According to Bayesian epistemology, rational learning from experience is consistent learning, that is learning should incorporate new information consistently into one's old system of beliefs. Simon M. Huttegger argues that this core idea can be transferred to situations where the learner's informational inputs are much more limited than Bayesianism assumes, thereby significantly expanding the reach of a Bayesian type of epistemology. What results from this is a unified account of probabilistic learning in the tradition of Richard Jeffrey's 'radical probabilism'. Along the way, Huttegger addresses a number of debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science, including the status of prior probabilities, whether Bayes' rule is the only legitimate form of learning from experience, and whether rational agents can have sustained disagreements. His book will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology, of game and decision theory, and of cognitive, economic, and computer sciences.

The mathematical proof is the most important form of justification in mathematics. It is not, however, the only kind of justification for mathematical propositions. The existence of other forms, some of very significant strength, places a question mark over the prominence given to proof within mathematics. This collection of essays, by leading figures working within the philosophy of mathematics, is a response to the challenge of understanding the nature and role of the proof.

Sums up the many fields of study where ignorance can undermine our understanding, while showing how an awareness of ignorance can lead to exploration and the discovery of new knowledge. The flip side of knowledge is ignorance. This book explores the vast scope of ignorance, even in an age when we think we know more than ever before. By marking off this ocean of ignorance into manageable categories, the author provides a kind of navigational chart to the unknown, and a series of red flags to all those who claim certitude. The book first lays out the many branches of ignorance--in education, the media, politics, religion, science, and other major institutions. It then assesses the costs and consequences of that ignorance. World conflicts, endemic poverty, environmental damage, waste, racism, and the manipulative forces of industry and politics that use propaganda to manipulate the public may all be seen as rooted in ignorance. But there are positive aspects of ignorance as well. Scientists and artists, by recognizing what they don't know, are spurred on to new creative approaches and discoveries, which would never be found by those too comfortable with the tried and true. The author cites Socrates, whom the Delphic Oracle declared to be the wisest of all people simply because he realized how much he didn't know. This book gives you ways to follow in the path that Socrates forged, to counter the closed minds whose false sense of certainty cannot help but distort reality, and to be better prepared to take on even the most serious challenges of today.

John Stuart Mill considered his A System of Logic, first published in 1843, the methodological foundation and intellectual groundwork of his later works in ethical, social, and political theory. Yet no book has attempted in the past to engage with the most important aspects of Mill's Logic. This volume brings together leading scholars to elucidate the key themes of this influential work, looking at such topics as his philosophy of language and mathematics, his view on logic, induction and deduction, free will, argumentation, ethology and psychology, as well as his account of normativity, kinds of pleasure, philosophical and political method and the "Art of Life."

The introduction of Greek philosophy into the Muslim world left an indelible mark on Islamic intellectual history. Philosophical discourse became a constant element in even traditionalist Islamic sciences. However, Aristotelian metaphysics gave rise to doctrines about God and the universe that were found highly objectionable by a number of Muslim theologians, among whom the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya stood foremost.

Ibn Taymiyya, one of the greatest and most prolific thinkers in medieval Islam, held Greek logic responsible for the `heretical' metaphysical conclusions reached by Islamic philosophers, theologians, mystics, and others. He therefore set out to refute philosophical logic, a task which culminated in one of the most devastating attacks ever levelled against the logical system upheld by the early Greeks, the later commentators, and their Muslim followers. His argument is grounded in an empirical approach that in many respects prefigures the philosophies of the British empiricists.

Professor Hallaq's translation, with a substantial introduction and extensive notes, makes this important work available to a wider audience for the first time.

Philosophy means 'love of wisdom,' but author Edmond Holmes fears the encroaching dominance of intellect over feeling. In this title, Holmes argues that metaphysics' reliance on intellect and pure reason undermines the study of philosophy. Rather, Holmes suggests a return to intuitional philosophy, combining thought and feeling. First published in 1930, this title will be ideal for students interested in Philosophy and Western Civilisation.

This work investigates problems about mind, meaning and mathematics rooted in preconceptions of language. It deals in particular with problems which are connected with our tendency to be misled by certain prevailing views and preconceptions about language. Philosophical claims made by theorists of meaning are scrutinized and shown to be connected with common views about the nature of certain mathematical notions and methods. Drawing in particular on Wittgenstein's ideas, the author demonstrates a strategy for tracing out and resolving conceptual and philosophical problems. By a critical examination of examples from different areas of philosophy, he shows that many problems arise through the transgression of the limits of the use of technical concepts and formal methods. Many 'prima facie' different kinds of problems are shown to have common roots, and should thus be dealt with and resolved together. Such an approach is usually prevented by the influence of traditional philosophical terminology and classification. The results of this investigation make it clear that the received ways of subdividing the subject matter of philosophy often conceal the roots of the problem.

This is the first book to systematically study the weak systems of mereology. In its chapters, the author critically analyzes and explains core topics related to mereology, such as parthood without antisymmetry, non-existence of the zero element, and Lesniewski's notion of class and set. The book also delves into three theories of parthood: two concern the sum existence axioms, and the third contends with transitivity of parthood. This is the first systematic analysis of systems of mereology of its kind and is suitable for students, scholars, logicians, and mathematicians who wish to further their knowledge of mereology. Original polish publication "Podstawy teorii czesci" by The Nicolaus Copernicus University Press

Originally published in 1938. This compact treatise is a complete treatment of Aristotle's logic as containing negative terms. It begins with defining Aristotelian logic as a subject-predicate logic confining itself to the four forms of categorical proposition known as the A, E, I and O forms. It assigns conventional meanings to these categorical forms such that subalternation holds. It continues to discuss the development of the logic since the time of its founder and address traditional logic as it existed in the twentieth century. The primary consideration of the book is the inclusion of negative terms - obversion, contraposition etc. - within traditional logic by addressing three questions, of systematization, the rules, and the interpretation.

This book is intended as a first introduction to the subject. It deals with questions of truth and meaning, questions which provide a basis for much of what is discussed in philosophy in general. This book should be of interest to students of philosophy.

David Morrow and Anthony Weston build on Weston's acclaimed A Rulebook for Arguments to offer a complete textbook for a course in critical thinking or informal logic. Features of the book include: Homework exercises adapted from a wide range of actual arguments from newspapers, philosophical texts, literature, movies, YouTube videos, and other sources. Practical advice to help students succeed when applying the Rulebook 's rules. Suggestions for further practice that outline activities students can do by themselves or with classmates to improve their critical thinking skills. Detailed instructions for in-class activities and take-home assignments designed to engage students in critical thinking. An appendix on mapping arguments, a topic not included in the Rulebook , that introduces students to this vital skill in evaluating or constructing complex and multi-step arguments. Model responses to odd-numbered exercises, including commentaries on the strengths and weaknesses of selected model responses as well as further discussion of some of the substantive intellectual, philosophical, and ethical issues raised by the exercises. The third edition of Workbook contains the entire text of the recent fifth edition of the Rulebook , supplementing this core text with extensive further explanations and exercises. Updated and improved homework exercises ensure that the examples continue to resonate with today's students. Roughly one-third of the exercises have been replaced with updated or improved examples. A new chapter on engaging constructively in public debates -including five new sets of exercises-trains students to engage respectfully and constructively on controversial topics, an increasingly important skill in our hyper-partisan age. Three new critical thinking activities offer further opportunities to practice constructive dialogue.

This second volume in the series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science brings a pragmatic perspective to the discussion of the unity of science.

Contemporary philosophy and cognitive science increasingly acknowledge the systematic interrelation of language, thought and action. The principal function of language is to enable speakers to communicate their intentions to others, to respond flexibly in a social context and to act cooperatively in the world. This book will contribute to our understanding of this dynamic process by clearly presenting and discussing the most important hypotheses, issues and theories in philosophical and logical study of language, thought and action. Among the fundamental issues discussed are the rationality and freedom of agents, theoretical and practical reasoning, individual and collective attitudes and actions, the nature of cooperation and communication, the construction and conditions of adequacy of scientific theories, propositional contents and their truth conditions, illocutionary force, time, aspect and presupposition in meaning, speech acts within dialogue, the dialogical approach to logic and the structure of dialogues and other language games, as well as formal methods needed in logic or artificial intelligence to account for choice, paradoxes, uncertainty and imprecision.

This volume contains major contributions by leading logicians, analytic philosophers, linguists and computer scientists. It will be of interest to graduate students and researchers from philosophy, logic, linguistics, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. There is no comparable survey in the existing literature.

Perhaps everyone who can think has the concept of possibility, but no one understands it. The metaphysical theory of Determinism is a symptom of this lack of understanding, and the inconclusiveness of its opponents' arguments indicates that the lack is universal. In this book, first published in 1968, the author shows that there are a number of different kinds on non-logical possibility, subtly interrelated, each requiring separate explanation. An original contribution to the subject, it is essential reading for all students of philosophy.

This book is a specialized monograph on the development of the mathematical and computational metatheory of reductive logic and proof-search, areas of logic that are becoming important in computer science. A systematic foundational text on these emerging topics, it includes proof-theoretic, semantic/model-theoretic and algorithmic aspects. The scope ranges from the conceptual background to reductive logic, through its mathematical metatheory, to its modern applications in the computational sciences. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematical, computational and philosophical logic, and in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence, this is the latest in the prestigous world-renowned Oxford Logic Guides, which contains Michael Dummet's Elements of intuitionism (2nd Edition), Dov M. Gabbay, Mark A. Reynolds, and Marcelo Finger's Temporal Logic Mathematical Foundations and Computational Aspects , J. M. Dunn and G. Hardegree's Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic, H. Rott's Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning , and P. T. Johnstone's Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium: Volumes 1 and 2 .

In Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness, Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels report on their systematic empirical research of the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. The experimental studies they carried out during more than ten years start from the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation developed at the University of Amsterdam, their home university. In these studies they test methodically the intersubjective acceptability of the rules for critical discussion proposed in this theory by confronting ordinary arguers who have not received any special education in argumentation and fallacies with discussion fragments containing both fallacious and non-fallacious argumentative moves. The research covers a wide range of informal fallacies. In this way, the authors create a basis for comparing the theoretical reasonableness conception of pragma-dialectics with the norms for judging argumentative moves prevailing in argumentative practice. Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness provides a unique insight into the relationship between theoretical and practical conceptions of reasonableness, supported by extensive empirical material gained by means of sophisticated experimental research.

First published in 1986. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche remain two of the most interesting and compelling thinkers for contemporary readers. Rejecting the dry, dispassionate tone of most academic philosophy, these thinkers offer witty, penetrating critiques of many modern values as well as passionately moving portraits of alternative ideals. This work reveals that what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche most fundamentally share, and what can be their greatest contribution to contemporary ethics, is a method of illustrating and evaluating different ways of life considered as a whole. In asking what way of life is best, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche revive an ancient approach to ethics largely neglected throughout the modern era. This work offers a detailed elucidation of this method and of their respective ideals, Kierkegaard's life of faith and Nietzsche's life of individual sovereignty. These ideals are explored within each thinker's typology of different ways of life and then compared and contrasted with each other.

First published in 1943, and revised for this 1952 edition, this book was intended for use by students of philosophy and as such traditional and modern developments in logic have been combined in a unified treatment. The author envisaged this volume as filling a gap for a simple, introductory text on formal logic, written from a modern point of view, unencumbered by traditional doctrine. This title provides a thorough introduction and grounding in the philosophy of logic, and was later revised after the author's death to correct a number of logical errors - making this edition the most complete version of the work.

In Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela examines Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies of logic, situating their philosophical significance in early and middle analytic philosophy with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Strawson. He argues that not only the early but also the later Wittgenstein sought to further develop the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries. Throughout his career Wittgenstein's aim was to resolve problems with and address the limitations of Frege's and Russell's accounts of logic and their logical methodologies so as to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated the logical-philosophical approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, Kuusela seeks to open up covered up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. Offering a novel interpretation of the philosopher, he explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methodology beyond calculus-based logical methods and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the complexity and richness of language use and thought while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. In addition, this volume outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein's later work and explaining how his account of logic can be used to dissolve the long-standing methodological dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy. It is of interest to scholars, researchers, and advance students of philosophy interested in engaging with a number of scholarly debates.

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1986. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A complete introduction to logic for first-year university students with no background in logic, philosophy or mathematics. In easily understood steps it shows the mechanics of the formal analysis of arguments.

Marx's Grundrisse is acknowledged as the vital link between Marx's early and late work. It is also a crucial text in elucidating Marx's debt to the idealist philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. This book, first published in 1988, is the first full-length study of that relationship, in a thorough textual analysis which makes the connections explicit and also the Grundrisse's relations to the works of Adam Smith and Aristotle. This book argues that Marx's critique of political economy, and his critique of Hegel, are double interrelated. Not only did Marx adapt Hegelian logic in order to analyse the economic categories crucial to modern society but it is argued that those logical categories were themselves seen as reflections of the productive processes of contemporary commercial society. Uchida reveals a conceptual structure common to the apparently rarefied world of Hegelian conceptual logic and to the supposedly common-sensical world of economic science. Demonstrating this is a considerable achievement, and it allows us to consider precisely what is valuable today in Marx's critical commentary on this conceptual structure and on the type of society in which it is manifested. Uchida's subject, like Marx's, is 'the force of capital on modern life'.

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge.

When this book was originally published in 1957 there had been lively debates on the air and in the press about the bearing of modern philosophy upon Christianity, but there had been relatively little sustained discussion of the subject. This book of essays was the product of a small group of Oxford philosophers and theologians, who had met and talked informally for some years before writing it. It is an attempt to discuss with care and candour some of the problems raised for Christian belief by contemporary analytical philosophy. In asking the questions raised, this book makes articulate the perplexities of many intelligent people, both believers and unbelievers. The contributors concentrate on the way such concepts as God, Revelation, the Soul, Grace are actually used rather than asserting or denying some very general theory of meaning.