Other Logics: Alternatives to Formal Logic in the History of Thought and Contemporary Philosophy challenges the widespread idea of formal logic as inherently monolithic, universal, and ahistorical. Written by both leading and up-and-coming scholars, and edited by Admir Skodo, Other Logics offers a wide variety of historical and philosophical alternatives to this idea, all arguing that logic is a historical, concrete, and multi-dimensional phenomenon. To name a few examples, Frank Ankersmit lays down a representationalist logic, Alessandra Tanesini forcefully argues for the possibility of logical aliens, Christopher Watkin analyzes how leading contemporary French philosophers view the idea of logic, and Aaron Wendland unearths Heidegger's critique of formal logic. In Other Logics readers will find provocative interventions in a highly contested field in contemporary philosophy. Contributors include: Frank Ankersmit, Christopher Watkin, Giuseppina D'Oro, Alessandra Tanesini, Admir Skodo, Aaron Wendland, Ervik Cejvan, Anders Kraal, Christopher Fear, Karim Dharamsi, Johan Modee, and Thord Svensson.

The book analyses the concept of discoverability, and some current epistemological problems related to it, with a special attention to science. It shows that discoverability is closely related to the sustainability of human creativity in an "eco-cognitive" perspective. Advocating the need of an integral ecology and leveraging the important concept of abduction, it demonstrates that an ecology of human creativity should have priority over other needs, i.e that the first ecological duty is to protect and sustain discoverability. Enhancing discoverability will protect human creativity, and it is exactly human creativity, a form of innovative abductive cognition, that can promote the implementation of the other kinds of ecology. The author guides readers through a comprehensive discussion on the concept of discoverability, eco-cognitive situatedness, and eco-cognitive openness and closure alike. By describing some key real-world examples, he highlights the main challenges that are currently posed to human creativity and epistemic integrity. He also describes future eco-cognitive settings, discussing the problem of overcomputationalism and suggesting a reinterpretation of the role of human knowledge. Overall, this book fills an important gap in the literature on the nexus abduction - creativity - discovery, offering a source of inspiration to philosophers, epistemologists, and cognitive scientists. Yet, it also addresses researchers in other disciplines interested in the problems of scientific discovery and epistemic integrity of research.

A system of philosophy of the sort presented in this and the following volumes begins with logic. Philosophy properly speaking is characterized by the kind oflogic it employs, for what it employs it assumes, however silently; and what it assumes it presupposes. The logic stands behind the ontology and is, so to speak, metaphysically prior. One word of caution. The philosophical aspects of logic have lagged behind the mathematical aspects in point of view of interest and develop ment. The work of N. Rescher and others have gone a long way to correct this. However, their work on philosophical logic has been more concerned with the logical than with the philosophical aspects. I have in mind another approach, one that would call attention to the ontological (systematic meta physics) or metaphysical (critical ontology) aspects, whichever term you prefer. It is this approach which I have pursued in the following chapters. Since together they stand at the head of a system of philosophy which has been developed in some seventeen books, a system which ranges over all of the topics of philosophy, the chosen approach can be seen as the necessary one. But I have not written any logic, I have merely indicated the sort of logic that has to be written."

The primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of language are speech acts of the type called illocutionary acts. In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken presented the first formalized logic of a general theory of speech acts. In Meaning and Speech Acts Daniel Vanderveken further develops the logic of speech acts and the logic of propositions to construct a general semantic theory of natural languages. Volume I, Principles of Language Use, explains the general principles that connect meaning, reason, thought and speech acts in the semantic structure of language. It presupposes no detailed knowledge of logical formalism, and will be accessible to a large readership of students and scholars from philosophy, lingustics, cognitive psychology and computer science. Volume II, Formal Semantics of Success and Satisfaction uses the resources of philosophical and mathematical logics to develop a formalization of the laws of the semantic theory advanced in Volume I. It will be of interest to theoretical linguists and those involved in mathematical logic and artificial intelligence.

A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Many paradoxes raise serious philosophical problems, and they are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. The expanded and revised third edition of this intriguing book considers a range of knotty paradoxes including Zeno's paradoxical claim that the runner can never overtake the tortoise, a new chapter on paradoxes about morals, paradoxes about belief, and hardest of all, paradoxes about truth. The discussion uses a minimum of technicality but also grapples with complicated and difficult considerations, and is accompanied by helpful questions designed to engage the reader with the arguments. The result is not only an explanation of paradoxes but also an excellent introduction to philosophical thinking.

Frege's puzzle concerning belief reports has been in the middle of the discussion on semantics and pragmatics of attitude reports: The intuition behind the opacity does not seem to be consistent with the thesis of semantic innocence according to which the semantic value of proper names is nothing but their referent. Main tasks of this book include providing truth-conditional content of belief reports. Especially, the focus is on semantic values of proper names. The key aim is to extend Crimmins's basic idea of semantic pretense and the introduction of pleonastic entities proposed by Schiffer. They enable us to capture Frege's puzzle in the analysis without giving up semantic innocence. To reach this conclusion, two issues are established. First, based on linguistic evidence, the frame of belief reports functions adverbially rather than relationally. Second, the belief ascriptions, on which each belief report is made, must be analyzed in terms of the measurement-theoretic analogy.

This book focuses on the game-theoretical semantics and epistemic logic of Jaakko Hintikka. Hintikka was a prodigious and esteemed philosopher and logician, and his death in August 2015 was a huge loss to the philosophical community. This book, whose chapters have been in preparation for several years, is dedicated to the work of Jaako Hintikka, and to his memory. This edited volume consists of 23 contributions from leading logicians and philosophers, who discuss themes that span across the entire range of Hintikka's career. Semantic Representationalism, Logical Dialogues, Knowledge and Epistemic logic are among some of the topics covered in this book's chapters. The book should appeal to students, scholars and teachers who wish to explore the philosophy of Jaako Hintikka.

This book explores a large variety of topics involved in Arabic philosophy. It examines concepts and issues relating to logic and mathematics, as well as metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. These topics are all studied by different Arabic philosophers and scientists from different periods ranging from the 9th century to the 20th century, and are representative of the Arabic tradition. This is the first book dealing with the Arabic thought and philosophy and written only by women. The book brings together the work and contributions of an international group of female scholars and researchers specialized in the history of Arabic logic, philosophy and mathematics. Although all authors are women, the book does not enter into any kind of feminist trend. It simply highlights the contributions of female scholars in order to make them available to the large community of researchers interested in Arabic philosophy and to bring to the fore the presence and representativeness of female scholars in the field.

The history of interwar Polish logic, including philosophical logic, is still a relatively little known area, especially if compared with the movement's well-documented contemporaries - the Vienna Circle or the Berlin Circle, for instance. The book aims to address this lacuna, by presenting the state of the art of research into this part of the history of analytic philosophy. It comprises thirteen essays, written by outstanding philosophers and exemplifying different approaches to the history of philosophy. One approach focuses on some little known aspects of Polish philosophy (e.g., Lesniewski's arithmetic, Tarski's geometry, philosophy of mathematics in interwar Krakow), analyzing it in great detail, sometimes by using current formal techniques. Another group of papers looks at the inspiration the Poles got from the founding fathers of analytic philosophy (Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein), and locates Polish philosophy in the larger landscape of European analytic philosophy. Finally, some contributors pick a topic from the Polish school (sometimes only mentioned, but not developed by the Poles), and construct an alternative account which is then compared with the earlier account. Most of the papers were presented at a symposium celebrating the 70th birthday of Jan Wolenski, whose book "Logic and Philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School" has played a substantial role in sparking contemporary interest in Polish analytic philosophy.

If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions? This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude properties such as inertial mass and electric charge, and much continues to be discovered. The book says the same is true of numbers. In the theory of magnitudes, the categorial distinction between quantity and individual is of central importance, for magnitudes are properties of quantities, not properties of individuals. Quantity entails divisibility, so the logic of quantity needs mereology, the a priori logic of part and whole. The three species of quantity are pluralities, continua and series, and the book presents three variants of mereology, one for each species of quantity. Given Euclid's axioms of equality, it is possible without the use of set theory to deduce the axioms of the natural, real and ordinal numbers from the respective mereologies of pluralities, continua and series. Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number carries out these deductions, arriving at a metaphysics of number that makes room for our a priori knowledge of mathematical reality.

This book examines the philosophical conception of abductive reasoning as developed by Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. It explores the historical and systematic connections of Peirce's original ideas and debates about their interpretations. Abduction is understood in a broad sense which covers the discovery and pursuit of hypotheses and inference to the best explanation. The analysis presents fresh insights into this notion of reasoning, which derives from effects to causes or from surprising observations to explanatory theories. The author outlines some logical and AI approaches to abduction as well as studies various kinds of inverse problems in astronomy, physics, medicine, biology, and human sciences to provide examples of retroductions and abductions. The discussion covers also everyday examples with the implication of this notion in detective stories, one of Peirce's own favorite themes. The author uses Bayesian probabilities to argue that explanatory abduction is a method of confirmation. He uses his own account of truth approximation to reformulate abduction as inference which leads to the truthlikeness of its conclusion. This allows a powerful abductive defense of scientific realism. This up-to-date survey and defense of the Peircean view of abduction may very well help researchers, students, and philosophers better understand the logic of truth-seeking.

This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the argument is to suggest that the theory of rational choice is less deterministic than many suppose.

A Chance for Possibility defends the view that the objective modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances. An understanding of supervenience in terms of grounding is developed which - unlike the standard modal characterization - allows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as Lewisian concreta or as abstract objects of some kind. Instead, a conception of pleonastic possible worlds is developed that reverses the direction of supervenience. On the basis of linguistic considerations concerning our use of natural language 'might' and 'might have' sentences, Steinberg finally argues that truths about objective chances are able to provide a supervenience base for modal truths. A Chance for Possibility is an investigation in analytic metaphysics, drawing on related work in the philosophy of logic and language as well as linguistics. It provides a detailed case study for the fruitful use of a notion of grounding in the clarification and evaluation of longstanding philosophical issues.

Of all philosophers of the 20th century, few built more bridges between academic disciplines than Karl Popper. He contributed to a wide variety of fields in addition to the epistemology and the theory of scientific method for which he is best known. This book illustrates and evaluates the impact, both substantive and methodological, that Popper has had in the natural and mathematical sciences. The topics selected include quantum mechanics, evolutionary biology, cosmology, mathematical logic, statistics, and cognitive science. The approach is multidisciplinary, opening a dialogue across scientific disciplines and between scientists and philosophers.

This lucid and original book offers a detailed and critical exposition of German metaphysics and philosophy of logic during the past century. Julian Roberts sets his argument in the context of the current debate between "analytical" and "continental" philosophers. the book centers on the problem of reflection-exploration of the boundaries of rationality, or (in analytical terms) of the "limits of thought"-which Roberts claims lies at the heart of both traditions. Roberts concentrates on the work of Frege, Wittengenstein, Husserl, the Erlangen School, and Habermas. In the course of his examination, however, he also considers philosophers ranging from Russell and Quine to Putnam and Heidegger. Roberts argues that the technical advances of modern logic have not, as is sometimes believed by analytical thinkers, generated uniquely modern problems that can only be dealt with by a correspondingly modernist philosophy, for the problem of reflection was already at the heart of Kant's critical project and of his confrontation with Leibniz. If we recover this earlier debate, says Roberts, we can develop a more adequate understanding not merely of its echoes in the twentieth century, but of the role and contribution of metaphysics and of philosophy in general.

The Rational Shakespeare: Peter Ramus, Edward de Vere, and the Question of Authorship examines William Shakespeare's rationality from a Ramist perspective, linking that examination to the leading intellectuals of late humanism, and extending those links to the life of Edward de Vere, Seventeenth Earl of Oxford. The application to Shakespeare's plays and sonnets of a game-theoretic hermeneutic, an interpretive approach that Ramism suggests but ultimately evades, strengthens these connections in further supporting the Oxfordian answer to the question of Shakespearean authorship.

This book offers an original philosophical perspective on exemplarity. Inspired by Wittgenstein's later work and Derrida's theory of deconstruction, it argues that examples are not static entities but rather oscillate between singular and universal moments. There is a broad consensus that exemplary cases mediate between singular instances and universal concepts or norms. In the first part of the book, Macha contends that there is a kind of differance between singular examples and general exemplars or paradigms. Every example is, in part, also an exemplar, and vice versa. Furthermore, he develops a paracomplete approach to the logic of exemplarity, which allows us to say of an exemplar of X neither that it is an X nor that it is not an X. This paradox is structurally isomorphic to Russell's paradox and can be addressed in similar ways. In the second part of the book, Macha presents four historical studies that exemplify the ideas developed in the first part. This part begins with Plato's Forms, understood as standards/paradigms, before considering Kant's theory of reflective judgment as a general epistemological account of exemplarity. This is then followed by analyses of Hegel's conceptual moment of particularity and Kuhn's concept of paradigm. The book concludes by discussing the speculative hypothesis that all our knowledge is based on paradigms, which, following the logic of exemplarity, are neither true nor false. The Philosophy of Exemplarity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of language, logic, history of philosophy, and literary theory.

Published in honor of Victor L. Selivanov, the 17 articles collected in this volume inform on the latest developments in computability theory and its applications in computable analysis; descriptive set theory and topology; and the theory of omega-languages; as well as non-classical logics, such as temporal logic and paraconsistent logic. This volume will be of interest to mathematicians and logicians, as well as theoretical computer scientists.

The central contention of this book is that second-order logic has a central role to play in laying the foundations of mathematics. In order to develop the argument fully, the author presents a detailed development of higher-order logic, including a comprehensive discussion of its semantics. Professor Shapiro demonstrates the prevalence of second-order notions in mathematics is practised, and also the extent to which mathematical concepts can be formulated in second-order languages . He shows how first-order languages are insufficient to codify many concepts in contemporary mathematics, and thus that higher-order logic is needed to fully reflect current mathematics. Throughout, the emphasis is on discussing the philosophical and historical issues associated with this subject, and the implications that they have for foundational studies. For the most part, the author assumes little more than a familiarity with logic as might be gained from a beginning graduate course which includes the incompleteness of arithmetic and the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems. All those concerned with the foundations of mathematics will find this a thought-provoking discussion of some of the central issues in this subject.

This book develops a new Wittgenstein interpretation called Wittgenstein's Metametaphysics. The basic idea is that one major strand in Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy can be described as undermining the dichotomy between realism and idealism. The aim of this book is to contribute to a better understanding of the relation between language and reality and to open up avenues of dialogue to overcome deep divides in the research literature. In the course of developing a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation, the author provides fresh and original analyses of the latest issues in Wittgenstein scholarship and gives new answers to both major exegetical and philosophical problems. This makes the book an illuminating study for scholars and advanced students alike.

The Routledge Companion to Pragmatism offers 44 cutting-edge chapters-written specifically for this volume by an international team of distinguished researchers-that assess the past, present, and future of pragmatism. Going beyond the exposition of canonical texts and figures, the collection presents pragmatism as a living philosophical idiom that continues to devise promising theses in contemporary debates. The chapters are organized into four major parts: Pragmatism's history and figures Pragmatism and plural traditions Pragmatism's reach Pragmatism's relevance Each chapter provides up-to-date research tools for philosophers, students, and others who wish to locate pragmatist options in their contemporary research fields. As a whole, the volume demonstrates that the vitality of pragmatism lies in its ability to build upon, and transcend, the ideas and arguments of its founders. When seen in its full diversity, pragmatism emerges as one of the most successful and influential philosophical movements in Western philosophy.

The operation of developing a concept is a common procedure in mathematics and in natural science, but has traditionally seemed much less possible to philosophers and, especially, logicians. Meir Buzaglo's innovative study proposes a way of expanding logic to include the stretching of concepts, while modifying the principles which block this possibility. He offers stimulating discussions of the idea of conceptual expansion as a normative process, and of the relation of conceptual expansion to truth, meaning, reference, ontology and paradox, and analyzes the views of Kant, Wittgenstein, Godel, and others, paying especially close attention to Frege. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers, from philosophers (of logic, mathematics, language, and science) to logicians, mathematicians, linguists, and cognitive scientists.

Computability and Logic has become a classic because of its accessibility to students without a mathematical background and because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate logic course, such as Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also a large number of optional topics, from Turing's theory of computability to Ramsey's theorem. This 2007 fifth edition has been thoroughly revised by John Burgess. Including a selection of exercises, adjusted for this edition, at the end of each chapter, it offers a simpler treatment of the representability of recursive functions, a traditional stumbling block for students on the way to the Godel incompleteness theorems. This updated edition is also accompanied by a website as well as an instructor's manual.