Experimental philosophy is one of the most exciting and controversial philosophical movements today. This book explores how it is reshaping thought about philosophical method. Experimental philosophy imports experimental methods and findings from psychology into philosophy. These fresh resources can be used to develop and defend both armchair methods and naturalist approaches, on an empirical basis. This outstanding collection brings together leading proponents of this new meta-philosophical naturalism, from within and beyond experimental philosophy. They explore how the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuition and cognition transforms traditional philosophical approaches and facilitates fresh ones. Part One examines important uses of traditional "armchair" methods which are not threatened by experimental work and develops empirically informed accounts of such methods that can potentially stand up to experimental scrutiny. Part Two analyses different uses and rationales of experimental methods in several areas of philosophy and addresses the key methodological challenges to experimental philosophy: Do its experiments target the intuitions that matter in philosophy? And how can they support conclusions about the rights and wrongs of philosophical views? Essential reading for students of experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism will also interest students and researchers in related areas such as epistemology and the philosophies of language, perception, mind and action, science and psychology.

This volume contains 21 new and original contributions to the study of formal semantics, written by distinguished experts in response to landmark papers in the field. The chapters make the target articles more accessible by providing background, modernizing the notation, providing critical commentary, explaining the afterlife of the proposals, and offering a useful bibliography for further study. The chapters were commissioned by the series editors to mark the 100th volume in the book series Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy. The target articles are amongst the most widely read and cited papers up to the end of the 20th century, and cover most of the important subfields of formal semantics. The authors are all prominent researchers in the field, making this volume a valuable addition to the literature for researchers, students, and teachers of formal semantics. Chapter 19 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

Experimental philosophy is one of the most exciting and controversial philosophical movements today. This book explores how it is reshaping thought about philosophical method. Experimental philosophy imports experimental methods and findings from psychology into philosophy. These fresh resources can be used to develop and defend both armchair methods and naturalist approaches, on an empirical basis. This outstanding collection brings together leading proponents of this new meta-philosophical naturalism, from within and beyond experimental philosophy. They explore how the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuition and cognition transforms traditional philosophical approaches and facilitates fresh ones. Part One examines important uses of traditional "armchair" methods which are not threatened by experimental work and develops empirically informed accounts of such methods that can potentially stand up to experimental scrutiny. Part Two analyses different uses and rationales of experimental methods in several areas of philosophy and addresses the key methodological challenges to experimental philosophy: Do its experiments target the intuitions that matter in philosophy? And how can they support conclusions about the rights and wrongs of philosophical views? Essential reading for students of experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism will also interest students and researchers in related areas such as epistemology and the philosophies of language, perception, mind and action, science and psychology.

The mathematical proof is the most important form of justification in mathematics. It is not, however, the only kind of justification for mathematical propositions. The existence of other forms, some of very significant strength, places a question mark over the prominence given to proof within mathematics. This collection of essays, by leading figures working within the philosophy of mathematics, is a response to the challenge of understanding the nature and role of the proof.

I am indebted to many people for the help they gave me in the writing of this book. lowe a large debt to David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker, on both general and specific grounds. As becomes apparent from reading the notes, the book would not have been possible without their pioneering work on subjunctive conditionals. In addition, both were kind enough to provide specific comments on earlier versions of different parts of the book, and Stalnaker read and commented on the entire manuscript. Closer to home, I am indebted to my colleagues Rolf Eberle and Henry Kyburg, Jf., my erstwhile colleague Keith Lehrer, and numerous graduate students for their helpful comments on various parts of the manuscript. Some of the material contained herein appeared first in the form of journal articles, and I wish to thank the journals in question for allowing the material to be reprinted here. Chapter One contains material taken from 'The "Possible Worlds" Analysis of Counter-factuals', published in Phil. Studies 29 (1976), 469 (Reidel); Chapter Two contains material much revised from 'Four Kinds of Conditionals', Am. Phil. Quarterly 12 (1975), and Chapter Three contains much revised material from 'Subjunctive Generaliza tions', Synthese 28 (1974), 199 (Reidel). CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1. SUBJUNCTIVE REASONING There exists quite a variety of statements which are in some sense 'subjunctive'."

This second edition of Free Will presents a complete treatment of the history of the debate over whether humans have free will. It analyses the conditions under which actions must be characterized as unfree, and explores whether recent findings in brain physiology counter-indicate free will. Nicholas Rescher leads the reader through a conceptual web of distinctions that, taken together, provide a satisfying contribution to philosophical thought on free will. To determine if humans have free will, Rescher first examines exactly what free will is and how it should function. He examines the role of nature, nurture, and free choice, and he concludes that it is possible to validate the compatibility between freedom of the will and a certain special mode of determinism. Rescher sharpens his highly conceptual assessment by making distinctions between productive (or metaphysical) and moral (or motivational) freedom. He also distinguishes between free decision and free action, and motivational and causal determination of choices. In addition, he considers the distinction between durational events and the instantaneous outcomes that mark their commencements and completions, as well as between pre-determination and determination based on precedence. New in paperback and completely revised, this edition of Free Will represents a leading contemporary philosopher in top form.

Sanskrit Debate: Vasubandhu's 'Vimsatika' versus Kumarila's 'Niralambanavada' illustrates the rules and regulations of classical Indian debate literature (pramanasastra) by introducing new translations of two Sanskrit texts composed in antithesis to each other's tradition of thought and practice. In the third century CE, Vasubandhu, a Buddhist philosopher-monk, proposed that the entire world of lived experience is a matter of mind only through his Vimsatika (Twenty Verses). In the seventh century CE, Kumarila, a Hindu philosopher-priest, composed Niralambanavada (Non-Sensory Limit Debate) to establish the objective reality of objects by refuting Vasubandhu's claim that objects experienced in waking life are not different from objects experienced in dreams. Kumarila rigorously employs formal rules and regulations of Indian logic and debate to demonstrate that Vasubandhu's assertion is totally irrational and incoherent. Vimsatika ranks among the world's most misunderstood texts but Kumarila's historic refutation allows Vimsatika to be read in its own text-historical context. This compelling, radically revolutionary re-reading of Vimsatika delineates a hermeneutic of humor indispensable to discerning its medicinal message. In Vimsatika, Vasubandhu employs the form of professional Sanskrit logic and debate as a guise and a ruse to ridicule the entire enterprise of Indian philosophy. Vasubandhu critiques all Indian theories of epistemology and ontology and claims that both how we know and what we know are acts of the imagination.

First published in 1985, Practical Inferences describes how practical inferences are used. Starting with relatively simple inference patterns exhibited in everyday prudential decisions, the author extends a basic structural framework to the more complex inferences used in assessing probabilities, and finally to moral inferences. In this way what have been regarded as disparate activities are shown to exhibit fundamental similarities. The author argues that at all levels of decision-making the practical inferences used contain at least one premise expressing the desires or preferences of the agent. This is in opposition to the dominant view in Western philosophy that desires must be regulated or evaluated by means of principles of conduct discovered by rational procedures. By examining the premises implied by holders of this view, the author shows that they are inadequate bases for justifying practical decisions. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy, logic and mathematics.

Many philosophers adopt methods that emulate those of the natural sciences. They call such an overall approach naturalism, and consider it indispensable for fruitful philosophical debate in various areas. In spite of this consensus however, little is ever said about how naturalism depends on the underlying idea of nature, which we often endorse unconsciously. If we can determine how naturalism reflects an underlying account of nature, we would be in a better position to distinguish between different kinds of naturalism and to assess the merits of each. This book undertakes a sustained study of the concept of nature to answer this need. It examines in detail how conceptual, historical, and scientific constraints affect the concept of nature in various domains of philosophy, and how, in the opposite sense, these constraints are themselves affected by the concept of nature. In so doing, this book relates the conceptual framework of scientific inquiry back to the lived experience that is proper to everyday self-understanding.

Timothy Smiley has made ground-breaking contributions to modal logic, free logic, multiple-conclusion logic, and plural logic. He has illuminated Aristotle's syllogistic, the ideas of logical form and consequence, and the distinction between assertion and rejection, and has worked to debunk the theory of descriptions. This volume brings together new articles by an international roster of leading logicians and philosophers in order to honour Smiley's work. Their essays will be of significant interest to those working across the logical spectrum-in philosophy of language, philosophical and mathematical logic, and philosophy of mathematics.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The collective focus of the essays here presented consists of the attempt to overcome the deadlock between metaphysical and non- (or anti-) metaphysical Hegel interpretations. There is no doubt that Hegel rejects traditional and influential forms of metaphysical thought. There is also no doubt that he grounds his philosophical system on a metaphysical theory of thought and reality. The question asked by the contributors in this volume is therefore: what kind of metaphysics does Hegel reject, and what kind does he embrace? Some of the papers address the issue in general and comprehensive terms, but from different, even opposite perspectives: Hegel's claim of a 'unity' of logic and metaphysics; his potentially deflationary understanding of metaphysics; his overt metaphysical commitments; his subject-less notion of logical thought; and his criticism of Kant's critique of metaphysics. Other contributors discuss the same topics in view of very specific subject-matter in Hegel's corpus, to wit: the philosophy of self-consciousness; practical philosophy; teleology and holism; a particular brand of naturalism; language's relation to thought; 'true' and 'spurious' infinity as pivotal in philosophic thinking; and Hegel's conception of human agency and action.

In Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, Nicholas Smith develops a new theory of vagueness: fuzzy plurivaluationism. A predicate is said to be vague if there is no sharply defined boundary between the things to which it applies and the things to which it does not apply. For example, 'heavy' is vague in a way that 'weighs over 20 kilograms' is not. A great many predicates - both in everyday talk, and in a wide array of theoretical vocabularies, from law to psychology to engineering - are vague. Smith argues, on the basis of a detailed account of the defining features of vagueness, that an accurate theory of vagueness must involve the idea that truth comes in degrees. The core idea of degrees of truth is that while some sentences are true and some are false, others possess intermediate truth values: they are truer than the false sentences, but not as true as the true ones. Degree-theoretic treatments of vagueness have been proposed in the past, but all have encountered significant objections. In light of these, Smith develops a new type of degree theory. Its innovations include a definition of logical consequence that allows the derivation of a classical consequence relation from the degree-theoretic semantics, a unified account of degrees of truth and subjective probabilities, and the incorporation of semantic indeterminacy - the view that vague statements need not have unique meanings - into the degree-theoretic framework. As well as being essential reading for those working on vagueness, Smith's book provides an excellent entry-point for newcomers to the era - both from elsewhere in philosophy, and from computer science, logic and engineering. It contains a thorough introduction to existing theories of vagueness and to the requisite logical background.

David Morrow and Anthony Weston build on Weston's acclaimed A Rulebook for Arguments to offer a complete textbook for a course in critical thinking or informal logic. Features of the book include: Homework exercises adapted from a wide range of actual arguments from newspapers, philosophical texts, literature, movies, YouTube videos, and other sources. Practical advice to help students succeed when applying the Rulebook 's rules. Suggestions for further practice that outline activities students can do by themselves or with classmates to improve their critical thinking skills. Detailed instructions for in-class activities and take-home assignments designed to engage students in critical thinking. An appendix on mapping arguments, a topic not included in the Rulebook , that introduces students to this vital skill in evaluating or constructing complex and multi-step arguments. Model responses to odd-numbered exercises, including commentaries on the strengths and weaknesses of selected model responses as well as further discussion of some of the substantive intellectual, philosophical, and ethical issues raised by the exercises. The third edition of Workbook contains the entire text of the recent fifth edition of the Rulebook , supplementing this core text with extensive further explanations and exercises. Updated and improved homework exercises ensure that the examples continue to resonate with today's students. Roughly one-third of the exercises have been replaced with updated or improved examples. A new chapter on engaging constructively in public debates -including five new sets of exercises-trains students to engage respectfully and constructively on controversial topics, an increasingly important skill in our hyper-partisan age. Three new critical thinking activities offer further opportunities to practice constructive dialogue.

This book is presented by two authors who worked in close cooperation. The first part is written by Ewa Binczyk and discusses various postulates that have been formulated in response to the problem of the unwanted side-effects of the practical success of technoscience which derive from two theoretical perspectives: the study of risk and science and technology studies (STS), inspired by actor-network theory (ANT). In the second part of the book Tomasz Stepien analyses and characterizes the nano-domain as an example of the development of techno-sciences. Generally, in the case of nanotechnology this book calibrates reciprocally to each other the indeed familiar but also slightly different theoretical approaches established in the philosophy of science and technology.

This open access book makes a case for extending logic beyond its traditional boundaries, to encompass not only statements but also also questions. The motivations for this extension are examined in detail. It is shown that important notions, including logical answerhood and dependency, emerge as facets of the fundamental notion of entailment once logic is extended to questions, and can therefore be treated with the logician's toolkit, including model-theoretic constructions and proof systems. After motivating the enterprise, the book describes how classical propositional and predicate logic can be made inquisitive-i.e., extended conservatively with questions-and what the resulting logics look like in terms of meta-theoretic properties and proof systems. Finally, the book discusses the tight connections between inquisitive logic and dependence logic.

Language as reason represents the unifying theme of this multifaceted reflection on Eddo Rigotti's scientific contribution offered by his students and colleagues on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Spanning argumentation theory, linguistics, psychology, semiotics and communication sciences, the volume reflects Rigotti's generous personality and his trajectory of semiotician, philosopher, linguist and specialist in argumentation studies. Language as an instrument of communication with semiotic peculiarities is considered at different levels in which it manifests traces of reason at work. This means considering how reality reveals itself by means of language and how the semiotic character of language structures is used by people to enable joint actions and change the natural and social world. Particularly in focus is the realm of argumentation, that is of those joint actions where people exchange reasons in various communities, fora and markets in view of understanding and practical deliberation. To argumentation Eddo Rigotti devoted all his research efforts in recent years, with a keen sense of its intrinsic educational value and a sincere care for fostering the development of the argumentative mind.

Used in a variety of courses in various disciplines, Asking the Right Questions helps students bridge the gap between simply memorizing or blindly accepting information, and the greater challenge of critical analysis and synthesis. Specifically, this concise text teaches students to think critically by exploring the components of arguments--issues, conclusions, reasons, evidence, assumptions, language--and on how to spot fallacies and manipulations and obstacles to critical thinking in both written and visual communication. It teaches them to respond to alternative points of view and develop a solid foundation for making personal choices about what to accept and what to reject.

This book revisits the definition of polemical discourse and deals with its functions in the democratic sphere. It first examines theoretical questions concerning the management of disagreement in democracy and the nature of polemical discourse. Next, it analyses case studies involving such issues as the place of women in the public space, illustrated by the case of the burqa in France and public controversy in the media on the exclusion of women from the public space. The book then explores reason, passion and violence in polemical discourse by means of cases involving confrontations between secular and ultra-orthodox circles, controversies about the Mexican Wall and fierce discussions about stock-options, and bonuses in times of financial crisis. Although polemical exchanges in the public sphere exacerbate dissent instead of resolving conflicts, they are quite frequent in the media and on the Net. How can we explain such a paradox? Most studies in argumentation avoid the question: they mainly focus on the verbal procedures leading to agreement. This focus stems from the centrality conferred upon consensus in our democratic societies, where decisions should be the result of a process of deliberation. What is then the social function of a confrontational management of dissent that does not primarily seek to achieve agreement? Is it just a sign of decadence, failure and powerlessness, or does it play a constructive role? This book answers these questions.

This work outlines and systematically defends a mathematically and logically sophisticated understanding of the concept of the 'many', a concept which has been at the centre of many debates for over a century.

Russell's "On Denoting" and Frege's "On Sense and Reference" are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of 20th-century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". They have generated a wealth of secondary literature and remain at the forefront of contemporary discussion in philosophy of language, thought and logic. This book challenges the accepted understanding of these two seminal papers. It forces us to reconsider contemporary approaches to the semantics of proper names and definite descriptions through a historically sensitive interpretation of Russell's and Frege's work on meaning. Gideon Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. Makin then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications for our understanding of this essay.

In The Causal Exclusion Problem, the popular strategy of abandoning any one of the principles constituting the causal exclusion problem is considered, but ultimately rejected. The metaphysical foundations undergirding the causal exclusion problem are then explored, revealing that the causal exclusion problem cannot be dislodged by undermining its metaphysical foundations - as some are in the habit of doing. Finally, the significant difficulties associated with the bevy of contemporary nonreductive solutions, from supervenience to emergentism, are expanded upon. While conducting this survey of contemporary options, however, two novel approaches are introduced, both of which may resolve the causal exclusion problem from within a nonreductive physicalist paradigm. The Causal Exclusion Problem, which relentlessly motivates the vexing causal exclusion problem and exhaustively surveys its metaphysical assumptions and contemporary responses, is ideal for an advanced undergraduate or graduate course in the philosophy of mind.

John Stuart Mill considered his A System of Logic, first published in 1843, the methodological foundation and intellectual groundwork of his later works in ethical, social, and political theory. Yet no book has attempted in the past to engage with the most important aspects of Mill's Logic. This volume brings together leading scholars to elucidate the key themes of this influential work, looking at such topics as his philosophy of language and mathematics, his view on logic, induction and deduction, free will, argumentation, ethology and psychology, as well as his account of normativity, kinds of pleasure, philosophical and political method and the "Art of Life."