This book offers a historical explanation of important philosophical problems in logic and mathematics, which have been neglected by the official history of modern logic. It offers extensive information on Gottlob Frege's logic, discussing which aspects of his logic can be considered truly innovative in its revolution against the Aristotelian logic. It presents the work of Hilbert and his associates and followers with the aim of understanding the revolutionary change in the axiomatic method. Moreover, it offers useful tools to understand Tarski's and Goedel's work, explaining why the problems they discussed are still unsolved. Finally, the book reports on some of the most influential positions in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, i.e., Maddy's mathematical naturalism and Shapiro's mathematical structuralism. Last but not least, the book introduces Biancani's Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics as this is considered important to understand current philosophical issue in the applications of mathematics. One of the main purposes of the book is to stimulate readers to reconsider the Aristotelian position, which disappeared almost completely from the scene in logic and mathematics in the early twentieth century.

The commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.8-22 is the main ancient commentary, by the 'greatest' commentator, on the chapters of the Prior Analytics in which Aristotle invented modal logic - the logic of propositions about what is necessary or contingent (possible). In this volume, which covers chapters 1.8-13, Alexander of Aphrodisias reaches the chapter in which Aristotle discusses the notion of contingency. Also included in this volume is Alexander's commentary on that part of Prior Analytics 1.17 which explains the conversion of contingent propositions (the rest of 1.17 is included in the second volume of Mueller's translation). Aristotle also invented the syllogism, a style of argument involving two premises and a conclusion. Modal propositions can be deployed in syllogism, and in the chapters included in this volume Aristotle discusses syllogisms consisting of two necessary propositions as well as the more controversial ones containing one necessary and one non-modal premiss. The discussion of syllogisms containing contingent propositions is reserved for Volume 2. In each volume, Ian Mueller provides a comprehensive explanation of Alexander's commentary on modal logic as a whole.

Our finances, politics, media, opportunities, information, shopping and knowledge production are mediated through algorithms and their statistical approaches to knowledge; increasingly, these methods form the organizational backbone of contemporary capitalism. Revolutionary Mathematics traces the revolution in statistics and probability that has quietly underwritten the explosion of machine learning, big data and predictive algorithms that now decide many aspects of our lives. Exploring shifts in the philosophical understanding of probability in the late twentieth century, Joque shows how this was not merely a technical change but a wholesale philosophical transformation in the production of knowledge and the extraction of value. This book provides a new and unique perspective on the dangers of allowing artificial intelligence and big data to manage society. It is essential reading for those who want to understand the underlying ideological and philosophical changes that have fueled the rise of algorithms and convinced so many to blindly trust their outputs, reshaping our current political and economic situation.

This book contains more than 15 essays that explore issues in truth, existence, and explanation. It features cutting-edge research in the philosophy of mathematics and logic. Renowned philosophers, mathematicians, and younger scholars provide an insightful contribution to the lively debate in this interdisciplinary field of inquiry. The essays look at realism vs. anti-realism as well as inflationary vs. deflationary theories of truth. The contributors also consider mathematical fictionalism, structuralism, the nature and role of axioms, constructive existence, and generality. In addition, coverage also looks at the explanatory role of mathematics and the philosophical relevance of mathematical explanation. The book will appeal to a broad mathematical and philosophical audience. It contains work from FilMat, the Italian Network for the Philosophy of Mathematics. These papers collected here were also presented at their second international conference, held at the University of Chieti-Pescara, May 2016.

The aim of Thinking through Error: The Moving Target of Knowledge is to describe knowledge as it works in our everyday attitude and behavior. Often in life, when making decisions and choices, we do not need to test the truth of our beliefs, so there must be another way to guide ourselves. With this in mind, Antomarini presents 'thinking through error' instead of 'excluding error'. That is, we act through a slow process of guess-work, followed by quick gestures. By using our own uncertainty and our exploratory abilities, we face unpredictable situations and at the same time we acknowledge the constant presence of error in our thinking. Every decision we make continuously determines and replaces an entire universe within which that decision is plausible. Our everyday knowledge is a balance between a feeling of the truth and its negation.

This volume brings together mostly previously unpublished studies by prominent historians, classicists, and philosophers on the roles and effects of religion in Socratic philosophy and on the trial of Socrates. Among the contributors are Thomas C. Brickhouse, Asli Gocer, Richard Kraut, Mark L. McPherran, Robert C. T. Parker, C. D. C. Reeve, Nicholas D. Smith, Gregory Vlastos, Stephen A. White, and Paul B. Woodruff.

The first volume in this new series explores, through extensive co-operation, new ways of achieving the integration of science in all its diversity. The book offers essays from important and influential philosophers in contemporary philosophy, discussing a range of topics from philosophy of science to epistemology, philosophy of logic and game theoretical approaches. It will be of interest to philosophers, computer scientists and all others interested in the scientific rationality.

This Companion provides a comprehensive guide to ancient logic. The first part charts its chronological development, focussing especially on the Greek tradition, and discusses its two main systems: Aristotle's logic of terms and the Stoic logic of propositions. The second part explores the key concepts at the heart of the ancient logical systems: truth, definition, terms, propositions, syllogisms, demonstrations, modality and fallacy. The systematic discussion of these concepts allows the reader to engage with some specific logical and exegetical issues and to appreciate their transformations across different philosophical traditions. The intersections between logic, mathematics and rhetoric are also explored. The third part of the volume discusses the reception and influence of ancient logic in the history of philosophy and its significance for philosophy in our own times. Comprehensive coverage, chapters by leading international scholars and a critical overview of the recent literature in the field will make this volume essential for students and scholars of ancient logic.

This Companion provides a comprehensive guide to ancient logic. The first part charts its chronological development, focussing especially on the Greek tradition, and discusses its two main systems: Aristotle's logic of terms and the Stoic logic of propositions. The second part explores the key concepts at the heart of the ancient logical systems: truth, definition, terms, propositions, syllogisms, demonstrations, modality and fallacy. The systematic discussion of these concepts allows the reader to engage with some specific logical and exegetical issues and to appreciate their transformations across different philosophical traditions. The intersections between logic, mathematics and rhetoric are also explored. The third part of the volume discusses the reception and influence of ancient logic in the history of philosophy and its significance for philosophy in our own times. Comprehensive coverage, chapters by leading international scholars and a critical overview of the recent literature in the field will make this volume essential for students and scholars of ancient logic.

Susan Stebbing (1885-1943), the UK's first female professor of philosophy, was a key figure in the development of analytic philosophy. Stebbing wrote the world's first accessible book on the new polyadic logic and its philosophy. She made major contributions to the philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophical logic, critical thinking and applied philosophy. Nonetheless she has remained largely neglected by historians of analytic philosophy. This Element provides a thorough yet accessible overview of Stebbing's positive, original contributions, including her solution to the paradox of analysis, her account of the relation of sense data to physical objects, and her anti- idealist interpretation of the new Einsteinian physics. Stebbing's innovative work in these and other areas helped move analytic philosophy from its early phase to its middle period.

This book presents the research achievements of Jin Yuelin, the first logician and a prominent philosopher in China, who founded a new philosophical system combining elements from Western and Chinese philosophical traditions, especially the concept of Tao. It consists of three sections: the first section interprets Jin's studies on Chinese philosophy, Russell's ideology and other general discussions in the field; section 2 includes Jin's studies on logic, which made him the founding father of modern logic in China; and section 3 presents Jin's ideas on politics, including his studies on Thomas Hill Green.

This accessible, SHORT introduction to symbolic logic includes coverage of sentential and predicate logic, translations, truth tables, and derivations. The author's engaging style makes this the most informal of introductions to formal logic. Topics are explained in a conversational, easy-to-understand way for readers not familiar with mathematics or formal systems, and the author provides patient, reader-friendly explanations-even with the occasional bit of humour. The first half of the book deals with all the basic elements of Sentential Logic: the five truth-functional connectives, formation rules and translation into this language, truth-tables for validity, logical truth/falsity, equivalency, consistency and derivations. The second half deals with Quantifier Logic: the two quantifiers, formation rules and translation, demonstrating certain logical characteristics by "Finding an Interpretation" and derivations. There are plenty of exercises scattered throughout, more than in many texts, arranged in order of increasing difficulty and including separate answer keys.

This textbook/software package covers first-order language in a method appropriate for a wide range of courses, from first logic courses for undergraduates (philosophy, mathematics, and computer science) to a first graduate logic course. The accompanying online grading service instantly grades solutions to hundreds of computer exercises. The second edition of "Language, Proof and Logic" represents a major expansion and revision of the original package and includes applications for mobile devices, additional exercises, a dedicated website, and increased software compatibility and support.

In these essays Geoffrey Hellman presents a strong case for a healthy pluralism in mathematics and its logics, supporting peaceful coexistence despite what appear to be contradictions between different systems, and positing different frameworks serving different legitimate purposes. The essays refine and extend Hellman's modal-structuralist account of mathematics, developing a height-potentialist view of higher set theory which recognizes indefinite extendability of models and stages at which sets occur. In the first of three new essays written for this volume, Hellman shows how extendability can be deployed to derive the axiom of Infinity and that of Replacement, improving on earlier accounts; he also shows how extendability leads to attractive, novel resolutions of the set-theoretic paradoxes. Other essays explore advantages and limitations of restrictive systems - nominalist, predicativist, and constructivist. Also included are two essays, with Solomon Feferman, on predicative foundations of arithmetic.

We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical (yes/no) and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' - at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.

Representational systems such as language, mind and perhaps even the brain exhibit a structure that is often assumed to be compositional. That is, the semantic value of a complex representation is determined by the semantic value of their parts and the way they are put together. Dating back to the late 19th century, the principle of compositionality has regained wide attention recently. Since the principle has been dealt with very differently across disciplines, the aim of the two volumes is to bring together the diverging approaches. They assemble a collection of original papers that cover the topic of compositionality from virtually all perspectives of interest in the contemporary debate. The well-chosen international list of authors includes psychologists, neuroscientists, computer scientists, linguists, and philosophers.

This textbook gives a complete and modern introduction to mathematical logic. The author uses contemporary notation, conventions, and perspectives throughout, and emphasizes interactions with the rest of mathematics. In addition to covering the basic concepts of mathematical logic and the fundamental material on completeness, compactness, and incompleteness, it devotes significant space to thorough introductions to the pillars of the modern subject: model theory, set theory, and computability. Requiring only a modest background of undergraduate mathematics, the text can be readily adapted for a variety of one- or two-semester courses at the upper-undergraduate or beginning-graduate level. Numerous examples reinforce the key ideas and illustrate their applications, and a wealth of classroom-tested exercises serve to consolidate readers' understanding. Comprehensive and engaging, this book offers a fresh approach to this enduringly fascinating and important subject.

To understand logic is, first and foremost, to understand logical consequence. This Element provides an in-depth, accessible, up-to-date account of and philosophical insight into the semantic, model-theoretic conception of logical consequence, its Tarskian roots, and its ideas, grounding, and challenges. The topics discussed include: (i) the passage from Tarski's definition of truth (simpliciter) to his definition of logical consequence, (ii) the need for a non-proof-theoretic definition, (iii) the idea of a semantic definition, (iv) the adequacy conditions of preservation of truth, formality, and necessity, (v) the nature, structure, and totality of models, (vi) the logicality problem that threatens the definition of logical consequence (the problem of logical constants), (vii) a general solution to the logicality, formality, and necessity problems/challenges, based on the isomorphism-invariance criterion of logicality, (viii) philosophical background and justification of the isomorphism-invariance criterion, and (ix) major criticisms of the semantic definition and the isomorphism-invariance criterion.

Does adherence to the principles of logic commit us to a particular way of viewing the world? Or are there ways of being - ways of behaving in the world, including ways of thinking, feeling, and speaking - that ground the normative constraints that logic imposes? Does the fact that assertions, the traditional elements of logic, are typically made about beings present a problem for metaphysical (or post-metaphysical) prospects of making assertions meaningfully about being? Does thinking about being (as opposed to beings) accordingly require revising or restricting logic's reach - and, if so, how is this possible? Or is there something precious about the very idea of thinking the limits of thinking? Contemporary scholars have become increasing sensitive to how Heidegger, much like Wittgenstein, instructively poses such questions. Heidegger on Logic is a collection of new essays by leading scholars who critically ponder the efficacy of his responses to them.

This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind.

Things are particulars and their qualities are universals, but do universals have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding universals, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology. The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist positions on properties, and outlines the way each handles the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and abstract reference. The debate about properties and philosophical naturalism is also examined. Different forms of extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and minimalist realism are critiqued. Later chapters defend a traditional realist view of universals and examine the objections to realism from various infinite regresses, the difficulties in stating identity conditions for properties, and problems with realist accounts of knowledge of abstract objects. In addition, the debate between Platonists and Aristotelians is examined alongside a discussion of the relationship between properties and an adequate theory of existence. The book's final chapter explores the problem of individuating particulars. The book makes accessible a difficult topic without blunting the sophistication of argument required by a more advanced readership.

The Law of Non-Contradiction -- that no contradiction can be true -- has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the "law," considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very center of logic itself.
The aim of this volume is to present a comprehensive debate about the Law of Non-Contradiction, from discussions as to how the law is to be understood, to reasons for accepting or re-thinking the law, and to issues that raise challenges to the law, such as the Liar Paradox, and a "dialetheic" resolution of that paradox. The editors contribute an introduction which surveys the issues and serves to frame the debate, and a useful bibliography offering a guide to further reading.
This volume will be of interest to anyone working on philosophical logic, and to anyone who has ever wondered about the status of logical laws and about how one might proceed to mount arguments for or against them.