The quality of our lives is determined by the quality of our thinking. The quality of our thinking, in turn, is determined by the quality of our questions, for questions are the engine, the driving force behind thinking. Without questions, we have nothing to think about. Without essential questions, we often fail to focus our thinking on the significant and substantive. When we ask essential questions, we deal with what is necessary, relevant, and indispensable to a matter at hand. We recognize what is at the heart of the matter. Our thinking is grounded and disciplined. We are ready to learn. We are intellectually able to find our way about. To be successful in life, one needs to ask essential questions: essential questions when reading, writing, and speaking; when shopping, working, and parenting; when forming friendships, choosing life-partners, and interacting with the mass media and the Internet. Yet few people are masters of the art of asking essential questions. Most have never thought about why some questions are crucial and others peripheral. Essential questions are rarely studied in school. They are rarely modeled at home. Most people question according to their psychological associations. Their questions are haphazard and scattered. The ideas we provide are useful only to the extent that they are employed daily to ask essential questions. Practice in asking essential questions eventually leads to the habit of asking essential questions. But we can never practice asking essential questions if we have no conception of them. This mini-guide is a starting place for understanding concepts that, when applied, lead to essential questions. We introduce essential questions as indispensable intellectual tools. We focus on principles essential to formulating, analyzing, assessing, and settling primary questions. You will notice that our categories of question types are not exclusive. There is a great deal of overlap

This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference and falsity is a form of reference failure. Most of the philosophical literature on truth concentrates on certain ontological and epistemic problems. This book focuses instead on language. By utilizing the Fregean idea that sentences are singular referring expressions, the author develops novel connections between the philosophical study of truth and falsity and the huge literature in in the philosophy of language on the notion of reference. The first part of the book constructs the author's theory and argues for it in length. Part II addresses the ways in which the theory relates to, and is different from, some of the basic theories of truth. Part III takes up how to account for the truth of sentences with logical operators and quantifiers. Finally, Part IV discusses the applications and implications of the theory for longstanding problems in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and linguistics.

Alonzo Church was undeniably one ofthe intellectual giants of theTwenti- eth Century . These articles are dedicated to his memory and illustrate the tremendous importance his ideas have had in logic , mathematics, comput er science and philosophy . Discussions of some of thesevarious contributions have appeared in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, and th e interested reader is invited to seek details there . Here we justtry to give somegener al sense of the scope, depth,and value of his work. Church is perhaps best known for the theorem , appropriately called " C h u r c h ' s Theorem ", that there is no decision procedure forthelogical valid- ity of formulas first-order of logic . A d ecision proce dure forthat part of logic would have come near to fulfilling Leibniz's dream of a calculus that could be mechanically used tosettle logical disputes . It was not to . be It could not be . What Church proved precisely is that there is no lambda-definable function that can i n every case providethe right answer , ' y e s ' or ' n o', tothe question of whether or not any arbitrarily given formula is valid .

This volume contains a collection of research papers centered around the concept of quantifier. Recently this concept has become the central point of research in logic. It is one of the important logical concepts whose exact domain and applications have so far been insufficiently explored, especially in the area of inferential and semantic properties of languages. It should thus remain the central point of research in the future. Moreover, during the last twenty years generalized quantifiers and logical technics based on them have proved their utility in various applications. The example of natu rallanguage semantics has been partcularly striking. For a long time it has been belived that elementary logic also called first-order logic was an ade quate theory of logical forms of natural language sentences. Recently it has been accepted that semantics of many natural language constructions can not be properly represented in elementary logic. It has turned out, however, that they can be described by means of generalized quantifiers. As far as computational applications oflogic are concerned, particulary interesting are semantics restricted to finite models. Under this restriction elementary logic looses several of its advantages such as axiomatizability and compactness. And for various purposes we can use equally well some semantically richer languages of which generalized quantifiers offer the most universal methods of describing extensions of elementary logic. Moreover we can look at generalized quantifiers as an explication of some specific mathematical concepts, e. g."

All humans can interpret sentences of their native language quickly and without effort. Working from the perspective of generative grammar, the contributors investigate three mental mechanisms, widely assumed to underlie this ability: compositional semantics, implicature computation and presupposition computation. This volume brings together experts from semantics and pragmatics to bring forward the study of interconnections between these three mechanisms. The contributions develop new insights into important empirical phenomena; for example, approximation, free choice, accommodation, and exhaustivity effects.

This book offers an array of important perspectives on Kant and nonconceptualism from some of the leading scholars in current Kant studies. As well as discussing the various arguments surrounding Kantian nonconceptualism, the book provides broad insight into the theory of perception, philosophy of mind, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, and aesthetics. His idealism aside, Kantian nonconceptualism is the most topical contemporary issue in Kant's theoretical philosophy. In this collection of specially commissioned essays, major players in the current debate, including Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, engage with each other and with the broader literature in the field addressing all the important aspects of Kantian nonconceptualism. Among other topics, the authors analyse the notion of intuition and the conditions of its generation, Kant's theory of space, including his pre-Critical view of space, the relation between nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction, and various challenges to both conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant. Two further chapters explore a prominent Hegelian conceptualist reading of Kant and Kant's nonconceptualist position in the Third Critique. The volume also contains a helpful survey of the recent literature on Kant and nonconceptual content. Kantian Nonconceptualism provides a comprehensive overview of recent perspectives on Kant and nonconceptual content, and will be a key resource for Kant scholars and philosophers interested in the topic of nonconceptualism.

This book presents a collection of contributions from related logics to applied paraconsistency. Moreover, all of them are dedicated to Jair Minoro Abe,on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. He is one of the experts in Paraconsistent Engineering, who developed the so-called annotated logics. The book includes important contributions on foundations and applications of paraconsistent logics in connection with engineering, mathematical logic, philosophical logic, computer science, physics, economics, and biology. It will be of interest to students and researchers, who are working on engineering and logic.

Quantifiers: Logics, Models and Computation is the first concentrated effort to give a systematic presentation of the main research results on the subject, since the modern concept was formulated in the late '50s and early '60s. The majority of the papers are in the nature of a handbook. All of them are self-contained, at various levels of difficulty. The Introduction surveys the main ideas and problems encountered in the logical investigation of quantifiers. The Prologue, written by Per Lindstrom, presents the early history of the concept of generalised quantifiers. The volume then continues with a series of papers surveying various research areas, particularly those that are of current interest. Together they provide introductions to the subject from the points of view of mathematics, linguistics, and theoretical computer science. The present volume has been prepared in parallel with Quantifiers: Logics, Models and Computation, Volume Two. Contributions, which contains a collection of research papers on the subject in areas that are too fresh to be summarised. The two volumes are complementary. For logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, linguists and computer scientists. Suitable as a text for advanced undergraduate and graduate specialised courses in logic. "

"Logic," one of the central words in Western intellectual history, compre hends in its meaning such diverse things as the Aristotelian syllogistic, the scholastic art of disputation, the transcendental logic of the Kantian critique, the dialectical logic of Hegel, and the mathematical logic of the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. The term "Formal Logic," following Kant is generally used to distinguish formal logical reasonings, precisely as formal, from the remaining universal truths based on reason. (Cf. SCHOLZ, 1931). A text-book example of a formal-logical inference which from "Some men are philosophers" and "All philosophers are wise" concludes that "Some men are wise" is called formal, because the validity of this inference depends only on the form ofthe given sentences -in particular it does not depend on the truth or falsity of these sentences. (On the dependence of logic on natural language, English, for example, compare Section 1 and 8). The form of a sentence like "Some men are philosophers," is that which remains preserved when the given predicates, here "men" and "philosophers" are replaced by arbitrary ones. The form itself can thus be represented by replacing the given predicates by variables. Variables are signs devoid of meaning, which may serve merely to indicate the place where meaningful constants (here the predicates) are to be inserted. As variables we shall use - as did Aristotle - letters, say P, Q and R, as variables for predicates."

It is with great pleasure that we are presenting to the community the second edition of this extraordinary handbook. It has been over 15 years since the publication of the first edition and there have been great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since then. The first edition has proved invaluable to generations of students and researchers in formal philosophy and language, as well as to consumers of logic in many applied areas. The main logic artiele in the Encyelopaedia Britannica 1999 has described the first edition as 'the best starting point for exploring any of the topics in logic'. We are confident that the second edition will prove to be just as good. ! The first edition was the second handbook published for the logic commu nity. It followed the North Holland one volume Handbook 0/ Mathematical Logic, published in 1977, edited by the late Jon Barwise. The four volume Handbook 0/ Philosophical Logic, published 1983-1989 came at a fortunate temporal junction at the evolution of logic. This was the time when logic was gaining ground in computer science and artificial intelligence cireles. These areas were under increasing commercial press ure to provide devices which help andjor replace the human in his daily activity. This pressure required the use of logic in the modelling of human activity and organisa tion on the one hand and to provide the theoretical basis for the computer program constructs on the other.

This collection of essays is dedicated to 'Joe' Karel Lambert. The contributors are all personally affected to Joe in some way or other, but they are definitely not the only ones. Whatever excuses there are - there are some -, the editors apologize to whomever they have neglected. But even so the collection displays how influential Karel Lambert has been, personally and through his teaching and his writings. The display is in alphabetical order - with one exception: Bas van Fraassen, being about the earliest student of Karel Lambert, opens the collection with some reminiscences. Naturally, one of the focal points of this volume is Lambert's logical thinking and (or: freed of) ontological thinking. Free logic is intimately connected with description theory. Bas van Fraassen gives a survey of the development of the area, and Charles Daniels points to difficulties with definite descriptions in modal contexts and stories. Peter Woodruff addresses the relation between free logic and supervaluation semantics, presenting a novel condition which recovers desirable metatheoretic properties for free logic under that semantics. Terence Parsons shows how free logic can be utilized in interpreting sentences as purporting to denote events (true ones succeed and false ones fail) and how this helps to understand natural language.

"The questions this book deals with deserve close investigation. The book offers a rare opportunity to think about the limitations of our standard logic and semantic analysis from an overall perspective." - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews In this challenging and provocative book, Dale Jacquette argues that contemporary philosophy labours under a number of historically inherited delusions about the nature of logic and the philosophical significance of certain formal properties of specific types of logical constructions. Exposing some of the key misconceptions about formal symbolic logic and its relation to thought, language and the world, Jacquette clears the ground of some very well-entrenched philosophical doctrines about the nature of logic, including some of the most fundamental seldom-questioned parts of elementary propositional and predicate-quantificational logic. Having presented difficulties for conventional ways of thinking about truth functionality, the metaphysics of reference and predication, the role of a concept of truth in a theory of meaning, among others, Jacquette proceeds to reshape the network of ideas about traditional logic that philosophy has acquired along with modern logic itself. In so doing Jacquette is able to offer a new perspective on a number of existing problems in logic and philosophy of logic.

We all engage in the process of reasoning, but we don't always pay attention to whether we are doing it well. This book offers the opportunity to practise reasoning in a clear-headed and critical way, with the aims of developing an awareness of the importance of reasoning well and of improving the reader's skill in analyzing and evaluating arguments.

In this third edition, Anne Thomson has updated and revised the book to include fresh and topical examples which will guide students through the processes of critical reasoning in a clear and engaging way. In addition, two new chapters on evaluating the credibility of evidence and decision making and dilemmas will fully equip students to reason well. By the end of the book students should be able to:

• identify flaws in arguments
• analyze the reasoning in newspaper articles, books and speeches
• assess the credibilty of evidence and authorities
• make sound decisions and solve dilemmas
• approach any topic with the ability to reason and think critically.

Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism presents a remarkable diversity of contemporary opinions on the prospects of addressing philosophical topics from a psychological perspective. It considers the history and philosophical merits of psychologism, and looks systematically at psychologism in phenomenology, cognitive science, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophical semantics, and artificial intelligence. It juxtaposes many different philosophical standpoints, each supported by rigorous philosophical argument.
Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism is intended for professionals in the fields indicated, advanced undergraduate and graduate students in related areas of study, and interested lay readers.

Modal Logic is a branch of logic with applications in many related disciplines such as computer science, philosophy, linguistics and artificial intelligence. Over the last twenty years, in all of these neighbouring fields, modal systems have been developed that we call multi-dimensional. (Our definition of multi-dimensionality in modal logic is a technical one: we call a modal formalism multi-dimensional if, in its intended semantics, the universe of a model consists of states that are tuples over some more basic set.) This book treats such multi-dimensional modal logics in a uniform way, linking their mathematical theory to the research tradition in algebraic logic. We will define and discuss a number of systems in detail, focusing on such aspects as expressiveness, definability, axiomatics, decidability and interpolation. Although the book will be mathematical in spirit, we take care to give motivations from the disciplines mentioned earlier on.

This book uncovers a logical fallacy underlying Afro-Pessimism and provides a formal theory of Articulation, teasing out new reflections on race and Blackness. Afro-Pessimism maintains that Blacks, subject to a subordinate position in society, suffer a cultural death. In this monograph, Victor Peterson rejects this theory, demonstrating that Black subjectivity is inherently multiple, articulating identities appropriate to the contexts in which it finds itself and yet remaining continuous across its individual but not mutually exclusive instantiations. Peterson argues that we should consider the mechanisms that produce the conditions under which individuals obtain positions of either dominance or subordination. By providing a working logical foundation for Articulation theory within cultural studies, Peterson encourages us to rethink the politics of racial identity and subjectivity in contemporary social life. Encouraging critical thought about the arbitrarily determined but instrumentally objective of our global racial order, this book will be of great interest to scholars of Black Studies, sociology, cultural studies, and philosophy.

We who live in this post-modern late twentieth century culture are still children of dualism. For a variety of rather complex reasons we continue to split apart and treat as radical opposites body and spirit, medicine and religion, sacred and secular, private and public, love and justice, men and women. Though this is still our strong tendency, we are beginning to discover both the futility and the harm of such dualistic splitting. Peoples of many ancient cultures might smile at the belatedness of our discovery concerning the commonalities of medicine and religion. A cur sory glance back at ancient Egypt, Samaria, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome would disclose a common thread - the close union of religion and medicine. Both were centrally concerned with healing, health, and wholeness. The person was understood as a unity of body, mind, and spirit. The priest and the physician frequently were combined in the same individual. One of the important contributions of this significant volume of essays is the sustained attack upon dualism. From a variety of vantage points, virtually all of the authors unmask the varied manifestations of dualism in religion and medicine, urging a more holistic approach. Since the editor has provided an excellent summary of each article, I shall not attempt to comment on specific contributions. Rather, I wish to highlight three 1 broad themes which I find notable for theological ethics."

This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.

These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic.

In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study.

On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic ( defeasible ) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail."

This book creates a conceptual schema that acts as a correlation between Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. It connects both fields and offers a proper theoretical foundation for the contemporary developments of Epistemic Logic regarding the dynamics of information. It builds a bridge between the view of Awareness Justification Internalism, and a dynamic approach to Awareness Logic. The book starts with an introduction to the main topics in Epistemic Logic and Epistemology and reviews the disconnection between the two fields. It analyses three core notions representing the basic structure of the conceptual schema: "Epistemic Awareness", "Knowledge" and "Justification". Next, it presents the Explicit Aware Knowledge (EAK) Schema, using a diagram of three ellipses to illustrate the schema, and a formal model based on a neighbourhood-model structure, that shows one concrete application of the EAK-Schema into a logical structure. The book ends by presenting conclusions and final remarks about the uses and applications of the EAK-Schema. It shows that the most important feature of the schema is that it serves both as a theoretical correlate to the dynamic extensions of Awareness Logic, providing it with a philosophical background, and as an abstract conceptual structure for a re-interpretation of Epistemology.

This anthology of original essays has been nearly .two and one-half years in the making, and reflects the generous effort of many persons. To begin with, we thank the contributors to the volume, who not only cooperated with regards to their own works, but who also provided valuable advice concerning the over-all volume. One of the contributors was outstanding in his assistance and warrants special mention: we thank Professor Michel Meyer, for his encouragement, counsel, and dedication to see this project to comple tion. We would also like to thank Professor Jaakko Hintikka for his encouragement and Mrs. Kuipers of Reidel for her patience and under standing along the way. A project such as this could never have been completed without the unique assistance of members of the Department of Communication, Ohio State University: Ms. Kimberly Pasi and Mr. Charles Mawhirtcr. Also, special thanks are due to our graduate research assistant Ms. Susan Jasko, for her proofreading and bibliographic work. The pressures of developing a Festschrift are considerable and could not have been met without the cooperation and enthusiasm of Mrs. Perelman, especially in allowing us to publish Professor Perelman's address to Ohio State University as our introduction."

In this book the authors present new results on interpolation for nonmonotonic logics, abstract (function) independence, the Talmudic Kal Vachomer rule, and an equational solution of contrary-to-duty obligations. The chapter on formal construction is the conceptual core of the book, where the authors combine the ideas of several types of nonmonotonic logics and their analysis of 'natural' concepts into a formal logic, a special preferential construction that combines formal clarity with the intuitive advantages of Reiter defaults, defeasible inheritance, theory revision, and epistemic considerations. It is suitable for researchers in the area of computer science and mathematical logic.

The modern discussion on the concept of truthlikeness was started in 1960. In his influential Word and Object, W. V. O. Quine argued that Charles Peirce's definition of truth as the limit of inquiry is faulty for the reason that the notion 'nearer than' is only "defined for numbers and not for theories." In his contribution to the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science at Stan ford, Karl Popper defended the opposite view by defining a compara tive notion of verisimilitude for theories. was originally introduced by the The concept of verisimilitude Ancient sceptics to moderate their radical thesis of the inaccessibility of truth. But soon verisimilitudo, indicating likeness to the truth, was confused with probabilitas, which expresses an opiniotative attitude weaker than full certainty. The idea of truthlikeness fell in disrepute also as a result of the careless, often confused and metaphysically loaded way in which many philosophers used - and still use - such concepts as 'degree of truth', 'approximate truth', 'partial truth', and 'approach to the truth'. Popper's great achievement was his insight that the criticism against truthlikeness - by those who urge that it is meaningless to speak about 'closeness to truth' - is more based on prejudice than argument."