This book provides a new, linguistic approach to Argumentation Theory. Its main goal is to integrate the logical, dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of argumentation in a model providing a unitary treatment of its justificatory and persuasive powers. This model takes as its basis Speech Acts Theory in order to characterize argumentation as a second-order speech act complex. The result is a systematic and comprehensive theory of the interpretation, analysis and evaluation of arguments. This theory sheds light on the many faces of argumentative communication: verbal and non-verbal, monological and dialogical, literal and non-literal, ordinary and specialized.
The book takes into consideration the major current comprehensive accounts of good argumentation (Perelman's New Rhetoric, Pragma-dialectics, the ARG model, the Epistemic Approach) and shows that these accounts have fundamental weaknesses rooted in their instrumentalist conception of argumentation as an activity oriented to a goal external to itself. Furthermore, the author addresses some challenging meta-theoretical questions such as the justification problem for Argumentation Theory models and the relationship between reasoning and arguing.

This volume honours the life and work of Solomon Feferman, one of the most prominent mathematical logicians of the latter half of the 20th century. In the collection of essays presented here, researchers examine Feferman's work on mathematical as well as specific methodological and philosophical issues that tie into mathematics. Feferman's work was largely based in mathematical logic (namely model theory, set theory, proof theory and computability theory), but also branched out into methodological and philosophical issues, making it well known beyond the borders of the mathematics community. With regard to methodological issues, Feferman supported concrete projects. On the one hand, these projects calibrate the proof theoretic strength of subsystems of analysis and set theory and provide ways of overcoming the limitations imposed by Goedel's incompleteness theorems through appropriate conceptual expansions. On the other, they seek to identify novel axiomatic foundations for mathematical practice, truth theories, and category theory. In his philosophical research, Feferman explored questions such as "What is logic?" and proposed particular positions regarding the foundations of mathematics including, for example, his "conceptual structuralism." The contributing authors of the volume examine all of the above issues. Their papers are accompanied by an autobiography presented by Feferman that reflects on the evolution and intellectual contexts of his work. The contributing authors critically examine Feferman's work and, in part, actively expand on his concrete mathematical projects. The volume illuminates Feferman's distinctive work and, in the process, provides an enlightening perspective on the foundations of mathematics and logic.

This book is for bioethicists, ethicists (theologians/philosophers), professionals in biotechnology, EU and national policymakers, and professors/teachers of courses in applied ethics. It presents an interdisciplinary reflection on the nature and scope of current biotechnology in Europe. It offers a concise presentation of the current biotechnological arena in Europe with its ethical implications and provides a survey of topical Council of Europe documents and treaties.

This monograph addresses the question of the increasing irrelevance of philosophy, which has seen scientists as well as philosophers concluding that philosophy is dead and has dissolved into the sciences. It seeks to answer the question of whether or not philosophy can still be fruitful and what kind of philosophy can be such. The author argues that from its very beginning philosophy has focused on knowledge and methods for acquiring knowledge. This view, however, has generally been abandoned in the last century with the belief that, unlike the sciences, philosophy makes no observations or experiments and requires only thought. Thus, in order for philosophy to once again be relevant, it needs to return to its roots and focus on knowledge as well as methods for acquiring knowledge. Accordingly, this book deals with several questions about knowledge that are essential to this view of philosophy, including mathematical knowledge. Coverage examines such issues as the nature of knowledge; plausibility and common sense; knowledge as problem solving; modeling scientific knowledge; mathematical objects, definitions, diagrams; mathematics and reality; and more. This monograph presents a new approach to philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics. It will appeal to graduate students and researchers with interests in the role of knowledge, the analytic method, models of science, and mathematics and reality.

Alfred Tarski was one of the two giants of the twentieth-century development of logic, along with Kurt Goedel. The four volumes of this collection contain all of Tarski's published papers and abstracts, as well as a comprehensive bibliography. Here will be found many of the works, spanning the period 1921 through 1979, which are the bedrock of contemporary areas of logic, whether in mathematics or philosophy. These areas include the theory of truth in formalized languages, decision methods and undecidable theories, foundations of geometry, set theory, and model theory, algebraic logic, and universal algebra.

The Legacy of Aristotelian Enthymeme provides a historical-logical analysis of Aristotle's rhetorical syllogism, the enthymeme, through its Medieval and Renaissance interpretations. Bringing together notions of credibility and proof, an international team of scholars highlight the fierce debates around this form of argumentation during two key periods for Aristotle's beliefs. Reflecting on medieval and humanist thinkers, philosophers, poets and theologians, this volume joins up dialectical and rhetorical argumentation as key to the enthymeme's interpretation and shows how the enthymeme was the source of a major interpretive conflict. As a method for achieving the standards for proof and credibility that persist across diverse fields of study today including the law, politics, medicine and morality, this book takes in Latin and Persian interpretations of the enthymeme and casts contemporary argumentation in a new historical light.

This book provides a collection of essays representing the state of the art in the research into argumentation in classical antiquity. It contains essays from leading and up and coming scholars on figures as diverse as Parmenides, Gorgias, Seneca, and Classical Chinese "wandering persuaders." The book includes contributions from specialists in the history of philosophy as well as specialists in contemporary argumentation theory, and stimulates the dialogue between scholars studying issues relating to argumentation theory in ancient philosophy and contemporary argumentation theorists. Furthermore, the book sets the direction for research into argumentation in antiquity by encouraging an engagement with a broader range of historical figures, and closer collaboration between contemporary concerns and the history of philosophy.

The Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems presents a detailed overview of the main lines of research on contemporary deontic logic and related topics. Although building on decades of previous work in the field, it is the first collection to take into account the significant changes in the landscape of deontic logic that have occurred in the past twenty years. These changes have resulted largely, though not entirely, from the interaction of deontic logic with a variety of other fields, including computer science, legal theory, organizational theory, economics, and linguistics. This first volume of the Handbook is divided into three parts, containing nine chapters in all, each written by leading experts in the field. The first part concentrates on historical foundations. The second examines topics of central interest in contemporary deontic logic. The third presents some new logical frameworks that have now become part of the mainstream literature. A second volume of the Handbook is currently in preparation, and there may be a third after that.

Andinmy haste, I said: "Allmenare Liars" 1 -Psalms 116:11 The Original Lie Philosophical analysis often reveals and seldom solves paradoxes. To quote Stephen Read: A paradox arises when an unacceptable conclusion is supported by a plausible argument from apparently acceptable premises. [...] So three di?erent reactions to the paradoxes are possible: to show that the r- soning is fallacious; or that the premises are not true after all; or that 2 the conclusion can in fact be accepted. There are sometimes elaborate ways to endorse a paradoxical conc- sion. One might be prepared to concede that indeed there are a number of grains that make a heap, but no possibility to know this number. However, some paradoxes are more threatening than others; showing the conclusiontobeacceptableisnotaseriousoption,iftheacceptanceleads to triviality. Among semantic paradoxes, the Liar (in any of its versions) 3 o?ers as its conclusion a bullet no one would be willing to bite. One of the most famous versions of the Liar Paradox was proposed by Epimenides, though its attribution to the Cretan poet and philosopher has only a relatively recent history. It seems indeed that Epimenides was mentioned neither in ancient nor in medieval treatments of the Liar 1 Jewish Publication Society translation. 2 Read [1].

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was an outstanding contributor to many fields of human knowledge. The historiography of philosophy has tagged him as a "rationalist." But what does this exactly mean? Is he a "rationalist" in the same sense in Mathematics and Politics, in Physics and Jurisprudence, in Metaphysics and Theology, in Logic and Linguistics, in Technology and Medicine, in Epistemology and Ethics? What are the most significant features of his "rationalism," whatever it is?

For the first time an outstanding group of Leibniz researchers, some acknowledged as leading scholars, others in the beginning of a promising career, who specialize in the most significant areas of Leibniz's contributions to human thought and action, were requested to spell out the nature of his rationalism in each of these areas, with a view to provide a comprehensive picture of what it amounts to, both in its general drive and in its specific features and eventual inner tensions.

The chapters of the book are the result of intense discussion in the course of an international conference focused on the title question of this book, and were selected in view of their contribution to this topic. They are clustered in thematically organized parts. No effort has been made to hide the controversies underlying the different interpretations of Leibniz's "rationalism" - in each particular domain and as a whole. On the contrary, the editor firmly believes that only through a variety of conflicting interpretive perspectives can the multi-faceted nature of an oeuvre of such a magnitude and variety as Leibniz's be brought to light and understood as it deserves.

In his new study, Beyond Atheism, Beyond God, author Philip A. Stahl uses atheism as a rational stepping stone to arrive at an emergent conception of the universe, exposing features that might be described as transcendent.

He presents an impersonal approach to Being that is devoid of any specific religious overtones or affi liations. Each person becomes a quantum-based co-creator in his or her own right, according to physicist Henry Stapp. As such, we are able to thereby see ourselves and our humanity in a new light, as opposed to being merely reactive cogs in a vast mechanical-reductionist machine. Effectively, we emerge as much more than assemblies of molecules.

This volume, the fourth and final entry in Stahl's series on atheism, seeks to arrive at a transcendent concept of being that also surpasses absolutism and naive or dogmatic deity templates. It considers the development of a more realistic, cogent and effective ethics and morality less likely to be exploited by the power mongers or sacred source apologists, and it answers the question of whether God exists-though not in the way one would normally assume.

This collection of papers, celebrating the contributions of Swedish logician Dag Prawitz to Proof Theory, has been assembled from those presented at the Natural Deduction conference organized in Rio de Janeiro to honour his seminal research. Dag Prawitz's work forms the basis of intuitionistic type theory and his inversion principle constitutes the foundation of most modern accounts of proof-theoretic semantics in Logic, Linguistics and Theoretical Computer Science.

The range of contributions includes material on the extension of natural deduction with higher-order rules, as opposed to higher-order connectives, and a paper discussing the application of natural deduction rules to dealing with equality in predicate calculus. The volume continues with a key chapter summarizing work on the extension of the Curry-Howard isomorphism (itself a by-product of the work on natural deduction), via methods of category theory that have been successfully applied to linear logic, as well as many other contributions from highly regarded authorities. With an illustrious group of contributors addressing a wealth of topics and applications, this volume is a valuable addition to the libraries of academics in the multiple disciplines whose development has been given added scope by the methodologies supplied by natural deduction. The volume is representative of the rich and varied directions that Prawitz work has inspired in the area of natural deduction.
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The second volume is devoted to issues of compositionality that arouse in the sciences of language, the investigation of the mind, and the modeling of representational brain functions. How could compositional languages evolve? How many sentences are needed to learn a compositional language? How does compositionality relate to the interpretation of texts, the generation of idioms and metaphors, and the understanding of aberrant expressions? What psychological mechanism underlies the combination of complex concepts? And finally, what neuronal structure can possibly realize a compositional system of mental representations?

Pondering on Problems of Argumentation is a collection of twenty essays brought together for anyone who is interested in theoretical issues in the study of argumentation. This collection of papers gives the reader an insightful and balanced view of the kind of theoretical issues argumentation theorists are currently concerned with. Because most of the perspectives on argumentation that are en vogue are represented, this volume provides a multidisciplinary and even interdisciplinary outlook on the current state of affairs in argumentation theory. Some of the contributions in Pondering on Problems of Argumentation deal with problems of argumentation that have been recognized as theoretical issues for a considerable time, like the problems of fallaciousness and identifying argumentation structures. Other contributions discuss issues that have become a focus of attention only recently or regained their prominence, such as the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, and the strategic use of the argumentative technique of dissociation. In five separate sections papers are included dealing with argumentative strategies, problems of norms of reasonableness and fallaciousness, types of argument and argument schemes the structure of argumentation and rules for advocacy and discussion.

This book collects, for the first time in one volume, contributions honoring Professor Raymond Smullyan's work on self-reference. It serves not only as a tribute to one of the great thinkers in logic, but also as a celebration of self-reference in general, to be enjoyed by all lovers of this field. Raymond Smullyan, mathematician, philosopher, musician and inventor of logic puzzles, made a lasting impact on the study of mathematical logic; accordingly, this book spans the many personalities through which Professor Smullyan operated, offering extensions and re-evaluations of his academic work on self-reference, applying self-referential logic to art and nature, and lastly, offering new puzzles designed to communicate otherwise esoteric concepts in mathematical logic, in the manner for which Professor Smullyan was so well known. This book is suitable for students, scholars and logicians who are interested in learning more about Raymond Smullyan's work and life.

This volume deals with the connection between thinking-and-speaking and our form(s) of life. All contributions engage with Wittgenstein's approach to this topic. As a whole, the volume takes a stance against both biological and ethnological interpretations of the notion "form of life" and seeks to promote a broadly logico-linguistic understanding instead. The structure of this book is threefold. Part one focuses on lines of thinking that lead from Wittgenstein's earlier thought to the concept of form of life in his later work. Contributions to part two examine the concrete philosophical function of this notion as well as the ways in which it differs from cognate concepts. Contributions to part three put Wittgenstein's notion of form of life in perspective by relating it to phenomenology, ordinary language philosophy and problems in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Thetitleofthisbookmentionstheconceptsofparaconsistencyandconstr- tive logic. However, the presented material belongs to the ?eld of parac- sistency, not to constructive logic. At the level of metatheory, the classical methods are used. We will consider two concepts of negation: the ne- tion as reduction to absurdity and the strong negation. Both concepts were developed in the setting of constrictive logic, which explains our choice of the title of the book. The paraconsistent logics are those, which admit - consistent but non-trivial theories, i. e. , the logics which allow one to make inferences in a non-trivial fashion from an inconsistent set of hypotheses. Logics in which all inconsistent theories are trivial are called explosive. The indicated property of paraconsistent logics yields the possibility to apply them in di?erent situations, where we encounter phenomena relevant (to some extent) to the logical notion of inconsistency. Examples of these si- ations are (see [86]): information in a computer data base; various scienti?c theories; constitutions and other legal documents; descriptions of ?ctional (and other non-existent) objects; descriptions of counterfactual situations; etc. The mentioned survey by G. Priest [86] may also be recommended for a ?rst acquaintance with paraconsistent logic. The study of the paracons- tency phenomenon may be based on di?erent philosophical presuppositions (see, e. g. , [87]). At this point, we emphasize only one fundamental aspect of investigations in the ?eld of paraconsistency. It was noted by D. Nelson in [65, p.

This monograph first presents a method of diagramming argument macrostructure, synthesizing the standard circle and arrow approach with the Toulmin model. A theoretical justification of this method through a dialectical understanding of argument, a critical examination of Toulmin on warrants, a thorough discussion of the linked-convergent distinction, and an account of the proper reconstruction of enthymemes follows.

The notion of complexity is an important contribution of logic to theoretical computer science and mathematics. This volume attempts to approach complexity in a holistic way, investigating mathematical properties of complexity hierarchies at the same time as discussing algorithms and computational properties. A main focus of the volume is on some of the new paradigms of computation, among them Quantum Computing and Infinitary Computation. The papers in the volume are tied together by an introductory article describing abstract properties of complexity hierarchies.

This volume will be of great interest to both mathematical logicians and theoretical computer scientists, providing them with new insights into the various views of complexity and thus shedding new light on their own research.

such questions for centuries (unrestricted by the capabilities of any hard ware). The principles governing the interaction of several processes, for example, are abstract an similar to principles governing the cooperation of two large organisation. A detailed rule based effective but rigid bureaucracy is very much similar to a complex computer program handling and manipulating data. My guess is that the principles underlying one are very much the same as those underlying the other. I believe the day is not far away in the future when the computer scientist will wake up one morning with the realisation that he is actually a kind of formal philosopher The projected number of volumes for this Handbook is about 18. The subject has evolved and its areas have become interrelated to such an extent that it no longer makes sense to dedicate volumes to topics. However, the volumes do follow some natural groupings of chapters. I would like to thank our authors are readers for their contributions and their commitment in making this Handbook a success. Thanks also to our publication administrator Mrs J. Spurr for her usual dedication and excellence and to Kluwer Academic Publishers for their continuing support for the Handbook."

Offers an extremely bold, far-reaching, and unsuspected thesis in the history of philosophy: Aristotelianism was a dominant movement of the British philosophical landscape, especially in the field of logic, and it had a long survival. British Aristotelian doctrines were strongly empiricist in nature, both in the theory of knowledge and in scientific method; this character marked and influenced further developments in British philosophy at the end of the century, and eventually gave rise to what we now call British empiricism, which is represented by philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Beyond the apparent and explicit criticism of the old Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, which has been very well recognized by the scholarship in the twentieth century and which has contributed to the false notion that early modern philosophy emerged as a reaction to Aristotelianism, the present research examines the continuity, the original developments and the impact of Aristotelian doctrines and terminology in logic and epistemology as the background for the rise of empiricism.Without the Aristotelian tradition, without its doctrines, and without its conceptual elaborations, British empiricism would never have been born. The book emphasizes that philosophy is not defined only by the great names, but also by minor authors, who determine the intellectual milieu from which the canonical names emerge. It considers every single published work of logic between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth century, being acquainted with a number of surviving manuscripts and being well-informed about the best existing scholarship in the field. "

This volume describes and analyzes in a systematic way the great contributions of the philosopher Krister Segerberg to the study of real and doxastic actions. Following an introduction which functions as a roadmap to Segerberg's works on actions, the first part of the book covers relations between actions, intentions and routines, dynamic logic as a theory of action, agency, and deontic logics built upon the logics of actions. The second section explores belief revision and update, iterated and irrevocable beliefs change, dynamic doxastic logic and hypertheories. Segerberg has worked for more than thirty years to analyze the intricacies of real and doxastic actions using formal tools - mostly modal (dynamic) logic and its semantics. He has had such a significant impact on modal logic that "It is hard to roam for long in modal logic without finding Krister Segerberg's traces," as Johan van Benthem notes in his chapter of this book.

If the phrase "the philosophy of difference" defines French anti-Hegelianism, then we have to say that there would be no philosophy of difference without Logic and Existence. Derrida's notion of differance, Deleuze's logic of sense, and Foucault's reconception of history all stem from this book. This first English translation of the virtually unknown Logic and Existence is essential for the understanding of the development of French thought in this century.

Logic and Existence, which originally appeared in 1952, completes the project Hyppolite began with Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Taking up successively the role of language, reflection, and categories in Hegel's Science of Logic, Hyppolite illuminates Hegelianism's most obscure dialectical synthesis: the relation between the phenomenology and the logic.

His interpretation of the relation between the phenomenology and the logic has the result of marking a rupture in French thought. Not only does Logic and Existence effectively end the humanistic reading of Hegel popularized by Kojeve in France before World War II, but also it initiates the great anti-Hegelianism of French philosophy in the sixties. Hyppolite's work displays the originality of Hegel's thought in a new way, and sets up the means by which to escape from it.

Essays on Husserl's Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics sets out to fill up a lacuna in the present research on Husserl by presenting a precise account of Husserl's work in the field of logic, of the philosophy of logic and of the philosophy of mathematics. The aim is to provide an in-depth reconstruction and analysis of the discussion between Husserl and his most important interlocutors, and to clarify pivotal ideas of Husserl's by considering their reception and elaboration by some of his disciples and followers, such as Oskar Becker and Jacob Klein, as well as their influence on some of the most significant logicians and mathematicians of the past century, such as Luitzen E. J. Brouwer, Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Goedel and Hermann Weyl. Most of the papers consider Husserl and another scholar - e.g. Leibniz, Kant, Bolzano, Brentano, Cantor, Frege - and trace out and contextualize lines of influence, points of contact, and points of disagreement. Each essay is written by an expert of the field, and the volume includes contributions both from the analytical tradition and from the phenomenological one.