Introduction to Logic is clear and concise, uses interesting examples (many philosophical in nature), and has easy-to-use proof methods. Its key features, retained in this Third Edition, include: simpler ways to test arguments, including an innovative proof method and the star test for syllogisms; a wide scope of materials, suiting it for introductory or intermediate courses; engaging examples, from philosophy and everyday life; useful for self-study and preparation for standardized tests, like the LSAT; a reasonable price (a third the cost of some competitors); and exercises that correspond to the free LogiCola instructional program. This Third Edition: improves explanations, especially on areas that students find difficult; has a fuller explanation of traditional Copi proofs and of truth trees; and updates the companion LogiCola software, which now is touch friendly (for use on Windows tablets and touch monitors), installs more easily on Windows and Macintosh, and adds exercises on Copi proofs and on truth trees. You can still install LogiCola for free (from http://www.harryhiker.com/lc or http://www.routledge.com/cw/gensler).

This book is not a conventional history of mathematics as such, a museum of documents and scientific curiosities. Instead, it identifies this vital science with the thought of those who constructed it and in its relation to the changing cultural context in which it evolved. Particular emphasis is placed on the philosophic and logical systems, from Aristotle onward, that provide the basis for the fusion of mathematics and logic in contemporary thought. Ettore Carruccio covers the evolution of mathematics from the most ancient times to our own day. In simple and non-technical language, he observes the changes that have taken place in the conception of rational theory, until we reach the lively, delicate and often disconcerting problems of modern logical analysis. The book contains an unusual wealth of detail (including specimen demonstrations) on such subjects as the critique of Euclid's fifth postulate, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, the introduction of theories of infinite sets, the construction of abstract geometry, and-in a notably intelligible discussion-the development of modern symbolic logic and meta-mathematics. Scientific problems in general and mathematical problems in particular show their full meaning only when they are considered in the light of their own history. This book accordingly takes the reader to the heart of mathematical questions, in a way that teacher, student and layman alike will find absorbing and illuminating. The history of mathematics is a field that continues to fascinate people interested in the course of creativity, and logical inference u quite part and in addition to those with direct mathematical interests.

From Concept to Objectivity uncovers the nature and authority of conceptual determination by critically thinking through neglected arguments in Hegel's Science of Logic pivotal for understanding reason and its role in philosophy. Winfield clarifies the logical problems of presuppositionlessness and determinacy that prepare the way for conceiving the concept, examines how universality, particularity, and individuality are determined, investigates how judgment and syllogism are exhaustively differentiated, and, on that basis, explores how objectivity can be categorized without casting thought in irrevocable opposition to reality. Winfield's book will be of interest to readers of Hegel, as well as anyone wondering how thought can be objective.

The notion of logical form and its applications are at the heart of some of the classical problems in philosophical logic and are the focus of Peter Long's investigations in the three essays that comprise this volume. In the first, major, essay the concern is with the notion of logical form as it applies to arguments involving hypotethical statements, for example 'If today is Wednesday then tomorrow is Thursday; today is Wednesday: therefore tomorrow is Thursday.' Whilst such an argument (an argument by modus ponens) is cited by logical textbooks as a paradigm of one that is 'formally valid', it is not hard to show that the conjunction forming a hypothetical statement is not a logical constant, in which case the argument form If p then q; p: therefore q is not a logical form. But, then, how can logic claim to be the science of formal inference? The author resolves this difficulty by drawing a fundamental distinction within the notion of the form under which an argument is valid. With this distinction it becomes possible for the first time to determine the status of any formally valid argument involving hypotheticals, whether as premises or conclusion or both. The second and third essays take up the notion of logical form as it applies to such simple propositions as 'This sheet is white' and 'London is north of Paris.' When we speak of the first as giving expression to the relation of relations's relating to its terms, what is in question is a formal relation and we call it such because the relation is expressed through these propositions having the respective forms Fa and Fab. It is shown that the confusion of formal relations with relations proper explains the assimilation of facts to complexes and is that the root of the theory of universals. Peter Long has taught at the University of Leeds and University College London, and is a past Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

The Price of Doubt is an important contribution to the problem of scepticism. It offers a new standard for the appraisal of philosophical arguments. Nicholas Nathan confronts the sceptic. He questions the value of his argument and the knowledge it contains and provides a potential remedy to the frustrations of anti-sceptical epistemology.

Most of the major twentieth-century thinkers develop their thought through critical dialogues with their predecessors. This anthology brings together a selection of these dialogues, offering a fresh approach to modern critical thought from Marx through to the present day.

The essays, lectures and reviews featured in this volume represent thinkers from Lukacs and Heidegger to Judith Butler and Slavoj Zižek. Often at their most accessible introducing their own key influences and predecessors, these writings therefore provide an ideal way into the traditions of modern critical thought and into their own more difficult writings. As the reader proceeds through the book, the pieces build into a series of overlapping conversations and arguments, spanning different generations and crossing boundaries between French, German and English thought. The book offers an invaluable introduction to traditions of Marxist critical theory, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and post-modern discourse.

The anthology opens with an introductory essay in which the editor introduces key critical terms and maps out the contested terrain of criticism and critique implicit in the choice of particular works. He also introduces each text with contextualizing notes and suggestions for further reading.

Richard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a better fit with actual human experience. Probability logic is viewed not as a source of judgment but as a framework for explaining the implications of probabilistic judgments and their mutual compatability. This collection of essays spans a period of some 35 years and includes what have become some of the classic works in the literature. There is also one completely new piece, while in many instances Jeffrey includes afterthoughts on the older essays.

The methods of logic are essential to an understanding of philosophy and are crucial in the study of mathematics, computing, linguistics and many other subjects. Introducing the major concepts and techniques involved in the study of logic, this authoritative book explores both formal and philosophical logic, and the ways in which we can achieve good reasoning. Individual chapters include: * Propositions and Arguments * Truth Tables * Trees * Conditionality * Natural Deduction * Predicates, Names and Quantifiers * Definite Descriptions. This exceptionally clear introduction to the subject is ideally suited to students taking introductory courses in logic.

The methods of logic are essential to an understanding of philosophy and are crucial in the study of mathematics, computing, linguistics and many other subjects. Introducing the major concepts and techniques involved in the study of logic, this authoritative book explores both formal and philosophical logic, and the ways in which we can achieve good reasoning. Individual chapters include:

* Propositions and Arguments
* Truth Tables
* Trees
* Conditionality
* Natural Deduction
* Predicates, Names and Quantifiers
* Definite Descriptions.

This exceptionally clear introduction to the subject is ideally suited to students taking introductory courses in logic.

This book presents the heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School from both the historical and the philosophical perspective. The historical view focuses on the beginnings and the dramatic end of the School brought about by the outbreak of World War II. The philosophical view, on the other hand, encompasses a broad spectrum of issues, including logical, epistemological, axiological, and psychological problems, revealing the interdisciplinary nature of studies carried out by Kazimierz Twardowski and his students. With thirteen diverse and original essays this volume is split into three parts: History, Culture and Axiology; Psychology; and Logic and Methodology. Exploring not only the history of philosophy represented by the Lvov-Warsaw school, the book also reflects on the condition of contemporary philosophy from the perspective of concepts developed by its representatives. Furthermore, the studies presented in this book delve into problems of contemporary science and its distinctive interdisciplinary character. This volume is, therefore, not only a collection of analyses of the Lvov-Warsaw School philosophy, but also an investigation into the interdisciplinarity of science and philosophy itself.

First published in 1998, Taking on Wittgensteinianism themes, but also using, or relying on several mathematical results, Slater in this book explores the idea of realism and further argues how in a philosophical viewpoint is incorrect. Slater also surveys various philosophers in the field of logic to argue against the idea of realism.

This text provides a truly comprehensive guide to one of the most important and challenging works of modern philosophy. The systematic complexity of Hegel's radical project in the Science of Logic prevents many from understanding and appreciating its value. By independently and critically working through Hegel's argument, this book offers an enlightening aid for study and anchors the Science of Logic at a central position in the philosophical canon.

This book, a rich collection authored by rhetorical scholars, unpacks how rhetoric contributes to argumentation studies. It begins with an introduction that identifies defining features of a rhetorical approach to argumentation which has several corollaries, including the special status of argumentation about action, the condition of uncertainty and the necessity of securing adherence from an audience. Chapters explore topics such as the properties of argumentation in the realm of rhetoric, the use of presentational devices, the role of rhetoric in the evolving formation of public morality, conditions for democratic argumentation, argument pedagogy, rhetorical insights into science communication, and other features within the realm of rhetorical argumentation. This book is relevant to students and researchers in linguistics, rhetoric, philosophy, argumentation studies, and communication studies. Previously published in Argumentation Volume 34, issue 3, September 2020

This book addresses the hasty development of modern logic, especially its introducing and embracing various kinds of artificial languages and moving from the study of natural languages to that of artificial ones. This shift seemed extremely helpful and managed to elevate logic to a new level of rigor and clarity. However, the change that logic underwent in this way was in no way insignificant, and it is also far from an insignificant matter to determine to what extent the "new logic" only engaged new and more powerful instruments to answer the questions posed by the "old" one, and to what extent it replaced these questions with new ones. Hence, this movement has generated brand new kinds of philosophical problems that have still not been dealt with systematically. Philosophy of Logical Systems addresses these new kinds of philosophical problems that are intertwined with the development of modern logic. Jaroslav Peregrin analyzes the rationale behind the introduction of the artificial languages of logic; classifies the various tools which were adopted to build such languages; gives an overview of the various kinds of languages introduced in the course of modern logic and the motifs of their employment; discusses what can actually be achieved by relocating the problems of logic from natural language into them; and reaches certain conclusions with respect to the possibilities and limitations of this "formal turn" of logic. This book is both an important scholarly contribution to the philosophy of logic and a systematic survey of the standard (and not so standard) logical systems that were established during the short history of modern logic.

Were the most serious philosophers of the millennium 200 A.D. to 1200 A.D. just confused mystics? This book shows otherwise. John Martin rehabilitates Neoplatonism, founded by Plotinus and brought into Christianity by St. Augustine. The Neoplatonists devise ranking predicates like good, excellent, perfect to divide the Chain of Being, and use the predicate intensifier hyper so that it becomes a valid logical argument to reason from God is not (merely) good to God is hyper-good. In this way the relational facts underlying reality find expression in Aristotle's subject-predicate statements, and the Platonic tradition proves able to subsume Aristotle's logic while at the same time rejecting his metaphysics. In the Middle Ages when Aristotle's larger philosophy was recovered and joined again to the Neoplatonic tradition which was never lost, Neoplatonic logic lived along side Aristotle's metaphysics in a sometime confusing and unsettled way. Showing Neoplatonism to be significantly richer in its logical and philosophical ideas than it is usually given credit for, this book will be of interest not just to historians of logic, but to philosophers, logicians, linguists, and theologians.

Originally published in 1973. This book is directed to the student of philosophy whose background in mathematics is very limited. The author strikes a balance between material of a philosophical and a formal kind, and does this in a way that will bring out the intricate connections between the two. On the formal side, he gives particular care to provide the basic tools from set theory and arithmetic that are needed to study systems of logic, setting out completeness results for two, three, and four valued logic, explaining concepts such as freedom and bondage in quantificational logic, describing the intuitionistic conception of the logical operators, and setting out Zermelo's axiom system for set theory. On the philosophical side, he gives particular attention to such topics as the problem of entailment, the import of the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem, the expressive powers of quantificational logic, the ideas underlying intuitionistic logic, the nature of set theory, and the relationship between logic and set theory. There are exercises within the text, set out alongside the theoretical ideas that they involve.

Originally published in 1962. A clear and simple account of the growth and structure of Mathematical Logic, no earlier knowledge of logic being required. After outlining the four lines of thought that have been its roots - the logic of Aristotle, the idea of all the parts of mathematics as systems to be designed on the same sort of plan as that used by Euclid and his Elements, and the discoveries in algebra and geometry in 1800-1860 - the book goes on to give some of the main ideas and theories of the chief writers on Mathematical Logic: De Morgan, Boole, Jevons, Pierce, Frege, Peano, Whitehead, Russell, Post, Hilbert and Goebel. Written to assist readers who require a general picture of current logic, it will also be a guide for those who will later be going more deeply into the expert details of this field.

Originally published in 1937. A short account of the traditional logic, intended to provide the student with the fundamentals necessary for the specialized study. Suitable for working through individualy, it will provide sufficient knowledge of the elements of the subject to understand materials on more advanced and specialized topics. This is an interesting historic perspective on this area of philosophy and mathematics.

Originally published in 1934. This fourth edition originally published 1954., revised by C. W. K. Mundle. "It must be the desire of every reasonable person to know how to justify a contention which is of sufficient importance to be seriously questioned. The explicit formulation of the principles of sound reasoning is the concern of Logic". This book discusses the habit of sound reasoning which is acquired by consciously attending to the logical principles of sound reasoning, in order to apply them to test the soundness of arguments. It isn't an introduction to logic but it encourages the practice of logic, of deciding whether reasons in argument are sound or unsound. Stress is laid upon the importance of considering language, which is a key instrument of our thinking and is imperfect.

Originally published in 1964. This book is concerned with general arguments, by which is meant broadly arguments that rely for their force on the ideas expressed by all, every, any, some, none and other kindred words or phrases. A main object of quantificational logic is to provide methods for evaluating general arguments. To evaluate a general argument by these methods we must first express it in a standard form. Quantificational form is dealt with in chapter one and in part of chapter three; in the remainder of the book an account is given of methods by which arguments when formulated quantificationally may be tested for validity or invalidity. Some attention is also paid to the logic of identity and of definite descriptions. Throughout the book an attempt has been made to give a clear explanation of the concepts involved and the symbols used; in particular a step-by-step and partly mechanical method is developed for translating complicated statements of ordinary discourse into the appropriate quantificational formulae. Some elementary knowledge of truth-functional logic is presupposed.

Originally published in 1962. This book gives an account of the concepts and methods of a basic part of logic. In chapter I elementary ideas, including those of truth-functional argument and truth-functional validity, are explained. Chapter II begins with a more comprehensive account of truth-functionality; the leading characteristics of the most important monadic and dyadic truth-functions are described, and the different notations in use are set forth. The main part of the book describes and explains three different methods of testing truth-functional aguments and agument forms for validity: the truthtable method, the deductive method and the method of normal forms; for the benefit mainly of readers who have not acquired in one way or another a general facility in the manipulation of symbols some of the procedures have been described in rather more detail than is common in texts of this kind. In the final chapter the author discusses and rejects the view, based largely on the so called paradoxes of material implication, that truth-functional logic is not applicable in any really important way to arguments of ordinary discourse.

Originally published in 1966. Professor Rescher's aim is to develop a "logic of commands" in exactly the same general way which standard logic has already developed a "logic of truth-functional statement compounds" or a "logic of quantifiers". The object is to present a tolerably accurate and precise account of the logically relevant facets of a command, to study the nature of "inference" in reasonings involving commands, and above all to establish a viable concept of validity in command inference, so that the logical relationships among commands can be studied with something of the rigour to which one is accustomed in other branches of logic.

Originally published in 1988. This text gives a lucid account of the most distinctive and influential responses by twentieth century philosophers to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The problem first became central to twentieth-century philosophy as a result of the depsychoiogising of logic brought about by Bradley and Frege who, responding to the 'Psychologism' of Mill and Hume, drew a sharp distinction between the province of psychology and the province of logic. This author argues that while Russell, Ryle and Davidson, each in different ways, attempted a theoretical solution, Frege and Wittgenstein (both in the Tractatus and the Investigations) rightly maintained that no theoretical solution is possible. It is this which explains the importance Wittgenstein attached in his later work to the idea of agreement in judgments. The two final chapters illustrate the way in which a response to the problem affects the way in which we think about the nature of the mind. They contain a discussion of Strawson's concept of a person and provide a striking critique of the philosophical claims made by devotees of artificial intelligence, in particular those made by Daniel Dennett.

Originally published in 1941. Professor Ushenko treats of current problems in technical Logic, involving Symbolic Logic to a marked extent. He deprecates the tendency, in influential quarters, to regard Logic as a branch of Mathematics and advances the intuitionalist theory of Logic. This involves criticism of Carnap, Russell,Wittgenstein, Broad and Whitehead, with additional discussions on Kant and Hegel. The author believes that the union of Philosophy and Logic is a natural one, and that an exclusively mathematical treatment cannot give an adequate account of Logic. A fundamental characteristic of Logic is comprehensiveness, which brings out the affinity between logic and philosophy, for to be comprehensive is the aim of philosophical ambition.

This book sets out for the first time in English and in the terms of modern logic the semantics of the Port Royal Logic (La Logique ou l'Art de penser, 1662-1685) of Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, perhaps the most influential logic book in the 17th and 18th centuries. Its goal is to explain how the Logic reworks the foundation of pre-Cartesian logic so as to make it compatible with Descartes' metaphysics. The Logic's authors forged a new theory of reference based on the medieval notion of objective being, which is essentially the modern notion of intentional content. Indeed, the book's central aim is to detail how the Logic reoriented semantics so that it centered on the notion of intentional content. This content, which the Logic calls comprehension, consists of an idea's defining modes. Mechanisms are defined in terms of comprehension that rework earlier explanations of central notions like conceptual inclusion, signification, abstraction, idea restriction, sensation, and most importantly within the Logic's metatheory, the concept of idea-extension, which is a new technical concept coined by the Logic. Although Descartes is famous for rejecting "Aristotelianism," he says virtually nothing about technical concepts in logic. His followers fill the gap. By putting to use the doctrine of objective being, which had been a relatively minor part of medieval logic, they preserve more central semantic doctrines, especially a correspondence theory of truth. A recurring theme of the book is the degree to which the Logic hews to medieval theory. This interpretation is at odds with what has become a standard reading among French scholars according to which this 16th-century work should be understood as rejecting earlier logic along with Aristotelian metaphysics, and as putting in its place structures more like those of 19th-century class theory.