First published in 1972, Philosophical Tasks was written to identify and examine some central themes in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The book explores the claim that philosophy is essentially linguistic, and considers in particular such topics as philosophy and science, fact and language, conceptual analysis, first- and second-order tasks, scepticism, ordinary language, and conceptual frameworks.

This volume discusses two distinct perspectives on the analysis of argumentative discourse: the dialectical and the rhetorical perspective. It intends to open a thorough discussion of the two approaches, their commonalities and differences, and the ways in which, in some combination or other, they can be used to further the development of sound analytic tools for dealing with argumentation.

This volume brings together a group of philosophically oriented logicians and logic-minded philosophers, mainly from Asia, to address a variety of logical and philosophical topics, such as modal logic and related directions (e.g. temporal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic, logic of conditionals, and modal proof theory), theory of truth, paradoxes, intentionality, and social networks. New approaches are also proposed, such as extended modal logic with planarity of graphs, extended branching time temporal logic with conditional operators, and a relational treatment of language and logical systems, to name but a few.Given the variety of topics and issues discussed here, the book will appeal to readers from a broad range of disciplines, from mathematical/philosophical logic, computing science, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, to linguistics, game theory and beyond.

Originally published in 1966 On the Syllogism and Other Logical Writings assembles for the first time the five celebrated memoirs of Augustus De Morgan on the syllogism. These are collected together with the more condensed accounts of his researches given in his Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic an article on Logic contributed to the English Cyclopaedia. De Morgan was among the most distinguished of nineteenth century British mathematicians but is chiefly remembered today as one of the founders of modern mathematical logic. His writings on this subject have been little read, however since apart from his Formal Logic, they lie buried for the most part in inaccessible periodicals. De Morgan's own later amendments are inserted in the text and the editorial introduction gives a summary of the whole and traces in some detail the course of the once-famous feud with Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh.

A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes examines how some of the classic philosophical paradoxes that have so puzzled philosophers over the centuries can be dissolved. Read argues that paradoxes such as the Sorites, Russell's Paradox and the paradoxes of time travel do not, in fact, need to be solved. Rather, using a resolute Wittgensteinian 'therapeutic' method, the book explores how virtually all apparent philosophical paradoxes can be diagnosed and dissolved through examining their conditions of arising; to loosen their grip and therapeutically liberate those philosophers suffering from them (including oneself). The book contrasts such paradoxes with real, 'lived paradoxes': paradoxes that are genuinely experienced outside of the philosopher's study, in everyday life. Thus Read explores instances of lived paradox (such as paradoxes of self-hatred and of denial of other humans' humanity) and the harm they can cause, psychically, morally or politically. These lived paradoxes, he argues, sometimes cannot be dissolved using a Wittgensteinian treatment. Moreover, in some cases they do not need to be: for some, such as the paradoxical practices of Zen Buddhism (and indeed of Wittgenstein himself), can in fact be beneficial. The book shows how, once philosophers' paradoxes have been exorcized, real lived paradoxes can be given their due.

The central problem of philosophy is the problem of certainty. What does it mean to be sure? Are there ideas beyond the possibility of error or refutation? What does it mean for a notion to be incorrigible? In this book, Frank D. Schubert squarely addresses the question of whether there is a single standard of certainty that can be applied to such disparate areas as logic, mathematics, politics, religion, familial/tribal commitments, and science. Schubert proposes a common standard for assessing certainty - the certainty of knowing one's own personal proper name - as a standard that can establish common ground within each widely disparate area. The result is a new "philosophy in a grand manner" and a powerful ethical proposal for our time.

This book offers a defense against non-classical approaches to the paradoxes. The author argues that, despite appearances, the paradoxes give no reason at all to reject classical logic. In fact, he believes classical solutions fare better than non-classical ones with respect to key tests like Curry's Paradox, a Liar-like paradox that dialetheists are forced to solve in a way totally disjoint from their solution to the Liar. Graham Priest's In Contradiction was the first major work that advocated the use of non-classical approaches. Since then, these views have moved into the philosophical mainstream. Much of this movement is fueled by a widespread sense that these logically heterodox solutions get to the real nub of the issue. They lack the ad hoc feel of many other solutions to the paradoxes. The author believes that it's long past time for a response to these attacks against classical orthodoxy. He presents a non-logically-revisionary solution to the paradoxes. This title offers a literal way of cashing out the disquotation metaphor. While the details of the view are novel, the idea has a pre-history in the relevant literature. The author examines objections in detail. He rejects each in turn and concludes by comparing the virtues of his logically orthodox approach with those of the paraconsistent and paracomplete competition.

This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge forms the core of Lewis's masterpiece Mind and the World Order . While Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the a priori as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any interpretation of it by the mind. The chapters in this book probe Lewis's new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in twentieth-century philosophy, including Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. C.I. Lewis: The A Priori and the Given represents a focused treatment of a longneglected figure in twentieth-century American philosophy.

This unique introduction fully engages and clearly explains pragmatism, an approach to knowledge and philosophy that rejects outmoded conceptions of objectivity while avoiding relativism and subjectivism. It follows pragmatism's focus on the process of inquiry rather than on abstract justifications meant to appease the skeptic. According to pragmatists, getting to know the world is a creative human enterprise, wherein we fashion our concepts in terms of how they affect us practically, including in future inquiry. This book fully illuminates that enterprise and the resulting radical rethinking of basic philosophical conceptions like truth, reality, and reason. Author Cornelis de Waal helps the reader recognize, understand, and assess classical and current pragmatist contributions-from Charles S. Peirce to Cornel West-evaluate existing views from a pragmatist angle, formulate pragmatist critiques, and develop a pragmatist viewpoint on a specific issue. The book discusses: Classical pragmatists, including Peirce, James, Dewey, and Addams; Contemporary figures, including Rorty, Putnam, Haack, and West; Connections with other twentieth-century approaches, including phenomenology, critical theory, and logical positivism; Peirce's pragmatic maxim and its relation to James's Will to Believe; Applications to philosophy of law, feminism, and issues of race and racism.

This book features original essays by leading epistemologists that address questions related to epistemic dilemmas from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It seems plausible that there can be "no win" moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmic situations-situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? The contributors to this volume cover a wide variety of positions on epistemic dilemmas. The coverage ranges from discussions of the nature of epistemic dilemmas to arguments that there are no such things to suggestions for how to resolve (or at least live with) epistemic dilemmas to proposals for how thinking about epistemic dilemmas can be used to inform theorizing in other areas of epistemology. Epistemic Dilemmas will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology working on the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.

This book presents a philosophical approach to probability and probabilistic thinking, considering the underpinnings of probabilistic reasoning and modeling, which effectively underlie everything in data science. The ultimate goal is to call into question many standard tenets and lay the philosophical and probabilistic groundwork and infrastructure for statistical modeling. It is the first book devoted to the philosophy of data aimed at working scientists and calls for a new consideration in the practice of probability and statistics to eliminate what has been referred to as the "Cult of Statistical Significance." The book explains the philosophy of these ideas and not the mathematics, though there are a handful of mathematical examples. The topics are logically laid out, starting with basic philosophy as related to probability, statistics, and science, and stepping through the key probabilistic ideas and concepts, and ending with statistical models. Its jargon-free approach asserts that standard methods, such as out-of-the-box regression, cannot help in discovering cause. This new way of looking at uncertainty ties together disparate fields - probability, physics, biology, the "soft" sciences, computer science - because each aims at discovering cause (of effects). It broadens the understanding beyond frequentist and Bayesian methods to propose a Third Way of modeling.

This collection brings together exciting new works that address today's key challenges for a feminist power-sensitive approach to knowledge and scientific practice. Taking up such issues as the role of contextualism in epistemology, democracy and dissent in knowledge practices, and epistemic agency under conditions of oppression, the essays build upon well-established work in feminist epistemology and philosophy of science such as standpoint theory and contextual empiricism, offering new interpretations and applications. Many contributions capture the current engagement of feminist epistemologists with the insights and programs of nonfeminist epistemologists, while others focus on the intersections between feminist epistemology and other fields of feminist inquiry such as feminist ethics and metaphysics. *see remarks below for remainder of text*

Originally published in 1967. An introduction to the literature of nonstandard logic, in particular to those nonstandard logics known as many-valued logics. Part I expounds and discusses implicational calculi, modal logics and many-valued logics and their associated calculi. Part II considers the detailed development of various many-valued calculi, and some of the important metathereoms which have been proved for them. Applications of the calculi to problems in the philosophy are also surveyed. This work combines criticism with exposition to form a comprehensive but concise survey of the field.

Originally published in 1966. An introduction to current studies of kinds of inference in which validity cannot be determined by ordinary deductive models. In particular, inductive inference, predictive inference, statistical inference, and decision making are examined in some detail. The last chapter discusses the relationship of these forms of inference to philosophical notions of rationality. Special features of the monograph include a discussion of the legitimacy of various criteria for successful predictive inference, the development of an intuitive model which exhibits the difficulties of choosing probability measures over infinite sets, and a comparison of rival views on the foundations of probability in terms of the amount of information which the members of these schools believe suitable for fruitful formalization. The bibliographies include articles by statisticians accessible to students of symbolic logic.

This book addresses the argument in the history of the philosophy of science between the positivists and the anti-positivists. The author starts from a point of firm conviction that all science and philosophy must start with the given... But that the range of the given is not definite. He begins with an examination of science from the outside and then the inside, explaining his position on metaphysics and attempts to formulate the character of operational acts before a general theory of symbolism is explored. The last five chapters constitute a treatise to show that the development from one stage of symbolismto the next is inevitable, consequently that explanatory science represents the culmination of knowledge.

Originally published in 1964. This book is concerned with general arguments, by which is meant broadly arguments that rely for their force on the ideas expressed by all, every, any, some, none and other kindred words or phrases. A main object of quantificational logic is to provide methods for evaluating general arguments. To evaluate a general argument by these methods we must first express it in a standard form. Quantificational form is dealt with in chapter one and in part of chapter three; in the remainder of the book an account is given of methods by which arguments when formulated quantificationally may be tested for validity or invalidity. Some attention is also paid to the logic of identity and of definite descriptions. Throughout the book an attempt has been made to give a clear explanation of the concepts involved and the symbols used; in particular a step-by-step and partly mechanical method is developed for translating complicated statements of ordinary discourse into the appropriate quantificational formulae. Some elementary knowledge of truth-functional logic is presupposed.

Bertrand Russell was a central figure in the rise of analytic philosophy, and there are few works in the genre whose influence is comparable to The Principles of Mathematics (1903), a book that established him as a major force in British philosophy. Logic as Universal Science takes a fresh look at the context of The Principles. This, it is argued, involves an extended argument against Kant's transcendental idealism and his conception of mathematics as a synthetic a priori science grounded in pure intuition. Philosophically, Russell's logicism substitutes pure logic for pure intuitions as the true source of mathematical knowledge. In this way, logic turns out to be a universal science and very far from Kant's general logic, which is a concise and dry science, delivering nothing but a purely formal criterion for knowledge. The picture of logic emerging from this opposition is investigated in detail for its content and consequences.

This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory, in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics, indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.

This book addresses the hasty development of modern logic, especially its introducing and embracing various kinds of artificial languages and moving from the study of natural languages to that of artificial ones. This shift seemed extremely helpful and managed to elevate logic to a new level of rigor and clarity. However, the change that logic underwent in this way was in no way insignificant, and it is also far from an insignificant matter to determine to what extent the "new logic" only engaged new and more powerful instruments to answer the questions posed by the "old" one, and to what extent it replaced these questions with new ones. Hence, this movement has generated brand new kinds of philosophical problems that have still not been dealt with systematically. Philosophy of Logical Systems addresses these new kinds of philosophical problems that are intertwined with the development of modern logic. Jaroslav Peregrin analyzes the rationale behind the introduction of the artificial languages of logic; classifies the various tools which were adopted to build such languages; gives an overview of the various kinds of languages introduced in the course of modern logic and the motifs of their employment; discusses what can actually be achieved by relocating the problems of logic from natural language into them; and reaches certain conclusions with respect to the possibilities and limitations of this "formal turn" of logic. This book is both an important scholarly contribution to the philosophy of logic and a systematic survey of the standard (and not so standard) logical systems that were established during the short history of modern logic.

This book provides a detailed exposition of one of the most practical and popular methods of proving theorems in logic, called Natural Deduction. It is presented both historically and systematically. Also some combinations with other known proof methods are explored. The initial part of the book deals with Classical Logic, whereas the rest is concerned with systems for several forms of Modal Logics, one of the most important branches of modern logic, which has wide applicability.

Originally published in 1994, The Incommensurability Thesis is a critical study of the Incommensurability Thesis of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The book examines the theory that different scientific theories may be incommensurable because of conceptual variance. The book presents a critique of the thesis and examines and discusses the arguments for the theory, acknowledging and debating the opposing views of other theorists. The book provides a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the incommensurability thesis.

The aim of this volume is to open up new perspectives and to raise new research questions about a unified approach to truth, modalities, and propositional attitudes. The volume's essays are grouped thematically around different research questions. The first theme concerns the tension between the theoretical role of the truth predicate in semantics and its expressive function in language. The second theme of the volume concerns the interaction of truth with modal and doxastic notions. The third theme covers higher-order solutions to the semantic and modal paradoxes, providing an alternative to first-order solutions embraced in the first two themes. This book will be of interest to researchers working in epistemology, logic, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Originally published in 1962. This book gives an account of the concepts and methods of a basic part of logic. In chapter I elementary ideas, including those of truth-functional argument and truth-functional validity, are explained. Chapter II begins with a more comprehensive account of truth-functionality; the leading characteristics of the most important monadic and dyadic truth-functions are described, and the different notations in use are set forth. The main part of the book describes and explains three different methods of testing truth-functional aguments and agument forms for validity: the truthtable method, the deductive method and the method of normal forms; for the benefit mainly of readers who have not acquired in one way or another a general facility in the manipulation of symbols some of the procedures have been described in rather more detail than is common in texts of this kind. In the final chapter the author discusses and rejects the view, based largely on the so called paradoxes of material implication, that truth-functional logic is not applicable in any really important way to arguments of ordinary discourse.

Originally published in 1968. This is a critical study of the concept of 'rule' featuring in law, ethics and much philosophical analysis which the author uses to investigate the concept of 'rationality'. The author indicates in what manner the modes of reasoning involved in reliance upon rules are unique and in what fashion they provide an alternative both to the modes of logico-mathematical reasoning and to the modes of scientific reasoning. This prepares the groundwork for a methodology meeting the requirements of the fields using rules such as law and ethics which could be significant for communications theory and the use of computers in normative fields. Other substantive issues related to the mainstream of legal philosophy are discussed - theories of interpretation, the notion of purpose and the requirements of principled decision-making. The book utilizes examples drawn from English and American legal decisions to suggest how the positions of legal positivism and of natural law are equally artificial and misleading.

Originally published in 1941. Professor Ushenko treats of current problems in technical Logic, involving Symbolic Logic to a marked extent. He deprecates the tendency, in influential quarters, to regard Logic as a branch of Mathematics and advances the intuitionalist theory of Logic. This involves criticism of Carnap, Russell,Wittgenstein, Broad and Whitehead, with additional discussions on Kant and Hegel. The author believes that the union of Philosophy and Logic is a natural one, and that an exclusively mathematical treatment cannot give an adequate account of Logic. A fundamental characteristic of Logic is comprehensiveness, which brings out the affinity between logic and philosophy, for to be comprehensive is the aim of philosophical ambition.