is said and what is implicated, the possibility of ascribing truth-values to legal prescriptions and the structure of legal inferences, the various forms of vagueness in the law, the distinctions between vagueness, ambiguity, and polysemy in legal language, and the distinction between concept and conceptions, mostly in the context of constitutional interpretation. The book demonstrates that paying close attention to the kind of speech acts legal directives are, and how they determine the content of the law, enables a better understanding of the boundaries between normative and linguistic determinants of legal content. |
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