Intelligence professionals are employees of the government working in a business that some would consider unethical-the business of spying. This book looks at the dilemmas that exist when one is asked to perform a civil service that is in conflict with what that individual believes to be "ethical." This is the first book to offer the best essays, articles, and speeches on ethics and intelligence that demonstrate the complex moral dilemmas in intelligence collection, analysis, and operations that confront government employees. Some are recently declassified and never before published, and all are written by authors whose backgrounds are as varied as their insights, including Robert M. Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; John P. Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University; and Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and recipient of the Owens Award for contributions to the understanding of U.S. intelligence activities. To the intelligence professional, this is a valuable collection of literature for building an ethical code that is not dependent on any specific agency, department, or country. Managers, supervisors, and employees of all levels should read this book. Creating the foundation for the study of ethics and intelligence by filling in the gap between warfare and philosophy, Ethics of Spying makes the statement that the intelligence professional has ethics.

Describes the operational challenges posed by the urban environment and proposes several recommendations to surmount them. In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.

Gives an overview of the formidable tasks facing US Army combat service support (CSS) in urban operations and recommends ways for the CSS community to prepare itself to meet them. The inevitability of US armed forces future involvement in urban contingencies worldwide demands that those responsible for arming, manning, sustaining, and otherwise supporting these operations prepare for the challenges inherent in such undertakings. This report gives an overview of these formidable tasks and recommends ways for the US Army combat service support (CSS) community to prepare itself to meet them.

Using a case study based on the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat team, the authors explore how the Army might improve its ability to contribute to prompt global power projection, that is, strategically responsive early-entry forces for time-critical events.

Current U.S. forces have little experience with urban warfare. This report identifies shortfalls in urban combat ground reconnaissance and assists in the creation of urban reconnaissance tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Marine Corps. The authors discuss four challenges: the constant adaptation demanded by the environment, the complexity of ground reconnaissance, the demands of urban operations on military personnel, and the demands of these operations on equipment and technology. The analysts' purpose is to narrow the gap between these challenges and the solutions immediately at hand.

In this concise and penetrating study, Roger Barnett illuminates the effect of operational, organisational, legal, and moral constraints on the ability of the U.S. to use military force. As the tragic events of September 11 demonstrated, potential adversaries can take advantage of these limitations, thus spawning "asymmetrical warfare." Barnett defines asymmetrical warfare as not simply a case of pitting one's strength against another's weakness but rather of taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against, certain actions. For instance, launching chemical, biological, or suicide attacks; taking indiscriminate actions against critical infrastructure; using hostages or human shields; deliberately destroying the environment; and targeting non-combatants all constitute possible asymmetrical warfare scenarios. Against these acts, the U.S. has not prepared any response in kind. Indeed it either cannot or will not undertake such responses, thus making these attacks especially difficult to counter. This refusal to retaliate in an "eye for an eye" fashion complicates the dilemma of American policy makers who seek to wield power and influence on the world stage while simultaneously projecting a peaceful and benign image. Barnett concludes that the U.S. must create a formal system of selectively eliminating the constraints that dictate their response to certain situations or scenarios. Failure to make such changes will only increase paralysis and, when the use of force is required, contribute to the already heightened risks.

This case study analysis of three recent urban operations is intended to update the lessons learned from prior military experience. The three cases examined - Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992-1993, and Chechnya in 1994-1995 - all occurred within the last ten years and capture the range of political constraints that military forces must operate under in urban environments. The author discusses how ongoing technological, social, and political changes are increasing the significance of certain elements of urban operations. These include the presence of the media; the presence of noncombatants; rules of engagement; and information-operation tools such as psychological operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and political-military strategy.

This title examines how the urban physical, social, and political environment constrains aerospace operations; identifies key operational tasks that aerospace forces can help accomplish; and discusses strategies and technologies that can improve success in urban operations.

A startling omission from the extensive literature on the Pacific events of World War II is an analysis of Allied psychological operations. Allison B. Gilmore makes a strong case for the importance of psychological warfare in this theater, countering the usual view of fanatical resistance by Japanese units. Gilmore marshals evidence that Japanese military indoctrination did not produce soldiers who were invulnerable to demoralization and the survival instinct.

Little Round Top, the Railroad Cut, Pickett’s Charge—these are the turning points within the most important battle of the Civil War. Even careful students of Gettysburg, however, can find themselves disoriented when visiting the site itself. Here, finally, is a convenient guide for serious student and casual visitor alike that makes plain the sweep of events and the geography of the battlefield. This invaluable guidebook was created by scholars who have walked the battlegrounds, consulted with local experts and park guides, and studied the testimony left behind by the participants. Gettysburg will help you find all the important locales and understand what the participants saw in 1863, even if you have no prior knowledge of the battle. Designed to enhance the experience of both first-time and returning visitors, this guide can be used alone or as a supplement to a tour. Clearly written and illustrated with maps and photographs, this is the book to have when you explore Gettysburg.

The hard-fought and dramatic battles of Chickamauga (September 19-20, 1863) and Chattanooga (November 23-25, 1863) changed the course of the Civil War. These battles sounded the death knell of the Confederacy and put Ulysses S. Grant on the road to final victory. For the first time in one convenient guide, Steven E. Woodworth provides an overview of the battles and an on-site tour to help both serious students and casual visitors get the most out of a visit to Chickamauga and Chattanooga. The guide emphasizes how the opposing armies used terrain and how that terrain shaped the course of each battle. Easy-to-follow directions to specific locations enable you to view the field from the historic perspectives of the combatants. Whether used alone or as a supplement to a tour, this guide will enhance your visit. Clearly written and illustrated with maps and photographs, it is an invaluable tool for both knowledgeable Civil War enthusiasts and first-time visitors to Chickamauga and Chattanooga.

Describing the radical transformation in German Infantry tactics that took place during World War I, this book presents the first detailed account of the evolution of stormtroop tactics available in English. It covers areas previously left unexplored: the German Infantry's tactical heritage, the squad's evolution as a tactical unit, the use of new weapons for close combat, the role of the elite assault units in the development of new tactics, and detailed descriptions of offensive battles that provided the inspiration and testing ground for this new way of fighting. Both a historical investigation and a standard of excellence in infantry tactics, Stormtroop Tactics is required reading for professional military officers and historians as well as enthusiasts. Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the "top down" intervention of reformers but instead a "bottom up" phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call "Blitzkrieg." Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I--tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.

In mid summer 1918 the First World War was still finely balanced. A top secret mission, which has remained classified information for a century, was set in motion to kill Kaiser Wilhelm II. It was felt that by killing their head of state and commander in chief it would serve as a mortal blow to the German forces and they would collapse very quickly after the assassination. In 2002 one of the participants on a battlefield tour sent a disc to Col. John Hughes- Wilson. On it was an historical treasure trove containing a Royal Flying Corps log book and photographs of service with 25 Squadron. Included among the effects of Lt A.R.Watts MC, of the newly formed Royal Air Force, was the breath-taking claim that he had taken part in a secret British mission to kill the Kaiser. This extraordinary secret was confirmed by further research at the RAF museum and the RAF Historical Branch. This startling but never before revealed story was true. On 2nd June 1918, at the height of the final German attack of WW1, the British RAF tried to assassinate the Kaiser when he was visiting a chateau near the front. The facts are borne out in never-before-published notebooks, maps and pilots' flying records, kept secret for a hundred years. Copies of these records are in the author's possession and are backed up by details tucked away in 25 Squadron's records. But the implications of this secret attack raise many new - and explosive - questions. Exactly who ordered an attack to kill the Kaiser? Was it sanctioned by the C-in-C, Sir Douglas Haig? By the War Office? Unlikely. Was the King informed of the attempt to kill his royal cousin? Was Lloyd George, the Prime Minister asked? We do not know; but someone in London must have sanctioned the attack. The Official History makes no mention of any attack, and public records say nothing. Even the RAF Museum has no official record: but the attack really did take place, of that there is no doubt. Other documents and various 25 Squadron log books prove it. So someone did give an order to kill the Kaiser. But who? John Hughes-Wilson has woven an exciting and well-paced historical novel to mark this centennial event from the research on discovering this mission. The story, based on true events, looks at this long hidden secret and puts it into the context of the time. It explores areas rarely examined: secret service operations in 1914-18; dirty, undercover intelligence work; the very real political intrigues between Whitehall and the generals and the heroics of the aircrew of the day, whose life expectancy at one point in 1917 was only eleven days in action.

Winning World War II was about more than military force. It required guile, and tremendous acts of bravery by Special Forces and intelligence operatives who had the odds stacked against them. Using hundreds of documents and images from The National Archives, including some that have never been seen in print before, this book reveals some of World War II's most audacious missions. These include Operation Anthropoid, the plot to assassinate SS General Reinhard Heydrich in Czechoslovakia in 1942, Operation Chariot, the attempt to damage the mighty German warship Tirpitz while she was in dock in St-Nazaire in France; and Operation Mincemeat, a complex plot whereby a corpse, replete with documentation designed to mislead the enemy, was dropped in southern Spain to spread misinformation.

Operation Torch, launched on 8 November 1942, landed Anglo-American forces in Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria to create a second front against the Axis forces in North Africa, catching Rommel's German and Italian forces in the claws of a giant pincer.

The US Army was powerfully well armoured and equipped, but fresh to war, and it showed. Organization suffered from a surfeit of peacetime theories and training was insufficient and ill-applied. Despite such failings the US GIs and their commanders learned very quickly, adapting to German tactics and the realities of mechanized warfare. The Axis forces in North Africa were seasoned by years of fighting against increasingly powerful British and Commonwealth forces, and were led by one of the Reich's most capable generals. The German doctrine of mechanized warfare had proved itself time and again, but ever-growing logistical and supply problems were blunting its effectiveness.

From Sidi Bou Zid to El Guettar, this fully illustrated study pits the US Army against the best that the Axis forces in Africa had to offer.

When the Civil War began, Northern soldiers and civilians alike sought a framework to help make sense of the chaos that confronted them. Many turned first to the classic European military texts from the Napoleonic era, especially Antoine Henri Jomini's Summary of the Art of War. As Carol Reardon shows, Jomini's work was only one voice in what ultimately became a lively and contentious national discourse about how the North should conduct war at a time when warfare itself was rapidly changing. She argues that the absence of a strong intellectual foundation for the conduct of war at its start-or, indeed, any consensus on the need for such a foundation-ultimately contributed to the length and cost of the conflict. Reardon examines the great profusion of new or newly translated military texts of the Civil War years, intended to fill that intellectual void, and draws as well on the views of the soldiers and civilians who turned to them in the search for a winning strategy. In examining how debates over principles of military thought entered into the question of qualifications of officers entrusted to command the armies of Northern citizen soldiers, she explores the limitations of nineteenth-century military thought in dealing with the human elements of combat.