Professor de Nicolas presents the reader with actualized posibilities of knowing other cultures as they knew themselves. In his work, philosophy becomes an ongoing synthesis of knowledge and sensation. This new translation of The Bhagavad Gita, with its easy and beautiful reading, is a major philosophical attempt to read a most important text of a culture in it's own context.

I am indebted to many people for the help they gave me in the writing of this book. lowe a large debt to David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker, on both general and specific grounds. As becomes apparent from reading the notes, the book would not have been possible without their pioneering work on subjunctive conditionals. In addition, both were kind enough to provide specific comments on earlier versions of different parts of the book, and Stalnaker read and commented on the entire manuscript. Closer to home, I am indebted to my colleagues Rolf Eberle and Henry Kyburg, Jf., my erstwhile colleague Keith Lehrer, and numerous graduate students for their helpful comments on various parts of the manuscript. Some of the material contained herein appeared first in the form of journal articles, and I wish to thank the journals in question for allowing the material to be reprinted here. Chapter One contains material taken from 'The "Possible Worlds" Analysis of Counter-factuals', published in Phil. Studies 29 (1976), 469 (Reidel); Chapter Two contains material much revised from 'Four Kinds of Conditionals', Am. Phil. Quarterly 12 (1975), and Chapter Three contains much revised material from 'Subjunctive Generaliza tions', Synthese 28 (1974), 199 (Reidel). CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1. SUBJUNCTIVE REASONING There exists quite a variety of statements which are in some sense 'subjunctive'."

This is a reading of Gilles Deleuze's masterpiece Logic of Sense. It provides a thorough and systematic reading of Deleuze's book by focusing on the aspects that are neglected in the existing literature. Specifically, the claim that Deleuze's Logic of Sense provides a convincing answer for the most important question of the history of philosophy regarding the relation between thought and existence as well as the relation between logic and ontology is defended. The answer is that if thought is related to existence, logic is supposed to be, not the logic of essence, but rather the logic of sense. This analysis s pursued respectively through Deleuze's readings of Frege, the ancient Stoics, Lewis Carroll, Kant, Lautman, Leibniz, and Melanie Klein.

This work outlines and systematically defends a mathematically and logically sophisticated understanding of the concept of the 'many', a concept which has been at the centre of many debates for over a century.

You've Got to Be Kidding!: How Jokes Can Help You Think is a thoughtful and accessible analysis of the ways in which jokes illustrate how we think critically, and how the thinking process goes awry in everyday human situations Uses jokes to illustrate the various mistakes or fallacies that are typically identified and discussed in courses on critical reasoning Provides an effective way to learn critical thinking skills since jokes often describe real-life situations where it really matters whether a person thinks well or not Demonstrates how philosophy is actually very practical and clearly related to real- life human experiences Explains how developing good reasoning habits can make a real difference in all aspects of one's life

This skit of Bertrand Russell s philosophy was originally published in 1918 by Russell s correspondent friend Jourdain. The introduction explains that the contents purport to be lost papers written by Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll, a contemporary of Bertrand Russell. This politically humorous volume from the early 20th Century parodies the writing style of Russell as well as his theories.

First published in 1972, Philosophical Tasks was written to identify and examine some central themes in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The book explores the claim that philosophy is essentially linguistic, and considers in particular such topics as philosophy and science, fact and language, conceptual analysis, first- and second-order tasks, scepticism, ordinary language, and conceptual frameworks.

This book is a comprehensive survey of methodological individualism in social, political and economic thought from the Enlightenment to the 20th century. Exploring the works of such figures as de Mandeville, Smith, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Simmel, Weber, Hayek, Popper and Parsons, this study underlines the contrasts between methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. The detailed analysis offered here also reveals the theoretical presuppositions behind the collectivist and individualist traditions and the practical consequences of their applications. Infantino concludes in favour of individualism.

What are reason and rationality? How significant are recent postmodernist and neuroscientific challenges to these longheld notions? Should we abandon a belief in reason and an adherence to rationality? Or can reason and rationality be reformulated and reframed? And what does politics have to do with how we think about reason and why we act more or less rationally? The Politics of Rationality differs from other books with "reason" or "rationality" due to its historical, political, depth-psychological, and multidisciplinary approach to understanding reason through history. Charles P. Webel eloquently clarifies the links among ideas, their creators, the relevant mental processes, and the political cultures within which such important concepts as reasons and rationality take hold. He demonstrates how reason and rationality/irrationality have become what they mean for us today and proposes a way to rethink reason and rationality in light of the withering critiques leveled against them. In doing so, he presents a "history of reason and rationality" by examining the intellectual and political contexts of four representative theorists of reason and rationality-- Plato, Machiavelli, Kant, and Weber-and by addressing contemporary challenges posed by postmodernism, depth psychology, and neurophilosophy.

All of us are faced countless times with the challenge of persuading others, whether we're trying to win a trivial argument with a friend or convince our coworkers about an important decision. Instead of relying on untrained instinct--and often floundering or failing as a result--we'd win more arguments if we learned the timeless art of verbal persuasion, rhetoric. How to Win an Argument gathers the rhetorical wisdom of Cicero, ancient Rome's greatest orator, from across his works and combines it with passages from his legal and political speeches to show his powerful techniques in action. The result is an enlightening and entertaining practical introduction to the secrets of persuasive speaking and writing--including strategies that are just as effective in today's offices, schools, courts, and political debates as they were in the Roman forum. How to Win an Argument addresses proof based on rational argumentation, character, and emotion; the parts of a speech; the plain, middle, and grand styles; how to persuade no matter what audience or circumstances you face; and more. Cicero's words are presented in lively translations, with illuminating introductions; the book also features a brief biography of Cicero, a glossary, suggestions for further reading, and an appendix of the original Latin texts. Astonishingly relevant, this unique anthology of Cicero's rhetorical and oratorical wisdom will be enjoyed by anyone who ever needs to win arguments and influence people--in other words, all of us.

"The book's major parts, one on polarity and the other on analogy, introduce the reader to the patterns of thinking that are fundamental not only to Greek philosophy but also to classical civilization as a whole. As a leading classicist in his own right, Lloyd is an impeccable guide. His sophistication in adducing anthropological parallels to Greek models of polarity and analogy broadens his perspective, making him a forerunner in the study of what we are now used to calling semiotics. A striking example of Lloyd's approach is his re-examination of the dichotomy of Olympian and chthonian gods in ancient Greek world view, which surpasses the reductionist and pseudo-historical models of sky-gods and earth-goddesses that are still commonly invoked to account for polarities in Greek pantheon. "In the second part, dealing with analogy, three crucial metaphorical models for the universe turn out to be basis for a dazzlingly wide variety of scientific and philosophical perspectives. Each model is tested in the whole spectrum of Greek artistic, philosophical and scientific thought. This work is a treasure-house of insights for experts and non experts alike." --Gregory Nagy, Harvard University

Logic Works is a critical and extensive introduction to logic. It asks questions about why systems of logic are as they are, how they relate to ordinary language and ordinary reasoning, and what alternatives there might be to classical logical doctrines. The book covers classical first-order logic and alternatives, including intuitionistic, free, and many-valued logic. It also considers how logical analysis can be applied to carefully represent the reasoning employed in academic and scientific work, better understand that reasoning, and identify its hidden premises. Aiming to be as much a reference work and handbook for further, independent study as a course text, it covers more material than is typically covered in an introductory course. It also covers this material at greater length and in more depth with the purpose of making it accessible to those with no prior training in logic or formal systems. Online support material includes a detailed student solutions manual with a running commentary on all starred exercises, and a set of editable slide presentations for course lectures. Key Features Introduces an unusually broad range of topics, allowing instructors to craft courses to meet a range of various objectives Adopts a critical attitude to certain classical doctrines, exposing students to alternative ways to answer philosophical questions about logic Carefully considers the ways natural language both resists and lends itself to formalization Makes objectual semantics for quantified logic easy, with an incremental, rule-governed approach assisted by numerous simple exercises Makes important metatheoretical results accessible to introductory students through a discursive presentation of those results and by using simple case studies

Language and Philosophical Problems investigates problems about mind, meaning and mathematics rooted in preconceptions of language. It deals in particular with problems which are connected with our tendency to be misled by certain prevailing views and preconceptions about language. Philosophical claims made by theorists of meaning are scrutinized and shown to be connected with common views about the nature of certain mathematical notions and methods. Drawing in particular on Wittgenstein's ideas, Sren Stenlund demonstrates a strategy for tracing out and resolving conceptual and philosophical problems. By a critical examination of examples from different areas of philosophy, he shows that many problems arise through the transgression of the limits of the use of technical concepts and formal methods. Many prima facie different kinds of problems are shown to have common roots, and should thus be dealt and resolved together. Such an approach is usually prevented by the influence of traditional philosophical terminology and classification. The results of this investigation make it clear that the received ways of subdividing the subject matter of philosophy often conceal the roots of the problem.

Paradoxes of the Infinite presents one of the most insightful, yet strangely unacknowledged, mathematical treatises of the 19th century: Dr Bernard Bolzano's Paradoxien. This volume contains an adept translation of the work itself by Donald A. Steele S.J., and in addition an historical introduction, which includes a brief biography as well as an evaluation of Bolzano the mathematician, logician and physicist.

This is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. Although not primarily historical this volume includes discussion of philosophers from the Middle Ages to the present day, from Aquinas to Wittgenstein. No one seriously interested in questions about realism can afford to be without this collection.

In this challenging and provocative analysis, Dale Jacquette argues that contemporary philosophy labours under a number of historically inherited delusions about the nature of logic and the philosophical significance of certain formal properties of specific types of logical constructions. Exposing some of the key misconceptions about formal symbolic logic and its relation to thought, language and the world, Jacquette clears the ground of some very well-entrenched philosophical doctrines about the nature of logic, including some of the most fundamental seldom-questioned parts of elementary propositional and predicate-quantificational logic. Having presented difficulties for conventional ways of thinking about truth functionality, the metaphysics of reference and predication, the role of a concept of truth in a theory of meaning, among others, Jacquette proceeds to reshape the network of ideas about traditional logic that philosophy has acquired along with modern logic itself. In so doing Jacquette is able to offer a new perspective on a number of existing problems in logic and philosophy of logic.

Truth Through Proof defends an anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics derived from game formalism. Classic formalists claimed implausibly that mathematical utterances are truth-valueless moves in a game. Alan Weir aims to develop a more satisfactory successor to game formalism utilising a widely accepted, broadly neo-Fregean framework, in which the proposition expressed by an utterance is a function of both sense and background circumstance. This framework allows for sentences whose truth-conditions are not representational, which are made true or false by conditions residing in the circumstances of utterances but not transparently in the sense.
Applications to projectivism and fiction pave the way for the claim that mathematical utterances are made true or false by the existence of concrete proofs or refutations, though these truth-making conditions form no part of their sense or informational content.
The position is compared with rivals, an account of the applicability of mathematics developed, and a new account of the nature of idealisation proffered in which it is argued that the finitistic limitations Godel placed on proofs are without rational justification. Finally a non-classical logical system is provided in which excluded middle fails, yet enough logical power remains to recapture the results of standard mathematics.

This unique introduction fully engages and clearly explains pragmatism, an approach to knowledge and philosophy that rejects outmoded conceptions of objectivity while avoiding relativism and subjectivism. It follows pragmatism's focus on the process of inquiry rather than on abstract justifications meant to appease the skeptic. According to pragmatists, getting to know the world is a creative human enterprise, wherein we fashion our concepts in terms of how they affect us practically, including in future inquiry. This book fully illuminates that enterprise and the resulting radical rethinking of basic philosophical conceptions like truth, reality, and reason. Author Cornelis de Waal helps the reader recognize, understand, and assess classical and current pragmatist contributions-from Charles S. Peirce to Cornel West-evaluate existing views from a pragmatist angle, formulate pragmatist critiques, and develop a pragmatist viewpoint on a specific issue. The book discusses: Classical pragmatists, including Peirce, James, Dewey, and Addams; Contemporary figures, including Rorty, Putnam, Haack, and West; Connections with other twentieth-century approaches, including phenomenology, critical theory, and logical positivism; Peirce's pragmatic maxim and its relation to James's Will to Believe; Applications to philosophy of law, feminism, and issues of race and racism.

This reissue, first published in 1971, provides a brief historical account of the Theory of Logical Types; and describes the problems that gave rise to it, its various different formulations (Simple and Ramified), the difficulties connected with each, and the criticisms that have been directed against it. Professor Copi seeks to make the subject accessible to the non-specialist and yet provide a sufficiently rigorous exposition for the serious student to see exactly what the theory is and how it works.

In 1942 G.E. Moore first wrote about the curious sort of 'nonsense' exhibited by the statement 'it is raining but I do not believe it'. What Moore discovered was a species of blindspots: consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might be true. In this book, Professor Sorenson aims to provide a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of blindspots . He devotes special attention to revealing their role in 'slippery slope' reasoning.

Originally published in 1966 On the Syllogism and Other Logical Writings assembles for the first time the five celebrated memoirs of Augustus De Morgan on the syllogism. These are collected together with the more condensed accounts of his researches given in his Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic an article on Logic contributed to the English Cyclopaedia. De Morgan was among the most distinguished of nineteenth century British mathematicians but is chiefly remembered today as one of the founders of modern mathematical logic. His writings on this subject have been little read, however since apart from his Formal Logic, they lie buried for the most part in inaccessible periodicals. De Morgan's own later amendments are inserted in the text and the editorial introduction gives a summary of the whole and traces in some detail the course of the once-famous feud with Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh.

"Everything one might want for a course on [Frege and Russell] is included, along with a seventy-five-page introduction that carefully lays out the contributions of each essay." -- Bernard Linsky, University of Alberta

"The old logic put thought in fetters, while the new logic gives it wings." For the past century, philosophers working in the tradition of Bertrand Russell - who promised to revolutionise philosophy by introducing the 'new logic' of Frege and Peano - have employed predicate logic as their formal language of choice. In this book, Dr David Corfield presents a comparable revolution with a newly emerging logic - modal homotopy type theory. Homotopy type theory has recently been developed as a new foundational language for mathematics, with a strong philosophical pedigree. Modal Homotopy Type Theory: The Prospect of a New Logic for Philosophy offers an introduction to this new language and its modal extension, illustrated through innovative applications of the calculus to language, metaphysics, and mathematics. The chapters build up to the full language in stages, right up to the application of modal homotopy type theory to current geometry. From a discussion of the distinction between objects and events, the intrinsic treatment of structure, the conception of modality as a form of general variation to the representation of constructions in modern geometry, we see how varied the applications of this powerful new language can be.