Contemporary or postmodern thought is based on the lack of foundation. The impossibility of having a principle for philosophy has become a position of principle. As a result, rhetoric has taken over. Content has given way to the priority of form. Michel Meyer's book aims at showing that philosophy as foundational is possible and necessary, and that rhetoric can flourish alongside, but the conception of reason must be changed. Questioning rather than answering must be considered as the guiding principle.

What the author calls "problematology" is not only the study of questioning but also the analysis of the reasons why it has been repressed throughout the history of philosophy. Since Socrates, philosophers and scientists have reasoned by asking questions and by trying to solve them. Questioning has been the unthematized foundation of philosophy and thought at large. Philosophers, however, have preferred another norm, granting privilege to the answers and thereby repressing the questions into the realm of the preliminary and unessential. They have not considered their discursive practice as being based upon some question-answer (or problem-solution) complex, but exclusively on the results they call propositions. Meyer argues that propositions ensue from corresponding questions, and not the other way around.

Anthropology, ontology, reasoning, and language thus receive a new interpretation in the problematological conception of philosophy, a conception in which questions and problems are thematized afresh. The theory of language in everyday use, in argumentation, or in literary analysis receives a full and decisive treatment here, making Meyer's question-view one of the leading theories in contemporary thought, alongside his rhetoric for which he is already well known.

This introduction to modern formal logic also contains discussions on more philosophical issues, such as truth, conditionals and modal logic. It presents the formal material using informal explanations and arguments rather than rigorous development. Worked examples and exercises enable readers to check their progress. The aim is to equip students with: a complete and clear account of the truth-tree system for first order logic; the importance of logic and its relevance to many different disciplines; the skills needed to grasp sophisticated formal reasoning techniques necessary to explore complex metalogic; and the ability to contest claims that "ordinary" reasoning is well represented by formal first order logic. The issues covered include truth-functional and full first order logic, using the truth-tree or semantic tableau approach. Completeness and soundness proofs are given for both truth-functional and first order trees. Much use is made of induction, which is presented in a clear and consistent manner. There is also discussion of alternative deductive systems.

Contents:
Introduction. Part 1: Truth-Functional Logic Chapter 1. The Basics 1. Deductively Valid Inference 2. Syntax: Connectives and the Principle of Composition 3. Semantics: Truth-Functionality 4. Negation and Conjunction 5. Disjunction 6. Truth-Functional Equivalence 7. The Conditional 8. Some Other Connectives, and the Biconditional Chapter 2. Truth Trees 1. Truth-Functionally Valid Inference 2. Conjugate Tree Diagrams 3. Truth Trees 4. Tautologies and Contradictions Chapter 3. Propositional Languages 1. Propositional Languages 2. Object Language and Metalanguage 3. Ancestral Trees 4. An Induction Principle 5. Multiple Conjunctions and Disjunctions 6. The Disjunctive Normal Form Theorem 7. Adequate Sets of Connectives 8. The Duality Principle 9. Conjunctive Normal Forms Chapter 4. Soundness and Completeness 1. The Standard Propositional Language 2. Truth Trees Again 3. Truth-Functional Consistency, Truth-Functionally Valid Inferences, and Trees 4. Soundness and Completeness Part 2: First Order Logic Chapter 5. Introduction 1. Some Non-Truth-Functional Inferences 2. Quantifiers and Variables 3. Relations 4. Formalising English Sentences Chapter 6. First Languages: Syntax and Two More Trees Rules 1. First Order Languages 2. Two More Tree Rules 3. Tree Proofs Chapter 7. First Order Languages: Semantics 1. Interpretations 2. Formulas and Truth 3. The Tree Rules Revisited 4. Consistency and Validity 5. Logical Truth and Logical Equivalence Chapter 8. Soundness and Completeness 1. Applying the Tree Rules 2. Branch Models 3. Soundness and Completeness Theorems 4. Compactness Chapter 9. Identity 1. Identity 2. Tree Rules For Identity 3. Some Arithmetic 4. Functions and Function Symbols 5. Working with Equations 6. Is Identity Part of Logic? Chapter 10. Alternative Deductive Systems for First Order Logic 1. Introduction 2. H 3 ND 4. Comparisons 5. Intuitionism Chapter 11. First Order Theories 1. First Order Theories 2. Infinite Cardinals 3. Lowenheim-Skolem Theorems 4. Second Order Languages 5. Completeness 6. The Liar Paradox Chapter 12. Beyond the Fringe 1. Counterfactual Conditions 2. Modal Propositional Logic 3. Indicative Conditionals and 4. Conclusion. List of Notation. Answers to Selected Exercises.

"Coalescent Argumentation" is based on the concept that arguments can function from agreement, rather than disagreement. To prove this idea, Gilbert first discusses how several components--emotional, visceral (physical) and kisceral (intuitive) are utilized in an argumentative setting by people everyday. These components, also characterized as "modes," are vital to argumentative communication because they affect both the argument and the resulting outcome.
In addition to the components/modes, this book also stresses the goals in argumentation as a means for understanding one's own and one's opposer's positions. Gilbert argues that by viewing positions as complex human events involving a variety of communicative modes, we are better able to find commonalities across positions, and, therefore, move from conflict to resolution. By focusing on agreement and shared goals in all modes, arguers can coalesce diverse positions and more easily distinguish between minor or unrelated differences and core disagreements. This permits much greater latitude for locating shared beliefs, values, and attitudes that will lead to conflict resolution.

"Coalescent Argumentation" is based on the concept that arguments can function from agreement, rather than disagreement. To prove this idea, Gilbert first discusses how several components--emotional, visceral (physical) and kisceral (intuitive) are utilized in an argumentative setting by people everyday. These components, also characterized as "modes," are vital to argumentative communication because they affect both the argument and the resulting outcome.
In addition to the components/modes, this book also stresses the goals in argumentation as a means for understanding one's own and one's opposer's positions. Gilbert argues that by viewing positions as complex human events involving a variety of communicative modes, we are better able to find commonalities across positions, and, therefore, move from conflict to resolution. By focusing on agreement and shared goals in all modes, arguers can coalesce diverse positions and more easily distinguish between minor or unrelated differences and core disagreements. This permits much greater latitude for locating shared beliefs, values, and attitudes that will lead to conflict resolution.

In three comprehensive volumes, Logic of the Future presents a full panorama of Charles S. Peirce's important late writings. Among the most influential American thinkers, Peirce took his existential graphs to be his greatest contribution to human thought. The manuscripts from 1895-1913, most of which are published here for the first time, testify the richness and open-endedness of his theory of logic and its applications. They also invite us to reconsider our ordinary conceptions of reasoning as well as the conventional stories told about the evolution of modern logic. This second volume collects Peirce's writings on existential graphs related to his Lowell Lectures of 1903, the annus mirabilis of his that became decisive in the development of the mature theory of the graphical method of logic.

This book, a rich collection authored by rhetorical scholars, unpacks how rhetoric contributes to argumentation studies. It begins with an introduction that identifies defining features of a rhetorical approach to argumentation which has several corollaries, including the special status of argumentation about action, the condition of uncertainty and the necessity of securing adherence from an audience. Chapters explore topics such as the properties of argumentation in the realm of rhetoric, the use of presentational devices, the role of rhetoric in the evolving formation of public morality, conditions for democratic argumentation, argument pedagogy, rhetorical insights into science communication, and other features within the realm of rhetorical argumentation. This book is relevant to students and researchers in linguistics, rhetoric, philosophy, argumentation studies, and communication studies. Previously published in Argumentation Volume 34, issue 3, September 2020

This long-awaited book replaces not one but both of Hughes and Cresswell's two previous classic studies of modal logic: "An Introduction to Modal Logic" and "A Companion to Modal Logic."
"A New Introduction to Modal Logic" has been completely rewritten by the authors to incorporate all the developments that have taken place since 1968 both in modal propositional logical and modal predicate logic, but without sacrificing the clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of the earlier works.
The book takes readers through the most basic systems of modal prepositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It deals with both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and discusses philosophical applications, especially, in the area of modal predicate logic.

This book contains a selection of the papers presented at the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality 2010 conference (LRR10) in Ghent. The conference aimed at stimulating the use of formal frameworks to explicate concrete cases of human reasoning, and conversely, to challenge scholars in formal studies by presenting them with interesting new cases of actual reasoning. According to the members of the Wiener Kreis, there was a strong connection between logic, reasoning, and rationality and that human reasoning is rational in so far as it is based on (classical) logic. Later, this belief came under attack and logic was deemed inadequate to explicate actual cases of human reasoning. Today, there is a growing interest in reconnecting logic, reasoning and rationality. A central motor for this change was the development of non-classical logics and non-classical formal frameworks. The book contains contributions in various non-classical formal frameworks, case studies that enhance our apprehension of concrete reasoning patterns, and studies of the philosophical implications for our understanding of the notions of rationality.

Chapter 9 of Aristotle's "On Interpretation" deals with determinism, and here the two influential commentaries of Ammonius and Boethius have been published together. These are crucial works, for Ammonuis' commentary influenced the Islamic Middle Ages, while that of Boethius was of equal importance to medieval Latin-speaking philosophers. It was once argued that Boethius was influenced by Ammonius, and this work aims to show that this was clearly not the case. Ammonius draws on the fourth- and fifth-century Neoplatonists Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus. He arranges his argument around three major deterministic arguments and is our main source for one of them, the Reaper argument. Boethius, on the other hand, draws on controversies from 300 years earlier between Stoics and Aristotelians as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry.

If you keep removing single grains of sand from a heap, when is it no longer a heap? From discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece, to modern formal approaches like fuzzy logic, Timothy Williamson traces the history of the problem of vagueness. He argues that standard logic and formal semantics apply even to vague languages and defends the controversial, realist view that vagueness is a form of ignorance - there really is a grain of sand whose removal turns a heap into a non-heap, but we can never know exactly which one it is.

Argumentation theory is a distinctly multidisciplinary field of inquiry. It draws its data, assumptions, and methods from disciplines as disparate as formal logic and discourse analysis, linguistics and forensic science, philosophy and psychology, political science and education, sociology and law, and rhetoric and artificial intelligence. This presents the growing group of interested scholars and students with a problem of access, since it is even for those active in the field not common to have acquired a familiarity with relevant aspects of each discipline that enters into this multidisciplinary matrix. This book offers its readers a unique comprehensive survey of the various theoretical contributions which have been made to the study of argumentation. It discusses the historical works that provide the background to the field and all major approaches and trends in contemporary research.
Argument has been the subject of systematic inquiry for twenty-five hundred years. It has been graced with theories, such as formal logic or the legal theory of evidence, that have acquired a more or less settled provenance with regard to specific issues. But there has been nothing to date that qualifies as a unified general theory of argumentation, in all its richness and complexity. This being so, the argumentation theorist must have access to materials and methods that lie beyond his or her "home" subject. It is precisely on this account that this volume is offered to all the constituent research communities and their students. Apart from the historical sections, each chapter provides an economical introduction to the problems and methods that characterize a given part of the contemporary research program. Because the chapters are self-contained, they can be consulted in the order of a reader's interests or research requirements. But there is value in reading the work in its entirety. Jointly authored by the very people whose research has done much to define the current state of argumentation theory and to point the way toward more general and unified future treatments, this book is an impressively authoritative contribution to the field.

Argumentation theory is a distinctly multidisciplinary field of inquiry. It draws its data, assumptions, and methods from disciplines as disparate as formal logic and discourse analysis, linguistics and forensic science, philosophy and psychology, political science and education, sociology and law, and rhetoric and artificial intelligence. This presents the growing group of interested scholars and students with a problem of access, since it is even for those active in the field not common to have acquired a familiarity with relevant aspects of each discipline that enters into this multidisciplinary matrix. This book offers its readers a unique comprehensive survey of the various theoretical contributions which have been made to the study of argumentation. It discusses the historical works that provide the background to the field and all major approaches and trends in contemporary research.
Argument has been the subject of systematic inquiry for twenty-five hundred years. It has been graced with theories, such as formal logic or the legal theory of evidence, that have acquired a more or less settled provenance with regard to specific issues. But there has been nothing to date that qualifies as a unified general theory of argumentation, in all its richness and complexity. This being so, the argumentation theorist must have access to materials and methods that lie beyond his or her "home" subject. It is precisely on this account that this volume is offered to all the constituent research communities and their students. Apart from the historical sections, each chapter provides an economical introduction to the problems and methods that characterize a given part of the contemporary research program. Because the chapters are self-contained, they can be consulted in the order of a reader's interests or research requirements. But there is value in reading the work in its entirety. Jointly authored by the very people whose research has done much to define the current state of argumentation theory and to point the way toward more general and unified future treatments, this book is an impressively authoritative contribution to the field.

Originally published in 1976. This comprehensive study discusses in detail the philosophical, mathematical, physical, logical and theological aspects of our understanding of time and space. The text examines first the many different definitions of time that have been offered, beginning with some of the puzzles arising from our awareness of the passage of time and shows how time can be understood as the concomitant of consciousness. In considering time as the dimension of change, the author obtains a transcendental derivation of the concept of space, and shows why there has to be only one dimension of time and three of space, and why Kant was not altogether misguided in believing the space of our ordinary experience to be Euclidean. The concept of space-time is then discussed, including Lorentz transformations, and in an examination of the applications of tense logic the author discusses the traditional difficulties encountered in arguments for fatalism. In the final sections he discusses eternity and the beginning and end of the universe. The book includes sections on the continuity of space and time, on the directedness of time, on the differences between classical mechanics and the Special and General theories of relativity, on the measurement of time, on the apparent slowing down of moving clocks, and on time and probability.

Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. The exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While the action-theoretic and epistemic questions raised are closely related, advances in one field are not always processed by the other. This volume brings together contributions by scholars in action theory and formal epistemology working on questions regarding rationality and time so that researchers in these overlapping fields can profit from each other's insights. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available a selection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide important background information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers. Available individually by volume.
1. The Emergence of Logical Empiricism (0-8153-2262-3) 432 pages
2. Logical Empiricism at its Peak (0-8153-2263-1) 4243 pages
3. Logic, Probability, and Epistemology (0-8153-2264-X) 424 pages
4. Logical Empiricism and the Special Sciences (0-8153-2265-8) 376 pages
5. Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricsm (0-8153-2266-6) 440 pages
6. The Legacy of the Vienna Circle (0-8153-2267-4) 400 pages

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available aselection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers.

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available aselection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide important background information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers.

Our finances, politics, media, opportunities, information, shopping and knowledge production are mediated through algorithms and their statistical approaches to knowledge; increasingly, these methods form the organizational backbone of contemporary capitalism. Revolutionary Mathematics traces the revolution in statistics and probability that has quietly underwritten the explosion of machine learning, big data and predictive algorithms that now decide many aspects of our lives. Exploring shifts in the philosophical understanding of probability in the late twentieth century, Joque shows how this was not merely a technical change but a wholesale philosophical transformation in the production of knowledge and the extraction of value. This book provides a new and unique perspective on the dangers of allowing artificial intelligence and big data to manage society. It is essential reading for those who want to understand the underlying ideological and philosophical changes that have fueled the rise of algorithms and convinced so many to blindly trust their outputs, reshaping our current political and economic situation.

Published in 1946, this volume does not purpose to be a treatise on logic. The author's contributions to the substance of logical doctrine have been made in his other works. What he has attempted in the studies that form this volume is an exploration of the periphery of logic, the relation of logic to the rest of the universe, the philosophical presuppositions which give logic its meaning and the applications which give it importance. It is his belief that formal logic is the heart of philosophy, since the subject matter of logic is the formal aspect of all being. From this standpoint he explores the relation of logic to such fields of study as natural science, ethics, history and general philosophy.

Reissuing five works originally published between 1937 and 1991, this collection contains books addressing the subject of time, from a mostly philosophic point of view but also of interest to those in the science and mathematics worlds. These texts are brought back into print in this small set of works addressing how we think about time, the history of the philosophy of time, the measurement of time, theories of relativity and discussions of the wider thinking about time and space, among other aspects. One volume is a thorough bibliography collating references on the subject of time across many disciplines.

First published in 1999, this volume re-examines Bertrand Russell's views on modal logic and logical relevance, arguing that Russell does in fact accommodate modality and modal logic. The author, Jan Dejnozka, draws together Russell's comments and perspectives from throughout his canon in order to demonstrate a coherent view on logical modality and logical relevance. To achieve this, Dejnozka explores questions including whether Russell has a possible worlds logic, Rescher's case against Russell, Russell's three levels of modality and the motives and origins of Russell's theory of modality.

First published in 1998, Taking on Wittgensteinianism themes, but also using, or relying on several mathematical results, Slater in this book explores the idea of realism and further argues how in a philosophical viewpoint is incorrect. Slater also surveys various philosophers in the field of logic to argue against the idea of realism.

First published in 1998, Loughlin examines the conception of rationality through the gazes of science, philosophy and political philosophy to further explain the concept of rational reasoning, the effects it has on the development on natural and social science and its implications on how we think about morals and politics.

First published in 1927, this translation of Kulpe's 'Einleitung in die Philosophie', 1895, covered psychology, logic, ethics, esthetics and general philosophy. The author adopted a uniform approach of positivity, interest and impartiality, aiming his work at a wider public than students of philosophy. The volume was intended as an elementary but complete guide to philosophy, past and present and included facts and arguments previously confined to philosophical encyclopaedias.