Godel's modal ontological argument is the centerpiece of an extensive examination of intensional logic. First, classical type theory is presented semantically, tableau rules for it are introduced, and the Prawitz/Takahashi completeness proof is given. Then modal machinery is added to produce a modified version of Montague/Gallin intensional logic. Finally, various ontological proofs for the existence of God are discussed informally, and the Godel argument is fully formalized. Parts of the book are mathematical, parts philosophical. "

The two volumes in this advanced textbook present results, proof methods, and translations of motivational and philosophical considerations to formal constructions. In the associated Vol. I the author explains preferential structures and abstract size. In this Vol. II he presents chapters on theory revision and sums, defeasible inheritance theory, interpolation, neighbourhood semantics and deontic logic, abstract independence, and various aspects of nonmonotonic and other logics. In both volumes the text contains many exercises and some solutions, and the author limits the discussion of motivation and general context throughout, offering this only when it aids understanding of the formal material, in particular to illustrate the path from intuition to formalisation. Together these books are a suitable compendium for graduate students and researchers in the area of computer science and mathematical logic.

Bernard Bolzano (1781-1850) is increasingly recognized as one of the greatest nineteenth-century philosophers. A philosopher and mathematician of rare talent, he made ground-breaking contributions to logic, the foundations and philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. Many of the larger features of later analytic philosophy (but also many of the details) first appear in his work: for example, the separation of logic from psychology, his sophisticated understanding of mathematical proof, his definition of logical consequence, his work on the semantics of natural kind terms, or his anticipations of Cantor's set theory, to name but a few. To his contemporaries, however, he was best known as an intelligent and determined advocate for reform of Church and State. Based in large part on a carefully argued utilitarian practical philosophy, he developed a program for the non-violent reform of the authoritarian institutions of the Hapsburg Empire, a program which he himself helped to set in motion through his teaching and other activities. Rarely has a philosopher had such a great impact on the political culture of his homeland. Persecuted in his lifetime by secular and ecclesiastical authorities, long ignored or misunderstood by philosophers, Bolzano's reputation has nevertheless steadily increased over the past century and a half. Much discussed and respected in Central Europe for over a century, he is finally beginning to receive the recognition he deserves in the English-speaking world. This book provides a comprehensive and detailed critical introduction to Bolzano, covering both his life and works.

Originally published in 1982, this volume examines the sources of British Hegelian thinking, the lines of its development and intellectual relationships among members of the school. The sources in this book include twentieth century Marxians who pioneered the move 'back to Hegel' such as Gramsci and Lukacs. It includes brief biographical entries of the principal British Hegelians and of minor figures wo paved the way for Hegel's entry into British philosophy.

Part I of this book presents a theory of modal metaphysics in the possible-worlds tradition. `Worlds' themselves are understood as structured sets of properties; this `Ersatzist' view is defended against its most vigorous competitors, Meinongianism and David Lewis' theory of existent concrete worlds. Related issues of essentialism and linguistic reference are explored. Part II takes up the question of lexical meaning in the context of possible-world semantics. There are skeptical analyses of analyticity and the notion of a logical constant; and an `infinite polysemy' thesis is defended. The book will be of particular interest to metaphysicians, possible-world semanticists, philosophers of language, and linguists concerned with lexical semantics.

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn't it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

This book is the first detailed and focused defense of necessitarianism. The author's original account of necessitarianism encourages a reexamination of commonly held metaphysical positions as well as important issues in other, related areas of philosophy. Necessitarianism is the view that absolutely nothing about the world could have been otherwise in any way, whatsoever. Most philosophers believe that necessitarianism is just plain false and presume that some things could have been otherwise than what they are. In this book, the author argues that necessitarianism is true and the view that some things in the world are contingent-what the author terms contingentarianism-is false. The author assesses various theories of contingency, including the possible worlds theory, combinatorialism, and dispositionalism, and argues that no theory can successfully explain why an entity is such as it is rather than not. She then lays out a case for necessitarianism and provides responses to various objections. The book concludes with an explanation of the ways in which necessitarianism is relevant to issues in ethics, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy. A Case for Necessitarianism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of science.

Max Weber and Charles Peirce: At the Crossroads of Science, Philosophy, and Culture shows that a relational conception of science is implicit in Max Weber's reflections on scientific inquiry as a bridge between the Geisteswissenschaften (soft sciences) and Naturwissenschaften (hard sciences). Because he is not a trained philosopher, Weber does not have the precise philosophical language in which to articulate his ideas clearly. Consequently, his relational vision of science remains obscure. Basit Bilal Koshul brings clarity and precision to Weber's insights using the pragmaticist philosophy of Charles Peirce. He makes explicit the phenomenology, semiotics, and logic that are implicit in Weber's methodological writings and translates them into Peircean terms. Since Peirce explicitly offers his philosophy of science as a critique of the modern divide between the humanistic and natural sciences and of the divide between religion and science, this translation has a double effect. It clarifies Weber's insights on the methodology of scientific inquiry, and it extends the reparative force of these insights into the larger culture of which science is one part. The reconstruction of Weber's relational conception of science along the lines of Peirce's pragmaticism, in turn, reveals that Weber's work points toward deep affinities between religion and science. Given the fact that the same phenomenology, semiotics, and logic that underpin Peirce's philosophy of science are also at the root of his philosophy of religion, we can begin to appreciate the fact that Weber's work makes an important contribution to bridging the divide between religion and science. In providing models that bridge divides and move towards complementary relationships, Weber and Peirce not only help us to better understand disenchantment as the fate of our times, but also offer uniquely valuable resources to reach for cultural horizons that lie beyond it.

This book analyzes the uses of emotive language and redefinitions from pragmatic, dialectical, epistemic and rhetorical perspectives, investigating the relationship between emotions, persuasion and meaning, and focusing on the implicit dimension of the use of a word and its dialectical effects. It offers a method for evaluating the persuasive and manipulative uses of emotive language in ordinary and political discourse. Through the analysis of political speeches (including President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize address) and legal arguments, the book offers a systematic study of emotive language in argumentation, rhetoric, communication, political science and public speaking.

First published in 1993. Why do mirrors reverse left and right but not up and down? Does time flow at an even rate These are just two of the questions that won't be answered in Pseudo-Problems. This book explains how problems are dissolved rather than solved. Roy Sorenson takes the most important and interesting examples from one hundred years of analytic philosophy (and the odd one from the centuries before) to consolidate a new theory of dissolution. Pseudo-Problems is a fast-moving, fascinating alternative history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, and a fine example of what philosophical analysis should be. Not least, it is an important contribution to the debates about creativity and problem solving.

This volume consists of papers delivered at the conference 'The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy', organised in celebration of the hun- dredth anniversary ofKazimierz Twardowski's first lecture as Professor of Phi- losophy at Lvov University. This lecture can be regarded as the starting point of the development of analytic philosophy in Poland, which culminated in the Warsaw School of Logic. The conference was held in Lvov (15-17 November) and Warsaw (19-21 November 1995). It was organised jointly by the Ukrainian Academy of Sci- ences and the Polish Academy of Sciences. The general organisation was un- dertaken by Professor Andrzej Grzegorczyk (polish Academy of Sciences) and Professor Marat Vernikov (Ukrainian Academy of Sciences). Professors Jaroslaw Isaievich (Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) and Jan Wolenski (Jagiel- Ionian University) were responsible for the scientific programme. Over 100 philosophers participated in the conference. Papers published in this volume are organised according to the sections of the conference and rep- of the papers delivered. resent a selection The editors would like to express their gratitude to Professor Andrzej Grze- gorczyk, spiritus movens of the conference, who, by including the present vol- ume in a programme of publications connected with the hundredth anniversary of the Lvov-Warsaw School, provided financial support for its preparation. Fi- nally, we express our gratitude to Dr Timothy Childers of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic for correcting the English of the papers.

Berkeley: Ideas, Immaterialism, and Objective Presence offers a novel interpretation of the arc of George Berkeley's philosophical thought, from his theory of vision through his immaterialism and finally to his proof of God's existence. Keota Fields unifies these themes to focus on Berkeley's use of the Cartesian doctrine of objective presence, which demands causal explanations of the content of ideas. This is particularly so with respect to Berkeley's arguments for immaterialism. One of those arguments is typically read as a straightforward transitivity argument. After identifying material bodies with sensible objects, and the latter with ideas of sense, Berkeley concludes that putative material bodies are actually identical to collections of ideas of sense. George Pappas has recently defended an alternative reading that grounds Berkeley's immaterialism in his rejection of what Pappas calls category-transcendent abstract ideas: abstract ideas of beings, entia, or existence. Fields uses Pappas's interpretation as a framework for understanding Berkeley's immaterialism in terms of transcendental arguments. Early moderns routinely used the doctrine of objective presence to justify transcendental arguments for the existence of material substance. The claim was that physical qualities are necessary for any causal explanation of the content of sensory ideas; since those qualities are represented to perceivers as ontologically dependent, material substance is the necessary condition for the existence of physical qualities and a fortiori any causal explanation of the content of sensory ideas. On the reading defended here, Berkeley rejects Locke's transcendental argument for the existence of material substratum on the grounds that it turns decisively on the aforementioned category-transcendent abstract ideas, which Berkeley rejects as logically inconsistent. In its place, Berkeley offers his own transcendental argument designed to show that only minds and ideas exist. He uses that argument as a

This book offers a plurality of perspectives on the historical origins of logicism and on contemporary developments of logicist insights in philosophy of mathematics. It uniquely provides up-to-date research and novel interpretations on a variety of intertwined themes and historical figures related to different versions of logicism. The essays, written by prominent scholars, are divided into three thematic sections. Part I focuses on major authors like Frege, Dedekind, and Russell, providing a historical and theoretical exploration of such figures in the philosophical and mathematical milieu in which logicist views were first expounded. Part II sheds new light on the interconnections between these founding figures and a number of influential other traditions, represented by authors like Hilbert, Husserl, and Peano, as well as on the reconsideration of logicism by Carnap and the logical empiricists. Finally, Part III assesses the legacy of such authors and of logicist themes for contemporary philosophy of mathematics, offering new perspectives on highly debated topics-neo-logicism and its extension to accounts of ordinal numbers and set-theory, the comparison between neo-Fregean and neo-Dedekindian varieties of logicism, and the relation between logicist foundational issues and empirical research on numerical cognition-which define the prospects of logicism in the years to come. This book offers a comprehensive account of the development of logicism and its contemporary relevance for the logico-philosophical foundations of mathematics. It will be of interest to graduate students and researchers working in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and the history of analytic philosophy.

This second and extended edition of Priest's classic includes new chapters on Heidegger and Nagarjuna, as well as reflections on reactions to the first edition.
Praise for previous edition: "a splendid tour de force, one which should be read by every philosopher..."--Philosophical Quarterly
" H]ighly entertaining and provocative...an engaging and instructive tour through some of the most perplexing features of our own conceptual finitude..."--TLS

Critical thinking is now needed more than ever. This accessible and engaging book provides the necessary tools to question and challenge the discourse that surrounds us-whether in the media, the classroom, or everyday conversation. Additionally, it offers readers a deeper understanding of the foundations of analytical thought. Informal Logical Fallacies: A Brief Guide is a systematic and concise introduction to more than fifty fallacies, from anthropomorphism and argumentum ad baculum, to reductionism and the slippery slope argument. This revised edition includes updated examples, exercises, and a new chapter on non-Western logical fallacies. With helpful definitions and relevant explanations, the author guides the reader through the realms of fallacious reasoning and deceptive rhetoric. This is an essential guide to philosophical reflection and clear thinking.

This book offers a defense against non-classical approaches to the paradoxes. The author argues that, despite appearances, the paradoxes give no reason at all to reject classical logic. In fact, he believes classical solutions fare better than non-classical ones with respect to key tests like Curry's Paradox, a Liar-like paradox that dialetheists are forced to solve in a way totally disjoint from their solution to the Liar. Graham Priest's In Contradiction was the first major work that advocated the use of non-classical approaches. Since then, these views have moved into the philosophical mainstream. Much of this movement is fueled by a widespread sense that these logically heterodox solutions get to the real nub of the issue. They lack the ad hoc feel of many other solutions to the paradoxes. The author believes that it's long past time for a response to these attacks against classical orthodoxy. He presents a non-logically-revisionary solution to the paradoxes. This title offers a literal way of cashing out the disquotation metaphor. While the details of the view are novel, the idea has a pre-history in the relevant literature. The author examines objections in detail. He rejects each in turn and concludes by comparing the virtues of his logically orthodox approach with those of the paraconsistent and paracomplete competition.

The present monograph is a slightly revised version of my Habilitations schrift Proof-theoretic Aspects of Intensional and Non-Classical Logics, successfully defended at Leipzig University, November 1997. It collects work on proof systems for modal and constructive logics I have done over the last few years. The main concern is display logic, a certain refinement of Gentzen's sequent calculus developed by Nuel D. Belnap. This book is far from offering a comprehensive presentation of generalized sequent systems for modal logics broadly conceived. The proof-theory of non-classical logics is a rapidly developing field, and even the generalizations of the ordinary notion of sequent listed in Chapter 1 can hardly be presented in great detail within a single volume. In addition to further investigating the various approaches toward generalized Gentzen systems, it is important to compare them and to discuss their relative advantages and disadvantages. An initial attempt at bringing together work on different kinds of proof systems for modal logics has been made in [188]. Another step in the same direction is [196]. Since Chapter 1 contains introductory considerations and, moreover, every remaining chapter begins with some surveying or summarizing remarks, in this preface I shall only emphasize a relation to philosophy that is important to me, register the sources of papers that have entered this book in some form or another, and acknowledge advice and support.

Originally published in 1987, this volume reflects the diversity in Hegelianism and every branch of philosophy which he contributed to. It includes essays on his contribution to contemporary social philosophy, logic and the philosophy of religion. His work is examined in relation to Marx, Wittgenstein and his social philosophy discussed from a feminist standpoint.

Originally published in 1991, this volume examines Hegel's political philosophy from the perspective of his argument for constitutional monarchy. It offers an interpretation of Hegelian theory that is relevant for the understanding of modern republican constitutions. Modern republican theories are assessed together with those of Plato, Kant and Marx in order to put Hegel's model to the most rigorous test. The arguments are based on fresh analysis of Hegel's system and on new translations of key passages in Hegel's text.

This book presents Goedel's incompleteness theorems and the other limitative results which are most significant for the philosophy of mathematics. Results are stated in the form most relevant for use in the philosophy of mathematics. An appendix considers their implications for Hilbert's Program for the foundations of mathematics. The text is self-contained, all notions being explained in full detail, but of course previous exposure to the very first rudiments of mathematical logic will help.

This book features original essays by leading epistemologists that address questions related to epistemic dilemmas from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It seems plausible that there can be "no win" moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmic situations-situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? The contributors to this volume cover a wide variety of positions on epistemic dilemmas. The coverage ranges from discussions of the nature of epistemic dilemmas to arguments that there are no such things to suggestions for how to resolve (or at least live with) epistemic dilemmas to proposals for how thinking about epistemic dilemmas can be used to inform theorizing in other areas of epistemology. Epistemic Dilemmas will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology working on the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.

Logic Works is a critical and extensive introduction to logic. It asks questions about why systems of logic are as they are, how they relate to ordinary language and ordinary reasoning, and what alternatives there might be to classical logical doctrines. The book covers classical first-order logic and alternatives, including intuitionistic, free, and many-valued logic. It also considers how logical analysis can be applied to carefully represent the reasoning employed in academic and scientific work, better understand that reasoning, and identify its hidden premises. Aiming to be as much a reference work and handbook for further, independent study as a course text, it covers more material than is typically covered in an introductory course. It also covers this material at greater length and in more depth with the purpose of making it accessible to those with no prior training in logic or formal systems. Online support material includes a detailed student solutions manual with a running commentary on all starred exercises, and a set of editable slide presentations for course lectures. Key Features Introduces an unusually broad range of topics, allowing instructors to craft courses to meet a range of various objectives Adopts a critical attitude to certain classical doctrines, exposing students to alternative ways to answer philosophical questions about logic Carefully considers the ways natural language both resists and lends itself to formalization Makes objectual semantics for quantified logic easy, with an incremental, rule-governed approach assisted by numerous simple exercises Makes important metatheoretical results accessible to introductory students through a discursive presentation of those results and by using simple case studies

Providing a clear interpretation of Hegel's characterizations of possibility and actuality in the Science of Logic, this book departs from the standard understandings of these concepts to break new ground in Hegelian scholarship. The book draws out some of the implications of Hegel's view of immanent possibility, especially as it relates to Leibniz's thesis of modal optimism: his view that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Reading Hegel as a philosopher of possibility, against a tradition that has conceived of him primarily as a philosopher of necessity, rationality, and finitude, Nahum Brown demonstrates the historical background and philosophical traditions from which Hegel's concept of possibility emerges. Systematically outlining Hegel's conceptions of positive and negative freedom, Brown reveals the Hegelian underpinnings of our conception of reality and what it is to be in the world itself. Original and convincing, this book is crucial for philosophers approaching modality from any tradition.

Absurdity, time, death-each poses a profound threat to Being, compelling us to face our limits and our finitude. Yet what does it mean to fully realize and experience these threats? Finite Transcendence: Existential Exile and the Myth of Home presents a thoughtful and thorough examination of these challenges and questions, arguing the universality of the realization of finitude in the experience of exile. By tracing the historical presence and experience of notions of "faith" and "exile" in Western thought from the Ancient Greeks to the present, Steven A. Burr demonstrates the character of each as fundamental constitutive components of what it means to be human. The book discusses essential elements of each, culminating in a compelling account of "existential exile" as a definitive name for the human experience of finitude. Burr follows with a comprehensive analysis of the writings of Albert Camus, demonstrating an edifying articulation of, engagement with, and reconciliation of the condition of existential exile. Finally, based on the model suggested in Camus's approach, Burr discusses responses to exile and articulates the meaning of home as the transcendence of exile. Finite Transcendence is a work that will be of great value to anyone working in or studying existentialism, philosophy of religion, hermeneutics, and social theory, as well as to anyone interested in questions of faith and society, religion, or secularity.

Logic is, and has always been, an essential part of philosophy. It employs concepts which are crucial for understanding thought and language, and demands a mastery of procedures and techniques. With the same intellectual goals as the first edition, this innovative introductory logic textbook explores the relationship between natural language and logic, motivating the student to acquire skills and techniques of formal logic.

This new and revised edition includes substantial additions which make the text even more useful to students and instructors alike. Central to these changes is an Appendix, 'How to Learn Logic', which takes the student through fourteen compact and sharply directed lessons with exercises and answers. Other new material includes a discussion of the truth tree method for both Sentential and Predicate logics, an account of alternative notations, and the provision of answers to selected exercises that figure in the main body of the book.