Martin Heidegger's 1925-26 lectures on truth and time provided much of the basis for his momentous work, Being and Time. Not published until 1976 as volume 21 of the Complete Works, three months before Heidegger's death, this work is central to Heidegger's overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth. The text shows the degree to which Aristotle underlies Heidegger's hermeneutical theory of meaning. It also contains Heidegger's first published critique of Husserl and takes major steps toward establishing the temporal bases of logic and truth. Thomas Sheehan's elegant and insightful translation offers English-speaking readers access to this fundamental text for the first time.

Originally published in 1932, this book presents a comprehensive study regarding the life and works of Peter Abelard. The text reflects the renewed interest in medieval thought at the time of publication, incorporating ideas from a broad variety of perspectives. A preface is included by the renowned theologian and biblical scholar Alexander Nairne. Detailed notes, appendices and a bibliography are also contained. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in logic, medieval philosophy and theology.

Originally published in 1905, this book presents a discussion regarding the nature of the subject-predicate relationship, or more specifically 'the Existential Import of Predication'. Textual notes are incorporated throughout. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in logic and the development of philosophy.

This book develops a view of logic as a theory of information-driven agency and intelligent interaction between many agents - with conversation, argumentation and games as guiding examples. It provides one uniform account of dynamic logics for acts of inference, observation, questions and communication, that can handle both update of knowledge and revision of beliefs. It then extends the dynamic style of analysis to include changing preferences and goals, temporal processes, group action and strategic interaction in games. Throughout, the book develops a mathematical theory unifying all these systems, and positioning them at the interface of logic, philosophy, computer science and game theory. A series of further chapters explores repercussions of the 'dynamic stance' for these areas, as well as cognitive science.

This book continues from where the authors' previous book, Structural Proof Theory, ended. It presents an extension of the methods of analysis of proofs in pure logic to elementary axiomatic systems and to what is known as philosophical logic. A self-contained brief introduction to the proof theory of pure logic is included that serves both the mathematically and philosophically oriented reader. The method is built up gradually, with examples drawn from theories of order, lattice theory and elementary geometry. The aim is, in each of the examples, to help the reader grasp the combinatorial behaviour of an axiom system, which typically leads to decidability results. The last part presents, as an application and extension of all that precedes it, a proof-theoretical approach to the Kripke semantics of modal and related logics, with a great number of new results, providing essential reading for mathematical and philosophical logicians.

William Ernest Johnson (1858-1931) was a renowned British logician and economist, andalso a fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Originally published in 1924, this book forms the third of a three-volume series by Johnson relating to 'the whole field of logic as ordinarily understood'. The series is widely regarded as Johnson's greatest achievement, making a significant contribution to the tradition of philosophical logic. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Johnson's theories, philosophy and the historical development of logic.

William Ernest Johnson (1858-1931) was a renowned British logician and economist, and also a fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Originally published in 1922, this book forms the second of a three-volume series by Johnson relating to 'the whole field of logic as ordinarily understood'. The series is widely regarded as Johnson's greatest achievement, making a significant contribution to the tradition of philosophical logic. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Johnson's theories, philosophy and the historical development of logic.

William Ernest Johnson (1858 1931) was a renowned British logician and economist, and also a fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Originally published in 1921, this book forms the first of a three-volume series by Johnson relating to 'the whole field of logic as ordinarily understood'. The series is widely regarded as Johnson's greatest achievement, making a significant contribution to the tradition of philosophical logic. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Johnson's theories, philosophy and the historical development of logic."

Originally published in 1915, this book presents an examination of philosophy from the perspective of personal idealism, arguing that logic should be the theoretical account of the actual processes of human understanding. The text explores the idea of utility in relation to philosophy, with a view towards practical engagement with the world. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in logic and the history of philosophy.

At the centre of the traditional discussion of truth is the question of how truth is defined. Recent research, especially with the development of deflationist accounts of truth, has tended to take truth as an undefined primitive notion governed by axioms, while the liar paradox and cognate paradoxes pose problems for certain seemingly natural axioms for truth. In this book, Volker Halbach examines the most important axiomatizations of truth, explores their properties and shows how the logical results impinge on the philosophical topics related to truth. In particular, he shows that the discussion on topics such as deflationism about truth depends on the solution of the paradoxes. His book is an invaluable survey of the logical background to the philosophical discussion of truth, and will be indispensable reading for any graduate or professional philosopher in theories of truth.

What can reason (or more broadly, thinking) do for us and what can't it do? This is the question examined by Herbert A. Simon, who received the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for his pioneering work on decision-making processes in economic organizations."
The ability to apply reason to the choice of actions is supposed to be one of the defining characteristics of our species. In the first two chapters, the author explores the nature and limits of human reason, comparing and evaluating the major theoretical frameworks that have been erected to explain reasoning processes. He also discusses the interaction of thinking and emotion in the choice of our actions. In the third and final chapter, the author applies the theory of bounded rationality to social institutions and human behavior, and points out the problems created by limited attention span human inability to deal with more than one difficult problem at a time. He concludes that we must recognize the limitations on our capabilities for rational choice and pursue goals that, in their tentativeness and flexibility, are compatible with those limits.

Logic is often perceived as having little to do with the rest of philosophy, and even less to do with real life. In this lively and accessible introduction, Graham Priest shows how wrong this conception is. He explores the philosophical roots of the subject, explaining how modern formal logic deals with issues ranging from the existence of God and the reality of time to paradoxes of probability and decision theory. Along the way, the basics of formal logic are explained in simple, non-technical terms, showing that logic is a powerful and exciting part of modern philosophy. In this new edition Graham Priest expands his discussion to cover the subjects of algorithms and axioms, and proofs in mathematics. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

For courses in Introduction to Logic or Critical Thinking. Fundamental, Fresh, Focused. Rendered from Copi/Cohen's Introduction to Logic, the most respected introductory logic text on the market, this concise version explains all concepts and techniques clearly, accurately, and thoroughly, bringing them to life using a wealth of contemporary examples. Essentials of Logic was created in response to a need in the market for a book that effectively covered the fundamental issues in logic. The first edition of Essentials of Logic was abridged from Copi and Cohen's Introduction, 11th edition, with an eye to including all and only those elements that most logic teachers would consider essential. In the second edition, new topics have been added based on readers' suggestions. For example, indirect and conditional proof techniques have been added and many examples have been thoroughly revised and rewritten. The result is a book that closely reflects what users deem essential and does so in a way that is sensitive to the needs of today's students.

After more than a decade teaching ancient Greek history and philosophy at University College, Oxford, British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) resigned from his post to spend more time writing. He was particularly interested in contemporary social theory, and was involved with the Charity Organisation Society and the London Ethical Society. He wrote numerous articles before beginning this book, which was his first and was published in 1885 as a response to the Principles of Logic, published in 1883, by his contemporary F. H. Bradley (1846-1924). Bosanquet, who was deeply influenced by the German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831), argues that there are 'signs of a philosophical movement in this country which may assimilate what is really great in European philosophy, without forfeiting the distinctive merits of English thought'. With this as the framework, the book examines the relationship of judgment and logic to knowledge.

After more than a decade teaching ancient Greek history and philosophy at University College, Oxford, British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) resigned from his post to spend more time writing. He was particularly interested in contemporary social theory, and was involved with the Charity Organisation Society and the London Ethical Society. Much of his work focused on the place of logic in philosophy, especially its role in metaphysical thought - the area where he is considered to have made his most important intellectual contributions. In 1888 he published this two-volume study of logic, addressing a variety of questions relating to logic, and drawing from the work of Hegel (1770-1831) in his examination. In Volume 1, Bosanquet considers the question of knowledge, what the act of naming implies, and judgment and measurement, which he considered to be integral to logic and consciousness.

After more than a decade teaching ancient Greek history and philosophy at University College, Oxford, British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) resigned from his post to spend more time writing. He was particularly interested in contemporary social theory, and was involved with the Charity Organisation Society and the London Ethical Society. Much of his work focused on the place of logic in philosophy, especially its role in metaphysical thought - the area where he is considered to have made his most important intellectual contributions. In 1888 he published this two-volume study of logic, addressing a variety of questions relating to logic, and drawing from the work of Hegel (1770-1831) in his examination. In Volume 2, Bosanquet focuses on inference, arguing that it has a similar essence to judgment but is fundamentally different in that it is used to 'mediate' reality.

F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) was the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist school, which came to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century and remained influential into the first half of the twentieth. Bradley, who was influenced by Hegel and also reacted against utilitarianism, was recognised during his lifetime as one of the greatest intellectuals of his generation, and was the first philosopher to receive the Order of Merit, in 1924. In this major work, originally published in 1883, Bradley discusses the basic principles of logic: judgment and inference. He rejects the idea of a separation between mind and body, arguing that human thought cannot be separated from its worldly context. In the second edition, published in 1922 and reissued here, Bradley added a commentary and essays, but left the text largely unaltered. Volume 1 contains Book 1 on judgment and Book 2 on inference.

F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) was the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist school, which came to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century and remained influential into the first half of the twentieth. Bradley, who was influenced by Hegel and also reacted against utilitarianism, was recognised during his lifetime as one of the greatest intellectuals of his generation, and was the first philosopher to receive the Order of Merit, in 1924. In this major work, originally published in 1883, Bradley discusses the basic principles of logic. He rejects the idea of a separation between mind and body, arguing that human thought cannot be separated from its worldly context. In the second edition, published in 1922 and reissued here, Bradley added a commentary and essays, but left the text largely unaltered. Volume 2 contains further discussion of inference, and twelve essays on moral philosophy.

How do you tell what's right from what's wrong? Can you always? What's the difference between deduction, induction and abduction? What are the best techniques for making an argument logically sound? In this fascinating little book, the smallest on its subject ever produced, philosopher Dr Earl Fontainelle explores the ancient art of Logic and demonstrates some of the techniques that have long been used to triumph over the debates and deceptions which assail us every day.

A concise introduction to logic that teaches you not only how reasoning works, but why it works How Logic Works is an introductory logic textbook that is different by design. Rather than teaching elementary symbolic logic as an abstract or rote mathematical exercise divorced from ordinary thinking, Hans Halvorson presents it as the skill of clear and rigorous reasoning, which is essential in all fields and walks of life, from the sciences to the humanities-anywhere that making good arguments, and spotting bad ones, is critical to success. Instead of teaching how to apply algorithms using "truth trees," as in the vast majority of logic textbooks, How Logic Works builds on and reinforces the innate human skills of making and evaluating arguments. It does this by introducing the methods of natural deduction, an approach that teaches students not only how to carry out a proof and solve a problem but also what the principles of valid reasoning are and how they can be applied to any subject. The book also allows students to transition smoothly to more advanced topics in logic by teaching them general techniques that apply to more complicated scenarios, such as how to formulate theories about specific subject matter. How Logic Works shows that formal logic-far from being only for mathematicians or a diversion from the really deep questions of philosophy and human life-is the best account we have of what it means to be rational. By teaching logic in a way that makes students aware of how they already use it, the book will help them to become even better thinkers. Offers a concise, readable, and user-friendly introduction to elementary symbolic logic that primarily uses natural deduction rather than algorithmic "truth trees" Draws on more than two decades' experience teaching introductory logic to undergraduates Provides a stepping stone to more advanced topics

Pierre Gassendi was a major figure in seventeenth-century philosophy whose philosophical and scientific works contributed to shaping Western intellectual identity. This collection of essays constitutes the first book on Gassendi in the English language that covers his biography, bibliography, and all aspects of his work.

When future generations come to analyze and survey twentieth-century philosophy as a whole, Bertrand Russell s logic and theory of knowledge is assured a place of prime importance. Yet until this book was first published in 1969 no comprehensive treatment of his epistemology had appeared. Commentators on twentieth-century philosophy at the time assumed that Russell s important contributions to the theory of knowledge were made before 1921. This book challenges that assumption and draws attention to features of Russell s later work which were overlooked.

The analysis starts with Russell s earliest views and moves from book to book and article to article through his enormous span of writing on the problems and theory of knowledge. The changes in ideas as he developed the theory are traced, and the study culminates in a statement of his latest views. His work is seen in a continuity in which the changes were part of the development of his mature thought, and the total evaluation and interpretation clarify many of the common misunderstandings of his philosophy.

This is naturally of interest to all philosophers, and for students this is the answer to inevitable questions on the nature of Russell s ideas and their evolution.

Bertrand Russell s eminence of intellect and person has long been unassailable. Besides his distinction as mathematician and philosopher, and a vast output of books, articles, lectures and talks on most aspects of the human condition, there is his continuing concern for day-to-day political issues, his championing of individual freedom and his readiness to stand for a cause to the point of imprisonment. To have distilled the essence of his ninety-odd years into this little book is itself quite an achievement. Originally published in 1962, it has been called a pocket guide to greatness and forms a useful complement to the longer and slightly earlier study by Alan Wood s "The Passionate Sceptic."

'Fascinating', 'brilliant', 'oddly moving', 'a warm human picture' - this biography was enthusiastically received when it came out in 1957. And no wonder. It is not only the lively story of a distinguished man but a lucid account of his work and its significance. The author, who was himself a philosopher and journalist, has followed the bright thread of Russell's personality with affectionate insight, from the three-day-old baby who looked about him 'in a very energetic way', and the boy who jibbed at taking Euclid on trust, through the many turns of his life, to the undimmed octogenarian, still questioning and still deeply concerned. The subject is a great one and the biographer has matched it.

This book addresses the logical aspects of the foundations of scientific theories. Even though the relevance of formal methods in the study of scientific theories is now widely recognized and regaining prominence, the issues covered here are still not generally discussed in philosophy of science. The authors focus mainly on the role played by the underlying formal apparatuses employed in the construction of the models of scientific theories, relating the discussion with the so-called semantic approach to scientific theories. The book describes the role played by this metamathematical framework in three main aspects: considerations of formal languages employed to axiomatize scientific theories, the role of the axiomatic method itself, and the way set-theoretical structures, which play the role of the models of theories, are developed. The authors also discuss the differences and philosophical relevance of the two basic ways of aximoatizing a scientific theory, namely Patrick Suppes' set theoretical predicates and the "da Costa and Chuaqui" approach. This book engages with important discussions of the nature of scientific theories and will be a useful resource for researchers and upper-level students working in philosophy of science.