This volume is a collection of papers presented at the 2007 colloquium on new perspectives on games and interaction at the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences in Amsterdam. The purpose of the colloquium was to clarify the uses of the concepts of game theory, and to identify promising new directions. This important collection testifies to the growing importance of game theory as a tool to capture the concepts of strategy, interaction, argumentation, communication, cooperation and competition. Also, it provides evidence for the richness of game theory and for its impressive and growing application.

Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology is a collection of twelve original essays honoring Roger F. Gibson, who has been a leading proponent and defender of W. V. Quine's philosophy for nearly thirty years. The essays address a wide range of topics, including normativity and naturalized epistemology, holism, consciousness, the philosophy of logic, perception, value theory, and the arts. The contributors are an international group of prominent philosophers as well as rising scholars including: Robert Barrett, Lars Bergstrom, Richard Creath, David Henderson, Terence Horgan, Ernest Lepore, Pete Mandik, Alex Orenstein, Kenneth Shockley, J. Robert Thompson, Josefa Toribio, Joseph Ullian, Josh Weisberg, and Chase B. Wrenn.

This is the first complete English translation of On the Purity of the Art of Logic, a handbook of logic written in Latin by English philosopher Walter Burley (c. 1275-1344/5). The work circulated in the Middle Ages in two versions, a shorter and a longer one, both translated here by Paul Vincent Spade. The translations arc based on the only complete edition of Burley's treatises, corrected by Spade on the basis of one of the surviving manuscripts. The book also includes an extensive introduction, explanatory notes, a table of corresponding passages between the two versions, a select annotated bibliography, and three indexes.

A contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Burley was active at the universities of both Paris and Oxford. He became one of the most important figures in the transformation of medieval logic and semantics that took place in the early fourteenth century. Burley used new tools and techniques of logical and semantical analysis, yet in many cases he used them in defense of traditional views, such as a realist metaphysical theory of "universals". On the Purity of the Art of Logic shows both these sides of Burley -- the innovator and the conservative -- as well as some of the ways in which his views corresponded or clashed with those of William of Ockham.

The topic of vagueness re-emerged in the twentieth century from relative obscurity. It deals with the phenomenon in natural language that manifests itself in apparent semantic indeterminacy - the indeterminacy, for example, that arises when asked to draw the line between the tall and non-tall, or the drunk and the sober. An associated paradox emphasises the challenging nature of the phenomenon, presenting one of the most resilient paradoxes of logic. The apparent threat posed for orthodox theories of the semantics and logic of natural language has become the focus of intense philosophical scrutiny amongst philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Vagueness, Logic and Ontology explores various responses to the philosophical problems generated by vagueness and its associated paradox - the sorites paradox. Hyde argues that the theoretical space in which vagueness is sometimes ontologically grounded and modelled by a truth-functional logic affords a coherent response to the problems posed by vagueness. Showing how the concept of vagueness can be applied to the world, Hyde's ontological account proposes a substantial revision of orthodox semantics, metaphysics and logic. This book will be of particular interest to readers in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science and geographic information systems.

During the last decade, argumentation has attracted growing attention as a means to elicit processes (linguistic, logical, dialogical, psychological, etc.) that can sustain or provoke reasoning and learning. Constituting an important dimension of daily life and of professional activities, argumentation plays a special role in democracies and is at the heart of philosophical reasoning and scientific inquiry. Argumentation, as such, requires specific intellectual and social skills. Hence, argumentation will have an increasing importance in education, both because it is a critical competence that has to be learned, and because argumentation can be used to foster learning in philosophy, history, sciences and in many other domains.

Argumentation and Education answers these and other questions by providing both theoretical backgrounds, in psychology, education and theory of argumentation, and concrete examples of experiments and results in school contexts in a range of domains. It reports on existing innovative practices in education settings at various levels.

The classical conception of reason (or logos) has been repeatedly attacked in the modern era. Its enemies range from Descartes, who complains that logos is not sufficiently useful or precise, to Derrida who hopes to liberate Western thought from its bondage to "logocentrism." At least since the time of Nietzsche, Plato has been damned as the chief architect of the classical conception of logos. He is accused of overvaluing reason and thereby devaluing the other, more human aspects of life. As it was originally formulated in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, Plato has been taken to be the arch-enemy of tragedy, which for Nietzsche was the most life-affirming of all the art forms of Greek culture. Originally published in 1990, The Tragedy of Reason defends Plato against his accusers. Employing a mode of exposition which exhibits Plato's position, Roochnik presents the Platonic conception of logos in confrontation with texts by Homer, Hesiod, Heraclitus, Aristotle, Descartes, Porty, and Derrida. In clear language, unencumbered by technical terminology, Roochnik shows that Platonic conception of logos is keenly aware of the strength of its opponents. The result is a presentation of Plato as a "tragic philosopher" whose conception of logos is characterized by an affirmation of its own limits as well as its goodness.

Real Essentialism presents a comprehensive defence of neo-Aristotelian essentialism. Do objects have essences? Must they be the kinds of things they are in spite of the changes they undergo? Can we know what things are really like can we define and classify reality? Many if not most philosophers doubt this, influenced by centuries of empiricism, and by the anti-essentialism of Wittgenstein, Quine, Popper, and other thinkers. Real Essentialism reinvigorates the tradition of realist, essentialist metaphysics, defending the reality and knowability of essence, the possibility of objective, immutable definition, and its relevance to contemporary scientific and metaphysical issues such as whether essence transcends physics and chemistry, the essence of life, the nature of biological species, and the nature of the person.

After Plato's Forms, and Aristotle's substances, the Stoics posited the fundamental reality of lekta - the meanings of sentences, distinct from the sentences themselves. This is the first time in the tradition of Western philosophy that what is signified is properly distinguished from signs and signifiers. The Stoics on Lekta offers a synoptic treatment of the many implications of this distinction, which grants an existential autonomy to lekta: language can only ever express meanings, but what happens to meanings which are there, ready to be said, but which are never actually expressed? It analyses the deep shift in ontological paradigm required by the presence of lekta in reality, and reveals a truly unique, complex, and consistent cosmic view in which lekta are the keystones of the structure of reality. According to this view, we cannot not speak or think in terms of lekta, and for this reason, they are in fact all there is to say. The Stoics' position ignited many fiery debates in antiquity and continues to do so in the modern era: they were the first to be concerned with questions about language and grammar, and the first to put the relation of language to reality at the heart of the enquiry into human understanding and the place of man in the cosmos. Such questions remain central to life and philosophy to this day, and by explicitly comparing and contrasting the themes and topics discussed to twentieth-century treatments of the status of the proposition, propositional structure, speech act theory, and the relation of attribution of the predicate to a subject-term, this volume seeks to demonstrate the enduring value of a direct Stoic contribution to the contemporary debate.

By 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had reached a breaking point. Afghans were becoming increasingly disillusioned with a state-building process that had failed to deliver the peace dividend that they were promised. For many Afghans, the most noticeable change in their lives since the fall of the Taliban has been an acute deterioration in security conditions. Whether it is predatory warlords, the Taliban-led insurgency, the burgeoning narcotics trade, or general criminality, the threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan are manifold. The response to those threats, both in terms of the international military intervention and the donor-supported process to rebuild the security architecture of the Afghan state, known as security sector reform (SSR), have been largely insufficient to address the task at hand. NATO has struggled to find the troops and equipment it requires to complete its Afghan mission and the SSR process, from its outset, has been severely under-resourced and poorly directed. Compounding these problems, rampant corruption and factionalism in the Afghan government, particularly in the security institutions, have served as a major impediment to reform and a driver of insecurity.

This paper charts the evolution of the security environment in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, deconstructing both the causes of insecurity and the responses to them. Through this analysis, it offers some suggestions on how to overcome Afghanistan's growing security crisis.

In The Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege contended that the difference between concepts and objects was absolute. He meant that no object could be a concept and no concept an object. Benno Kerry disagreed; he contended that a concept could be an object, and that therefore the difference between concepts and objects was only relative. In this book, Jolley aims to understand the debate between Frege and Kerry. But Jolley's purpose is not so much to champion either side; rather, it is to utilize an understanding of the debate to shed light on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein-and vice versa. Jolley not only sifts through the debate between Frege and Kerry, but also through subsequent versions of the debate in J. J. Valberg and Wilfred Sellars. Jolley's goal is to show that the central notion of Philosophical Investigations, that of a 'conceptual investigation', is a legacy of the Frege/Kerry debate and also a contribution to it. Jolley concludes that the difference between concepts and objects is as absolute in its way in Philosophical Investigations as it was in The Foundations of Arithmetic and that recognizing the absoluteness of the difference in Philosophical Investigations provides a beginning for a 'resolute' reading of Wittgenstein's book.

In this book, Jennifer Moon explores and clarifies critical thinking and provides practical guidance for improving student learning and supporting the teaching process.

Key themes covered include:

• different views of and approaches to critical thinking with an emphasis on a practical basis that can be translated into use in the classroom.
• links between learning, thinking and writing
• the place of critical thinking alongside other academic activities such as reflective learning and argument
• critical thinking and assessment, class environments, staff knowledge and development, writing tasks and oral tasks.

Teachers in all disciplines in post-compulsory education will find this approach to defining and improving studentsa (TM) critical thinking skills invaluable.

Foundational questions in logic, mathematics, computer science and physics are constant sources of epistemological debate in contemporary philosophy. To what extent is the transfinite part of mathematics completely trustworthy? Why is there a general 'malaise' concerning the logical approach to the foundations of mathematics? What is the role of symmetry in physics? Is it possible to build a coherent worldview compatible with a macroobjectivistic position and based on the quantum picture of the world? What account can be given of opinion change in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions discussed in this volume, which collects 14 lectures on the foundation of science given at the School of Philosophy of Science, Trieste, October 1989. The volume will be of particular interest to any student or scholar engaged in interdisciplinary research into the foundations of science in the context of contemporary debates.

Silly rabbit Your argument is ill-founded.

Have you read (or stumbled into) one too many irrational online debates? Ali Almossawi certainly had, so he wrote An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments This handy guide is here to bring the internet age a much-needed dose of old-school logic (really old-school, a la Aristotle).

Here are cogent explanations of the straw man fallacy, the slippery slope argument, the ad hominem attack, and other common attempts at reasoning that actually fall short plus a beautifully drawn menagerie of animals who (adorably) commit every logical faux pas. Rabbit thinks a strange light in the sky must be a UFO because no one can prove otherwise (the appeal to ignorance). And Lion doesn t believe that gas emissions harm the planet because, if that were true, he wouldn t like the result (the argument from consequences).

Once you learn to recognize these abuses of reason, they start to crop up everywhere from congressional debate to YouTube comments which makes this geek-chic book a must for anyone in the habit of holding opinions. It s the antidote to fuzzy thinking, with furry animals "

This book creates a conceptual schema that acts as a correlation between Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. It connects both fields and offers a proper theoretical foundation for the contemporary developments of Epistemic Logic regarding the dynamics of information. It builds a bridge between the view of Awareness Justification Internalism, and a dynamic approach to Awareness Logic. The book starts with an introduction to the main topics in Epistemic Logic and Epistemology and reviews the disconnection between the two fields. It analyses three core notions representing the basic structure of the conceptual schema: "Epistemic Awareness", "Knowledge" and "Justification". Next, it presents the Explicit Aware Knowledge (EAK) Schema, using a diagram of three ellipses to illustrate the schema, and a formal model based on a neighbourhood-model structure, that shows one concrete application of the EAK-Schema into a logical structure. The book ends by presenting conclusions and final remarks about the uses and applications of the EAK-Schema. It shows that the most important feature of the schema is that it serves both as a theoretical correlate to the dynamic extensions of Awareness Logic, providing it with a philosophical background, and as an abstract conceptual structure for a re-interpretation of Epistemology.

Quine's set theory, New Foundations, has often been treated as an anomaly in the history and philosophy of set theory. In this book, Sean Morris shows that it is in fact well-motivated, emerging in a natural way from the early development of set theory. Morris introduces and explores the notion of set theory as explication: the view that there is no single correct axiomatization of set theory, but rather that the various axiomatizations all serve to explicate the notion of set and are judged largely according to pragmatic criteria. Morris also brings out the important interplay between New Foundations, Quine's philosophy of set theory, and his philosophy more generally. We see that his early technical work in logic foreshadows his later famed naturalism, with his philosophy of set theory playing a crucial role in his primary philosophical project of clarifying our conceptual scheme and specifically its logical and mathematical components.

This book presents an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant's philosophy together with those of the British empiricists-Locke, Berkeley, and Hume-in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant's psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant's philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. It also relates Kant's psychologism to Wittgenstein's later conception of language. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which Kant's philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists.

Despite there being deep lines of convergence between the philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead, C. S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and other classical American philosophers, it remains an open question whether Whitehead is a pragmatist, and conversation between pragmatists and Whitehead scholars have been limited. Indeed, it is difficult to find an anthology of classical American philosophy that includes Whitehead's writings. These camps began separately, and so they remain. This volume questions the wisdom of that separation, exploring their connections, both historical and in application. The essays in this volume embody original and creative work by leading scholars that not only furthers the understanding of American philosophy, but seeks to advance it by working at the intersection of experience and reality to incite novel and creative thought. This exploration is long overdue. Specific questions that are addressed are: Is Whitehead a pragmatist? What contrasts and affinities exist between American pragmatism and Whitehead's thought? What new questions, strategies, and critiques emerge by juxtaposing their distinct perspectives?

Luciano Floridi presents a book that will set the agenda for the philosophy of information. PI is the philosophical field concerned with (1) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and (2) the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. This book lays down, for the first time, the conceptual foundations for this new area of research. It does so systematically, by pursuing three goals. Its metatheoretical goal is to describe what the philosophy of information is, its problems, approaches, and methods. Its introductory goal is to help the reader to gain a better grasp of the complex and multifarious nature of the various concepts and phenomena related to information. Its analytic goal is to answer several key theoretical questions of great philosophical interest, arising from the investigation of semantic information.

From Concept to Objectivity uncovers the nature and authority of conceptual determination by critically thinking through neglected arguments in Hegel's Science of Logic pivotal for understanding reason and its role in philosophy. Winfield clarifies the logical problems of presuppositionlessness and determinacy that prepare the way for conceiving the concept, examines how universality, particularity, and individuality are determined, investigates how judgment and syllogism are exhaustively differentiated, and, on that basis, explores how objectivity can be categorized without casting thought in irrevocable opposition to reality. Winfield's book will be of interest to readers of Hegel, as well as anyone wondering how thought can be objective.

This collection of essays presents cutting-edge research on a classic philosophical problem --- the link between reasoning and practice. The essays, by such well-known thinkers as Davidson, Scheffler, Sunstein, Dworkin, and Stroud, cover a range of issues raised by the move from thought to action. The book represents an inquiry into the very nature of reason, reasoning and reasons, rationale, rationalization, and rationality. These essays also connect philosophical thought with concrete issues in social life and political practice, thus, it will be of interest not only to philosophers, but also to political theorists, legal scholars, and any researcher interested in the practical applications of reason.

The notion of logical form and its applications are at the heart of some of the classical problems in philosophical logic and are the focus of Peter Long's investigations in the three essays that comprise this volume. In the first, major, essay the concern is with the notion of logical form as it applies to arguments involving hypotethical statements, for example 'If today is Wednesday then tomorrow is Thursday; today is Wednesday: therefore tomorrow is Thursday.' Whilst such an argument (an argument by modus ponens) is cited by logical textbooks as a paradigm of one that is 'formally valid', it is not hard to show that the conjunction forming a hypothetical statement is not a logical constant, in which case the argument form If p then q; p: therefore q is not a logical form. But, then, how can logic claim to be the science of formal inference? The author resolves this difficulty by drawing a fundamental distinction within the notion of the form under which an argument is valid. With this distinction it becomes possible for the first time to determine the status of any formally valid argument involving hypotheticals, whether as premises or conclusion or both. The second and third essays take up the notion of logical form as it applies to such simple propositions as 'This sheet is white' and 'London is north of Paris.' When we speak of the first as giving expression to the relation of relations's relating to its terms, what is in question is a formal relation and we call it such because the relation is expressed through these propositions having the respective forms Fa and Fab. It is shown that the confusion of formal relations with relations proper explains the assimilation of facts to complexes and is that the root of the theory of universals. Peter Long has taught at the University of Leeds and University College London, and is a past Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

First published in 1998, this volume has its origin in a meeting that was held in Santiago de Compostela University, Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in January 1996. The meeting was organized by the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science in cooperation with the Association for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain. Within analytical philosophy issues such as the definability of truth, its semantic relevance, its role in the distinction between formal and natural languages, the status of truth-bearers or in its case of truth-makers, have become a crossroads in the studies of logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology and ontology. Thus, in spite of what the title Truth in Perspective may suggest to the reader at first, the present volume is not only - though it is also a presentation of different theories or conceptions of truth. Most of the book presents a vision of different groups of philosophical questions in which the issue of truth appears embedded together with other related themes, from different points of view.

The Price of Doubt is an important contribution to the problem of scepticism. It offers a new standard for the appraisal of philosophical arguments. Nicholas Nathan confronts the sceptic. He questions the value of his argument and the knowledge it contains and provides a potential remedy to the frustrations of anti-sceptical epistemology.

The methods of logic are essential to an understanding of philosophy and are crucial in the study of mathematics, computing, linguistics and many other subjects. Introducing the major concepts and techniques involved in the study of logic, this authoritative book explores both formal and philosophical logic, and the ways in which we can achieve good reasoning. Individual chapters include: * Propositions and Arguments * Truth Tables * Trees * Conditionality * Natural Deduction * Predicates, Names and Quantifiers * Definite Descriptions. This exceptionally clear introduction to the subject is ideally suited to students taking introductory courses in logic.

The methods of logic are essential to an understanding of philosophy and are crucial in the study of mathematics, computing, linguistics and many other subjects. Introducing the major concepts and techniques involved in the study of logic, this authoritative book explores both formal and philosophical logic, and the ways in which we can achieve good reasoning. Individual chapters include:

* Propositions and Arguments
* Truth Tables
* Trees
* Conditionality
* Natural Deduction
* Predicates, Names and Quantifiers
* Definite Descriptions.

This exceptionally clear introduction to the subject is ideally suited to students taking introductory courses in logic.