Current U.S. forces have little experience with urban warfare. This report identifies shortfalls in urban combat ground reconnaissance and assists in the creation of urban reconnaissance tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Marine Corps. The authors discuss four challenges: the constant adaptation demanded by the environment, the complexity of ground reconnaissance, the demands of urban operations on military personnel, and the demands of these operations on equipment and technology. The analysts' purpose is to narrow the gap between these challenges and the solutions immediately at hand.

In Waging Modern War , General Wesley K. Clark recounts his experience leading NATO's forces to a hard-fought and ultimately successful victory in Kosovo in 1999. As the American military machine has swung into action in the months following the attacks on the World Trade centre and the Pentagon, it has become clear that the lessons of Kosovo are directly applicable to the war against terrorism and the nations that sponsor it. The problems posed, and overcome, in the war in Kosovo-how to fight an air war against unconventional forces in rough terrain and how to coordinate U.S. objectives with those of other nations-are the problems that America increasingly faces in the today's world. As the Los Angeles Times noted in late September of 2001, this book's "lessons are highly relevant now, . We need to think about exactly what steps will lessen, rather than increase, the terrorist threat. And we also need innovative commanders willing to improvise to meet a new kind of threat, more determined political leadership, a more flexible outlook in the Pentagon, . Gen. Clark has performed another service by highlighting these problems at a crucial moment in American history." Waging Modern War is history, memoir, guidebook, and forecast, essential reading for those who want to know how modern war is fought, and won.

This title examines how the urban physical, social, and political environment constrains aerospace operations; identifies key operational tasks that aerospace forces can help accomplish; and discusses strategies and technologies that can improve success in urban operations.

This case study analysis of three recent urban operations is intended to update the lessons learned from prior military experience. The three cases examined - Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992-1993, and Chechnya in 1994-1995 - all occurred within the last ten years and capture the range of political constraints that military forces must operate under in urban environments. The author discusses how ongoing technological, social, and political changes are increasing the significance of certain elements of urban operations. These include the presence of the media; the presence of noncombatants; rules of engagement; and information-operation tools such as psychological operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and political-military strategy.

Describing the radical transformation in German Infantry tactics that took place during World War I, this book presents the first detailed account of the evolution of stormtroop tactics available in English. It covers areas previously left unexplored: the German Infantry's tactical heritage, the squad's evolution as a tactical unit, the use of new weapons for close combat, the role of the elite assault units in the development of new tactics, and detailed descriptions of offensive battles that provided the inspiration and testing ground for this new way of fighting. Both a historical investigation and a standard of excellence in infantry tactics, Stormtroop Tactics is required reading for professional military officers and historians as well as enthusiasts. Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the "top down" intervention of reformers but instead a "bottom up" phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call "Blitzkrieg." Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I--tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.

The ideas of the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) underlie most modern military thought. This intellectual history of the reception of Carl von Clausewitz's military theories in Britain and the United States thus provides an important and revealing examination of the evolution of military thinking in both countries. In the first comprehensive study of the literature, Christopher Bassford argues that the impact of Clausewitzian theory - particularly the classic On War, published in 1832 - has been widely misunderstood, and he follows the trail of Clausewitzian influence from early-Victorian Britain to 1945. He examines the attitudes and interpretations of a large array of commentators, ranging from soldiers like the Duke of Wellington, "Wully" Robertson, and Dwight Eisenhower to theorists like Julian Corbett, to journalists and historians like Spenser Wilkinson and Basil Liddell Hart, to a wide range of reformers, special pleaders, and propagandists. By exploring the changing ways in which Clausewitz's ideas have been received by these various groups of commentators, Bassford also offers some penetrating lessons concerning the manner in which ideas are ignored, acclaimed, rejected, distorted, or re-transmitted. In bringing this literature to light, Clausewitz in English makes a persuasive case for Clausewitzian theory having had a broad impact on the development of British and American military thinking. It will be of interest to a wide range of military and intellectual historians.

This book assembles a collection of three of the most influential military writings of all time: du Picq's BATTLE STUDIES, an established authority on the effect of "moral force" on battle; Clausewitz's PRINCIPLES OF WAR, which has had an effect on the destiny and welfare of the world like few other books; and Jomini's ART OF WAR, which teaches Napoleonic doctrine, which has exerted a strong influence on the development of modern military thought.

The US Airborne force fielded some of the toughest, best-trained and most resourceful troops of World War II - all necessary qualities in a force that was lightly armed and which would in most operational circumstances be surrounded from the moment it landed on the battlefield. The German Wehrmacht grew to rely on a series of defensive measures to combat the airborne threat, including fortifications, localized reserves, and special training to help intercept and disrupt airborne troops both in the air and on the ground. Despite such methods it was cool-headed command and control that would prove to be the real key to blunting the Airborne's edge.

Using specially commissioned artwork, this book examines the development of the American airborne forces that spearheaded the Allied effort in Sicily, Normandy and Operation Market Garden, and the German countermeasures that evolved in response to the threat of Allied airborne landings.

Fresh, funny crime series for fans of Jasper Fforde and M.C. Beaton. 'Delightful and original ... A series that could well become a cult' DAILY MAIL. 125 Gower Street, 1883. Sidney Grice is London's foremost personal detective. Called away to Yorkshire, he leaves his ward, March Middleton, to run his house. But hearth and home hold little charm for March, who harbours dreams of becoming London's foremost, and first, lady detective. So, when a mysterious letter arrives from her long-lost uncle, she accepts his invitation to stay at the palatial Saturn Villa. Her new Uncle Tolly is sweet, eccentric and - come the morning - very, very dead. But March is not called upon to solve the case, instead she's in the frame for murder. Praise for DEATH DESCENDS ON SATURN VILLA: 'Think Lemony Snicket meets Neil Gaiman for tea in Dracula's castle' BOOKLIST. 'Packed full of delicious dialogue and many laugh-out-loud moments. My adoration of Sidney and March remains unshaken' HISTORICAL NOVELS SOCIETY. Read the whole series: THE MANGLE STREET MURDERS. THE CURSE OF THE HOUSE OF FOSKETT. DEATH DESCENDS ON SATURN VILLA. THE SECRETS OF GASLIGHT LANE. DARK DAWN OVER STEEP HOUSE.

No modern intervention is intended to endure indefinitely; indeed some fashion of exit is always envisioned from the outset. This commitment to an exit is normally informed by an exit strategy. Whilst strategies of closure have been scrutinised recently, not least in light of charges of defective intentions and planning, the relations between the strategies, operations and tactics of exit have not been contextualised. Focus on the local, specific and bottom-up manifestations of transitions offers significant enhances to historical, theoretical and applied understandings. This book is an introduction not just to the issues of transition, handover and withdrawal, but to exit as a package of theoretical concepts and how these have been understood, shaped and employed in historic and contemporary perspective. Drawing on a wide range of post-1945 examples derived from a variety of regions and periods, At the End of Military Intervention provides researchers and practitioners with a source book on what forms a crucial and often overlooked element of past and present interventions.

In 1779 Sir Henry Clinton and more than eight thousand British troops left the waters of New York, seeking to capture the colonies' most important southern port, Charleston, South Carolina. Clinton and his officers believed that victory in Charleston would change both the seat of the war and its character. In this comprehensive study of the 1780 siege and surrender of Charleston, Carl P. Borick offers a full examination of the strategic and tactical elements of Clinton's operations. Suggesting that the importance of the siege has been underestimated, Borick contends that the British effort against Charleston was one of the most critical campaigns of the war. Borick examines the reasons for the shift in British strategy, the efforts of their army and navy, and the difficulties the patriots faced as they defended the city. He explores the roles of key figures in the campaign, including Benjamin Lincoln, William Moultrie, and Lord Charles Cornwallis. Borick relies on an impressive array of primary and secondary sources relating to the siege and includes maps that depict the British approach to the city and the complicated military operations that led to the patriots' greatest defeat of the American Revolution.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.

In this unique examination of Civil War leadership, W. J. Wood looks at the tactical and strategic problems that threatened to overwhelm untried Civil War generals and the pragmatic strategies, born of necessity, that they developed to solve them. Focusing on three decisive battles involving six generals, Wood provides the background necessary to understand the problems confronting commanders on both sides of the war, then looks at the campaign of Cedar Mountain, directed by Stonewall Jackson and Nathaniel Banks the battle of Chickamauga, where Confederate Army leader Braxton Bragg and Union General William Rosecrans faced each other the battle of Nashville, where Jon Bell Hood led his Southern troops against George H. Thomas and his Union army. Deftly describing the art of war these men developed, an art that provides paradigms for military leaders to this day, Wood demonstrate why Civil War remains a topic of never-diminishing interest.

An examination of the military doctrine that animated the French defense against the German invasion in 1940.- Argues that the French learned the wrong lessons from World War I and were ill prepared for World War II- Lessons for modern armies about how to learn from past wars and prepare for future wars- Winner of the Paul Birdsall Prize of the American Historical Association

Describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics Why did the Confederacy lose so many men? The authors contend that the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks more often than the Federals. Offensive tactics, which had been used successfully by Americans in the Mexican War, were much less effective in the 1860s because an improved weapon--the rifle--had given increased strength to defenders. This book describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics. It also considers the development of tactics in all three arms of the service during the Civil War. In examining the Civil War the book separates Southern from Northern tactical practice and discusses Confederate military history in the context of Southern social history. Although the Southerners could have offset their numerical disadvantage by remaining on the defensive and forcing the Federals to attack, they failed to do so. The authors argue that the Southerners' consistent favoring of offensive warfare was attributable, in large measure, to their Celtic heritage: they fought with the same courageous dash and reckless abandon that had characterized their Celtic forebears since ancient times. The Southerners of the Civil War generation were prisoners of their social and cultural history: they attacked courageously and were killed--on battlefields so totally defended by the Federals that "not even a chicken could get through."

The classical distinctions between "strategy," "operations," and "tactics" in warfare derive from two basic sources-Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri de Jomini, both veterans of the Napoleonic wars who translated their experiences into books outlining general precepts about the nature and rules of military engagement. Nearly two centuries after the publication of these works, Jomini has been all but forgotten, but Clausewitz's On War remains perhaps the most significant work of military theory ever written. He has become a global brand, one constantly refreshed by a flow of books and articles debating his ideas and arguing what he truly meant in various passages of On War. The masterwork appears in an array of translations sweeping from Arabic to Vietnamese. Military staff colleges the world over use Clausewitz's text, largely to prepare their officers for staff positions and higher command. Military historian Donald Stoker here offers an incisive biography of Carl von Clausewitz, sketching out his life and career and exploring the various causes that led to the formulation of his theories about war. Though On War remained unfinished at the time of his death in 1831, Clausewitz's devoted wife, Marie, organized the papers he had left behind and arranged for their publication. The ten volumes of Clausewitz's collected works appeared from 1832-1837, with On War encompassing the first three volumes. Stoker considers both the merits and detriments of the works, but also pays careful attention to the life and experiences of Clausewitz himself. In doing so, he notes that those discussing Clausewitz's legacy as a theorist today have largely forgotten what was most important to him: being a soldier, and one of renown. Clausewitz is often remembered merely as staff officer, someone pushing papers and not in the midst of battle. Though Stoker notes that Clausewitz certainly spilled his share of ink, he also spilled blood - his as well as that of the enemy. He experienced the mass warfare of his age at its most intense and visceral. He knew what it was like to be wounded, to be a prisoner, to have friends killed and wounded, to suffer hunger and thirst, and to have the heat and cold try to kill him after the enemy's best efforts had failed. Success on the field of battle-success meaning victory as well as distinguishing one's self above one's comrades, who are also brave and daring men - this, Stoker shows, is what drove Clausewitz. Stoker also considers the continuing relevance of Clausewitz's work today, particularly focusing on its effect on strategic thinking in American foreign policy. The result is a brilliant reassessment of both the man and his legacy, one that adds to our understanding of Clausewitz and his place in today's military and political landscape.

Today's strategic environment implies an obligation to preserve innocent life when possible and to rebuild that which war destroys. Urban areas are the keys to nations; people make nations just, as Thucydides wrote, men make cities. This study aimed to reveal lessons that will better enable military and civilian alike to meet national policy objectives by more effectively conducting urban combat and restoration.

Weapons improved rapidly after the Civil War, raising difficult questions about the battle tactics employed by the United States Army. The most fundamental problem was the dominance of the tactical defensive, when defenders protected by fieldworks could deliver deadly fire from rifles and artillery against attackers advancing in close-ordered lines. The vulnerability of these offensive forces as they crossed the so-called "deadly ground" in front of defensive positions was even greater with the improvement of armaments after the Civil War.

The first political history of the Second World War, of building the Grand Alliance to defeat Hitler, by the Sunday Times-bestselling author of Appeasing Hitler.

After the fall of France in June 1940, only Britain stood between Hitler and total victory. Desperate for allies, Winston Churchill did everything he could to bring the United States into the conflict, drive the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany apart and persuade neutral countries to resist German domination.

By 1942, after the German invasion of Russia and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the British-Soviet-American alliance was in place. Yet it was an improbable and incongruous coalition, divided by ideology and politics and riven with mistrust and deceit. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were partners in the fight to defeat Hitler, yet they were also rivals who disagreed on strategy, imperialism and the future of liberated Europe. Only by looking at their points of conflict, as well as of co-operation, are we able to understand the course of the war and world that developed in its aftermath.

Allies at War is a fast-paced, narrative history, based on material drawn from over a hundred archives. Using vivid, first-hand accounts and unpublished diaries, we enter the rooms where the critical decisions were made while going beyond the confines of the Grand Alliance to examine, among other themes, the doomed Anglo-French alliance, fractious relations with General de Gaulle and the Free French, and interactions with Poland, Greece and Nationalist China.

Ambitious and compelling, revealing the political drama behind the military events, Allies at War offers a fresh perspective on the Second World War and the origins of the Cold War.