This volume brings together a group of philosophically oriented logicians and logic-minded philosophers, mainly from Asia, to address a variety of logical and philosophical topics, such as modal logic and related directions (e.g. temporal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic, logic of conditionals, and modal proof theory), theory of truth, paradoxes, intentionality, and social networks. New approaches are also proposed, such as extended modal logic with planarity of graphs, extended branching time temporal logic with conditional operators, and a relational treatment of language and logical systems, to name but a few.Given the variety of topics and issues discussed here, the book will appeal to readers from a broad range of disciplines, from mathematical/philosophical logic, computing science, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, to linguistics, game theory and beyond.

People tend to rank values of all kinds linearly from good to bad, but there is little reason to think that this is reasonable or correct. This book argues, to the contrary, that values are often partially ordered and hence frequently incomparable. Proceeding logically from a small set of axioms, John Nolt examines the great variety of partially ordered value structures, exposing fallacies that arise from overlooking them. He reveals various ways in which incomparability is obscured: using linear indices to summarize partially ordered data, relying on an inadequately defined concept of parity, or conflating incomparability with vagueness. Incomparability can enrich and clarify a range of topics including the paradoxes of Derek Parfit, rational decision theory, and the infinite values of theology. Finally, Nolt shows how to generalize many of the concepts introduced earlier, explores the intricate depths of certain noteworthy partially ordered value structures, and argues for the finitude of value. Incomparable Values will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, value theory, rational decision theory, and logic.

Hellenistic philosophy concerns the thought of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics, the most influential philosophical groups in the era between the death of Alexander the Great (323 BCE) and the defeat of the last Greek stronghold in the ancient world (31 BCE). The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy provides accessible yet rigorous introductions to the theories of knowledge, ethics, and physics belonging to each of the three schools, explores the fascinating ways in which interschool rivalries shaped the philosophies of the era, and offers unique insight into the relevance of Hellenistic views to issues today, such as environmental ethics, consumerism, and bioethics. Eleven countries are represented among the Handbook's 35 authors, whose chapters were written specifically for this volume and are organized thematically into six sections: The people, history, and methods of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism. Earlier philosophical influences on Hellenistic thought, such as Aristotle, Socrates, and Presocratics. The soul, perception, and knowledge. God, fate, and the primary principles of nature and the universe. Ethics, political theory, society, and community. Hellenistic philosophy's relevance to contemporary life. Spanning from the ancient past to the present, this Handbook aims to show that Hellenistic philosophy has much to offer all thinking people of the twenty-first century.

This book offers a defense against non-classical approaches to the paradoxes. The author argues that, despite appearances, the paradoxes give no reason at all to reject classical logic. In fact, he believes classical solutions fare better than non-classical ones with respect to key tests like Curry's Paradox, a Liar-like paradox that dialetheists are forced to solve in a way totally disjoint from their solution to the Liar. Graham Priest's In Contradiction was the first major work that advocated the use of non-classical approaches. Since then, these views have moved into the philosophical mainstream. Much of this movement is fueled by a widespread sense that these logically heterodox solutions get to the real nub of the issue. They lack the ad hoc feel of many other solutions to the paradoxes. The author believes that it's long past time for a response to these attacks against classical orthodoxy. He presents a non-logically-revisionary solution to the paradoxes. This title offers a literal way of cashing out the disquotation metaphor. While the details of the view are novel, the idea has a pre-history in the relevant literature. The author examines objections in detail. He rejects each in turn and concludes by comparing the virtues of his logically orthodox approach with those of the paraconsistent and paracomplete competition.

This book presents a philosophical approach to probability and probabilistic thinking, considering the underpinnings of probabilistic reasoning and modeling, which effectively underlie everything in data science. The ultimate goal is to call into question many standard tenets and lay the philosophical and probabilistic groundwork and infrastructure for statistical modeling. It is the first book devoted to the philosophy of data aimed at working scientists and calls for a new consideration in the practice of probability and statistics to eliminate what has been referred to as the "Cult of Statistical Significance." The book explains the philosophy of these ideas and not the mathematics, though there are a handful of mathematical examples. The topics are logically laid out, starting with basic philosophy as related to probability, statistics, and science, and stepping through the key probabilistic ideas and concepts, and ending with statistical models. Its jargon-free approach asserts that standard methods, such as out-of-the-box regression, cannot help in discovering cause. This new way of looking at uncertainty ties together disparate fields - probability, physics, biology, the "soft" sciences, computer science - because each aims at discovering cause (of effects). It broadens the understanding beyond frequentist and Bayesian methods to propose a Third Way of modeling.

This collection brings together exciting new works that address today's key challenges for a feminist power-sensitive approach to knowledge and scientific practice. Taking up such issues as the role of contextualism in epistemology, democracy and dissent in knowledge practices, and epistemic agency under conditions of oppression, the essays build upon well-established work in feminist epistemology and philosophy of science such as standpoint theory and contextual empiricism, offering new interpretations and applications. Many contributions capture the current engagement of feminist epistemologists with the insights and programs of nonfeminist epistemologists, while others focus on the intersections between feminist epistemology and other fields of feminist inquiry such as feminist ethics and metaphysics. *see remarks below for remainder of text*

A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes examines how some of the classic philosophical paradoxes that have so puzzled philosophers over the centuries can be dissolved. Read argues that paradoxes such as the Sorites, Russell's Paradox and the paradoxes of time travel do not, in fact, need to be solved. Rather, using a resolute Wittgensteinian 'therapeutic' method, the book explores how virtually all apparent philosophical paradoxes can be diagnosed and dissolved through examining their conditions of arising; to loosen their grip and therapeutically liberate those philosophers suffering from them (including oneself). The book contrasts such paradoxes with real, 'lived paradoxes': paradoxes that are genuinely experienced outside of the philosopher's study, in everyday life. Thus Read explores instances of lived paradox (such as paradoxes of self-hatred and of denial of other humans' humanity) and the harm they can cause, psychically, morally or politically. These lived paradoxes, he argues, sometimes cannot be dissolved using a Wittgensteinian treatment. Moreover, in some cases they do not need to be: for some, such as the paradoxical practices of Zen Buddhism (and indeed of Wittgenstein himself), can in fact be beneficial. The book shows how, once philosophers' paradoxes have been exorcized, real lived paradoxes can be given their due.

The central problem of philosophy is the problem of certainty. What does it mean to be sure? Are there ideas beyond the possibility of error or refutation? What does it mean for a notion to be incorrigible? In this book, Frank D. Schubert squarely addresses the question of whether there is a single standard of certainty that can be applied to such disparate areas as logic, mathematics, politics, religion, familial/tribal commitments, and science. Schubert proposes a common standard for assessing certainty - the certainty of knowing one's own personal proper name - as a standard that can establish common ground within each widely disparate area. The result is a new "philosophy in a grand manner" and a powerful ethical proposal for our time.

Bertrand Russell was a central figure in the rise of analytic philosophy, and there are few works in the genre whose influence is comparable to The Principles of Mathematics (1903), a book that established him as a major force in British philosophy. Logic as Universal Science takes a fresh look at the context of The Principles. This, it is argued, involves an extended argument against Kant's transcendental idealism and his conception of mathematics as a synthetic a priori science grounded in pure intuition. Philosophically, Russell's logicism substitutes pure logic for pure intuitions as the true source of mathematical knowledge. In this way, logic turns out to be a universal science and very far from Kant's general logic, which is a concise and dry science, delivering nothing but a purely formal criterion for knowledge. The picture of logic emerging from this opposition is investigated in detail for its content and consequences.

This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory, in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics, indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn't it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

This book is the first detailed and focused defense of necessitarianism. The author's original account of necessitarianism encourages a reexamination of commonly held metaphysical positions as well as important issues in other, related areas of philosophy. Necessitarianism is the view that absolutely nothing about the world could have been otherwise in any way, whatsoever. Most philosophers believe that necessitarianism is just plain false and presume that some things could have been otherwise than what they are. In this book, the author argues that necessitarianism is true and the view that some things in the world are contingent-what the author terms contingentarianism-is false. The author assesses various theories of contingency, including the possible worlds theory, combinatorialism, and dispositionalism, and argues that no theory can successfully explain why an entity is such as it is rather than not. She then lays out a case for necessitarianism and provides responses to various objections. The book concludes with an explanation of the ways in which necessitarianism is relevant to issues in ethics, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy. A Case for Necessitarianism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of science.

Formal representations of values and norms are employed in several academic disciplines and specialties, such as economics, jurisprudence, decision theory, and social choice theory. Hansson has developed a unified formal representation of values and norms that reflects both their static and their dynamic properties. This formalized treatment, carried out in terms of both informal value theory and precise logical detail, will contribute to the clarification of certain issues in the basic philosophical theory of values and norms.

This book provides a detailed exposition of one of the most practical and popular methods of proving theorems in logic, called Natural Deduction. It is presented both historically and systematically. Also some combinations with other known proof methods are explored. The initial part of the book deals with Classical Logic, whereas the rest is concerned with systems for several forms of Modal Logics, one of the most important branches of modern logic, which has wide applicability.

First published in 1993. Why do mirrors reverse left and right but not up and down? Does time flow at an even rate These are just two of the questions that won't be answered in Pseudo-Problems. This book explains how problems are dissolved rather than solved. Roy Sorenson takes the most important and interesting examples from one hundred years of analytic philosophy (and the odd one from the centuries before) to consolidate a new theory of dissolution. Pseudo-Problems is a fast-moving, fascinating alternative history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, and a fine example of what philosophical analysis should be. Not least, it is an important contribution to the debates about creativity and problem solving.

Providing a clear interpretation of Hegel's characterizations of possibility and actuality in the Science of Logic, this book departs from the standard understandings of these concepts to break new ground in Hegelian scholarship. The book draws out some of the implications of Hegel's view of immanent possibility, especially as it relates to Leibniz's thesis of modal optimism: his view that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Reading Hegel as a philosopher of possibility, against a tradition that has conceived of him primarily as a philosopher of necessity, rationality, and finitude, Nahum Brown demonstrates the historical background and philosophical traditions from which Hegel's concept of possibility emerges. Systematically outlining Hegel's conceptions of positive and negative freedom, Brown reveals the Hegelian underpinnings of our conception of reality and what it is to be in the world itself. Original and convincing, this book is crucial for philosophers approaching modality from any tradition.

This book offers a plurality of perspectives on the historical origins of logicism and on contemporary developments of logicist insights in philosophy of mathematics. It uniquely provides up-to-date research and novel interpretations on a variety of intertwined themes and historical figures related to different versions of logicism. The essays, written by prominent scholars, are divided into three thematic sections. Part I focuses on major authors like Frege, Dedekind, and Russell, providing a historical and theoretical exploration of such figures in the philosophical and mathematical milieu in which logicist views were first expounded. Part II sheds new light on the interconnections between these founding figures and a number of influential other traditions, represented by authors like Hilbert, Husserl, and Peano, as well as on the reconsideration of logicism by Carnap and the logical empiricists. Finally, Part III assesses the legacy of such authors and of logicist themes for contemporary philosophy of mathematics, offering new perspectives on highly debated topics-neo-logicism and its extension to accounts of ordinal numbers and set-theory, the comparison between neo-Fregean and neo-Dedekindian varieties of logicism, and the relation between logicist foundational issues and empirical research on numerical cognition-which define the prospects of logicism in the years to come. This book offers a comprehensive account of the development of logicism and its contemporary relevance for the logico-philosophical foundations of mathematics. It will be of interest to graduate students and researchers working in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and the history of analytic philosophy.

First published in 1972, Philosophical Tasks was written to identify and examine some central themes in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The book explores the claim that philosophy is essentially linguistic, and considers in particular such topics as philosophy and science, fact and language, conceptual analysis, first- and second-order tasks, scepticism, ordinary language, and conceptual frameworks.

This book provides an account of the emergence of norms. Put very crudely, the main thesis of this book is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems.

Belief Revision Refutation and systems in Propositional Logic. A Quantifier Scope in Formal Linguistics and Non-deterministic Semantics for Logical Systems.

This volume opens up stimulating new perspectives on a broad variety of Barcan Marcus's concerns ranging from the systematic foundation and interpretation of quantified modal logic, nature of extensionality, necessity of identity, direct reference theory for proper names, notions of essentialism, second-order modal logic, modal metaphysics, properties and classes, substitutional and objectual quantification, actualism, the Barcan formula, possibilia and possible-world semantics to epistemic and deontic modalities, non-language-centered theories of belief, accounts of rationality, consistency of a moral code, moral dilemmas, and much more. The contributions demonstrate that Barcan Marcus's original and clear ideas have had a formative influence on the direction in which certain themes central to today's philosophical debate have developed. Furthermore, the volume includes an illuminating intellectual autobiography from Barcan Marcus herself as well as an informal interview containing her unfiltered, frank answers. The book brings together contributions by Ruth Barcan Marcus, Timothy Williamson, Dagfinn Follesdal, Joelle Proust, Pascal Engel, Edgar Morscher, Erik J. Olsson, and Michael Frauchiger.

Logic Works is a critical and extensive introduction to logic. It asks questions about why systems of logic are as they are, how they relate to ordinary language and ordinary reasoning, and what alternatives there might be to classical logical doctrines. The book covers classical first-order logic and alternatives, including intuitionistic, free, and many-valued logic. It also considers how logical analysis can be applied to carefully represent the reasoning employed in academic and scientific work, better understand that reasoning, and identify its hidden premises. Aiming to be as much a reference work and handbook for further, independent study as a course text, it covers more material than is typically covered in an introductory course. It also covers this material at greater length and in more depth with the purpose of making it accessible to those with no prior training in logic or formal systems. Online support material includes a detailed student solutions manual with a running commentary on all starred exercises, and a set of editable slide presentations for course lectures. Key Features Introduces an unusually broad range of topics, allowing instructors to craft courses to meet a range of various objectives Adopts a critical attitude to certain classical doctrines, exposing students to alternative ways to answer philosophical questions about logic Carefully considers the ways natural language both resists and lends itself to formalization Makes objectual semantics for quantified logic easy, with an incremental, rule-governed approach assisted by numerous simple exercises Makes important metatheoretical results accessible to introductory students through a discursive presentation of those results and by using simple case studies

Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. In a radical departure from current philosophical and psychological theories of concepts, this book provides the first in-depth discussion on the psychological act of reidentification. It will be of interest to a broad range of students of philosophy, especially those interested in the application of evolutionary theory to analytic philosophy.

Cognition is a paradoxical process, from the moment of the formation of human subjectivity, through its relationship with the Other (or more precisely: l'autre) and with the world, to the ontological status of the world as such. This is what this book has at stake. The book deals with selected aspects of poststructural thought which are introduced into the language of contemporary science, prose, and poetry. Such an enterprise is possible by treating philosophy, science, and poetry as languages which can try to enter into a dialogue through metaphors. This is the ground on which the project is implemented.

Originally published in 1982, this volume examines the sources of British Hegelian thinking, the lines of its development and intellectual relationships among members of the school. The sources in this book include twentieth century Marxians who pioneered the move 'back to Hegel' such as Gramsci and Lukacs. It includes brief biographical entries of the principal British Hegelians and of minor figures wo paved the way for Hegel's entry into British philosophy.