A group of 100 prisoners, all together in the prison dining area, are told that they will be all put in isolation cells and then will be interrogated one by one in a room containing a light with an on/off switch. The prisoners may communicate with one another by toggling the light switch (and that is the only way in which they can communicate). The light is initially switched off. There is no fixed order of interrogation, or interval between interrogations, and the same prisoner may be interrogated again at any stage. When interrogated, a prisoner can either do nothing, or toggle the light switch, or announce that all prisoners have been interrogated. If that announcement is true, the prisoners will (all) be set free, but if it is false, they will all be executed. While still in the dining room, and before the prisoners go to their isolation cells (forever), can the prisoners agree on a protocol that will set them free? At first glance, this riddle may seem impossible to solve: how can all of the necessary information be transmitted by the prisoners using only a single light bulb? There is indeed a solution, however, and it can be found by reasoning about knowledge. This book provides a guided tour through eleven classic logic puzzles that are engaging and challenging and often surprising in their solutions. These riddles revolve around the characters' declarations of knowledge, ignorance, and the appearance that they are contradicting themselves in some way. Each chapter focuses on one puzzle, which the authors break down in order to guide the reader toward the solution. For general readers and students with little technical knowledge of mathematics, One Hundred Prisoners and a Light Bulb will be an accessible and fun introduction to epistemic logic. Additionally, more advanced students and their teachers will find it to be a valuable reference text for introductory course work and further study.

This second volume of a collection of papers offers new perspectives and challenges in the study of logic. It is presented in honor of the fiftieth birthday of Jean-Yves Beziau. The papers touch upon a wide range of topics including paraconsistent logic, quantum logic, geometry of oppositions, categorical logic, computational logic, fundamental logic notions (identity, rule, quantification) and history of logic (Leibniz, Peirce, Hilbert). The volume gathers personal recollections about Jean-Yves Beziau and an autobiography, followed by 25 papers written by internationally distinguished logicians, mathematicians, computer scientists, linguists and philosophers, including Irving Anellis, Dov Gabbay, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Istvan Nemeti, Henri Prade. These essays will be of interest to all students and researchers interested in the nature and future of logic.

Most of the major schools of contemporary philosophy, from Marxism to Existentialism, are reactions to Hegelianism and all, if they are to be understood, require some understanding of Hegel's "Logic". From its first appearance in 1812, this work has been recognised by both admirers and detractors alike as being the absolute foundation of Hegel's system.

The book investigates the ontology and logic of quantum physics. The first part discusses the relationship of theory and observation and different views on the ontological status of scientific theories. It introduces the fundamentals of quantum mechanics and some of its interpretations and their compatibility with various ontological positions. In the second part, implications of quantum mechanics on classical logic, especially on the distributive law and bivalence, as discussed by Garrett Birkhoff & John von Neumann (1936) and Hilary Putnam (1968), and their counterarguments are reconstructed and discussed. It is concluded that classical logic is sufficient for dealing with quantum mechanical propositions.

Extended Rationality provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address problems such as scepticism and relativism.

Over the past few years, the tree model of time has been widely employed to deal with issues concerning the semantics of tensed discourse. The thought that has motivated its adoption is that the most plausible way to make sense of indeterminism is to conceive of future possibilities as branches that depart from a common trunk, constituted by the past and the present. However, the thought still needs to be further articulated and defended, and several important questions remain open, such as the question of how actuality can be understood and formally represented in a branching framework. The present volume is intended to be a 360 degree reflection on the tree model. The contributions is gathers concern the model and its alternatives, both from a semantic and from a metaphysical point of view.

In September 2007, more than 100 philosophers came to Prague with the determination to approach Karl Popper's philosophy as a source of inspiration in many areas of our intellectual endeavor. This volume is a result of that effort. Topics cover Popper's views on rationality, scientific methodology, the evolution of knowledge and democracy; and since Popper's philosophy has always had a strong interdisciplinary influence, part of the volume discusses the impact of his ideas in such areas as education, economics, psychology, biology, or ethics. The concept of falsification, the problem of demarcation, the ban on induction, or the role of the empirical basis, along with the provocative parallels between historicism, holism and totalitarianism, have always caused controversies. The aim of this volume is not to smooth them but show them as a challenge. In this time when the traditional role of reason in the Western thought is being undermined, Popper's non-foundationist model of reason brings the Enlightenment message into a new perspective. Popper believed that the open society was vulnerable, due precisely to its tolerance of otherness. This is a matter of great urgency in the modern world, as cultures based on different values gain prominence. The processes related to the extending of the EU, or the increasing economic globalization also raise questions about openness and democracy. The volume's aim is to show the vitality of critical rationalism in addressing and responding to the problems of this time and this world.

Saul Kripke, in a series of classic writings of the 1960s and 1970s, changed the face of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Christopher Hughes offers a careful exposition and critical analysis of Kripke's central ideas about names, necessity, and identity. He clears up some common misunderstandings of Kripke's views on rigid designation, causality and reference, the necessary and the contingent, the a posteriori and the a priori. Through his engagement with Kripke's ideas Hughes makes a significant contribution to ongoing debates on, inter alia, the semantics of natural kind terms, the nature of natural kinds, the essentiality of origin and constitution, the relative merits of 'identitarian' and counterpart-theoretic accounts of modality, and the identity or otherwise of mental types and tokens with physical types and tokens. No specialist knowledge in either the philosophy of language or metaphysics is presupposed; Hughes's book will be valuable for anyone working on the ideas which Kripke made famous in the philosophy world.

These two volumescontaina selection of the papersdeliveredat the rst conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) which took place in Madrid,at ComplutenseUniversity,from14to 17November2007. The rst volume is entitled Epistemology and Methodology, and includes papers mainly concerned with general philosophy of science, rationality, and method. The second volume, devoted to Philosophical Issues in the Sciences, includes papers concerned with philosophy of the sciences, particularly physics, economics, chemistry and bi- ogy. Overall the selection has been very severe and took place in two stages. The 30-strong conference programme committee chaired by Mauro Dorato and Miklos ' R' edei rst selected 160 papers forpresentationout of 410 abstracts submitted. After the conference the three of us went on to further select 60 papers among those - livered. The selection was made on the recommendation of the members of the programme committee and the chairs of the conference sessions, who were invited to nominate their favourite papers and provide reasons for their choices. Every - per included in these volumes has been independently nominated by at least two referees. There are thus good groundsto the claim that these essays constitute some of most signi cant and importantresearch presently carried out in the philosophyof science throughoutEurope. The two volumes also represent the rst tangible outcome of the newly born EPSA. Together with the conference they in effect constitute the launching of the Association.

This new volume on logic follows a recognizable format that deals in turn with the topics of mathematical logic, moving from concepts, via definitions and inferences, to theories and axioms. However, this fresh work offers a key innovation in its 'pyramidal' graph system for the logical formalization of all these items. The author has developed this new methodology on the basis of original research, traditional logical instruments such as Porphyrian trees, and modern concepts of classification, in which pyramids are the central organizing concept. The pyramidal schema enables both the content of concepts and the relations between the concept positions in the pyramid to be read off from the graph. Logical connectors are analyzed in terms of the direction in which they connect within the pyramid. Additionally, the author shows that logical connectors are of fundamentally different types: only one sort generates propositions with truth values, while the other yields conceptual expressions or complex concepts. On this basis, strong arguments are developed against adopting the non-discriminating connector definitions implicit in Wittgensteinian truth-value tables. Special consideration is given to mathematical connectors so as to illuminate the formation of concepts in the natural sciences. To show what the pyramidal method can contribute to science, a pyramid of the number concepts prevalent in mathematics is constructed. The book also counters the logical dogma of 'false' contradictory propositions and sheds new light on the logical characteristics of probable propositions, as well as on syllogistic and other inferences.

Offers an extremely bold, far-reaching, and unsuspected thesis in the history of philosophy: Aristotelianism was a dominant movement of the British philosophical landscape, especially in the field of logic, and it had a long survival. British Aristotelian doctrines were strongly empiricist in nature, both in the theory of knowledge and in scientific method; this character marked and influenced further developments in British philosophy at the end of the century, and eventually gave rise to what we now call British empiricism, which is represented by philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Beyond the apparent and explicit criticism of the old Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, which has been very well recognized by the scholarship in the twentieth century and which has contributed to the false notion that early modern philosophy emerged as a reaction to Aristotelianism, the present research examines the continuity, the original developments and the impact of Aristotelian doctrines and terminology in logic and epistemology as the background for the rise of empiricism.Without the Aristotelian tradition, without its doctrines, and without its conceptual elaborations, British empiricism would never have been born. The book emphasizes that philosophy is not defined only by the 'great names', but also by minor authors, who determine the intellectual milieu from which the canonical names emerge. It considers every single published work of logic between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth century, being acquainted with a number of surviving manuscripts and being well-informed about the best existing scholarship in the field.

In 1986, the emergence of a novel brain disease in British cattle presented a unique challenge to scientists. How that challenge was addressed has been the subject of a public inquiry and numerous academic studies conducted to date. However, none of these investigations has sought to examine the reasoning of scientists during this critical period in the public health of the UK. Using concepts and techniques in informal logic, argumentation and fallacy theory, this study reconstructs and evaluates the reasoning of scientists in the ten-year period between 1986 and 1996. Specifically, a form of presumptive reasoning is described in which extensive use is made of arguments traditionally identified as informal fallacies. In the context of the adverse epistemic conditions that confronted scientists during the BSE epidemic, these arguments were anything but fallacious, serving instead to confer a number of epistemic gains upon scientific inquiry. This book argues for a closer integration of philosophy with public health science, an integration that is exemplified by the case of scientific reasoning during the BSE affair. It will therefore be of interest to advanced students, academics, researchers and professionals in the areas of public health science and epidemiology, as well as philosophical disciplines such as informal logic, argumentation and fallacy theory and epistemology.

This text examines the many transformations in Husserl's phenomenology that his discoveries of the nature of appearing lead to. It offers a comprehensive look at the Logical Investigations' delimitation of the phenomenological field, and continues with Husserl's account of our consciousness of time. This volume examines Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism and the problems this raises for our recognition of other subjects. It details Husserl's account of embodiment and takes largely from his manuscripts, both published and unpublished, dealing with his theory of instincts, his considerations of mortality and the teleological character of our existence. This book appeals to students and researchers and presents a genetic account of our selfhood, one that unifies Husserl's different claims about who and what we are.

3 in philosophy, and therefore in metaphilosophy, cannot be based on rules that avoid spending time on pseudo-problems. Of course, this implies that, if one succeeds in demonstrating convincingly the pseudo-character of a problem by giving its 'solution', the time spent on it need not be seen as wasted. We conclude this section with a brief statement of the criteria for concept explication as they have been formulated in several places by Carnap, Hempel and Stegmiiller. Hempel's account ( 13J, Chapter 1) is still very adequate for a detailed introduction. The process of explication starts with the identification of one or more vague and, perhaps, ambiguous concepts, the so-called explicanda. Next, one tries to disentangle the ambiguities. This, however, need not be possible at once. Ultimately the explicanda are to be replaced (not necessarily one by one) by certain counterparts, the so-called explicata, which have to conform to four requirements. They have to be as precise as possible and as simple as possible. In addition, they have to be useful in the sense that they give rise to the formulation of theories and the solution of problems. The three requirements of preciseness, simplicity and usefulness. have of course to be pursued in all concept formation.

- Donation refusal is high in all the regions of Argentina. - The deficient operative structure is a negative reality that allows inadequate donor maintenance and organ procurement. - In more developed regions, there are a high number of organs which are not utilized. This is true for heart, liver and lungs. Small waiting lists for these organs probably reflect an inadequate economic coverage for these organ transplant activities. - There is a long waiting list for cadaveric kidney transplants, which reflect poor procurement and transplant activity. - Lack of awareness by many physicians leads to the denouncing of brain deaths. In spite of these factors, we can say that there has been a significant growth in organ procuration and transplantation in 1993, after the regionalization of the INCUCAI. Conclusions Is there a shortage of organs in Argentina? There may be. But the situation in Argentina differs from that in Europe, as we have a pool of organs which are not utilized (donation refusal, operational deficits, lack of denouncing of brain deaths). Perhaps, in the future, when we are able to make good use of all the organs submitted for transplantation, we will be able to say objectively whether the number of organs is sufficient or not. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the University of Lyon and the Merieux Foundation, especially Professors Traeger, Touraine and Dr. Dupuy for the honour of being invited to talk about the issue of organ procurement.

This book on infinite regress arguments provides (i) an up-to-date overview of the literature on the topic, (ii) ready-to-use insights for all domains of philosophy, and (iii) two case studies to illustrate these insights in some detail. Infinite regress arguments play an important role in all domains of philosophy. There are infinite regresses of reasons, obligations, rules, and disputes, and all are supposed to have their own moral. Yet most of them are involved in controversy. Hence the question is: what exactly is an infinite regress argument, and when is such an argument a good one?

The purpose of this brief introduction is to describe the origin of the papers here presented and to acknowledge the help of some of the many individuals who were involved in the preparation of this volume. Of the eighteen papers, nine stem from the annual fall colloquium of the Depart ment of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario held in London, Ontario from November 10 to November 12, 1967. The colloquium was entitled 'Philosophical Logic'. After some discussion, the editors decided to retain that title for this volume. Von Wright's paper 'On the Logic and Ontology of Norms' is printed here after some revision. A. R. Anderson commented on the paper at the colloquium, but his comments here are based upon the revised version of the von Wright paper. The chairman of the session at which von Wright's paper was read and discussed was T. A. Goudge. Aqvist's paper 'Scattered Topics in Interrogative Logic', and Belnap's comments, 'Aqvist's Cor rections-Accumulating Question-Sequences', are printed as delivered. The chairman of the Aqvist-Belnap session was R. E. Butts. Wilfrid Sellars' paper 'Some Problems about Belief' is printed as delivered at the col loquium, but 'Quantifiers, Beliefs, and Sellars' by Ernest Sosa is a revision of his comments at the colloquium. That session was chaired by G. D. W. Berry. Ackermann's paper 'Some Problems oflnductive Logic', as well as Skyrms' comments, are printed as delivered."

cians concerned with using logical tools in philosophy have been keenly aware of the limitations that arise from the original con centration of symbolic logic on the idiom of mathematics, and many of them have worked to create extensions of the received logical theories that would make them more generally applicable in philosophy. Carnap's Testability and Meaning, published in 1936 and 1937, was a good early example of this sort of research, motivated by the inadequacy of first-order formalizations of dis 'This sugar cube is soluble in water'. positional sentences like And in fact there is a continuous history of work on this topic, extending from Carnap's paper to Shoham's contribution to the present volume . . Much of the work in philosophical logic, and much of what has appeared in The Journal of Philosophical Logic, was mo tivated by similar considerations: work in modal logic (includ ing tense, deontic, and epistemic logic), intensional logics, non declaratives, presuppositions, and many other topics. In this sort of research, sin.ce the main point is to devise new formalisms, the technical development tends to be rather shallow in comparison with mathematical logic, though it is sel dom absent: theorems need to be proved in order to justify the formalisms, and sometimes these are nontrivial. On the other hand, much effort has to go into motivating a logical innovation."

"Intuition" has perhaps been the least understood and the most abused term in philosophy. It is often the term used when one has no plausible explanation for the source of a given belief or opinion. According to some sceptics, it is understood only in terms of what it is not, and it is not any of the better understood means for acquiring knowledge. In mathematics the term has also unfortunately been used in this way. Thus, intuition is sometimes portrayed as if it were the Third Eye, something only mathematical "mystics," like Ramanujan, possess. In mathematics the notion has also been used in a host of other senses: by "intuitive" one might mean informal, or non-rigourous, or visual, or holistic, or incomplete, or perhaps even convincing in spite of lack of proof. My aim in this book is to sweep all of this aside, to argue that there is a perfectly coherent, philosophically respectable notion of mathematical intuition according to which intuition is a condition necessary for mathemati cal knowledge. I shall argue that mathematical intuition is not any special or mysterious kind of faculty, and that it is possible to make progress in the philosophical analysis of this notion. This kind of undertaking has a precedent in the philosophy of Kant. While I shall be mostly developing ideas about intuition due to Edmund Husser there will be a kind of Kantian argument underlying the entire book."

Is critical argumentation an effective way to overcome disagreement? And does the exchange of arguments bring opponents in a controversy closer to the truth? This study provides a new perspective on these pivotal questions. By means of multi-agent simulations, it investigates the truth and consensus-conduciveness of controversial debates. The book brings together research in formal epistemology and argumentation theory. Aside from its consequences for discursive practice, the work may have important implications for philosophy of science and the way we construe scientific rationality as well.

Modern logic has Wldergone some remarkable developments in the last hun dred years. These have contributed to the extraordinary use of formal logic which has become essentially the concern of mathematicians. This has led to attempts to identify logic with formal logic. The claim has even been made that all non-formal reasoning, to the extent that it cannot be formalized, no longer belongs to logic. This conception leads to a genuine impoverishment of logic as well as to a narrow conception of reason. It means that as soon as demonstrative proofs are no longer available reason will no longer dominate. Even the idea of the 'reasonable' becomes foreign to logic and such expres sions as 'reasonable decisions', 'reasonable choice' or 'reasonable hypotheses' would be put aside as meaningless. The domain of action, including method ology and everything that is given over to deliberation or controversy - i.e., foreign to formal logic - would become a battleground where necessarily the reason of the strongest would always prevail."

Moral philosophy is no longer being pursued from arm-chairs. Instead, ethical questions are dissected in the experimental lab. This volume enables its readers to immerse themselves into Experimental Ethics' history, its current topics and future perspectives, its methodology, and the criticism it is subject to.

In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.