Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley provide a natural point of entry to what for most readers will be a new subject. Plural logic deals with plural terms ('Whitehead and Russell', 'Henry VIII's wives', 'the real numbers', 'the square root of -1', 'they'), plural predicates ('surrounded the fort', 'are prime', 'are consistent', 'imply'), and plural quantification ('some things', 'any things'). Current logic is singularist: its terms stand for at most one thing. By contrast, the foundational thesis of this book is that a particular term may legitimately stand for several things at once; in other words, there is such a thing as genuinely plural denotation. The authors argue that plural phenomena need to be taken seriously and that the only viable response is to adopt a plural logic, a logic based on plural denotation. They expound a framework of ideas that includes the distinction between distributive and collective predicates, the theory of plural descriptions, multivalued functions, and lists. A formal system of plural logic is presented in three stages, before being applied to Cantorian set theory as an illustration. Technicalities have been kept to a minimum, and anyone who is familiar with the classical predicate calculus should be able to follow it. The authors' approach is an attractive blend of no-nonsense argumentative directness and open-minded liberalism, and they convey the exciting and unexpected richness of their subject. Mathematicians and linguists, as well as logicians and philosophers, will find surprises in this book. This second edition includes a greatly expanded treatment of the paradigm empty term zilch, a much strengthened treatment of Cantorian set theory, and a new chapter on higher-level plural logic.

This book provides an epistemological study of the great Islamic scholar of Banjarese origin, Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (1710-1812) who contributed to the development of Islam in Indonesia and, in general, Southeast Asia. The work focuses on Arsyad al-Banjari's dialectical use and understanding of qiyas or correlational inference as a model of parallel reasoning or analogy in Islamic jurisprudence. This constituted the most prominent instrument he applied in his effort of integrating Islamic law into the Banjarese society.This work studies how Arsyad al-Banjari integrates jadal theory or dialectic in Islamic jurisprudence, within his application of qiyas. The author develops a framework for qiyas which acts as the interface between jadal, dialogical logic, and Per Martin-Loef's Constructive Type Theory (CTT). One of the epistemological results emerging from the present study is that the different forms of qiyas applied by Arsyad al-Banjari represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning. The volume is divided into three parts that discuss the types of qiyas as well their dialectical and argumentative aspects, historical background and context of Banjar, and demonstrates how the theory of qiyas comes quite close to the contemporary model of parallel reasoning for sciences and mathematics developed by Paul Bartha (2010). This volume will be of interest to historians and philosophers in general, and logicians and historians of philosophy in particular.

The quality of our lives is determined by the quality of our thinking. The quality of our thinking, in turn, is determined by the quality of our questions, for questions are the engine, the driving force behind thinking. Without questions, we have nothing to think about. Without essential questions, we often fail to focus our thinking on the significant and substantive. When we ask essential questions, we deal with what is necessary, relevant, and indispensable to a matter at hand. We recognize what is at the heart of the matter. Our thinking is grounded and disciplined. We are ready to learn. We are intellectually able to find our way about. To be successful in life, one needs to ask essential questions: essential questions when reading, writing, and speaking; when shopping, working, and parenting; when forming friendships, choosing life-partners, and interacting with the mass media and the Internet. Yet few people are masters of the art of asking essential questions. Most have never thought about why some questions are crucial and others peripheral. Essential questions are rarely studied in school. They are rarely modeled at home. Most people question according to their psychological associations. Their questions are haphazard and scattered. The ideas we provide are useful only to the extent that they are employed daily to ask essential questions. Practice in asking essential questions eventually leads to the habit of asking essential questions. But we can never practice asking essential questions if we have no conception of them. This mini-guide is a starting place for understanding concepts that, when applied, lead to essential questions. We introduce essential questions as indispensable intellectual tools. We focus on principles essential to formulating, analyzing, assessing, and settling primary questions. You will notice that our categories of question types are not exclusive. There is a great deal of overlap

This book applies the formal discipline of logic to everyday discourse. It offers a new analysis of the notion of individual, suggesting that this notion is linguistic, not ontological, and that anything denoted by a proper name in a well-functioning language game is an individual. It further posits that everyday discourse is non-compositional, i.e., its complex expressions are not just the result of putting simpler ones together but react on the latter, modifying their meaning through feedback. The book theorizes that in everyday discourse, there is no algebra of truth values, but the latter can be both input and output of something which has no truth value at all. It suggests that an elementary proposition of everyday discourse (defined as having exactly one predicate) can, in principle, be indefinitely expanded by adding new components, belonging neither to subject nor to predicate, but remain elementary. This book is of interest to logicians and philosophers of language.

It is with great pleasure that we are presenting to the community the second edition of this extraordinary handbook. It has been over 15 years since the publication of the first edition and there have been great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since then. The first edition has proved invaluable to generations of students and researchers in formal philosophy and language, as well as to consumers of logic in many applied areas. The main logic article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999 has described the first edition as 'the best starting point for exploring any of the topics in logic'. We are confident that the second edition will prove to be just as good. ! The first edition was the second handbook published for the logic commu nity. It followed the North Holland one volume Handbook of Mathematical Logic, published in 1977, edited by the late Jon Barwise, The four volume Handbook of Philosophical Logic, published 1983-1989 came at a fortunate temporal junction at the evolution of logic. This was the time when logic was gaining ground in computer science and artificial intelligence circles. These areas were under increasing commercial pressure to provide devices which help and/or replace the human in his daily activity. This pressure required the use of logic in the modelling of human activity and organisa tion on the one hand and to provide the theoretical basis for the computer program constructs on the other.

Of the four chapters in this book, the first two discuss (albeit in consider ably modified form) matters previously discussed in my papers 'On the Logic of Conditionals' [1] and 'Probability and the Logic of Conditionals' [2], while the last two present essentially new material. Chapter I is relatively informal and roughly parallels the first of the above papers in discussing the basic ideas of a probabilistic approach to the logic of the indicative conditional, according to which these constructions do not have truth values, but they do have probabilities (equal to conditional probabilities), and the appropriate criterion of soundness for inferences involving them is that it should not be possible for all premises of the inference to be probable while the conclusion is improbable. Applying this criterion is shown to have radically different consequences from the orthodox 'material conditional' theory, not only in application to the standard 'fallacies' of the material conditional, but to many forms (e. g. , Contraposition) which have hitherto been regarded as above suspi cion. Many more applications are considered in Chapter I, as well as certain related theoretical matters. The chief of these, which is the most important new topic treated in Chapter I (i. e.

This volume offers English translations of three early works by Ernst Schroeder (1841-1902), a mathematician and logician whose philosophical ruminations and pathbreaking contributions to algebraic logic attracted the admiration and ire of figures such as Dedekind, Frege, Husserl, and C. S. Peirce. Today he still engages the sympathetic interest of logicians and philosophers. The works translated record Schroeder's journey out of algebra into algebraic logic and document his transformation of George Boole's opaque and unwieldy logical calculus into what we now recognize as Boolean algebra. Readers interested in algebraic logic and abstract algebra can look forward to a tour of the early history of those fields with a guide who was exceptionally thorough, unfailingly honest, and deeply reflective.

This volume examines the role of logic in cognitive psychology in light of recent developments. Gonzalo Reyes's new semantic theory has brought the fields of cognitive psychology and logic closer together, and has shed light on how children master proper names and count nouns, and thus acquire knowledge. The chapters highlight the inadequacies of classical logic in its handling of ordinary language and reveal the prospects of applying these new theories to cognitive psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, the philosophy of language and logic.

This volume deals with formal, mechanizable reasoning in modal logics, that is, logics of necessity, possibility, belief, time computations etc. It is therefore of immense interest for various interrelated disciplines such as philosophy, AI, computer science, logic, cognitive science and linguistics. The book consists of 15 original research papers, divided into three parts. The first part contains papers which give a profound description of powerful proof-theoretic methods as applied to the normal modal logic S4. Part II is concerned with a number of generalizations of the standard proof-theoretic formats, while the third part presents new and important results on semantics-based proof systems for modal logic.

Papers from more than three decades reflect the development of thinkingover the dialogical framework that shapes verbal expression of comprehending experience and that has to be exhibited in responsible argumentations. With dialogical reconstructions of experience owing to the methodical constructivism of the a oeErlangen Schoola it is possible to uncover the origin of many conceptual oppositions in traditional philosophical talk, like natural vs. artificial/cultural, subjective vs. objective, etc., and to solve philosophical riddles connected with them.

By drawing on the insights of diverse scholars from around the globe, this volume systematically investigates the meaning and reality of the concept of negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy-German Idealism, Early German Romanticism, and Neo-Kantianism. The reader benefits from the historical, critical, and systematic investigations contained which trace not only the significance of negation in these traditions, but also the role it has played in shaping the philosophical landscape of Post-Kantian philosophy. By drawing attention to historically neglected thinkers and traditions, and positioning the dialogue within a global and comparative context, this volume demonstrates the enduring relevance of Post-Kantian philosophy for philosophers thinking in today's global context. This text should appeal to graduate students and professors of German Idealism, Post-Kantian philosophy, comparative philosophy, German studies, and intellectual history.

This book features mathematical and formal philosophers' efforts to understand philosophical questions using mathematical techniques. It offers a collection of works from leading researchers in the area, who discuss some of the most fascinating ways formal methods are now being applied. It covers topics such as: the uses of probable and statistical reasoning, rational choice theory, reasoning in the environmental sciences, reasoning about laws and changes of rules, and reasoning about collective decision procedures as well as about action. Utilizing mathematical techniques has been very fruitful in the traditional domains of formal philosophy - logic, philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics - while formal philosophy is simultaneously branching out into other areas in philosophy and the social sciences. These areas particularly include ethics, political science, and the methodology of the natural and social sciences. Reasoning about legal rules, collective decision-making procedures, and rational choices are of interest to all those engaged in legal theory, political science and economics. Statistical reasoning is also of interest to political scientists and economists.

This book intends to unite studies in different fields related to the development of the relations between logic, law and legal reasoning. Combining historical and philosophical studies on legal reasoning in Civil and Common Law, and on the often neglected Arabic and Talmudic traditions of jurisprudence, this project unites these areas with recent technical developments in computer science. This combination has resulted in renewed interest in deontic logic and logic of norms that stems from the interaction between artificial intelligence and law and their applications to these areas of logic. The book also aims to motivate and launch a more intense interaction between the historical and philosophical work of Arabic, Talmudic and European jurisprudence. The publication discusses new insights in the interaction between logic and law, and more precisely the study of different answers to the question: what role does logic play in legal reasoning? Varying perspectives include that of foundational studies (such as logical principles and frameworks) to applications, and historical perspectives.

Free logic - i.e., logic free of existential presuppositions in general and with respect to singular terms in particular- began to come into its own as a field of research in the 1950s. As is the case with so many developments in Western philosophy, its roots can be traced back to ancient Greek philo sophy. It is only during the last fifty years, however, that it has become well established as a branch of modern logic. The name of Karel Lambert is most closely connected with this development: he gave it its name and its profile as a well defined field of research. After a development of fifty years, it is time to look back and take stock while at the same time scanning for new perspectives. This is the purpose of the papers collected in this volume. The first paper is written by Karel Lambert himself who also comments on all the papers of the other authors. In an introductory essay we give a survey of the present status of and new directions in free logic."

Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. In The Construction of Logical Space Agustin Rayo defends the idea that one's conception of logical space is shaped by one's acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: statements like 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O', or 'for the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs'. The resulting picture is used to articulate a conception of metaphysical possibility that does not depend on a reduction of the modal to the non-modal, and to develop a trivialist philosophy of mathematics, according to which the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth-conditions.

In 1911, Bertrand Russell began a historically formative interchange about the nature of logic and cognition with his student, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1913, Russell set to work on a manuscript, the "Theory of Knowledge", designed to move from the analysis of perception to judgement and on to knowledge of the world. After Wittgenstein interrupted Russell's daily writing with a series of objections to his doctrine of judgement and conception of logic, Russell abandoned his project in despair, leaving it unfinished. His subsequent work can be understood largely as an attempt to assimilate and respond to Wittgenstein's challenge in 1913. "Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement" is the first book-length treatment of Russell's decisive 1913 exchanges with Wittgenstein. Rosalind Carey incorporates little-known notes and diagrams into a new analysis of the problems Russell was facing. She also evaluates the numerous interpretations of Russell's positions and Wittgenstein's objections to them. The result is a new perspective on both these great thinkers, at a crucial point in the development of twentieth-century philosophy.

This book focuses on logic and logical language. It examines different types of words, terms and propositions in detail. While discussing the nature of propositions, it illustrates the procedures used to determine the truth and falsity of a proposition, and the validity and invalidity of an argument. In addition, the book provides a clear exposition of the pure and mixed form of syllogism with suitable examples. The book encompasses sentential logic, predicate logic, symbolic logic, induction and set theory topics. The book is designed to serve all those involved in teaching and learning courses on logic. It offers a valuable resource for students and researchers in philosophy, mathematics and computer science disciplines. Given its scope, it is an essential read for everyone interested in logic, language, formulation of the hypotheses for the scientific enquiries and research studies, and judging valid and invalid arguments in the natural language discourse.