The importance of Stoicism for Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense and Michel Foucault's Hermeneutics of the Subject and The Care of the Self is well known. However, few students of either classics or philosophy are aware of the breadth of French and Italian receptions of Stoicism. This book firstly presents this broad field to readers, and secondly advances it by renewing dialogues with ancient Stoic texts. The authors in this volume, who combine expertise in continental and Hellenistic philosophy, challenge our understanding of both modern and ancient concepts, arguments, exercises, and therapies. It conceives of Stoicism as a vital strand of philosophy which contributes to the life of contemporary thought. Flowing through the sustained, varied engagement with Stoicism by continental thinkers, this volume covers Jean-Paul Sartre, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Alain Badiou, Emile Brehier, Barbara Cassin, Giorgio Agamben, and Pierre Hadot. Stoic sources addressed range from doxography and well-known authors like Epictetus and Seneca to more obscure authorites like Musonius Rufus and Cornutus.

Terence Parsons presents a new study of the development and logical complexity of medieval logic. Basic principles of logic were used by Aristotle to prove conversion principles and reduce syllogisms. Medieval logicians expanded Aristotle's notation in several ways, such as quantifying predicate terms, as in 'No donkey is every animal', and allowing singular terms to appear in predicate position, as in 'Not every donkey is Brownie'; with the enlarged notation come additional logical principles. The resulting system of logic is able to deal with relational expressions, as in De Morgan's puzzles about heads of horses. A crucial issue is a mechanism for dealing with anaphoric pronouns, as in 'Every woman loves her mother'. Parsons illuminates the ways in which medieval logic is as rich as contemporary first-order symbolic logic, though its full potential was not envisaged at the time. Along the way, he provides a detailed exposition and examination of the theory of modes of common personal supposition, and the useful principles of logic included with it. An appendix discusses the artificial signs introduced in the fifteenth century to alter quantifier scope.

1. STRUCTURE AND REFERENCES 1.1. The main part of the dictionary consists of alphabetically arranged articles concerned with basic logical theories and some other selected topics. Within each article a set of concepts is defined in their mutual relations. This way of defining concepts in the context of a theory provides better understand ing of ideas than that provided by isolated short defmitions. A disadvantage of this method is that it takes more time to look something up inside an extensive article. To reduce this disadvantage the following measures have been adopted. Each article is divided into numbered sections, the numbers, in boldface type, being addresses to which we refer. Those sections of larger articles which are divided at the first level, i.e. numbered with single numerals, have titles. Main sections are further subdivided, the subsections being numbered by numerals added to the main section number, e.g. I, 1.1, 1.2, ..., 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and so on. A comprehensive subject index is supplied together with a glossary. The aim of the latter is to provide, if possible, short defmitions which sometimes may prove sufficient. As to the use of the glossary, see the comment preceding it."

This book is the first to provide a critical history of analytic philosophy from its inception in the late nineteenth century to the present day. Quentin Smith focuses on the connections between the four leading movements in analytic philosophy -- logical realism, logical positivism, ordinary language analysis, and linguistic essentialism -- and corresponding twentieth-century theories of ethics and of religion. Through a critical evaluation of each school's theoretical positions, Smith counters the widespread view of analytic philosophy as indifferent to important questions about fight and wrong and human meaning. He argues that analytic philosophy throughout its history has revolved around the central issues of existence, and he offers a new ethics and philosophy of religion.

The author develops a positive ethical theory based on a method of ethics first formulated by Robert Adams. Smith's theory belongs to the tradition of perfectionism or self-realization ethics and builds on Thomas Hurka's recent theory of perfectionism. In his consideration of philosophy of religion, Smith concludes that there is a sound "logical argument from evil" that takes into account Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense and undermines monotheism, paving the way to a naturalistic pantheism.

"Smith's book is original not only in intent but frequently in the detailed argument involved in evaluating the merits of the philosophies of language and their implications for ethics and philosophy of religion". -- John F. Post, Vanderbilt University

Model theory, a major branch of mathematical logic, plays a key role connecting logic and other areas of mathematics such as algebra, geometry, analysis, and combinatorics. Simplicity theory, a subject of model theory, studies a class of mathematical structures, called simple. The class includes all stable structures (vector spaces, modules, algebraically closed fields, differentially closed fields, and so on), and also important unstable structures such as the random graph, smoothly approximated structures, pseudo-finite fields, ACFA and more. Simplicity theory supplies the uniform model theoretic points of views to such structures in addition to their own mathematical analyses.
This book starts with an introduction to the fundamental notions of dividing and forking, and covers up to the hyperdefinable group configuration theorem for simple theories. It collects up-to-date knowledge on simplicity theory and it will be useful to logicians, mathematicians and graduate students working on model theory.

This monograph is a detailed study, and systematic defence, of the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), first conceived by C.D. Broad. The book offers a coherent, logically perspicuous and ideologically lean formulation of GBT, defends it against the most notorious objections to be found in the extant philosophical literature, and shows how it can be derived from a more general theory, consistent with relativistic spacetime, on the pre-relativistic assumption of an absolute and total temporal order. The authors devise axiomatizations of GBT and its competitors which, against the backdrop of a shared quantified tense logic, significantly improves the prospects of their comparative assessment. Importantly, neither of these axiomatizations involves commitment to properties of presentness, pastness or futurity. The authors proceed to address, and defuse, a number of objections that have been marshaled against GBT, including the so-called epistemic objection according to which the theory invites skepticism about our temporal location. The challenge posed by relativistic physics is met head-on, by replacing claims about temporal variation by claims about variation across spacetime. The book aims to achieve the greatest possible rigor. The background logic is set out in detail, as are the principles governing the notions of precedence and temporal location. The authors likewise devise a novel spacetime logic suited for the articulation, and comparative assessment, of relativistic theories of time. The book comes with three technical appendices which include soundness and completeness proofs for the systems corresponding to GBT and its competitors, in both their pre-relativistic and relativistic forms. The book is primarily directed at researchers and graduate students working on the philosophy of time or temporal logic, but is of interest to metaphysicians and philosophical logicians more generally.

This volume clusters together issues centered upon the variety of types of intensional semantics. Consisting of 10 contributions, the volume is based on papers presented at the Trends in Logic 2019 conference. The various chapters introduce readers to the topic, or apply new types of logical semantics to elucidate subtleties of logical systems and natural language semantics. The book introduces hyperintentional systems that aim at solving some open philosophical problems. Specifically, the first three studies focus on relating semantics, while the following ones discuss fundamental issues related to hyper-intensional semantics or develop hyper-intensional frameworks to address issues in modal, epistemic, deontic and action logic. Authors in this volume present original results on logical systems but also extend beyond this by offering philosophical considerations on the topic as well. This volume will appeal to students and researchers in the field of logic.

This book offers insights relevant to modern history and epistemology of physics, mathematics and, indeed, to all the sciences and engineering disciplines emerging of 19th century. This research volume is the first of a set of three Springer books on Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot's (1753-1823) remarkable work: Essay on Machines in General (Essai sur les machines en general [1783] 1786). The other two forthcoming volumes are: Principes fondamentaux de l'equilibre et du mouvement (1803) and Geometrie de position (1803). Lazare Carnot - l'organisateur de la victoire - in Essai sur le machine en general (1786) assumed that the generalization of machines was a necessity for society and its economic development. Subsequently, his new coming science applied to machines attracted considerable interest for technician, as well, already in the 1780's. With no lack in rigour, Carnot used geometric and trigonometric rather than algebraic arguments, and usually went on to explain in words what the formulae contained. His main physical- mathematical concepts were the Geometric motion and Moment of activity-concept of Work . In particular, he found the invariants of the transmission of motion (by stating the principle of the moment of the quantity of motion) and theorized the condition of the maximum efficiency of mechanical machines (i.e., principle of continuity in the transmission of power). While the core theme remains the theories and historical studies of the text, the book contains an extensive Introduction and an accurate critical English Translation - including the parallel text edition and substantive critical/explicative notes - of Essai sur les machines en general (1786). The authors offer much-needed insight into the relation between mechanics, mathematics and engineering from a conceptual, empirical and methodological, and universalis point of view. As a cutting-edge writing by leading authorities on the history of physics and mathematics, and epistemological aspects, it appeals to historians, epistemologist-philosophers and scientists (physicists, mathematicians and applied sciences and technology).

Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. In The Construction of Logical Space Agustin Rayo defends the idea that one's conception of logical space is shaped by one's acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: statements like 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O', or 'for the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs'. The resulting picture is used to articulate a conception of metaphysical possibility that does not depend on a reduction of the modal to the non-modal, and to develop a trivialist philosophy of mathematics, according to which the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth-conditions.

This book presents a mechanist philosophy of mind. I hold that the human mind is a system of computational or recursive rules that are embodied in the nervous system; that the material presence of these rules accounts for perception, conception, speech, belief, desire, intentional acts, and other forms of intelligence. In this edition I have retained the whole of the fIrst edition except for discussion of issues which no longer are relevant in philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. Earlier reference to disputes of the 1960's and 70's between hard-line empiricists and neorationalists over the psychological status of grammars and language acquisition, for instance, has simply been dropped. In place of such material I have entered some timely or new topics and a few changes. There are brief references to the question of computer versus distributed processing (connectionist) theories. Many of these questions dissolve if one distinguishes as I now do in Chapter II between free and embodied algorithms. I have also added to my comments on artifIcal in telligence some reflections. on Searle's Chinese Translator. The irreducibility of machine functionalist psychology in my version or any other has been exaggerated. Input, output, and state entities are token identical to physical or biological things of some sort, while a machine system as a collection of recursive rules is type identical to representatives of equivalence classes. This nuld technicality emerges in Chapter XI. It entails that so-called "anomalous monism" is right in one sense and wrong in another."

Kawalec's monograph is a novel defence of the programme of inductive logic, developed initially by Rudolf Carnap in the 1950s and Jaakko Hintikka in the 1960s. It revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The main strength of the work is its link between inductive logic and contemporary discussions of epistemology. Through this perspective the author succeeds to shed new light on the significance of inductive logic. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. The claim is made that this sets up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. Therefore, the book is interesting for philosophers of science dealing with problems of induction, but it will also appeal to readers working in the theory of knowledge. Kawalec writes in a clear manner, makes his theses and arguments explicit, and gives ample bibliographical references. The book will be a valuable companion to graduate and postgraduate courses on inductive logic.

The philosophical thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein continues to have a profound influence that transcends barriers between philosophical disciplines and reaches beyond philosophy itself. Less than one hundred years after their publication, his early masterpiece 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and the posthumously published 'Philosophical Investigations' have emerged as two classic philosophical texts, each of which has elicited widely divergent readings and spawned contesting schools of interpretation. This collection of original essays by leading experts offers deep insights into the forces that shaped and influenced Wittgenstein's thought on a broad variety of topics. It also contains the text - in both the original German and an English translation by Juliet Floyd and Burton Dreben - of letters and cards sent to Wittgenstein by the philosopher and logician Gottlob Frege, which shed light on their interaction during the crucial period when Wittgenstein completed work on the 'Tractatus'. This important record of a philosophical friendship is complemented by a scholarly apparatus and an introduction. Other essays featured in this volume document and discuss Wittgenstein's thinking on music and religion as well as issues that take center stage in the 'Investigations' such as Wittgenstein's account of rule-following. The volume provides an invaluable research tool not only for students of the history of philosophy and for scholars of both Wittgenstein and Frege but also for anyone interested in the intellectual history of the first half of the twentieth century.

Are there such things as merely possible people, who would have lived if our ancestors had acted differently? Are there future people, who have not yet been conceived? Questions like those raise deep issues about both the nature of being and its logical relations with contingency and change. In Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson argues for positive answers to those questions on the basis of an integrated approach to the issues, applying the technical resources of modal logic to provide structural cores for metaphysical theories. He rejects the search for a metaphysically neutral logic as futile. The book contains detailed historical discussion of how the metaphysical issues emerged in the twentieth century development of quantified modal logic, through the work of such figures as Rudolf Carnap, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Arthur Prior, and Saul Kripke. It proposes higher-order modal logic as a new setting in which to resolve such metaphysical questions scientifically, by the construction of systematic logical theories embodying rival answers and their comparison by normal scientific standards. Williamson provides both a rigorous introduction to the technical background needed to understand metaphysical questions in quantified modal logic and an extended argument for controversial, provocative answers to them. He gives original, precise treatments of topics including the relation between logic and metaphysics, the methodology of theory choice in philosophy, the nature of possible worlds and their role in semantics, plural quantification compared to quantification into predicate position, communication across metaphysical disagreement, and problems for truthmaker theory.

Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays on the nature of quantity, probability, coherence, and induction. The first part explores the nature of quantity and includes essays on tractarian nominalism, combinatorial possibility, and coherence. Part Two proceeds to examine coherent updating of degrees of belief in various learning situations. Finally, in Part Three, Skyrms develops an account of aspects of inductive reasoning, which proceeds from specific problems to general considerations. These essays span the breadth of Skyrms's illustrious career and will be essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy of science and formal epistemology.

There is a tradition of interpreting Heidegger's remarks on logic as an attempt to flout, revise, or eliminate logic, and of thus characterizing Heidegger as an irrationalist. Heidegger and Logic looks closely at Heidegger's writings on logic in the Being and Time era and argues that Heidegger does not seek to discredit logic, but to determine its scope and explain its foundations. Through a close examination of the relevant texts, Greg Shirley shows that this tradition of interpretation rests on mischaracterizations and false assumptions. What emerges from Heidegger's remarks on logic is an account of intelligibility that is both novel and relevant to issues in contemporary philosophy of logic. Heidegger's views on logic form a coherent whole that is an important part of his larger philosophical project and helps us understand it better, and that constitutes a unique contribution to the philosophy of logic

An introductory textbook, Logic for Justice covers, in full detail, the language and semantics of both propositional logic and first-order logic. It motivates the study of those logical systems by drawing on social and political issues. Basically, Logic for Justice frames propositional logic and first-order logic as two theories of the distinction between good arguments and bad arguments. And the book explains why, for the purposes of social justice and political reform, we need theories of that distinction. In addition, Logic for Justice is extremely lucid, thorough, and clear. It explains, and motivates, many different features of the formalism of propositional logic and first-order logic, always connecting those features back to real-world issues. Key Features Connects the study of logic to real-world social and political issues, drawing in students who might not otherwise be attracted to the subject. Offers extremely clear and thorough presentations of technical material, allowing students to learn directly from the book without having to rely on instructor explanations. Carefully explains the value of arguing well throughout one’s life, with several discussions about how to argue and how arguments – when done with care – can be helpful personally. Includes examples that appear throughout the entire book, allowing students to see how the ideas presented in the book build on each other. Provides a large and diverse set of problems for each chapter. Teaches logic by connecting formal languages to natural languages with which students are already familiar, making it much easier for students to learn how logic works.

David Bostock presents a critical appraisal of Bertrand Russell's philosophy from 1900 to 1924-a period that is considered to be the most important in his career. Russell developed his theory of logic from 1900 to 1910, and over those years wrote the famous work Principia Mathematica with A. N. Whitehead. Bostock explores Russell's development of 'logical atomism', which applies this logic to problems in the theory of knowledge and in metaphysics, and was central to his philosophical work from 1910 to 1924. This book is the first to focus on this important period of Russell's development, examining the three key areas of logic and mathematics, knowledge, and metaphysics, and demonstrating the enduring value of his work in these areas.

Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures is concerned with a crucial aspect of Brentano's philosophy as it was developed in his logic lectures from c. 1870 to c. 1885. The first part of the volume is an analysis of his theory of concept and judgment. The second part consists of materials, including a German edition and English translation of notes that a student took from a lecture course that Brentano gave. A short book by this student on Brentano is also translated in the materials. The access to Brentano's philosophy is enhanced by this volume not only with regard to his logic as a theory of deductive inference, but also to his descriptive psychology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.

This book presents a new structural approach to the psychology of the person, inspired by Kenneth Colby's computer-generated simulation, PARRY. The simulation was of a paranoid psychological state, represented in forms of the person's logic and syntax, as these would be evidenced in personal communication. Harwood Fisher uses a Structural View to highlight similarities in the logical form of the linguistic representations of Donald Trump, his avid followers ("Trumpers"), and the paranoid-referred to as "The Trio." He demonstrates how the Structural View forms a series of logical and schematic patterns, similar to the way that content analysis can bring forth associations meanings, and concepts held in the text. Such comparisons, Fisher argues, can be used to shed light on contingencies for presenting, representing, and judging truth. Specifically, Fisher posits that the major syntactic and logical patterns that were used to produce the computer-generated "paranoid" responses in Colby's project can be used to analyze Donald Trump's rhetoric and his followers' reactions to it. Ultimately, Fisher offers a new kind of structural approach for the philosophy of psychology. This novel work will appeal to students and scholars of social and cognitive psychology, psychology of personality, psychiatric classification, psycholinguistics, rhetoric, and computer science.

This book argues that languages are composed of sets of 'signs', rather than 'strings'. This notion, first posited by de Saussure in the early 20th century, has for decades been neglected by linguists, particularly following Chomsky's heavy critiques of the 1950s. Yet since the emergence of formal semantics in the 1970s, the issue of compositionality has gained traction in the theoretical debate, becoming a selling point for linguistic theories.

Yet the concept of 'compositionality' itself remains ill-defined, an issue this book addresses. Positioning compositionality as a cornerstone in linguistic theory, it argues that, contrary to widely held beliefs, there exist non-compositional languages, which shows that the concept of compositionality has empirical content. The author asserts that the existence of syntactic structure can flow from the fact that a compositional grammar cannot be delivered without prior agreement on the syntactic structure of the constituents.

This volume brings together those papers of mine which may be of interest not only to various specialists but also to philosophers. Many of my writings in mathematics were motivated by epistemological considerations; some papers originated in the critique of certain views that at one time dominated the discussions of the Vienna Cirele; others grew out of problems in teaching fundamental ideas of mathematics; sti II others were occasioned by personal relations with economists. Hence a wide range of subjects will be discussed: epistemology, logic, basic concepts of pure and applied mathematics, philosophical ideas resulting from geometric studies, mathematical didactics and, finally, economics. The papers also span a period of more than fifty years. What unifies the various parts of the book is the spirit of searching for the elarification of basic concepts and methods and of articulating hidden ideas and tacit procedures. Part 1 ineludes papers published about 1930 which expound an idea that Carnap, after a short period of opposition in the Cirele, fully adopted ; and, under the name "Princip/e of To/erance", he eloquently formulated it in great generality in his book, Logica/ Syntax of Language (1934), through which it was widely disseminated. "The New Logic" in Chapter 1 furthermore ineludes the first report (I932) to a larger public of Godel's epochal discovery presented among the great logic results of ali time. Chapter 2 is a translation of an often quoted 1930 paper presenting a detailed exposition and critique of intuitionism.

This book presents an English translation of a classic Russian text on duality theory for Heyting algebras. Written by Georgian mathematician Leo Esakia, the text proved popular among Russian-speaking logicians. This translation helps make the ideas accessible to a wider audience and pays tribute to an influential mind in mathematical logic. The book discusses the theory of Heyting algebras and closure algebras, as well as the corresponding intuitionistic and modal logics. The author introduces the key notion of a hybrid that "crossbreeds" topology (Stone spaces) and order (Kripke frames), resulting in the structures now known as Esakia spaces. The main theorems include a duality between the categories of closure algebras and of hybrids, and a duality between the categories of Heyting algebras and of so-called strict hybrids. Esakia's book was originally published in 1985. It was the first of a planned two-volume monograph on Heyting algebras. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the publishing house closed and the project died with it. Fortunately, this important work now lives on in this accessible translation. The Appendix of the book discusses the planned contents of the lost second volume.

This wide-ranging book introduces information as a key concept not only in physics, from quantum mechanics to thermodynamics, but also in the neighboring sciences and in the humanities. The central part analyzes dynamical processes as manifestations of information flows between microscopic and macroscopic scales and between systems and their environment. Quantum mechanics is interpreted as a reconstruction of mechanics based on fundamental limitations of information processing on the smallest scales. These become particularly manifest in quantum chaos and in quantum computing. Covering subjects such as causality, prediction, undecidability, chaos, and quantum randomness, the book also provides an information-theoretical view of predictability. More than 180 illustrations visualize the concepts and arguments. The book takes inspiration from the author's graduate-level topical lecture but is also well suited for undergraduate studies and is a valuable resource for researchers and professionals.

1. 1. The Principle of Universalizability-an informal explication This work is concerned with the so-called Principle of Universalizability. As we shall understand it, this principle represents a claim that moral properties of things (persons, actions, state of affairs, situations) are essentially independent of their purely 'individual' or-as one often says -'numerical' aspects. l Thus, if a thing, x, is better than another thing, y, then this fact is not dependent on x's being x nor on y's being y. If a certain person, a, has a duty to help another person, b, then this duty does not arise as a consequence of their being a and b, respectively. And if in a certain situation, W, it ought to be the case that certain goods are transferred from one person to another, then this moral obligation does not depend on the individual identities of the persons involved. The Universalizability Principle may also be expressed in terms of similarities. Instead of saying that the moral properties of x are essentially independent of the individual aspects of x, we may say that any object which is exactly similar to x, which is precisely like x in all non-individual, 'qualitative' respects, must exhibit exactly similar moral properties. Thus, if two persons are exactly similar to each other, (if they are placed in exactly similar circumstances, have exactly similar information, preferences, character, etc. ), then they will have exactly similar rights and duties.