Originally published in 1962. This book gives an account of the concepts and methods of a basic part of logic. In chapter I elementary ideas, including those of truth-functional argument and truth-functional validity, are explained. Chapter II begins with a more comprehensive account of truth-functionality; the leading characteristics of the most important monadic and dyadic truth-functions are described, and the different notations in use are set forth. The main part of the book describes and explains three different methods of testing truth-functional aguments and agument forms for validity: the truthtable method, the deductive method and the method of normal forms; for the benefit mainly of readers who have not acquired in one way or another a general facility in the manipulation of symbols some of the procedures have been described in rather more detail than is common in texts of this kind. In the final chapter the author discusses and rejects the view, based largely on the so called paradoxes of material implication, that truth-functional logic is not applicable in any really important way to arguments of ordinary discourse.

Originally published in 1962. A clear and simple account of the growth and structure of Mathematical Logic, no earlier knowledge of logic being required. After outlining the four lines of thought that have been its roots - the logic of Aristotle, the idea of all the parts of mathematics as systems to be designed on the same sort of plan as that used by Euclid and his Elements, and the discoveries in algebra and geometry in 1800-1860 - the book goes on to give some of the main ideas and theories of the chief writers on Mathematical Logic: De Morgan, Boole, Jevons, Pierce, Frege, Peano, Whitehead, Russell, Post, Hilbert and Goebel. Written to assist readers who require a general picture of current logic, it will also be a guide for those who will later be going more deeply into the expert details of this field.

Originally published in 1966. Professor Rescher's aim is to develop a "logic of commands" in exactly the same general way which standard logic has already developed a "logic of truth-functional statement compounds" or a "logic of quantifiers". The object is to present a tolerably accurate and precise account of the logically relevant facets of a command, to study the nature of "inference" in reasonings involving commands, and above all to establish a viable concept of validity in command inference, so that the logical relationships among commands can be studied with something of the rigour to which one is accustomed in other branches of logic.

Originally published in 1934. This fourth edition originally published 1954., revised by C. W. K. Mundle. "It must be the desire of every reasonable person to know how to justify a contention which is of sufficient importance to be seriously questioned. The explicit formulation of the principles of sound reasoning is the concern of Logic". This book discusses the habit of sound reasoning which is acquired by consciously attending to the logical principles of sound reasoning, in order to apply them to test the soundness of arguments. It isn't an introduction to logic but it encourages the practice of logic, of deciding whether reasons in argument are sound or unsound. Stress is laid upon the importance of considering language, which is a key instrument of our thinking and is imperfect.

Originally published in 1973. This book is directed to the student of philosophy whose background in mathematics is very limited. The author strikes a balance between material of a philosophical and a formal kind, and does this in a way that will bring out the intricate connections between the two. On the formal side, he gives particular care to provide the basic tools from set theory and arithmetic that are needed to study systems of logic, setting out completeness results for two, three, and four valued logic, explaining concepts such as freedom and bondage in quantificational logic, describing the intuitionistic conception of the logical operators, and setting out Zermelo's axiom system for set theory. On the philosophical side, he gives particular attention to such topics as the problem of entailment, the import of the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem, the expressive powers of quantificational logic, the ideas underlying intuitionistic logic, the nature of set theory, and the relationship between logic and set theory. There are exercises within the text, set out alongside the theoretical ideas that they involve.

Originally published in 1988. This text gives a lucid account of the most distinctive and influential responses by twentieth century philosophers to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The problem first became central to twentieth-century philosophy as a result of the depsychoiogising of logic brought about by Bradley and Frege who, responding to the 'Psychologism' of Mill and Hume, drew a sharp distinction between the province of psychology and the province of logic. This author argues that while Russell, Ryle and Davidson, each in different ways, attempted a theoretical solution, Frege and Wittgenstein (both in the Tractatus and the Investigations) rightly maintained that no theoretical solution is possible. It is this which explains the importance Wittgenstein attached in his later work to the idea of agreement in judgments. The two final chapters illustrate the way in which a response to the problem affects the way in which we think about the nature of the mind. They contain a discussion of Strawson's concept of a person and provide a striking critique of the philosophical claims made by devotees of artificial intelligence, in particular those made by Daniel Dennett.

Originally published in 1937. A short account of the traditional logic, intended to provide the student with the fundamentals necessary for the specialized study. Suitable for working through individualy, it will provide sufficient knowledge of the elements of the subject to understand materials on more advanced and specialized topics. This is an interesting historic perspective on this area of philosophy and mathematics.

Originally published in 1941. Professor Ushenko treats of current problems in technical Logic, involving Symbolic Logic to a marked extent. He deprecates the tendency, in influential quarters, to regard Logic as a branch of Mathematics and advances the intuitionalist theory of Logic. This involves criticism of Carnap, Russell,Wittgenstein, Broad and Whitehead, with additional discussions on Kant and Hegel. The author believes that the union of Philosophy and Logic is a natural one, and that an exclusively mathematical treatment cannot give an adequate account of Logic. A fundamental characteristic of Logic is comprehensiveness, which brings out the affinity between logic and philosophy, for to be comprehensive is the aim of philosophical ambition.

The articles in this volume are all landmarks in the evolution of modern studies in Indian logic. The book traces the development of modern studies in Indian logic from their beginnings right up to 1998. Each of the articles has very specific reasons for its inclusion.

The articles in this volume are all landmarks in the evolution of modern studies in Indian logic. The book traces the development of modern studies in Indian logic from their beginnings right up to the latest work.

Contents:
Hamblin, C L, The Indian Tradition, Fallacies [London: Methuen, 1970]
Randle, H H, A Note on the Indian Syllogism, Mind, 33 [1924]
Staal, Frits, The Concept of Paksa in Indian Logic, Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 [1973]
Staal, J F, Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 25 [1962]
Gillon, Brendan S and Martha Lile Love, Indian Logic Revisited: Nyayapravesa Reviewed, Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 [1980]
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, Some Features of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyaya, Philosophy East and West 40 [1990]
Shaw, J L, The Nyaya on Double Negation, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 [1988]
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, The Middle Term, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9 [1968]
Mohanty, J N, Psychologism in Indian Logic, In B K Matilal and J L Shaw eds., Analytical Philosophy in Comparitive Perspective [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985]
David, Lawrence, Tarka in the Nyaya Theory of Inference, Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 [1981]
Matilal, B K Anenkanta: Both Yes and No? Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 8 [1991]
Staal, J F, Sanskrit Philosophy of Language, In Thomas A Seboek ed., Current Trends in Linguistics: Vol 5, Linguistics in South Asia [The Hague: Mouton, 1969]
Brough, John, Some Indian Theories of Meaning, Transactions of the Philological Society [1953]
Matilal, B K, Reference and Existence in Nyaya and Buddhist Logic, Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 [1970]
Matilal, B K, and P K Sen, The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies Over Meaning, Mind 97 [1988]
Siderits, Mark, The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language, Synthese 69 [1986]
Herzberger, Hans, and Radhika Hersberger, Bhartrhari's Paradox, Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 [1981]

W.V. Quine (1908-) has played a crucial role in philosophy during the second half of the twentieth century. These five volumes contain the most essential of the more than 2000 articles written about Quine's work. Chosen for their clarity and brevity, they cover both basic ideas as well as objections to Quine's work. These articles are a valuable resource for students and scholars; many have been previously available only in hard-to-find sources, and in addition, some have been written or translated expressly for this collection. Available individually or by volume

Russell's "On Denoting" and Frege's "On Sense and Reference" are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of 20th-century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". They have generated a wealth of secondary literature and remain at the forefront of contemporary discussion in philosophy of language, thought and logic. This book challenges the accepted understanding of these two seminal papers. It forces us to reconsider contemporary approaches to the semantics of proper names and definite descriptions through a historically sensitive interpretation of Russell's and Frege's work on meaning. Gideon Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. Makin then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications for our understanding of this essay.

Russell's "On Denoting" and Frege's "On Sense and Reference" are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of 20th-century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". They have generated a wealth of secondary literature and remain at the forefront of contemporary discussion in philosophy of language, thought and logic. This book challenges the accepted understanding of these two seminal papers. It forces us to reconsider contemporary approaches to the semantics of proper names and definite descriptions through a historically sensitive interpretation of Russell's and Frege's work on meaning. Gideon Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. Makin then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications for our understanding of this essay.

Originally published in 1991, this volume examines Hegel's political philosophy from the perspective of his argument for constitutional monarchy. It offers an interpretation of Hegelian theory that is relevant for the understanding of modern republican constitutions. Modern republican theories are assessed together with those of Plato, Kant and Marx in order to put Hegel's model to the most rigorous test. The arguments are based on fresh analysis of Hegel's system and on new translations of key passages in Hegel's text.

Originally published in 1982, this volume examines the sources of British Hegelian thinking, the lines of its development and intellectual relationships among members of the school. The sources in this book include twentieth century Marxians who pioneered the move 'back to Hegel' such as Gramsci and Lukacs. It includes brief biographical entries of the principal British Hegelians and of minor figures wo paved the way for Hegel's entry into British philosophy.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This historical study investigates Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic and language, as it is presented in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Drawing on Wittgenstein's correspondence, and on his numerous pre-Tractatus manuscripts, the study makes a case for the Tractatus as an insightful critique of the philosophies of Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege - the Founding Fathers of analytic philosophy.
The book urges a re-assessment of the relative influence of these philosophers on the early Wittgenstein. It argues that the current vogue for "Fregean" readings of the Tractatus has tended to obscure the true depth and importance of Wittgenstein's involvement with Russell's philosophy. This case is built through a series of detailed studies of central logico-linguistic topics including: tautology, logical assertion, the picture theory of the proposition and the deductive inference.

Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument.
Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically with arguments against justified and rational belief.

An Invitation to Formal Reasoning introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful new system formulated by Fred Sommers. This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard system employed in modern logic; most striking is its greater simplicity and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the 19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogistic, Scholastic logicians, Leibniz, and the 19th century British algebraists. Term logic takes its syntax directly from natural language, construing statements as combinations of pairs of terms, where complex terms are taken to have the same syntax as statements. Whereas standard logic requires extensive 'translation' from natural language to symbolic language, term logic requires only 'transcription' into the symbolic language. Its naturalness is the result of its ability to stay close to the forms of sentences usually found in every day discourse. Written by the founders of the term logic approach, An Invitation to Formal Reasoning is a unique introduction and exploration of this new system, offering numerous exercises and examples throughout the text. Summarising the standard system of mathematical logic to set term logic in context, and showing how the two systems compare, this book presents an alternative approach to standard modern logic for those studying formal logic, philosophy of language or computer theory. Fred Sommers is Professor Emeritus, Brandeis University, USA; George Englebretsen is Professor of Philosophy, Bishop's University, Canada.

Originally published in 1976. This comprehensive study discusses in detail the philosophical, mathematical, physical, logical and theological aspects of our understanding of time and space. The text examines first the many different definitions of time that have been offered, beginning with some of the puzzles arising from our awareness of the passage of time and shows how time can be understood as the concomitant of consciousness. In considering time as the dimension of change, the author obtains a transcendental derivation of the concept of space, and shows why there has to be only one dimension of time and three of space, and why Kant was not altogether misguided in believing the space of our ordinary experience to be Euclidean. The concept of space-time is then discussed, including Lorentz transformations, and in an examination of the applications of tense logic the author discusses the traditional difficulties encountered in arguments for fatalism. In the final sections he discusses eternity and the beginning and end of the universe. The book includes sections on the continuity of space and time, on the directedness of time, on the differences between classical mechanics and the Special and General theories of relativity, on the measurement of time, on the apparent slowing down of moving clocks, and on time and probability.

Originally published in 1990. This study was first written in 1965 when interest in Leibniz was intensifying. The book looks in detail at the doctrine of necessity - that necessary truths are those derivable from the principle of identity by the substitution of definitions. It first considers views of philosophic predecessors, relating Leibniz' doctrine to Aristotle and Hobbes among others. The second section examines the conflict between his reductionistic and formalistic views and the opposing intuitionism and anti-reductionism of Descartes and Locke. The author critically examines the theory of necessity, including Leibniz's arguments against the views of Hobbes and Locke, concluding with distinctions between necessary and contingent truths.