This volume gives a theoretical account of the problem of analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse. After placing argumentation in a communicative perspective, and then discussing the fallacies that occur when certain rules of communication are violated, the authors offer an alternative to both the linguistically-inspired descriptive and logically-inspired normative approaches to argumentation.
The authors characterize argumentation as a complex speech act in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. The various stages of a critical discussion are outlined, and the communicative and interactional aspects of the speech acts performed in resolving a simple or complex dispute are discussed. After dealing with crucial aspects of analysis and linking the evaluation of argumentative discourse to the analysis, the authors identify the fallacies that can occur at various stages of discussion. Their general aim is to elucidate their own pragma- dialectical perspective on the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse, bringing together pragmatic insight concerning speech acts and dialectical insight concerning critical discussion.

The mathematical proof is the most important form of justification in mathematics. It is not, however, the only kind of justification for mathematical propositions. The existence of other forms, some of very significant strength, places a question mark over the prominence given to proof within mathematics. This collection of essays, by leading figures working within the philosophy of mathematics, is a response to the challenge of understanding the nature and role of the proof.

The introduction of Greek philosophy into the Muslim world left an indelible mark on Islamic intellectual history. Philosophical discourse became a constant element in even traditionalist Islamic sciences. However, Aristotelian metaphysics gave rise to doctrines about God and the universe that were found highly objectionable by a number of Muslim theologians, among whom the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya stood foremost.

Ibn Taymiyya, one of the greatest and most prolific thinkers in medieval Islam, held Greek logic responsible for the `heretical' metaphysical conclusions reached by Islamic philosophers, theologians, mystics, and others. He therefore set out to refute philosophical logic, a task which culminated in one of the most devastating attacks ever levelled against the logical system upheld by the early Greeks, the later commentators, and their Muslim followers. His argument is grounded in an empirical approach that in many respects prefigures the philosophies of the British empiricists.

Professor Hallaq's translation, with a substantial introduction and extensive notes, makes this important work available to a wider audience for the first time.

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Perhaps everyone who can think has the concept of possibility, but no one understands it. The metaphysical theory of Determinism is a symptom of this lack of understanding, and the inconclusiveness of its opponents' arguments indicates that the lack is universal. In this book, first published in 1968, the author shows that there are a number of different kinds on non-logical possibility, subtly interrelated, each requiring separate explanation. An original contribution to the subject, it is essential reading for all students of philosophy.

This work investigates problems about mind, meaning and mathematics rooted in preconceptions of language. It deals in particular with problems which are connected with our tendency to be misled by certain prevailing views and preconceptions about language. Philosophical claims made by theorists of meaning are scrutinized and shown to be connected with common views about the nature of certain mathematical notions and methods. Drawing in particular on Wittgenstein's ideas, the author demonstrates a strategy for tracing out and resolving conceptual and philosophical problems. By a critical examination of examples from different areas of philosophy, he shows that many problems arise through the transgression of the limits of the use of technical concepts and formal methods. Many 'prima facie' different kinds of problems are shown to have common roots, and should thus be dealt with and resolved together. Such an approach is usually prevented by the influence of traditional philosophical terminology and classification. The results of this investigation make it clear that the received ways of subdividing the subject matter of philosophy often conceal the roots of the problem.

First published in 1986. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book is intended as a first introduction to the subject. It deals with questions of truth and meaning, questions which provide a basis for much of what is discussed in philosophy in general. This book should be of interest to students of philosophy.

In Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness, Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels report on their systematic empirical research of the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. The experimental studies they carried out during more than ten years start from the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation developed at the University of Amsterdam, their home university. In these studies they test methodically the intersubjective acceptability of the rules for critical discussion proposed in this theory by confronting ordinary arguers who have not received any special education in argumentation and fallacies with discussion fragments containing both fallacious and non-fallacious argumentative moves. The research covers a wide range of informal fallacies. In this way, the authors create a basis for comparing the theoretical reasonableness conception of pragma-dialectics with the norms for judging argumentative moves prevailing in argumentative practice. Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness provides a unique insight into the relationship between theoretical and practical conceptions of reasonableness, supported by extensive empirical material gained by means of sophisticated experimental research.

First published in 1943, and revised for this 1952 edition, this book was intended for use by students of philosophy and as such traditional and modern developments in logic have been combined in a unified treatment. The author envisaged this volume as filling a gap for a simple, introductory text on formal logic, written from a modern point of view, unencumbered by traditional doctrine. This title provides a thorough introduction and grounding in the philosophy of logic, and was later revised after the author's death to correct a number of logical errors - making this edition the most complete version of the work.

This second volume in the series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science brings a pragmatic perspective to the discussion of the unity of science.

Contemporary philosophy and cognitive science increasingly acknowledge the systematic interrelation of language, thought and action. The principal function of language is to enable speakers to communicate their intentions to others, to respond flexibly in a social context and to act cooperatively in the world. This book will contribute to our understanding of this dynamic process by clearly presenting and discussing the most important hypotheses, issues and theories in philosophical and logical study of language, thought and action. Among the fundamental issues discussed are the rationality and freedom of agents, theoretical and practical reasoning, individual and collective attitudes and actions, the nature of cooperation and communication, the construction and conditions of adequacy of scientific theories, propositional contents and their truth conditions, illocutionary force, time, aspect and presupposition in meaning, speech acts within dialogue, the dialogical approach to logic and the structure of dialogues and other language games, as well as formal methods needed in logic or artificial intelligence to account for choice, paradoxes, uncertainty and imprecision.

This volume contains major contributions by leading logicians, analytic philosophers, linguists and computer scientists. It will be of interest to graduate students and researchers from philosophy, logic, linguistics, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. There is no comparable survey in the existing literature.

This book is a specialized monograph on the development of the mathematical and computational metatheory of reductive logic and proof-search, areas of logic that are becoming important in computer science. A systematic foundational text on these emerging topics, it includes proof-theoretic, semantic/model-theoretic and algorithmic aspects. The scope ranges from the conceptual background to reductive logic, through its mathematical metatheory, to its modern applications in the computational sciences. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematical, computational and philosophical logic, and in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence, this is the latest in the prestigous world-renowned Oxford Logic Guides, which contains Michael Dummet's Elements of intuitionism (2nd Edition), Dov M. Gabbay, Mark A. Reynolds, and Marcelo Finger's Temporal Logic Mathematical Foundations and Computational Aspects , J. M. Dunn and G. Hardegree's Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic, H. Rott's Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning , and P. T. Johnstone's Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium: Volumes 1 and 2 .

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge.

Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche remain two of the most interesting and compelling thinkers for contemporary readers. Rejecting the dry, dispassionate tone of most academic philosophy, these thinkers offer witty, penetrating critiques of many modern values as well as passionately moving portraits of alternative ideals. This work reveals that what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche most fundamentally share, and what can be their greatest contribution to contemporary ethics, is a method of illustrating and evaluating different ways of life considered as a whole. In asking what way of life is best, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche revive an ancient approach to ethics largely neglected throughout the modern era. This work offers a detailed elucidation of this method and of their respective ideals, Kierkegaard's life of faith and Nietzsche's life of individual sovereignty. These ideals are explored within each thinker's typology of different ways of life and then compared and contrasted with each other.

This volume is a direct result of the International Symposium on Japanese Sentence Processing held at Duke University. The symposium provided the first opportunity for researchers in three disciplinary areas from both Japan and the United States to participate in a conference where they could discuss issues concerning Japanese syntactic processing. The goals of the symposium were three-fold: * to illuminate the mechanisms of Japanese sentence processing from the viewpoints of linguistics, psycholinguistics and computer science; * to synthesize findings about the mechanisms of Japanese sentence processing by researchers in these three fields in Japan and the United States; * to lay foundations for future interdisciplinary research in Japanese sentence processing, as well as international collaborations between researchers in Japan and the United States. The chapters in this volume have been written from the points of view of three different disciplines, with various immediate objectives -- from building usable speech understanding systems to investigating the nature of competence grammars for natural languages. All of the papers share the long term goal of understanding the nature of human language processing mechanisms. The book is concerned with two central issues -- the universality of language processing mechanisms, and the nature of the relation between the components of linguistic knowledge and language processing. This volume demonstrates that interdisciplinary research can be fruitful, and provides groundwork for further research in Japanese sentence processing.

Marx's Grundrisse is acknowledged as the vital link between Marx's early and late work. It is also a crucial text in elucidating Marx's debt to the idealist philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. This book, first published in 1988, is the first full-length study of that relationship, in a thorough textual analysis which makes the connections explicit and also the Grundrisse's relations to the works of Adam Smith and Aristotle. This book argues that Marx's critique of political economy, and his critique of Hegel, are double interrelated. Not only did Marx adapt Hegelian logic in order to analyse the economic categories crucial to modern society but it is argued that those logical categories were themselves seen as reflections of the productive processes of contemporary commercial society. Uchida reveals a conceptual structure common to the apparently rarefied world of Hegelian conceptual logic and to the supposedly common-sensical world of economic science. Demonstrating this is a considerable achievement, and it allows us to consider precisely what is valuable today in Marx's critical commentary on this conceptual structure and on the type of society in which it is manifested. Uchida's subject, like Marx's, is 'the force of capital on modern life'.

First published in 1986. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela examines Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies of logic, situating their philosophical significance in early and middle analytic philosophy with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Strawson. He argues that not only the early but also the later Wittgenstein sought to further develop the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries. Throughout his career Wittgenstein's aim was to resolve problems with and address the limitations of Frege's and Russell's accounts of logic and their logical methodologies so as to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated the logical-philosophical approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, Kuusela seeks to open up covered up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. Offering a novel interpretation of the philosopher, he explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methodology beyond calculus-based logical methods and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the complexity and richness of language use and thought while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. In addition, this volume outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein's later work and explaining how his account of logic can be used to dissolve the long-standing methodological dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy. It is of interest to scholars, researchers, and advance students of philosophy interested in engaging with a number of scholarly debates.

A complete introduction to logic for first-year university students with no background in logic, philosophy or mathematics. In easily understood steps it shows the mechanics of the formal analysis of arguments.

When this book was originally published in 1957 there had been lively debates on the air and in the press about the bearing of modern philosophy upon Christianity, but there had been relatively little sustained discussion of the subject. This book of essays was the product of a small group of Oxford philosophers and theologians, who had met and talked informally for some years before writing it. It is an attempt to discuss with care and candour some of the problems raised for Christian belief by contemporary analytical philosophy. In asking the questions raised, this book makes articulate the perplexities of many intelligent people, both believers and unbelievers. The contributors concentrate on the way such concepts as God, Revelation, the Soul, Grace are actually used rather than asserting or denying some very general theory of meaning.

What do we understand 'noise' to be? The term 'noise' no longer suggests only aesthetic judgement, as in acoustic or visual noise, and is now relevant to domains as varied as communication theory, physics and biology. This trans-disciplinary usage leads to confusion and complication, and reveals that the question of noise is a properly philosophical problem. Presenting an analysis of the rising interest in the notion of noise, this book investigates if there can be a coherent understanding of what it is, that can be effectively shared among the natural and human sciences, technology and the arts. Drawing the philosophical consequences of noise for the theory of knowledge, Malaspina undertakes a philosophical revaluation of Shannon and Weaver's theory of 'information entropy'; this forms the basis upon which to challenge the common idea that noise can be reduced to notions of error, disorder or disorganization. The wider consequences of this analysis relate the technological and scientific aspect of noise, with its cultural and psycho-social aspects. At the heart of Malaspina's argument is the contestation of the ground upon which we judge and distinguish noise from information and finally the exploration of its emancipatory potential.

The book is about logical analysis of natural language. Since we humans communicate by means of natural language, we need a tool that helps us to understand in a precise manner how the logical and formal mechanisms of natural language work. Moreover, in the age of computers, we need to communicate both with and through computers as well. Transparent Intensional Logic is a tool that is helpful in making our communication and reasoning smooth and precise. It deals with all kinds of linguistic context in a fully compositional and anti-contextual way.

The three ancient philosophical introductions translated in this volume flesh out our picture of what it would have been like to sit in a first-year Philosophy course in ancient Alexandria. Ammonius (AD 445-517/26) set up a new teaching programme in Alexandria with up to six introductions to the philosophy curriculum, which made it far more accessible, and encouraged its spread from Greek to other cultures. This volume's three introductory texts include one by his student Olympiodorus and one each by Olympiodorus' students Elias and David. Elias' Introductions to Philosophy starts with six definitions of Philosophy, to which David adds replies to the sceptical question whether there is such a thing as Philosophy. Olympiodorus' text translated here is an Introduction to Logic, which is just one of the three introductions he wrote himself.