Recent bestsellers by Niall Ferguson and John Keegan have created tremendous popular interest in World War I. In America's Great War prominent historian Robert H. Zieger examines the causes, prosecution, and legacy of this bloody conflict from a frequently overlooked perspective, that of American involvement. This is the first book to illuminate both America's dramatic influence on the war and the war's considerable impact upon our nation. Zieger's engaging narrative provides vivid descriptions of the famous battles and diplomatic maneuvering, while also chronicling America's rise to prominence within the postwar world. On the domestic front, Zieger details how the war forever altered American politics and society by creating the National Security State, generating powerful new instruments of social control, bringing about innovative labor and social welfare programs, and redefining civil liberties and race relations. America's Great War promises to become the definitive history of America and World War I.

In Russia and Armed Persuasion, Stephen J. Cimbala argues that Russia's war planners and political leaders must make painful adjustments in their thinking about the relationship between military art and policy in the twenty-first century. Russia must master the use of force for persuasion, not just destruction. As the author shows, military persuasion requires that Russian leaders master the politico-military complexity of crisis management, deterrence and arms control, and the limitation of ends and means in war. Russia now has scarce resources to devote to defense and can no longer afford the stick-only diplomacy and strategy that have characterized some of its recent past. Russian and Soviet military thinking historically emphasized the blunderbuss and total war: overwhelming mass, firepower, and conflicts of annihilation or prolonged attrition. However, historical experience also forced Russia and the Soviet Union to come to grips with crisis management and with limited aims and means in the conduct of war. On the one hand, Russia failed the test of military persuasion in its management of the July 1914 crisis that plunged Europe into World War I. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did adjust to the requirements of the nuclear age for crisis management, deterrence, and limited war. Using this mixed record of Russian and Soviet success and failure in twentieth century experience, Cimbala argues that Russia can, and must, improve in the twenty-first century. According to the author, the first decades of this century will pose at least three immediate challenges to Russia's military persuasion. Russia must continue to pursue strategic nuclear arms control and arms reductions, with the United States and avoid re-starting the Cold War by means of an ill-considered race in missile defenses. Second, Russia must maintain a surer grip on the military information revolution, especially as it pertains to the management of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Third, Russia must develop forces that are more flexible in small wars and peace operations: its recent experiences in Chechnya show that it has a long way to go in using economy of force as a military persuader. Cimbala's original analysis demonstrates the similar features in apparently dissimilar, or even opposite, events and processes. For example, he shows how the problem of military persuasion applies equally to the challenge of managing a nuclear crisis and the problem of low-intensity war. In each case, the dilemma is calibrating the military means to the political ends. Controversially, the author argues against both military and academic traditionalists, contending that the complexity of the force-policy relationship in the next century will reward the subtle users of military power and that others will be subject to a 'Gulliver effect' of diminishing returns.

Building on a strong foundation of primary sources, this unique study traces the role of East Germany's military (NVA) in the country's unification with West Germany. Utilizing interviews with and questionnaires from NVA officers, Herspring unravels the puzzle of the NVA's decision against using force to save the political system it was sworn to serve. The author also examines the integration of a select minority of officers and NCOs into the Bundeswehr. Illuminating the problems encountered by the Bundeswehr as it incorporated these individuals, Herspring constructs an ideal type of officer in one of the most politicized and tightly controlled of all communist militaries. His findings will be invaluable for all military-political specialists and for anyone interested in the process of transition from authoritarian/totalitarian to democratic systems.

In 1779 Sir Henry Clinton and more than eight thousand British troops left the waters of New York, seeking to capture the colonies' most important southern port, Charleston, South Carolina. Clinton and his officers believed that victory in Charleston would change both the seat of the war and its character. In this comprehensive study of the 1780 siege and surrender of Charleston, Carl P. Borick offers a full examination of the strategic and tactical elements of Clinton's operations. Suggesting that the importance of the siege has been underestimated, Borick contends that the British effort against Charleston was one of the most critical campaigns of the war. Borick examines the reasons for the shift in British strategy, the efforts of their army and navy, and the difficulties the patriots faced as they defended the city. He explores the roles of key figures in the campaign, including Benjamin Lincoln, William Moultrie, and Lord Charles Cornwallis. Borick relies on an impressive array of primary and secondary sources relating to the siege and includes maps that depict the British approach to the city and the complicated military operations that led to the patriots' greatest defeat of the American Revolution.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.

Describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics Why did the Confederacy lose so many men? The authors contend that the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks more often than the Federals. Offensive tactics, which had been used successfully by Americans in the Mexican War, were much less effective in the 1860s because an improved weapon--the rifle--had given increased strength to defenders. This book describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics. It also considers the development of tactics in all three arms of the service during the Civil War. In examining the Civil War the book separates Southern from Northern tactical practice and discusses Confederate military history in the context of Southern social history. Although the Southerners could have offset their numerical disadvantage by remaining on the defensive and forcing the Federals to attack, they failed to do so. The authors argue that the Southerners' consistent favoring of offensive warfare was attributable, in large measure, to their Celtic heritage: they fought with the same courageous dash and reckless abandon that had characterized their Celtic forebears since ancient times. The Southerners of the Civil War generation were prisoners of their social and cultural history: they attacked courageously and were killed--on battlefields so totally defended by the Federals that "not even a chicken could get through."

Weapons improved rapidly after the Civil War, raising difficult questions about the battle tactics employed by the United States Army. The most fundamental problem was the dominance of the tactical defensive, when defenders protected by fieldworks could deliver deadly fire from rifles and artillery against attackers advancing in close-ordered lines. The vulnerability of these offensive forces as they crossed the so-called "deadly ground" in front of defensive positions was even greater with the improvement of armaments after the Civil War.