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Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Logic
In this book, the contributors present an overview of recent
developments in philosophy of science by providing a collection of
articles that together constitute a systematic and comprehensive
investigation of how to understand the relation between the social
sciences and democracy.
This book, translated from the French, is an introduction to first-order model theory. The first six chapters are very basic: starting from scratch, they quickly reach the essential, namely, the back-and-forth method and compactness, which are illustrated with examples taken from algebra. The next chapter introduces logic via the study of the models of arithmetic, and the following is a combinatorial tool-box preparing for the chapters on saturated and prime models. The last ten chapters form a rather complete but nevertheless accessible exposition of stability theory, which is the core of the subject.
This book aids in the rehabilitation of the wrongfully deprecated
work of William Parry, and is the only full-length investigation
into Parry-type propositional logics. A central tenet of the
monograph is that the sheer diversity of the contexts in which the
mereological analogy emerges - its effervescence with respect to
fields ranging from metaphysics to computer programming - provides
compelling evidence that the study of logics of analytic
implication can be instrumental in identifying connections between
topics that would otherwise remain hidden. More concretely, the
book identifies and discusses a host of cases in which analytic
implication can play an important role in revealing distinct
problems to be facets of a larger, cross-disciplinary problem. It
introduces an element of constancy and cohesion that has previously
been absent in a regrettably fractured field, shoring up those who
are sympathetic to the worth of mereological analogy. Moreover, it
generates new interest in the field by illustrating a wide range of
interesting features present in such logics - and highlighting
these features to appeal to researchers in many fields.
I was very happy when in 1997 Fiachra Long came to spend part of
his sabbatical leave at the Archives Maurice Blondel at
Louvain-Ia-Neuve. This allowed him to bring together and complete
his translation of three important articles from Maurice Blondel,
known as the philosopher of Aix-en-Province. These three articles
fonn a unity: they make explicit certain aspects of the method used
in the great thesis of 1893, Action. This thesis, it is well known,
aroused many polemic debates after its appearance. Thomist
theologians accused Blondel of turning back towards Kantian
idealism whereas the philosophers of the Revue de metaphysique et
de morale accused him on the contrary of falling back on a
pre-critical realism. The three articles translated here, each in
its own way, attempt to pass beyond these two opposite charges. The
Idealist Illusion (1898) underlines the fact that the content of
consciousness should be unfurled as it appears, by withdrawing from
any idealist or realist prejudice, before judging the consistency
of its content as a whole. In this way Blondel supports the
"phenomenological" method used in his thesis. The Elementary
Principle of a Logic of the Moral Life (1903) is a very well-worked
text which shows that "the logic of possession and privation" is
broader than "the logic of amnnation and negation. " Using these
words, Blondel develops certain striking laws of action such as
that of the "parallelogram of contrary forces.
The notion of truth has become much discussed in philosophy over
the last few decade, with many senior figures grappling with the
relativist and constructivist notions of truth popular in other
parts of the academy. It continues to be a subject enjoying vibrant
debate. Despite the varieties of views on truth, most of the
discussion has agreed that truth has a uniform, stable nature,
ranging across the boundaries of human knowledge. The editors and
contributors to this volume challenge this very basic assumption,
putting forth the idea of what is called alethic pluralism - that
there is more than one way of being true. While it is
uncontroversial that there are different kinds of truth (moral
truth, scientific truth etc), these pluralist views propose that
truth itself can vary and that bearers of truth can literally be
true in different ways. This volume presents new essays by some of
the world's leading philosophers to explore this new view and its
implications for the philosophy of language, epistemology,
metaphysics, and logic.
Intuitionistic type theory can be described, somewhat boldly, as a
partial fulfillment of the dream of a universal language for
science. This book expounds several aspects of intuitionistic type
theory, such as the notion of set, reference vs. computation,
assumption, and substitution. Moreover, the book includes
philosophically relevant sections on the principle of
compositionality, lingua characteristica, epistemology,
propositional logic, intuitionism, and the law of excluded middle.
Ample historical references are given throughout the book.
Alfred Tarski was one of the two giants of the twentieth-century
development of logic, along with Kurt Goedel. The four volumes of
this collection contain all of Tarski's published papers and
abstracts, as well as a comprehensive bibliography. Here will be
found many of the works, spanning the period 1921 through 1979,
which are the bedrock of contemporary areas of logic, whether in
mathematics or philosophy. These areas include the theory of truth
in formalized languages, decision methods and undecidable theories,
foundations of geometry, set theory, and model theory, algebraic
logic, and universal algebra.
This clear, accessible account of Hegelian logic makes a case for its enormous seductiveness, its surprising presence in the collective consciousness, and the dangers associated therewith. Offering comprehensive coverage of Hegel's important works, Bencivenga avoids getting bogged down in short-lived scholarly debates to provide a work of permanent significance and usefulness.
George Boole (1815-1864) is well known to mathematicians for his
research and textbooks on the calculus, but his name has spread
world-wide for his innovations in symbolic logic and the
development and applications made since his day. The utility of
"Boolean algebra" in computing has greatly increased curiosity in
the nature and extent of his achievements. His work is most
accessible in his two books on logic, "A mathematical analysis of
logic" (1947) and "An investigation of the laws of thought" (1954).
But at various times he wrote manuscript essays, especially after
the publication of the second book; several were intended for a
non-technical work, "The Philosophy of logic," which he was not
able to complete. This volume contains an edited selection which
not only relates them to Boole's publications and the historical
context of his time, but also describes their strange history of
family, followers and scholars have treid to confect an edition.
The book will appeal to logicians, mathematicians and philosophers,
and those interested in the histories of the corresponding
subjects; and also students of the early Victorian Britain in which
they were written.
Cognitive existentialism is a version of hermeneutic philosophy.
The volume provides a summation of the critical approaches to this
version. All essays are engaged in probing the value of universal
hermeneutics. Drawing on various conceptions developed in
analytical and Continental traditions, the authors explore the
interpretative dimensions of scientific inquiry. They try to place
the projects of their investigations in historical, socio-cultural,
and political contexts. The task of extending hermeneutics to the
natural sciences is an initiative of much relevance to the dialogue
between the scientific and humanistic culture. A special aspect of
this dialogue, addressed by all authors, is the promotion of
interpretive reflexivity in both kinds of academic culture.
Distinctions of Reason and Reasonable Distinctions is an
intellectual biography of John Wallis (1616-1703), professor of
mathematics at Oxford for over half a century. His career spans the
political tumult of the English Civil Wars, the religious upheaval
of the Church of England, and the fascinating developments in
mathematics and natural philosophy. His ability to navigate this
terrain and advance human learning in the academic world was
facilitated by his use of the Jesuit Francisco Suarez's theory of
distinctions. This Roman Catholic's philosophy in the hands of a
Protestant divine fostered an instrumentalism necessary to bridge
the old and new. With this tool, Wallis brought modern science into
the university and helped form the Royal Society.
The aim of this thematically unified anthology is to track the
history of epistemic logic, to consider some important applications
of these logics of knowledge and belief in a variety of fields, and
finally to discuss future directions of research with particular
emphasis on 'active agenthood' and multi-modal systems. It is
accessible to researchers and graduate students in philosophy,
computer science, game theory, economics and related disciplines
utilizing the means and methods of epistemic logic.
The Dialectical Forge identifies dialectical disputation (jadal) as
a primary formative dynamic in the evolution of pre-modern Islamic
legal systems, promoting dialectic from relative obscurity to a
more appropriate position at the forefront of Islamic legal
studies. The author introduces and develops a dialectics-based
analytical method for the study of pre-modern Islamic legal
argumentation, examines parallels and divergences between
Aristotelian dialectic and early juridical jadal-theory, and
proposes a multi-component paradigm-the Dialectical Forge Model-to
account for the power of jadal in shaping Islamic law and legal
theory.In addition to overviews of current evolutionary narratives
for Islamic legal theory and dialectic, and expositions on key
texts, this work shines an analytical light upon the considerably
sophisticated "proto-system" of juridical dialectical teaching and
practice evident in Islam's second century, several generations
before the first "full-system" treatises of legal and dialectical
theory were composed. This proto-system is revealed from analyses
of dialectical sequences in the 2nd/8th century Kitab Ikhtilaf
al-'Iraqiyyin / 'Iraqiyyayn (the "subject-text") through a lens
molded from 5th/11th century jadal-theory treatises (the
"lens-texts"). Specific features thus uncovered inform the
elaboration of a Dialectical Forge Model, whose more general
components and functions are explored in closing chapters.
This book deals with a basic problem arising within the Bayesian
approach 1 to scientific methodology, namely the choice of prior
probabilities. The problem will be considered with special
reference to some inference methods used within Bayesian statistics
(BS) and the so-called theory of inductive 2 probabilities (T/P).
In this study an important role will be played by the assumption -
defended by Sir Karl Popper and the supporters of the current
verisimilitude theory (VT) - that the cognitive goal of science is
the achievement of a high degree of truthlikeness or
verisimilitude. A more detailed outline of the issues and
objectives of the book is given in Section 1. In Section 2 the
historical background of the Bayesian approach and the
verisimilitude theory is briefly illustrated. In Section 3, the
methods used in TIP and BS for making multinomial inference~ are
considered and some conceptual relationships between TIP and BS are
pointed out. In Section 4 the main lines of a new approach to the
problem of the choice of prior probabilities are illustrated.
Lastly, in Section 5 >the structure of the book is described and
a first explanation of some technical terms is provided.
This book is intended to be a survey of the most important results
in mathematical logic for philosophers. It is a survey of results
which have philosophical significance and it is intended to be
accessible to philosophers. I have assumed the mathematical
sophistication acquired. in an introductory logic course or in
reading a basic logic text. In addition to proving the most
philosophically significant results in mathematical logic, I have
attempted to illustrate various methods of proof. For example, the
completeness of quantification theory is proved both constructively
and non-constructively and relative ad vantages of each type of
proof are discussed. Similarly, constructive and non-constructive
versions of Godel's first incompleteness theorem are given. I hope
that the reader. will develop facility with the methods of proof
and also be caused by reflect on their differences. I assume
familiarity with quantification theory both in under standing the
notations and in finding object language proofs. Strictly speaking
the presentation is self-contained, but it would be very difficult
for someone without background in the subject to follow the
material from the beginning. This is necessary if the notes are to
be accessible to readers who have had diverse backgrounds at a more
elementary level. However, to make them accessible to readers with
no background would require writing yet another introductory logic
text. Numerous exercises have been included and many of these are
integral parts of the proofs."
Tadeusz Kotarbinski is one of towering figures in contemporary
Polish philosophy. He was a great thinker, a great teacher, a great
organizer of philosophical and scientific life (he was, among
others, the rector of the Uni versi ty of t6dz, the president of
the Polish Academy of Sciences, and the president of the
International Institute of Philosophy), and, last but not least, a
great moral authority. He died at the age of 96 on October 3, 1981.
Kotarbinski was active in almost all branches of philosophy. He
made many significant contributions to logic, semantics, ontology,
epistemology, history of philosophy, and ethics. He created a new
field, namely praxiology. Thus, using an ancient distinction, he
contributed to theoretical as well as practical philoso hy.
Kotarbinski regarded praxiology as his major philosophical "child."
Doubtless, praxiology belongs to practical philosophy. This
collection, howewer, is mainly devoted to Kotarbinski' s
theoretical philosophy. Reism - Kotarbinski' s fundamental idea of
ontology and semantics - is the central topic of most papers
included here; even Pszczolowski' s essay on praxiology considers
its ontological basis., Only two papers, namely that of
Zarnecka-Bialy and that of Wolenski, are not linked with reism.
However, both fall under the general label "Kotarbinski: logic,
semantics and ontology." The collection partly consists of earlier
published papers.
"Necessity is the mother of invention. " Part I: What is in this
book - details. There are several different types of formal proof
procedures that logicians have invented. The ones we consider are:
1) tableau systems, 2) Gentzen sequent calculi, 3) natural
deduction systems, and 4) axiom systems. We present proof
procedures of each of these types for the most common normal modal
logics: S5, S4, B, T, D, K, K4, D4, KB, DB, and also G, the logic
that has become important in applications of modal logic to the
proof theory of Peano arithmetic. Further, we present a similar
variety of proof procedures for an even larger number of regular,
non-normal modal logics (many introduced by Lemmon). We also
consider some quasi-regular logics, including S2 and S3. Virtually
all of these proof procedures are studied in both propositional and
first-order versions (generally with and without the Barcan
formula). Finally, we present the full variety of proof methods for
Intuitionistic logic (and of course Classical logic too). We
actually give two quite different kinds of tableau systems for the
logics we consider, two kinds of Gentzen sequent calculi, and two
kinds of natural deduction systems. Each of the two tableau systems
has its own uses; each provides us with different information about
the logics involved. They complement each other more than they
overlap. Of the two Gentzen systems, one is of the conventional
sort, common in the literature.
Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science is a collection of
outstanding contributed papers presented at the 11th International
Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science held in
Krakow in 1999. The Congress was a follow-up to the series of
meetings, initiated once by Alfred Tarski, which aimed to provide
an interdisciplinary forum for scientists, philosophers and
logicians. The articles selected for publication in the book comply
with that idea and innovatively address current issues in logic,
metamathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and
cognitive science, as well as philosophical problems of biology,
chemistry and physics.
The volume will be of interest to philosophers, logicians and
scientists interested in foundational problems of their
disciplines."
The present study of sense and reference in the logic of Frege
represents the first fruits of several years of dealing with the
work of this great German logician. In the preparation of this
work, which was presented as a dissertation to the Faculty of
Philosophy of the Friedrich-Alexander University in
Erlangen/Nuremberg, assistance came from many quarters. lowe most
to Professor R. Zocher, who directed this dissertation with
understanding counsel and unflagging interest. I must also thank
Professor P. Lorenzen, whose courses and seminars provided more
inspiration than might be immediately apparent in the book.
Professor W. Britzelmayr of Munich was so kind as to provide copies
of important fragments of Frege's works. These texts are reproduced
with the permission of Professor H. Hermes, Director of the
'Institut fUr mathematische Logik und Grund lagenforschung' in
Munster, where Frege's works and letters are being prepared for
publication. The preparation of this work was greatly facilitated
by a two-year grant from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. CHRISTIAN
THIEL Nuremberg, February 1965 v TRANSLATOR'S NOTE In the difficult
matter of Fregean terminology we have taken Ignacio Angelelli's
translation of Two Soviet Studies on Frege as the model. Both
Professor Angelelli and Dr. Thiel have been so kind as to read over
the translation before publication."
This skit of Bertrand Russell's philosophy was originally published
in 1918 by Russell's correspondent friend Jourdain. The
introduction explains that the contents purport to be lost papers
written by Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll, a contemporary of Bertrand
Russell. This politically humorous volume from the early 20th
Century parodies the writing style of Russell as well as his
theories.
It is with great pleasure that we are presenting to the community
the second edition of this extraordinary handbook. It has been over
15 years since the publication of the first edition and there have
been great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since
then. The first edition has proved invaluable to generations of
students and researchers in formal philosophy and language, as weIl
as to consumers of logic in many applied areas. The main logic
article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999 has described the
first edition as 'the best starting point for exploring any of the
topics in logic'. We are confident that the second edition will
prove to be just as good The first edition was the second handbook
published for the logic commu nity. It followed the North Holland
one volume Handbook 0/ Mathematical Logic, published in 1977,
edited by the late Jon Barwise. The four volume Handbook 0/
Philosophical Logic, published 1983-1989 came at a fortunate
temporal junction at the evolution of logic. This was the time when
logic was gaining ground in computer science and artificial
intelligence circles. These areas were under increasing commercial
pressure to provide devices which help and/or replace the human in
his daily activity. This pressure required the use of logic in the
modelling of human activity and organisa tion on the one hand and
to provide the theoretical basis for the computer program
constructs on the other."
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