In an increasingly urbanized world, urban terrain has become a greater factor in military operations. Simultaneously, advances in military technology have given military forces sharply increased capabilities. The conflict comes from how urban terrain can negate or degrade many of those increased capabilities. What happens when advanced weapons are used in a close-range urban fight with an abundance of cover? Storming the City explores these issues by analyzing the performance of the US Army and US Marine Corps in urban combat in four major urban battles of the mid-twentieth century (Aachen 1944, Manila 1945, Seoul 1950, and Hue 1968). Alec Wahlman assesses each battle using a similar framework of capability categories, and separate chapters address urban warfare in American military thought. In the four battles, across a wide range of conditions, American forces were ultimately successful in capturing each city because of two factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The preparations US forces made for warfare writ large proved generally applicable to urban warfare. Battlefield adaptation, a strong suit of American forces, filled in where those overall preparations for combat needed fine tuning. From World War II to Vietnam, however, there was a gradual reduction in tactical performance in the four battles.

Featuring full-color artwork, specially drawn maps and archive photographs, this study offers key insights into the tactics, leadership, combat performance and subsequent reputations of six representative German and Soviet infantry battalions pitched into three pivotal actions that determined the course of the "Barbarossa" campaign at the height of World War II.
The Axis invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 pitted Nazi Germany and her allies against Stalin's forces in a mighty struggle for survival. Three German army groups - North, Center and South - advanced into Soviet-held territory; Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center, the largest of these three, was tasked with defeating General of the Army Dmitry Pavlov's Western Front in Belarus, and was assigned two Panzer Groups to achieve this. Bock's command would complete the encirclement and destruction of vast numbers of Soviet personnel and materiel at battles such as Białystok-Minsk in June-July and Smolensk in July-August before being halted as German efforts centered on the conquest of the Ukraine, only to resume the offensive at the end of September. As the dust of summer gave way to the mud of autumn, the ensuing German drive on Moscow was slowed and then halted by a Soviet counteroffensive mounted by Konev's Kalinin and Timoshenko's Southwestern Fronts in December amid unusually harsh winter conditions, marking the failure of the German Blitzkrieg; Army Group Centre was forced back and Moscow remained in Soviet hands.
At the forefront of the German advance, fighting alongside the spearhead Panzer divisions, were the lorry-borne infantrymen of the motorized infantry divisions. Unlike the Schutzen, the specialist armored infantry integral to the Panzer divisions, these highly trained motorized formations were organized, armed and equipped as per their footslogging counterparts in the standard infantry divisions; together, these two troop types were the forerunners of the formidable Panzergrenadier formations that would provide the Germans with their mobile infantry forces in the climactic years of World War II.
Opposing the German mobile forces, the Soviets deployed rifle divisions and motorized rifle divisions, some of which would be upgraded to Guards status following outstanding combat performance. The Soviet forces fought tenaciously in the teeth of sometimes overwhelming local German superiority and with the threat of savage reprisals from the NKVD troops at their backs, suffering huge losses but remaining in the fight until the lines could be stabilized in the worsening winter conditions outside Moscow. Their clashes with the motorized infantrymen of the German vanguard would shape the outcome of this mighty battle for survival.

At the end of the Second World War, it quickly dawned on the West that the defeat of one totalitarian enemy - Hitler's Germany - had left another, our late ally turned potential foe: Soviet Russia. This official assessment of the Red Army's strength and standing, published in 1949, is therefore of consuming interest to students of the Cold War. It comprises a history of the Red Army from its formation in 1918 after the Bolshevik Revolution to its triumph in the Second World War. Then follows a section on the army's command and control structure; notes on its post-war re-organisation; and two long chapters on tactics - including such subjects as tanks, air support; night attacks and artillery. There are more chapters on weapons, equipment, conditions of service, supply and airborne operations. With charts of command structures, and photographs and diagrams of important weapons, this is as complete a snapshot of a potentially hostile enemy force as can be imagined.

Accidental harm to civilians in warfare often becomes an occasion for public outrage, from citizens of both the victimized and the victimizing nation. In this vitally important book on a topic of acute concern for anyone interested in military strategy, international security, or human rights, Alexander B. Downes reminds readers that democratic and authoritarian governments alike will sometimes deliberately kill large numbers of civilians as a matter of military strategy. What leads governments to make such a choice?

Downes examines several historical cases: British counterinsurgency tactics during the Boer War, the starvation blockade used by the Allies against Germany in World War I, Axis and Allied bombing campaigns in World War II, and ethnic cleansing in the Palestine War. He concludes that governments decide to target civilian populations for two main reasons desperation to reduce their own military casualties or avert defeat, or a desire to seize and annex enemy territory. When a state's military fortunes take a turn for the worse, he finds, civilians are more likely to be declared legitimate targets to coerce the enemy state to give up. When territorial conquest and annexation are the aims of warfare, the population of the disputed land is viewed as a threat and the aggressor state may target those civilians to remove them. Democracies historically have proven especially likely to target civilians in desperate circumstances.

In Targeting Civilians in War, Downes explores several major recent conflicts, including the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Civilian casualties occurred in each campaign, but they were not the aim of military action. In these cases, Downes maintains, the achievement of quick and decisive victories against overmatched foes allowed democracies to win without abandoning their normative beliefs by intentionally targeting civilians. Whether such "restraint" can be guaranteed in future conflicts against more powerful adversaries is, however, uncertain. During times of war, democratic societies suffer tension between norms of humane conduct and pressures to win at the lowest possible costs. The painful lesson of Targeting Civilians in War is that when these two concerns clash, the latter usually prevails."

Elephants have fought in human armies for more than three thousand years. Asian armies boasted of their pachyderm power, while the Romans fielded elephants alongside their legendary legions but were perhaps too proud to admit that mere animals contributed to victory. "War Elephants" is the story of their largely forgotten role in the history of warfare. Generals throughout recorded history used elephants as tanks, bulldozers, and cargo trucks long before such vehicles existed. Until gunpowder began to reduce the utility of elephants in battle during the seventeenth century, these beasts built roads, swung swords, or simply terrified opposing forces. Although some believe that elephants were mere gimmicks of warfare, John M. Kistler discredits that notion. "War Elephants" shows that elephants deserve respect for the sacrifices they have made in the service of many cultures. Elephants have long fought for and served human masters, but it is now the elephants themselves that must be protected.

Strategic bombardments, either aimed explicitly at civilians or deployed in circumstances where extensive civilian deaths are written off as collateral damage or accidental, are becoming increasingly common. This book shows how certain European colonial powers, notably Britain, initiated aerial bombardment of civilians after World War I, how it was an instrument of choice in World War II, and how it has since been refined and practised by the US in Korea, Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. It exposes the rationalizations put forward to avoid the label of 'state terrorism', the race, gender and class biases used to justify bombing 'other' people and the dirty secret about the so-called 'clean' use of air power. It argues that if terrorism is to be diminished, the role of aerial bombing in sustaining global violence must be recognized and confronted.

Describes the operational challenges posed by the urban environment and proposes several recommendations to surmount them. In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.

Gives an overview of the formidable tasks facing US Army combat service support (CSS) in urban operations and recommends ways for the CSS community to prepare itself to meet them. The inevitability of US armed forces future involvement in urban contingencies worldwide demands that those responsible for arming, manning, sustaining, and otherwise supporting these operations prepare for the challenges inherent in such undertakings. This report gives an overview of these formidable tasks and recommends ways for the US Army combat service support (CSS) community to prepare itself to meet them.

Using a case study based on the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat team, the authors explore how the Army might improve its ability to contribute to prompt global power projection, that is, strategically responsive early-entry forces for time-critical events.

Current U.S. forces have little experience with urban warfare. This report identifies shortfalls in urban combat ground reconnaissance and assists in the creation of urban reconnaissance tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Marine Corps. The authors discuss four challenges: the constant adaptation demanded by the environment, the complexity of ground reconnaissance, the demands of urban operations on military personnel, and the demands of these operations on equipment and technology. The analysts' purpose is to narrow the gap between these challenges and the solutions immediately at hand.

This title examines how the urban physical, social, and political environment constrains aerospace operations; identifies key operational tasks that aerospace forces can help accomplish; and discusses strategies and technologies that can improve success in urban operations.

This case study analysis of three recent urban operations is intended to update the lessons learned from prior military experience. The three cases examined - Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992-1993, and Chechnya in 1994-1995 - all occurred within the last ten years and capture the range of political constraints that military forces must operate under in urban environments. The author discusses how ongoing technological, social, and political changes are increasing the significance of certain elements of urban operations. These include the presence of the media; the presence of noncombatants; rules of engagement; and information-operation tools such as psychological operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and political-military strategy.

This book assembles a collection of three of the most influential military writings of all time: du Picq's BATTLE STUDIES, an established authority on the effect of "moral force" on battle; Clausewitz's PRINCIPLES OF WAR, which has had an effect on the destiny and welfare of the world like few other books; and Jomini's ART OF WAR, which teaches Napoleonic doctrine, which has exerted a strong influence on the development of modern military thought.

THE PERFECT STOCKING FILLER for anyone who thinks they'd survive the world's most hostile environments - or at least imagine they could do. ----------------------------- First issued to British airmen in the 1950s the beautifully illustrated Air Ministry Survival Guide provides invaluable practical tips and instruction on how to keep calm and carry on in any hostile environment. Whether you're lost in the desert, arctic, jungle, or adrift on the open ocean, you'll be better off armed with sensible advice on how to: - Build a structurally sound igloo - Pull faces to prevent frostbite (and when to expect bits to fall off should you fail) - Fashion a mask to prevent snowblindness - Make a hat out of seat cushions - Behave in the event of meeting hostile locals - Stay safe from poisonous reptiles and insects - Use a 'fire thong' - Punch man-eating sharks (which are cowards)

In contemporary missions, soldiers often face unconventional opponents rather than enemy armies. How do Western soldiers deal with war criminals, rioters, or insurgents? What explains differences in behavior across military organizations in multinational missions? How does military conduct impact local populations? Comparing troops from the United States, Britain, Germany, and Italy at three sites of intervention (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan), this book shows that militaries in the field apply idiosyncratic organizational routines. Friesendorf uses the concept of routines to explain, for example, why US soldiers are trigger-happy, why British soldiers patrol on foot, and why German soldiers avoid risk. Despite convergence in military structures and practices, militaries continue to fight differently, often with much autonomy. This bottom-up perspective focuses on different routines at the level of operations and tactics, thus contributing to a better understanding of the implementation of military missions, and highlighting failures of Western militaries to protect civilians.