This informative book is a necessary companion for anyone seeking to uncover the secret of successful persuasion: to organize, construct, and communicate arguments. It is at once comprehensive and accessible, an authoritative guide to logical thinking and effective communication. First, the text defines the nature and uses of argument, explaining how to read argument carefully. Such analysis then requires the student to reconstruct arguments in his or her own words. Finally, the reader is taught how to create a critical, reasoned response, thus constructing his or her own argument. To increase its accessibility and expand its range of application, "Critical Inquiry" uses (in addition to textual examples) advertisements from print media as "texts" for applying its principles to subjects outside the traditional mode of academic presentation. Throughout, carefully selected reading questions and exercises pace the reader and ensure that the material is securely grasped and successfully applied.

This book is presented by two authors who worked in close cooperation. The first part is written by Ewa Binczyk and discusses various postulates that have been formulated in response to the problem of the unwanted side-effects of the practical success of technoscience which derive from two theoretical perspectives: the study of risk and science and technology studies (STS), inspired by actor-network theory (ANT). In the second part of the book Tomasz Stepien analyses and characterizes the nano-domain as an example of the development of techno-sciences. Generally, in the case of nanotechnology this book calibrates reciprocally to each other the indeed familiar but also slightly different theoretical approaches established in the philosophy of science and technology.

The Logical Must is an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective Penelope Maddy has called "Second Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a humble but tireless inquirer who begins her investigation of the world with ordinary perceptual beliefs, moves from there to empirical generalizations, then to deliberate experimentation, and eventually to theory formation and confirmation. She takes this same approach to logical truth, locating its ground in simple worldly structures and our knowledge of it in our basic cognitive machinery, tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect those structures where they occur.
In his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein also links the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but he includes one key unnaturalistic assumption: that the sense of our representations must be given prior to-independently of-facts about how the world is. When that assumption is removed, the general outlines of the resulting position come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher's roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture that arises in the wake of the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even closer harmony-locating the ground of our logical practices in our interests, our natural inclinations and abilities, and very general features of the world-until the Second Philosopher moves to fill in the account with her empirical investigations of the world and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle.

This book presents an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant's philosophy together with those of the British empiricists-Locke, Berkeley, and Hume-in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant's psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant's philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. It also relates Kant's psychologism to Wittgenstein's later conception of language. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which Kant's philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists.

Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds, whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs, and with reference to modal properties, whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object. Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles. By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.

Inferentialism is a philosophical approach premised on the claim that an item of language (or thought) acquires meaning (or content) in virtue of being embedded in an intricate set of social practices normatively governed by inferential rules. Inferentialism found its paradigmatic formulation in Robert Brandom's landmark book Making it Explicit, and over the last two decades it has established itself as one of the leading research programs in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic. While Brandom's version of inferentialism has received wide attention in the philosophical literature, thinkers friendly to inferentialism have proposed and developed new lines of inquiry that merit wider recognition and critical appraisal. From Rules to Meaning brings together new essays that systematically develop, compare, assess and critically react to some of the most pertinent recent trends in inferentialism. The book's four thematic sections seek to apply inferentialism to a number of core issues, including the nature of meaning and content, reconstructing semantics, rule-oriented models and explanations of social practices and inferentialism's historical influence and dialogue with other philosophical traditions. With contributions from a number of distinguished philosophers-including Robert Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin-this volume is a major contribution to the philosophical literature on the foundations of logic and language.

The topic of vagueness re-emerged in the twentieth century from relative obscurity. It deals with the phenomenon in natural language that manifests itself in apparent semantic indeterminacy - the indeterminacy, for example, that arises when asked to draw the line between the tall and non-tall, or the drunk and the sober. An associated paradox emphasises the challenging nature of the phenomenon, presenting one of the most resilient paradoxes of logic. The apparent threat posed for orthodox theories of the semantics and logic of natural language has become the focus of intense philosophical scrutiny amongst philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Vagueness, Logic and Ontology explores various responses to the philosophical problems generated by vagueness and its associated paradox - the sorites paradox. Hyde argues that the theoretical space in which vagueness is sometimes ontologically grounded and modelled by a truth-functional logic affords a coherent response to the problems posed by vagueness. Showing how the concept of vagueness can be applied to the world, Hyde's ontological account proposes a substantial revision of orthodox semantics, metaphysics and logic. This book will be of particular interest to readers in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science and geographic information systems.

A lively and engaging look at logic puzzles and their role in mathematics, philosophy, and recreation Logic puzzles were first introduced to the public by Lewis Carroll in the late nineteenth century and have been popular ever since. Games like Sudoku and Mastermind are fun and engrossing recreational activities, but they also share deep foundations in mathematical logic and are worthy of serious intellectual inquiry. Games for Your Mind explores the history and future of logic puzzles while enabling you to test your skill against a variety of puzzles yourself. In this informative and entertaining book, Jason Rosenhouse begins by introducing readers to logic and logic puzzles and goes on to reveal the rich history of these puzzles. He shows how Carroll's puzzles presented Aristotelian logic as a game for children, yet also informed his scholarly work on logic. He reveals how another pioneer of logic puzzles, Raymond Smullyan, drew on classic puzzles about liars and truthtellers to illustrate Kurt Goedel's theorems and illuminate profound questions in mathematical logic. Rosenhouse then presents a new vision for the future of logic puzzles based on nonclassical logic, which is used today in computer science and automated reasoning to manipulate large and sometimes contradictory sets of data. Featuring a wealth of sample puzzles ranging from simple to extremely challenging, this lively and engaging book brings together many of the most ingenious puzzles ever devised, including the "Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever," metapuzzles, paradoxes, and the logic puzzles in detective stories.

Real Essentialism presents a comprehensive defence of neo-Aristotelian essentialism. Do objects have essences? Must they be the kinds of things they are in spite of the changes they undergo? Can we know what things are really like can we define and classify reality? Many if not most philosophers doubt this, influenced by centuries of empiricism, and by the anti-essentialism of Wittgenstein, Quine, Popper, and other thinkers. Real Essentialism reinvigorates the tradition of realist, essentialist metaphysics, defending the reality and knowability of essence, the possibility of objective, immutable definition, and its relevance to contemporary scientific and metaphysical issues such as whether essence transcends physics and chemistry, the essence of life, the nature of biological species, and the nature of the person.

By 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had reached a breaking point. Afghans were becoming increasingly disillusioned with a state-building process that had failed to deliver the peace dividend that they were promised. For many Afghans, the most noticeable change in their lives since the fall of the Taliban has been an acute deterioration in security conditions. Whether it is predatory warlords, the Taliban-led insurgency, the burgeoning narcotics trade, or general criminality, the threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan are manifold. The response to those threats, both in terms of the international military intervention and the donor-supported process to rebuild the security architecture of the Afghan state, known as security sector reform (SSR), have been largely insufficient to address the task at hand. NATO has struggled to find the troops and equipment it requires to complete its Afghan mission and the SSR process, from its outset, has been severely under-resourced and poorly directed. Compounding these problems, rampant corruption and factionalism in the Afghan government, particularly in the security institutions, have served as a major impediment to reform and a driver of insecurity.

This paper charts the evolution of the security environment in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, deconstructing both the causes of insecurity and the responses to them. Through this analysis, it offers some suggestions on how to overcome Afghanistan's growing security crisis.

First published in 1998, Loughlin examines the conception of rationality through the gazes of science, philosophy and political philosophy to further explain the concept of rational reasoning, the effects it has on the development on natural and social science and its implications on how we think about morals and politics.

This volume presents the best scholarship from the 19th National Communication Association/American Forensic Association Conference on Argumentation, which took place July 30-August 2, 2015, at Cliff Lodge, Snowbird Resort, in Alta, Utah. The Alta Conference, first held in 1979, is the oldest conference in argumentation studies in the world and biennially brings together a lively group of scholars, representing a variety of countries, with diverse perspectives on the theory and practice of argument. The essays in Recovering Argument invite reflection upon and reconsideration of argumentation's legacy, present status, and potential roles in social, cultural, and political life. Readers will encounter essays that treat the relationship between argumentation and memory, historical approaches to argumentation, the vitality of public and interpersonal argument, argument's role in leadership, discursive and presentational forms of argument, and the challenges of difference. Readers also will find these topics addressed from a variety of historical, social-scientific, and critical-interpretive perspectives.

This is the first complete English translation of On the Purity of the Art of Logic, a handbook of logic written in Latin by English philosopher Walter Burley (c. 1275-1344/5). The work circulated in the Middle Ages in two versions, a shorter and a longer one, both translated here by Paul Vincent Spade. The translations arc based on the only complete edition of Burley's treatises, corrected by Spade on the basis of one of the surviving manuscripts. The book also includes an extensive introduction, explanatory notes, a table of corresponding passages between the two versions, a select annotated bibliography, and three indexes.

A contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Burley was active at the universities of both Paris and Oxford. He became one of the most important figures in the transformation of medieval logic and semantics that took place in the early fourteenth century. Burley used new tools and techniques of logical and semantical analysis, yet in many cases he used them in defense of traditional views, such as a realist metaphysical theory of "universals". On the Purity of the Art of Logic shows both these sides of Burley -- the innovator and the conservative -- as well as some of the ways in which his views corresponded or clashed with those of William of Ockham.

Professionals today, whether scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, or managers, need to maximize their effectiveness. Real world problems are complex and must be tackled with adequate conceptual tools. Hard work and motivation are not enough. Professionals need to think strategically in order to choose the right problem to solve, to solve it in a cost-effective way, to use resources efficiently, and to be innovative and productive. Written in a concise, accessible style, Thinking Strategically goes beyond brainstorming motivational books to provide the power tools needed to dissect problems and to find innovative solutions. These tools are based on an understanding of the power of bottlenecks, paradox, scale and perspective constraints, and feedback as leverage points for getting a grip on the problem. The result is a practical book for managers and other professionals about the strategic use of effort that can lead to astonishing levels of productivity.

In The Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege contended that the difference between concepts and objects was absolute. He meant that no object could be a concept and no concept an object. Benno Kerry disagreed; he contended that a concept could be an object, and that therefore the difference between concepts and objects was only relative. In this book, Jolley aims to understand the debate between Frege and Kerry. But Jolley's purpose is not so much to champion either side; rather, it is to utilize an understanding of the debate to shed light on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein-and vice versa. Jolley not only sifts through the debate between Frege and Kerry, but also through subsequent versions of the debate in J. J. Valberg and Wilfred Sellars. Jolley's goal is to show that the central notion of Philosophical Investigations, that of a 'conceptual investigation', is a legacy of the Frege/Kerry debate and also a contribution to it. Jolley concludes that the difference between concepts and objects is as absolute in its way in Philosophical Investigations as it was in The Foundations of Arithmetic and that recognizing the absoluteness of the difference in Philosophical Investigations provides a beginning for a 'resolute' reading of Wittgenstein's book.

Biologists, climate scientists, and economists all rely on models to move their work forward. In this book, Stephen M. Downes explores the use of models in these and other fields to introduce readers to the various philosophical issues that arise in scientific modeling. Readers learn that paying attention to models plays a crucial role in appraising scientific work. This book first presents a wide range of models from a number of different scientific disciplines. After assembling some illustrative examples, Downes demonstrates how models shed light on many perennial issues in philosophy of science and in philosophy in general. Reviewing the range of views on how models represent their targets introduces readers to the key issues in debates on representation, not only in science but in the arts as well. Also, standard epistemological questions are cast in new and interesting ways when readers confront the question, "What makes for a good (or bad) model?" All examples from the sciences and positions in the philosophy of science are presented in an accessible manner. The book is suitable for undergraduates with minimal experience in philosophy and an introductory undergraduate experience in science. Key features: The book serves as a highly accessible philosophical introduction to models and modeling in the sciences, presenting all philosophical and scientific issues in a nontechnical manner. Students and other readers learn to practice philosophy of science by starting with clear examples taken directly from the sciences. While not comprehensive, this book introduces the reader to a wide range of views on key issues in the philosophy of science.

Published in 1946, this volume does not purpose to be a treatise on logic. The author's contributions to the substance of logical doctrine have been made in his other works. What he has attempted in the studies that form this volume is an exploration of the periphery of logic, the relation of logic to the rest of the universe, the philosophical presuppositions which give logic its meaning and the applications which give it importance. It is his belief that formal logic is the heart of philosophy, since the subject matter of logic is the formal aspect of all being. From this standpoint he explores the relation of logic to such fields of study as natural science, ethics, history and general philosophy.

In this book, Jennifer Moon explores and clarifies critical thinking and provides practical guidance for improving student learning and supporting the teaching process.

Key themes covered include:

• different views of and approaches to critical thinking with an emphasis on a practical basis that can be translated into use in the classroom.
• links between learning, thinking and writing
• the place of critical thinking alongside other academic activities such as reflective learning and argument
• critical thinking and assessment, class environments, staff knowledge and development, writing tasks and oral tasks.

Teachers in all disciplines in post-compulsory education will find this approach to defining and improving studentsa (TM) critical thinking skills invaluable.

Robert Stern investigates how scepticism can be countered by using transcendental arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. He shows that the most damaging sceptical questions concern neither the certainty of our beliefs, nor the reliability of our belief-forming methods, but rather how we can justify our beliefs in the light of our doxastic norms.

This book is a study in the methodology of philosophical inquiry. Accordingly, it is a venture in metaphilosophy, perhaps the most controversial of philosophical disciplines.

Philosophy is caught in a dilemma. On one hand, its omission as a legitimate venture in empirical inquiry requires its looking to "the big picture" and striving to counteract the fragmented specialization of other cognitive domains. On the other hand, philosophy does not and cannot avert division of labor. Thus, it remains committed to the quest for unity and coherence in our understanding of the nature of things in a world where our knowledge is exploding in scope and in complexity. "

Philosophical Reasoning" explores this difficult situation and clarifies its implications by expounding and defending the following thesis: that systematization is the proper instrument of philosophical inquiry, and that the effective pursuit of philosophy's mission calls for constructing a doctrinal system that answers our questions in a coherent and comprehensive manner.

Despite there being deep lines of convergence between the philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead, C. S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and other classical American philosophers, it remains an open question whether Whitehead is a pragmatist, and conversation between pragmatists and Whitehead scholars have been limited. Indeed, it is difficult to find an anthology of classical American philosophy that includes Whitehead's writings. These camps began separately, and so they remain. This volume questions the wisdom of that separation, exploring their connections, both historical and in application. The essays in this volume embody original and creative work by leading scholars that not only furthers the understanding of American philosophy, but seeks to advance it by working at the intersection of experience and reality to incite novel and creative thought. This exploration is long overdue. Specific questions that are addressed are: Is Whitehead a pragmatist? What contrasts and affinities exist between American pragmatism and Whitehead's thought? What new questions, strategies, and critiques emerge by juxtaposing their distinct perspectives?

Luciano Floridi presents a book that will set the agenda for the philosophy of information. PI is the philosophical field concerned with (1) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and (2) the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. This book lays down, for the first time, the conceptual foundations for this new area of research. It does so systematically, by pursuing three goals. Its metatheoretical goal is to describe what the philosophy of information is, its problems, approaches, and methods. Its introductory goal is to help the reader to gain a better grasp of the complex and multifarious nature of the various concepts and phenomena related to information. Its analytic goal is to answer several key theoretical questions of great philosophical interest, arising from the investigation of semantic information.

This book is not a conventional history of mathematics as such, a museum of documents and scientific curiosities. Instead, it identifies this vital science with the thought of those who constructed it and in its relation to the changing cultural context in which it evolved. Particular emphasis is placed on the philosophic and logical systems, from Aristotle onward, that provide the basis for the fusion of mathematics and logic in contemporary thought. Ettore Carruccio covers the evolution of mathematics from the most ancient times to our own day. In simple and non-technical language, he observes the changes that have taken place in the conception of rational theory, until we reach the lively, delicate and often disconcerting problems of modern logical analysis. The book contains an unusual wealth of detail (including specimen demonstrations) on such subjects as the critique of Euclid's fifth postulate, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, the introduction of theories of infinite sets, the construction of abstract geometry, and-in a notably intelligible discussion-the development of modern symbolic logic and meta-mathematics. Scientific problems in general and mathematical problems in particular show their full meaning only when they are considered in the light of their own history. This book accordingly takes the reader to the heart of mathematical questions, in a way that teacher, student and layman alike will find absorbing and illuminating. The history of mathematics is a field that continues to fascinate people interested in the course of creativity, and logical inference u quite part and in addition to those with direct mathematical interests.

This reissue of the modern classic on the study of argumentation features a new Introduction by the author.