The book offers a reflection on the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge that have been at the focus of the author's work over decades. The essays collected in this volume expound and extend these efforts in exploring the outer fringes of understanding: the outer boundaries of conceivability, the limits of cognition, and the ramifications of ineffability and paradox. They join in exploring the lay of the land at the boundaries of knowledge. The first chapters address basic facts regarding the conceptualization of knowledge. This is followed by a study on how to deal with problems relating to the affirmation and considerations of truth. The final chapters scrutinize the limits of demonstration and the inherent impossibility of realizing an ideal systematization of our knowledge of totalities. The book affords novel perspectives regarding the thought of a widely appreciated philosopher. It is an original work aimed for readers interested in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of cognition.

This volume presents the state of the art in the algebraic investigation into substructural logics. It features papers from the workshop AsubL (Algebra & Substructural Logics - Take 6). Held at the University of Cagliari, Italy, this event is part of the framework of the Horizon 2020 Project SYSMICS: SYntax meets Semantics: Methods, Interactions, and Connections in Substructural logics. Substructural logics are usually formulated as Gentzen systems that lack one or more structural rules. They have been intensively studied over the past two decades by logicians of various persuasions. These researchers include mathematicians, philosophers, linguists, and computer scientists. Substructural logics are applicable to the mathematical investigation of such processes as resource-conscious reasoning, approximate reasoning, type-theoretical grammar, and other focal notions in computer science. They also apply to epistemology, economics, and linguistics. The recourse to algebraic methods -- or, better, the fecund interplay of algebra and proof theory -- has proved useful in providing a unifying framework for these investigations. The AsubL series of conferences, in particular, has played an important role in these developments. This collection will appeal to students and researchers with an interest in substructural logics, abstract algebraic logic, residuated lattices, proof theory, universal algebra, and logical semantics.

This volume presents different conceptions of logic and mathematics and discuss their philosophical foundations and consequences. This concerns first of all topics of Wittgenstein's ideas on logic and mathematics; questions about the structural complexity of propositions; the more recent debate about Neo-Logicism and Neo-Fregeanism; the comparison and translatability of different logics; the foundations of mathematics: intuitionism, mathematical realism, and formalism. The contributing authors are Matthias Baaz, Francesco Berto, Jean-Yves Beziau, Elena Dragalina-Chernya, Gunther Eder, Susan Edwards-McKie, Oliver Feldmann, Juliet Floyd, Norbert Gratzl, Richard Heinrich, Janusz Kaczmarek, Wolfgang Kienzler, Timm Lampert, Itala Maria Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Paolo Mancosu, Matthieu Marion, Felix Muhlhoelzer, Charles Parsons, Edi Pavlovic, Christoph Pfisterer, Michael Potter, Richard Raatzsch, Esther Ramharter, Stefan Riegelnik, Gabriel Sandu, Georg Schiemer, Gerhard Schurz, Dana Scott, Stewart Shapiro, Karl Sigmund, William W. Tait, Mark van Atten, Maria van der Schaar, Vladimir Vasyukov, Jan von Plato, Jan Wolenski and Richard Zach.

Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland's own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.

Assuming no previous study in logic, this informal yet rigorous text covers the material of a standard undergraduate first course in mathematical logic, using natural deduction and leading up to the completeness theorem for first-order logic. At each stage of the text, the reader is given an intuition based on standard mathematical practice, which is subsequently developed with clean formal mathematics. Alongside the practical examples, readers learn what can and can't be calculated; for example the correctness of a derivation proving a given sequent can be tested mechanically, but there is no general mechanical test for the existence of a derivation proving the given sequent. The undecidability results are proved rigorously in an optional final chapter, assuming Matiyasevich's theorem characterising the computably enumerable relations. Rigorous proofs of the adequacy and completeness proofs of the relevant logics are provided, with careful attention to the languages involved. Optional sections discuss the classification of mathematical structures by first-order theories; the required theory of cardinality is developed from scratch. Throughout the book there are notes on historical aspects of the material, and connections with linguistics and computer science, and the discussion of syntax and semantics is influenced by modern linguistic approaches. Two basic themes in recent cognitive science studies of actual human reasoning are also introduced. Including extensive exercises and selected solutions, this text is ideal for students in Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, and Computer Science.

For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. Few will dispute this claim, but there is little agreement as to what Platonic dialectic is. According to a now prevailing view it is a method for inquiry the conception of which changed so radically for Plato that it "had a strong tendency ... to mean 'the ideal method', whatever that may be" (Richard Robinson). Most studies of Platonic dialectic accordingly focus on only one aspect of this method that allegedly characterizes one specific period in Plato's development. This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. Its 13 chapters present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato's philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways in which these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Collectively, the chapters challenge the now prevailing understanding of Plato's ideal of method. New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in Plato, ancient philosophy, philosophical method, and the history of logic.

This book bridges the gaps between logic, mathematics and computer science by delving into the theory of well-quasi orders, also known as wqos. This highly active branch of combinatorics is deeply rooted in and between many fields of mathematics and logic, including proof theory, commutative algebra, braid groups, graph theory, analytic combinatorics, theory of relations, reverse mathematics and subrecursive hierarchies. As a unifying concept for slick finiteness or termination proofs, wqos have been rediscovered in diverse contexts, and proven to be extremely useful in computer science. The book introduces readers to the many facets of, and recent developments in, wqos through chapters contributed by scholars from various fields. As such, it offers a valuable asset for logicians, mathematicians and computer scientists, as well as scholars and students.

This volume brings together a group of philosophically oriented logicians and logic-minded philosophers, mainly from Asia, to address a variety of logical and philosophical topics, such as modal logic and related directions (e.g. temporal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic, logic of conditionals, and modal proof theory), theory of truth, paradoxes, intentionality, and social networks. New approaches are also proposed, such as extended modal logic with planarity of graphs, extended branching time temporal logic with conditional operators, and a relational treatment of language and logical systems, to name but a few.Given the variety of topics and issues discussed here, the book will appeal to readers from a broad range of disciplines, from mathematical/philosophical logic, computing science, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, to linguistics, game theory and beyond.

This book on proof theory centers around the legacy of Kurt Schutte and its current impact on the subject. Schutte was the last doctoral student of David Hilbert who was the first to see that proofs can be viewed as structured mathematical objects amenable to investigation by mathematical methods (metamathematics). Schutte inaugurated the important paradigm shift from finite proofs to infinite proofs and developed the mathematical tools for their analysis. Infinitary proof theory flourished in his hands in the 1960s, culminating in the famous bound 0 for the limit of predicative mathematics (a fame shared with Feferman). Later his interests shifted to developing infinite proof calculi for impredicative theories. Schutte had a keen interest in advancing ordinal analysis to ever stronger theories and was still working on some of the strongest systems in his eighties. The articles in this volume from leading experts close to his research, show the enduring influence of his work in modern proof theory. They range from eye witness accounts of his scientific life to developments at the current research frontier, including papers by Schutte himself that have never been published before.

This book presents the state of the art in the fields of formal logic pioneered by Graham Priest. It includes advanced technical work on the model and proof theories of paraconsistent logic, in contributions from top scholars in the field. Graham Priest's research has had a considerable influence on the field of philosophical logic, especially with respect to the themes of dialetheism-the thesis that there exist true but inconsistent sentences-and paraconsistency-an account of deduction in which contradictory premises do not entail the truth of arbitrary sentences. Priest's work has regularly challenged researchers to reappraise many assumptions about rationality, ontology, and truth. This book collects original research by some of the most esteemed scholars working in philosophical logic, whose contributions explore and appraise Priest's work on logical approaches to problems in philosophy, linguistics, computation, and mathematics. They provide fresh analyses, critiques, and applications of Priest's work and attest to its continued relevance and topicality. The book also includes Priest's responses to the contributors, providing a further layer to the development of these themes .

An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.

This study of Plato's Phaedo promotes better understanding of its arguments for the soul's immortality by showing how Plato intended them, not as proofs, but as properly dialectical arguments functioning in accordance with the method of hypothesis. Unlike the argument for the soul's immortality in the Phaedrus, which does seem intended as a proof, the Phaedo arguments are proceeding toward the first principles that could serve as the basis for a proof - the most important being an account of the soul's own essential nature. This study attends to the substantial progress the Phaedo makes toward such an account. It also considers Socrates' epistemic situation in the dialogue and the problem of whether his confidence in the face of death is misplaced if his arguments have not been proofs before considering how the concluding myth draws together several of the dialogue's main themes.

Quine's set theory, New Foundations, has often been treated as an anomaly in the history and philosophy of set theory. In this book, Sean Morris shows that it is in fact well-motivated, emerging in a natural way from the early development of set theory. Morris introduces and explores the notion of set theory as explication: the view that there is no single correct axiomatization of set theory, but rather that the various axiomatizations all serve to explicate the notion of set and are judged largely according to pragmatic criteria. Morris also brings out the important interplay between New Foundations, Quine's philosophy of set theory, and his philosophy more generally. We see that his early technical work in logic foreshadows his later famed naturalism, with his philosophy of set theory playing a crucial role in his primary philosophical project of clarifying our conceptual scheme and specifically its logical and mathematical components.

The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill took thirty years to complete and is acknowledged as the definitive edition of J.S. Mill and as one of the finest works editions ever completed. Mill's contributions to philosophy, economics, and history, and in the roles of scholar, politician and journalist can hardly be overstated and this edition remains the only reliable version of the full range of Mill's writings. Each volume contains extensive notes, a new introduction and an index. Many of the volumes have been unavailable for some time, but the Works are now again available, both as a complete set and as individual volumes.

The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill took thirty years to complete and is acknowledged as the definitive edition of J.S. Mill and as one of the finest works editions ever completed. Mill's contributions to philosophy, economics, and history, and in the roles of scholar, politician and journalist can hardly be overstated and this edition remains the only reliable version of the full range of Mill's writings. Each volume contains extensive notes, a new introduction and an index. Many of the volumes have been unavailable for some time, but the Works are now again available, both as a complete set and as individual volumes.

We all reason about what we ought to do, what should be, and what is permissible, but neither Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) nor its more recent variants adequately represent the principles of our deontic reasoning. In this groundbreaking new work, author James Forrester first explores the shortcomings of standard deontic systems, and concludes that we need a new type of deontic logic; in the second part of the book, he presents a new deontic logic and semantics that fit our deontic reasoning better than standard systems. Finally, in a third section, Forrester sketches some original implications of his new deontic logic for practical reasoning. This book will be of interest to all philosophers, especially those with an interest in questions of moral and practical reasoning.

This work represents an attempt to show that standard systems of deontic logic (taken as attempts to codify normal deontic reasoning) run into a number of difficulties. It also presents a new system of deontic logic and argues that it is free from the shortcomings of standard systems.

A concise introduction to logic that teaches you not only how reasoning works, but why it works How Logic Works is an introductory logic textbook that is different by design. Rather than teaching elementary symbolic logic as an abstract or rote mathematical exercise divorced from ordinary thinking, Hans Halvorson presents it as the skill of clear and rigorous reasoning, which is essential in all fields and walks of life, from the sciences to the humanities-anywhere that making good arguments, and spotting bad ones, is critical to success. Instead of teaching how to apply algorithms using "truth trees," as in the vast majority of logic textbooks, How Logic Works builds on and reinforces the innate human skills of making and evaluating arguments. It does this by introducing the methods of natural deduction, an approach that teaches students not only how to carry out a proof and solve a problem but also what the principles of valid reasoning are and how they can be applied to any subject. The book also allows students to transition smoothly to more advanced topics in logic by teaching them general techniques that apply to more complicated scenarios, such as how to formulate theories about specific subject matter. How Logic Works shows that formal logic-far from being only for mathematicians or a diversion from the really deep questions of philosophy and human life-is the best account we have of what it means to be rational. By teaching logic in a way that makes students aware of how they already use it, the book will help them to become even better thinkers. Offers a concise, readable, and user-friendly introduction to elementary symbolic logic that primarily uses natural deduction rather than algorithmic "truth trees" Draws on more than two decades' experience teaching introductory logic to undergraduates Provides a stepping stone to more advanced topics

This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind.

We are all captivated and puzzled by the infinite, in its many varied guises; by the endlessness of space and time; by the thought that between any two points in space, however close, there is always another; by the fact that numbers go on forever; and by the idea of an all-knowing, all-powerful God. In this acclaimed introduction to the infinite, A. W. Moore takes us on a journey back to early Greek thought about the infinite, from its inception to Aristotle. He then examines medieval and early modern conceptions of the infinite, including a brief history of the calculus, before turning to Kant and post-Kantian ideas. He also gives an account of Cantor's remarkable discovery that some infinities are bigger than others. In the second part of the book, Moore develops his own views, drawing on technical advances in the mathematics of the infinite, including the celebrated theorems of Skolem and Goedel, and deriving inspiration from Wittgenstein. He concludes this part with a discussion of death and human finitude. For this third edition Moore has added a new part, 'Infinity superseded', which contains two new chapters refining his own ideas through a re-examination of the ideas of Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. This new part is heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze. Also new for the third edition are: a technical appendix on still unresolved questions about different infinite sizes; an expanded glossary; and updated references and further reading. The Infinite, Third Edition is ideal reading for anyone interested in an engaging and historically informed account of this fascinating topic, whether from a philosophical point of view, a mathematical point of view, or a religious point of view.

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available aselection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide important background information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers.

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available aselection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers.

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available aselection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers.

A new direction in philosophy
Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science.
Criticism and decline
Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology.
A resurgence of interest
During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence.
Hard-to-find core writings now available
This collection makes available aselection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers.

Contents:
Preface 1. Introduction 2. Argument and Evidence 3. Context, Convention and Communication 4. An informal Analysis of Arguments 5. Patterns of Reasoning 6. Establishing Validity 7. Critical Analysis in Practice 8.Assumptions 9. Evidence as Ground Belief 10. What Counts as Evidence? 11. Presenting and Summarising Evidence 12. Furthering Knowledge 13. Probability and Uncertainty 14. Probability Theory applied 15. Estimation and Reliability 16. Testing Hypotheses; Appendices; Glossery; References