This monograph examines truth in fiction by applying the techniques of a naturalized logic of human cognitive practices. The author structures his project around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting it right? What would it take to write a book about truth in fiction as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows? It is argued that the most semantically distinctive feature of the sentences of fiction is that they areunambiguously true and false together. It is true that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street and also concurrently false that he did. A second distinctive feature of fiction is that the reader at large knows of this inconsistency and isn't in the least cognitively molested by it. Why, it is asked, would this be so? What would explain it? Two answers are developed. According to the no-contradiction thesis, the semantically tangled sentences of fiction are indeed logically inconsistent but not logically contradictory. According to the no-bother thesis, if the inconsistencies of fiction were contradictory, a properly contrived logic for the rational management of inconsistency would explain why readers at large are not thrown off cognitive stride by their embrace of those contradictions. As developed here, the account of fiction suggests the presence of an underlying three - or four-valued dialethic logic. The author shows this to be a mistaken impression. There are only two truth-values in his logic of fiction. The naturalized logic of Truth in Fiction jettisons some of the standard assumptions and analytical tools of contemporary philosophy, chiefly because the neurotypical linguistic and cognitive behaviour of humanity at large is at variance with them. Using the resources of a causal response epistemology in tandem with the naturalized logic, the theory produced here is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to a circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of language and cognition.

This book contains 20 essays tracing the work of David Zarefsky, a leading North American scholar of argumentation from a rhetorical perspective.The essays cohere around 4 general themes: objectives for studying argumentation rhetorically, approaches to rhetorical study of argumentation, patterns and schemes of rhetorical argumentation, and case studies illustrating the potential of studying argumentation rhetorically.These articles are drawn from across Zarefsky's 45-year career. Many of these articles originally appeared in publications that are difficult to access today, and this collection brings the reader up to date on the topic.

Zarefsky's scholarship focuses on the role of language in political argumentation, the ways in which argumentation creates public knowledge and belief, the influence of framing and context on what is said and understood, the deployment of particular patterns and schemes of argumentation in public reasoning, and the influence of debate on politics and governance. All these topics are addressed in this book.

Each of the conceptual essays includes brief application to specific cases, and five extended case studies are also presented in this volume. The case studies cover different themes: two explore famous political debates, the third focuses on presidential rhetoric across the course of United States history, the fourth on the arguments for liberalism at a time of political polarization, and the fifth on the contemporary effort to engage the United States with the Muslim world.

This bookis ofinterest to scholars in the fields of philosophy, logic, law, philosophy of law, and legal history. The range of topics and concepts addressed, the interplay of concepts and cases and the unifying perspective of rhetorical argumentation make this book a valuable read for students of argumentative practice, whether rhetorically or otherwise."

This book presents the current state of the art regarding the application of logical tools to the problems of theory and practice of lawmaking. It shows how contemporary logic may be useful in the analysis of legislation, legislative drafting and legal reasoning concerning different contexts of law making. Elaborations of the process of law making have variously emphasised its political, social or economic aspects. Yet despite strong interest in logical analyses of law, questions remains about the role of logical tools in law making. This volume attempts to bridge that gap, or at least to narrow it, drawing together some important research problems-and some possible solutions-as seen through the work of leading contemporary academics. The volume encompasses 20 chapters written by authors from 16 countries and it presents diversified views on the understanding of logic (from strict mathematical approaches to the informal, argumentative ones) and differentiated choices concerning the aspects of law making taken into account. The book presents a broad set of perspectives, insights and results into the emerging field of research devoted to the logical analysis of the area of creation of law. How does logic inform lawmaking? Are legal systems consistent and complete? How can legal rules be represented by means of formal calculi and visualization techniques? Does the structure of statutes or of legal systems resemble the structure of deductive systems? What are the logical relations between the basic concepts of jurisprudence that constitute the system of law? How are theories of legal interpretation relevant to the process of legislation? How might the statutory text be analysed by means of contemporary computer programs? These and other questions, ranging from the theoretical to the immediately practical, are addressed in this definitive collection.

Logic is of course a general resource for reasoning at large. But in the first half of the twentieth century, it developed particularity with a view to mathematical applications, and the field of mathematical logic came into being and flourished. In the second half of the century, much the same happened with regard to philosophical applications. Hence philosophical logic. The deliberations of this book cover a varied but interrelated array of key issues in the field. They address the representation of information in linguistic formulation, and modes of cogent demonstration in logic, mathematics, and empirical investigation, as well as the role of logic in philosophical deliberations. Overall, the book seeks to demonstrate and illustrate the utility of logic as a productive resource for rational inquiry at large.

The content of the volume is divided as follows: after presenting two rival approaches to substantiality and causality: a traditional (ontological) view vs. a transcendental one (Rosiak) there follow two sections: the first presents studies of substance as showing some causal aspects (Buchheim, Keinanen, Kovac, Piwowarczyk), whereas the other contains investigations of causality showing in a way its reference to the category of substance (Kobiela, Meixner, Mitscherling, Wronski). The last, short section contains two studies of extension (Leszczynski and Skowron) which can be regarded as a conceptual background of both substantiality and causality. The book gives a very colourful picture of the discussions connected with substantiality and causality which may be of potential interest for the readers.

This volume presents recent advances in philosophical logic with chapters focusing on non-classical logics, including paraconsistent logics, substructural logics, modal logics of agency and other modal logics. The authors cover themes such as the knowability paradox, tableaux and sequent calculi, natural deduction, definite descriptions, identity, truth, dialetheism and possible worlds semantics.

The developments presented here focus on challenging problems in the specification of fundamental philosophical notions, as well as presenting new techniques and tools, thereby contributing to the development of the field. Each chapter contains a bibliography, to assist the reader in making connections in the specific areas covered. Thus this work provides both a starting point for further investigations into philosophical logic and an update on advances, techniques and applications in a dynamic field.

The chapters originate from papers presented during the T"rends in Logic XI" conference at the Ruhr University Bochum, June 2012.

For centuries debates about reason and its Other have animated and informed philosophy, art, science and politics throughout Western civilization - but nowhere, arguably as deeply and turbulently as in Germany. Reason, the legacy of the Enlightenment, has been claimed, rejected and redefined by influential German thinkers from Kant to Nietzsche to Habermas. In our own time - more than 200 years after Kant's Critique of Pure Reason - the status of reason and the irrational, what is and what should be excluded from reason, what qualifies as a critique of reason, are all still central philosophical issues in Germany as well as throughout the West.

This volume documents the 17th Munster Lectures in Philosophy with Susan Haack, the prominent contemporary philosopher. It contains an original, programmatic article by Haack on her overall philosophical approach, entitled 'The Fragmentation of Philosophy, the Road to Reintegration'. In addition, the volume includes seven papers on various aspects of Haack's philosophical work as well as her replies to the papers. Susan Haack has deeply influenced many of the debates in contemporary philosophy. In her vivid and accessible way, she has made ground-breaking contributions covering a wide range of topics, from logic, metaphysics and epistemology, to pragmatism and the philosophy of science and law. In her work, Haack has always been very sensitive in detecting subtle differences. The distinctions she has introduced reveal what lies at the core of philosophical controversies, and show the problems that exist with established views. In order to resolve these problems, Haack has developed some 'middle-course approaches'. One example of this is her famous 'Foundherentism', a theory of justification that includes elements from both the rival theories of Foundationalism and Coherentism. Haack herself has offered the best description of her work calling herself a 'passionate moderate'.

This collection of papers, published in honour of Hector J. Levesque on the occasion of his 60th birthday, addresses a number of core areas in the field of knowledge representation and reasoning. In a broad sense, the book is about knowledge and belief, tractable reasoning, and reasoning about action and change. More specifically, the book contains contributions to Description Logics, the expressiveness of knowledge representation languages, limited forms of inference, satisfiablity (SAT), the logical foundations of BDI architectures, only-knowing, belief revision, planning, causation, the situation calculus, the action language Golog, and cognitive robotics.

This meticulous critical assessment of the ground-breaking work of philosopher Stanislaw Le niewski focuses exclusively on primary texts and explores the full range of output by one of the master logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw school. The author's nuanced survey eschews secondary commentary, analyzing Le niewski's core philosophical views and evaluating the formulations that were to have such a profound influence on the evolution of mathematical logic.

One of the undisputed leaders of the cohort of brilliant logicians that congregated in Poland in the early twentieth century, Le niewski was a guide and mentor to a generation of celebrated analytical philosophers (Alfred Tarski was his PhD student). His primary achievement was a system of foundational mathematical logic intended as an alternative to the Principia Mathematica of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. Its three strands-'protothetic', 'ontology', and 'mereology', are detailed in discrete sections of this volume, alongside a wealth other chapters grouped to provide the fullest possible coverage of Le niewski's academic output.

With material on his early philosophical views, his contributions to set theory and his work on nominalism and higher-order quantification, this book offers a uniquely expansive critical commentary on one of analytical philosophy's great pioneers. "

This book focuses on the problems of rules, rule-following and normativity as discussed within the areas of analytic philosophy, linguistics, logic and legal theory. Divided into four parts, the volume covers topics in general analytic philosophy, analytic legal theory, legal interpretation and argumentation, logic as well as AI& Law area of research. It discusses, inter alia, "Kripkenstein's" sceptical argument against rule-following and normativity of meaning, the role of neuroscience in explaining the phenomenon of normativity, conventionalism in philosophy of law, normativity of rules of interpretation, some formal approaches towards rules and normativity as well as the problem of defeasibility of rules. The aim of the book is to provide an interdisciplinary approach to an inquiry into the questions concerning rules, rule-following and normativity.

Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.

In recent years, mathematical logic has developed in many directions, the initial unity of its subject matter giving way to a myriad of seemingly unrelated areas. The articles collected here, which range from historical scholarship to recent research in geometric model theory, squarely address this development. These articles also connect to the diverse work of Vaananen, whose ecumenical approach to logic reflects the unity of the discipline."

This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity.

This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory (CTT). The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion. One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach within a game-theoretical conception of meaning. In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning. According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons (games involving Why-questions), they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This volume is a culmination of years of development, and the first to introduce the concepts of superoptimum evaluative and explanatory reasoning. Stuart Nagel's new Quorum book will help academic and practicing attorneys in two important ways. First, by understanding evaluative reasoning, they will gain a better grasp of the appropriate behavior to be adopted if they wish to achieve certain desired goals. Second, by understanding the elements of explanatory reasoning, they will understand how and why decisions are reached.

Evaluative reasoning can take several forms. It can help decision-makers select from among several public policy choices. It can enhance individual decision-making and provide means to allocate scarce resources. It can also assist in advocating and influencing decisions, mediating disputes, representing divergent viewpoints, and in assigning people to specific tasks. Explanatory reasoning, on the other hand, will help explain public policy making, and assist users in generalizing from cases and facts, and in understanding relationships. The purpose of explanatory reasoning is also to explain why superoptimum solutions are infrequently adopted and why they are seldom successfully implemented. The use of both kinds of reasoning, says Nagel, are particularly important to those who want a better understanding and want to improve the legal system.

Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (using demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized but nonexistent objects that our scientific theories are often couched in terms of. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items-especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences-are indispensable. We cannot avoid talking about such things. Scientific and ordinary languages thus enable us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false), such as "Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse," or "That elf I'm now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes." Standard contemporary metaphysical views and semantic analyses of singular idioms on offer in contemporary philosophy of language have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). That is, philosophers often feel driven to claim that such objects do exist, or they claim that all our talk isn't genuine truth-apt talk, but only pretence. This book reconfigures metaphysics (and the role of metaphysics in semantics) in radical ways that allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial presupposition that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.

This volume responds to and reassesses the work of Hector-Neri Castaneda (1924-1991). The essays collected here, written by his students, followers, and opponents, examine Castaneda s seminal views on deontic logic, metaethics, indedicality, praticitions, fictions, and metaphysics, utilizing the critical viewpoint afforded by time, as well as new data, to offer insights on his theories and methodology."