Originally published in 1934. This fourth edition originally published 1954., revised by C. W. K. Mundle. "It must be the desire of every reasonable person to know how to justify a contention which is of sufficient importance to be seriously questioned. The explicit formulation of the principles of sound reasoning is the concern of Logic". This book discusses the habit of sound reasoning which is acquired by consciously attending to the logical principles of sound reasoning, in order to apply them to test the soundness of arguments. It isn't an introduction to logic but it encourages the practice of logic, of deciding whether reasons in argument are sound or unsound. Stress is laid upon the importance of considering language, which is a key instrument of our thinking and is imperfect.

Originally published in 1973. This book is directed to the student of philosophy whose background in mathematics is very limited. The author strikes a balance between material of a philosophical and a formal kind, and does this in a way that will bring out the intricate connections between the two. On the formal side, he gives particular care to provide the basic tools from set theory and arithmetic that are needed to study systems of logic, setting out completeness results for two, three, and four valued logic, explaining concepts such as freedom and bondage in quantificational logic, describing the intuitionistic conception of the logical operators, and setting out Zermelo's axiom system for set theory. On the philosophical side, he gives particular attention to such topics as the problem of entailment, the import of the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem, the expressive powers of quantificational logic, the ideas underlying intuitionistic logic, the nature of set theory, and the relationship between logic and set theory. There are exercises within the text, set out alongside the theoretical ideas that they involve.

Originally published in 1988. This text gives a lucid account of the most distinctive and influential responses by twentieth century philosophers to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The problem first became central to twentieth-century philosophy as a result of the depsychoiogising of logic brought about by Bradley and Frege who, responding to the 'Psychologism' of Mill and Hume, drew a sharp distinction between the province of psychology and the province of logic. This author argues that while Russell, Ryle and Davidson, each in different ways, attempted a theoretical solution, Frege and Wittgenstein (both in the Tractatus and the Investigations) rightly maintained that no theoretical solution is possible. It is this which explains the importance Wittgenstein attached in his later work to the idea of agreement in judgments. The two final chapters illustrate the way in which a response to the problem affects the way in which we think about the nature of the mind. They contain a discussion of Strawson's concept of a person and provide a striking critique of the philosophical claims made by devotees of artificial intelligence, in particular those made by Daniel Dennett.

Originally published in 1937. A short account of the traditional logic, intended to provide the student with the fundamentals necessary for the specialized study. Suitable for working through individualy, it will provide sufficient knowledge of the elements of the subject to understand materials on more advanced and specialized topics. This is an interesting historic perspective on this area of philosophy and mathematics.

Originally published in 1941. Professor Ushenko treats of current problems in technical Logic, involving Symbolic Logic to a marked extent. He deprecates the tendency, in influential quarters, to regard Logic as a branch of Mathematics and advances the intuitionalist theory of Logic. This involves criticism of Carnap, Russell,Wittgenstein, Broad and Whitehead, with additional discussions on Kant and Hegel. The author believes that the union of Philosophy and Logic is a natural one, and that an exclusively mathematical treatment cannot give an adequate account of Logic. A fundamental characteristic of Logic is comprehensiveness, which brings out the affinity between logic and philosophy, for to be comprehensive is the aim of philosophical ambition.

The articles in this volume are all landmarks in the evolution of modern studies in Indian logic. The book traces the development of modern studies in Indian logic from their beginnings right up to 1998. Each of the articles has very specific reasons for its inclusion.

The articles in this volume are all landmarks in the evolution of modern studies in Indian logic. The book traces the development of modern studies in Indian logic from their beginnings right up to the latest work.

Contents:
Hamblin, C L, The Indian Tradition, Fallacies [London: Methuen, 1970]
Randle, H H, A Note on the Indian Syllogism, Mind, 33 [1924]
Staal, Frits, The Concept of Paksa in Indian Logic, Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 [1973]
Staal, J F, Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 25 [1962]
Gillon, Brendan S and Martha Lile Love, Indian Logic Revisited: Nyayapravesa Reviewed, Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 [1980]
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, Some Features of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyaya, Philosophy East and West 40 [1990]
Shaw, J L, The Nyaya on Double Negation, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 [1988]
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, The Middle Term, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9 [1968]
Mohanty, J N, Psychologism in Indian Logic, In B K Matilal and J L Shaw eds., Analytical Philosophy in Comparitive Perspective [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985]
David, Lawrence, Tarka in the Nyaya Theory of Inference, Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 [1981]
Matilal, B K Anenkanta: Both Yes and No? Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 8 [1991]
Staal, J F, Sanskrit Philosophy of Language, In Thomas A Seboek ed., Current Trends in Linguistics: Vol 5, Linguistics in South Asia [The Hague: Mouton, 1969]
Brough, John, Some Indian Theories of Meaning, Transactions of the Philological Society [1953]
Matilal, B K, Reference and Existence in Nyaya and Buddhist Logic, Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 [1970]
Matilal, B K, and P K Sen, The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies Over Meaning, Mind 97 [1988]
Siderits, Mark, The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language, Synthese 69 [1986]
Herzberger, Hans, and Radhika Hersberger, Bhartrhari's Paradox, Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 [1981]

W.V. Quine (1908-) has played a crucial role in philosophy during the second half of the twentieth century. These five volumes contain the most essential of the more than 2000 articles written about Quine's work. Chosen for their clarity and brevity, they cover both basic ideas as well as objections to Quine's work. These articles are a valuable resource for students and scholars; many have been previously available only in hard-to-find sources, and in addition, some have been written or translated expressly for this collection. Available individually or by volume

Russell's "On Denoting" and Frege's "On Sense and Reference" are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of 20th-century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". They have generated a wealth of secondary literature and remain at the forefront of contemporary discussion in philosophy of language, thought and logic. This book challenges the accepted understanding of these two seminal papers. It forces us to reconsider contemporary approaches to the semantics of proper names and definite descriptions through a historically sensitive interpretation of Russell's and Frege's work on meaning. Gideon Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. Makin then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications for our understanding of this essay.

Russell's "On Denoting" and Frege's "On Sense and Reference" are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of 20th-century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". They have generated a wealth of secondary literature and remain at the forefront of contemporary discussion in philosophy of language, thought and logic. This book challenges the accepted understanding of these two seminal papers. It forces us to reconsider contemporary approaches to the semantics of proper names and definite descriptions through a historically sensitive interpretation of Russell's and Frege's work on meaning. Gideon Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. Makin then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications for our understanding of this essay.

Originally published in 1991, this volume examines Hegel's political philosophy from the perspective of his argument for constitutional monarchy. It offers an interpretation of Hegelian theory that is relevant for the understanding of modern republican constitutions. Modern republican theories are assessed together with those of Plato, Kant and Marx in order to put Hegel's model to the most rigorous test. The arguments are based on fresh analysis of Hegel's system and on new translations of key passages in Hegel's text.

Originally published in 1982, this volume examines the sources of British Hegelian thinking, the lines of its development and intellectual relationships among members of the school. The sources in this book include twentieth century Marxians who pioneered the move 'back to Hegel' such as Gramsci and Lukacs. It includes brief biographical entries of the principal British Hegelians and of minor figures wo paved the way for Hegel's entry into British philosophy.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument.
Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically with arguments against justified and rational belief.

This historical study investigates Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic and language, as it is presented in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Drawing on Wittgenstein's correspondence, and on his numerous pre-Tractatus manuscripts, the study makes a case for the Tractatus as an insightful critique of the philosophies of Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege - the Founding Fathers of analytic philosophy.
The book urges a re-assessment of the relative influence of these philosophers on the early Wittgenstein. It argues that the current vogue for "Fregean" readings of the Tractatus has tended to obscure the true depth and importance of Wittgenstein's involvement with Russell's philosophy. This case is built through a series of detailed studies of central logico-linguistic topics including: tautology, logical assertion, the picture theory of the proposition and the deductive inference.

Originally published in 1990. This study was first written in 1965 when interest in Leibniz was intensifying. The book looks in detail at the doctrine of necessity - that necessary truths are those derivable from the principle of identity by the substitution of definitions. It first considers views of philosophic predecessors, relating Leibniz' doctrine to Aristotle and Hobbes among others. The second section examines the conflict between his reductionistic and formalistic views and the opposing intuitionism and anti-reductionism of Descartes and Locke. The author critically examines the theory of necessity, including Leibniz's arguments against the views of Hobbes and Locke, concluding with distinctions between necessary and contingent truths.

This book introduces an important group of logics that have come to be known under the umbrella term 'susbstructural'. Substructural logics have independently led to significant developments in philosophy, computing and linguistics. An Introduction to Substrucural Logics is the first book to systematically survey the new results and the significant impact that this class of logics has had on a wide range of fields.The following topics are covered:
* Proof Theory
* Propositional Structures
* Frames
* Decidability
* Coda
Both students and professors of philosophy, computing, linguistics, and mathematics will find this to be an important addition to their reading.

This book introduces an important group of logics that have come to be known under the umbrella term 'susbstructural'. Substructural logics have independently led to significant developments in philosophy, computing and linguistics. An Introduction to Substrucural Logics is the first book to systematically survey the new results and the significant impact that this class of logics has had on a wide range of fields.The following topics are covered:
* Proof Theory
* Propositional Structures
* Frames
* Decidability
* Coda
Both students and professors of philosophy, computing, linguistics, and mathematics will find this to be an important addition to their reading.

The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism comprises fifty specially written chapters on Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Cartesianism, the dominant paradigm for philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, written by an international group of leading scholars of early modern philosophy. The first part focuses on the various aspects of Descartes's biography (including his background, intellectual contexts, writings, and correspondence) and philosophy, with chapters on his epistemology, method, metaphysics, physics, mathematics, moral philosophy, political thought, medical thought, and aesthetics. The chapters of the second part are devoted to the defense, development and modification of Descartes's ideas by later generations of Cartesian philosophers in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere. The third and final part considers the opposition to Cartesian philosophy by other philosophers, as well as by civil, ecclesiastic, and academic authorities. This handbook provides an extensive overview of Cartesianism - its doctrines, its legacies and its fortunes - in the period based on the latest research.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This work is a contribution to certain aspects of idealistic philosophy. It is a comparative study, yet it is not a comparison for the sake of comparison. This book examines the supra-rational Absolutism of the West developed under the Hegelian influence, and in the light of the criticisms shows the peculiar character of the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara. It is therefore not a mere exposition, but a criticism and construction. The discussions are not cosmological, but epistemological and metaphysical, approached from the side of logic. The work may also be viewed as a reorientation of Sankara's system. It places Sankara's philosophy in line with the idealistic philosophies of the West, so that we can understand the peculiarities of the former in terms of the latter. It thus discovers or brings into clearer light the guiding principle of Sankara's thought. It brings out the full significance of the principles of non-contradiction applied by Sankara as a test of truth and reality, and shows its difference from the same principle as understood by Hegel and the Hegelians. The aim of this work is to attempt at laying the metaphysical foundation of the logic of supra-rational Absolutism, the interpretation of Advaita is based mostly on polemical works.

First published in 1998, this volume has its origin in a meeting that was held in Santiago de Compostela University, Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in January 1996. The meeting was organized by the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science in cooperation with the Association for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain. Within analytical philosophy issues such as the definability of truth, its semantic relevance, its role in the distinction between formal and natural languages, the status of truth-bearers or in its case of truth-makers, have become a crossroads in the studies of logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology and ontology. Thus, in spite of what the title Truth in Perspective may suggest to the reader at first, the present volume is not only - though it is also a presentation of different theories or conceptions of truth. Most of the book presents a vision of different groups of philosophical questions in which the issue of truth appears embedded together with other related themes, from different points of view.