How Effective is Strategic Bombing is a thought provoking analysis on the subject of air power and bombing and the use of surveys to explain the effects of air power on the enemy in conflict."
-- "Parameters"

In the wake of World War II, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President Harry S. Truman established the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, to determine exactly how effectively strategic air power had been applied in the European theater and in the Pacific. The final study, consisting of over 330 separate reports and annexes, was staggering in its size and emphatic in its conclusions. As such it has for decades been used as an objective primary source and a guiding text, a veritable Bible for historians of air power.

In this aggressively revisionist volume, Gian Gentile examines afresh this influential document to reveal how it reflected to its very foundation the American conceptual approach to strategic bombing. In the process, he exposes the survey as largely tautological and thereby throwing into question many of the central tenets of American air power philosophy and strategy.

With a detailed chapter on the Gulf War and the resulting Gulf War Air Power Survey, and a concluding chapter on the lessons of the Kosovo air war, How Effective is Strategic Bombing? is the most comprehensive and important book on air power strategy in decades.

This is the first of a two volume set exploring the inception, planning and preparation of the offensive to liberate Europe, Operation Overlord, culminating in its launch on D-Day.

Fully illustrated, this absorbing study assesses the warriors fighting on both sides during the Vikings' attacks on the Frankish realm in the 9th century, as raiding escalated into full-scale siege warfare. On the eve of the 9th century, Vikings first raided the Frankish Empire on the coast of what is now western France. Although this attack ended in disaster for the Scandinavians, Charlemagne reportedly wept, not in fear of his own life, but for the ensuing bloodshed brought upon his successors. Mobile parties of highly skilled Viking warriors would continue to raid Francia for decades; as these attacking contingents grew more numerous they began to assail powerful centres, besieging Paris in 845 and again in 885. To combat the Viking threat, Frankish kings mustered scores of infantrymen, then subsequently transitioned to cavalry-based forces in the 9th century. The dynamic nature of Viking activity in Francia meant that numbers and mobility would determine the fate of Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire. This study documents the evolving trial of strength between the Vikings and the Franks under Charlemagne and his successors. Through a careful synthesis of primary sources, expert analysis and the archaeological record, the author invites the reader to visualize the fighting men who fought one another in Francia, and offers a balanced assessment of their successes and failures over decades of warfare during the Viking Age.

Asymmetric warfare, involving conflicts where smaller powers apply their strengths against the weaknesses of a more powerful opponent, has become a key modern concern since the September 11th attacks. Conflict in Afghanistan tackles this issue by examining the five wars Afghanistan has waged against foreign powers over the past two centuries, all of which have involved forms of asymmetric warfare.

Incorporating contemporary documents and material from Soviet archives, the text analyzes each war s antecedents, conduct, and consequences. Important questions are asked about the role of religious beliefs, fanaticism, diplomacy, governmental decision-making and military competence, issues that have great contemporary relevance. The book provides an illuminating commentary of Afghanistan s wars and examines the relevance of these conflicts to the modern-day challenge of counter-insurgency and asymmetric warfare.

Initially published on the eve of the German blitzkrieg against France in 1940, this analysis of the German doctrine of defense as it evolved in 1915-1918 is often overlooked because of its misleading title. No understanding of the failure of the Allied offensives on the Western Front in World War I is adequate without reference to this work which explores the problem from the German point of view.

Token forces - tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions - have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.

This absorbing study casts light on the tactics, weapons and combat effectiveness of the US Marines and North Korean soldiers who fought one another in August and September 1950. Equipped with Soviet tanks and bolstered by a cadre of combat veterans returning from the Chinese Civil War, North Korea's army launched its surprise offensive against the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950; within days Seoul had fallen and the majority of South Korea's divisions had been shattered. American ground troops rushed to Korea also seemed incapable of stopping the rapidly advancing North Koreans. By August, the remnants of the South Korean and US Army divisions had been pushed into a small corner around the port of Pusan, their backs to the sea. Time was also running out for the North Koreans; virtually all of their planning and preparations were based on a two-month campaign. Although the North Korean People's Army had enjoyed an impressive string of victories, its losses were no longer being replaced in the needed quantity or quality. It was truly a do-or-die moment for both sides. In the wake of World War II, the United States Marine Corps had shrunk from 473,000 men in 1945 to only 70,000 in 1950. Despite its heavily slashed budget and manpower, the Marine Corps responded swiftly and decisively. Active-duty Marines from all over the globe gathered and for once the Marine Corps even received some of the latest American military equipment; it was the Marines' esprit de corps that made the real difference, however. Using first-hand accounts and specially commissioned artwork, this study assesses the KPA and US Marine Corps troops participating in three crucial battles - Hill 342, the Obong-Ni Ridge and the Second Battle of Seoul - to reveal the tactics, weapons and combat effectiveness of both sides' fighting men in Korea in 1950.

It would be hard to overstate the impact of Sun Tzu's The Art of War on military thought. Beyond its impact in Asia, the work has been required reading in translation for US military personnel since the Cold War. Sun Tzu has been interpreted as arguing for 'Indirect Strategy' in contrast to 'Direct Strategy,' the latter idea stemming from Ancient Greece. This is a product of twentieth-century Western thinking, specifically that of Liddell Hart, who influenced Samuel B. Griffith's 1963 translation of Sun Tzu. The credibility of Griffith's translation was enhanced by his combat experience in the Pacific during World War II, and his translation of Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla War. This reading of Sun Tzu is, however, very different from Chinese interpretations. Western strategic thinkers have used Sun Tzu as a foil or facilitator for their own thinking, inadvertently engaging the Western military tradition and propagating misleading generalizations about Chinese warfare.

It would be hard to overstate the impact of Sun Tzu's The Art of War on military thought. Beyond its impact in Asia, the work has been required reading in translation for US military personnel since the Cold War. Sun Tzu has been interpreted as arguing for 'Indirect Strategy' in contrast to 'Direct Strategy,' the latter idea stemming from Ancient Greece. This is a product of twentieth-century Western thinking, specifically that of Liddell Hart, who influenced Samuel B. Griffith's 1963 translation of Sun Tzu. The credibility of Griffith's translation was enhanced by his combat experience in the Pacific during World War II, and his translation of Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla War. This reading of Sun Tzu is, however, very different from Chinese interpretations. Western strategic thinkers have used Sun Tzu as a foil or facilitator for their own thinking, inadvertently engaging the Western military tradition and propagating misleading generalizations about Chinese warfare.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the most important CIA spymaster in history, singlehandedly led America's intelligence service from the age of Mata Hari into the space age. Under his guidance the U-2 spy-plane, the SR-71 "Blackbird," and the Corona spy satellite were developed, and the agency rose to the pinnacle of its power. Bissell was also, however, the architect of the infamous Bay of Pigs operation that failed to overthrow Castro in 1961 and led to the decline of the CIA. In this compelling memoir, Bissell gives us an insider's view of the personalities, policies, and historical forces surrounding these and other covert operations and the lessons learned during those times of conflict. Bissell begins by describing his early years as a member of America's unofficial aristocracy. Born in a house that his father bought from Samuel Clemens, he was educated at Groton and Yale and befriended by Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh, among others. Bissell recounts how he became acting head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the agency in charge of the Marshall Plan after World War II, and helped to create the European Payments Union. Bissell was brought into the CIA in 1954, where he initiated a revolution in intelligence-gathering techniques. He reveals the details of these developments, as well as of the unique CIA-Lockheed partnership he pioneered, his participation in the CIA-sponsored coup to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala, and his involvement in crises in Laos and the Congo. Bissell's memoir sheds light not only on pivotal points of American foreign policy but also on America's evolution from isolationist to interventionist superpower.

The British Empire employed a diverse range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over its overseas territories in the Middle East. This new interpretation of how Britain maintained order, protected its interests and carried out its defence obligations in the Gulf in the decades before its withdrawal from the region in 1971 looks at how the British government increasingly sought to achieve security with great economy of force by building up local militaries instead of deploying costly military forces from the home country. Benefitting from the extensive use of recently declassified British Government archival documents and India Office records, this highly original narrative weighs the successes and failures of Britain's use of 'indirect rule' among the small states of Eastern Arabia, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States and Oman. Drawing important lessons for scholars and policymakers about the limitations of trying to outsource security to local partners, Security in the Gulf is a remarkable study of the deployment of British colonial policy in the Middle East before 1971.

This is a wide-ranging study of how the British were more successful in managing the strains of modern industrial war than the French. The book addresses such current historical debates as the nature of the political Right and Left in Europe during the 1930s, the extent of rearmament and economic mobilization, and the causes of France's defeat in 1940.

Featuring full-colour artwork, maps and carefully chosen illustrations, this exciting book investigates the Teutonic Knights and their Lithuanian foes during the epic Lithuanian Crusade. The Teutonic Knights were a military order committed to spreading Christendom eastwards into the non-Christian realms of the Baltic and Russia. They progressively extended their control across the various feuding tribes of the Baltic until they confronted the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a relatively well-organized and cohesive state. Fully illustrated, this book investigates the fighting men on both sides, assessing their origins, tactics, armament and combat effectiveness in three clashes of the Lithuanian Crusade. The battle of Voplaukis (1311), triggered by a major Lithuanian invasion of newly Christianized lands, saw the Teutonic Knights defeat the numerous but relatively poorly equipped Lithuanian raiders once they had brought them to battle. As a result, the Lithuanians would begin to prepare for full-scale warfare, and the siege of Kaunas (1362) was the month-long investment of the first brick-built castle the Lithuanians constructed. In the battle of Grunwald (1410), the forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - fielding knights by now almost comparable to those of the Order - broke the armies of the Teutonic Knights, a defeat from which the Order would never really recover. This lively study lifts the veil on these formidable medieval warriors and three battles that shaped the Baltic world.

This book is the first full-length study of a key security issue confronting the west in the twenty-first century, urban military operations - as currently being undertaken by US and UK forces in Iraq. It relates military operations in cities to the wider study of conflict and security in an era of urbanization, expeditionary warfare and new power conflicts; its central process is urban operations, but its context is the changing security environment, whose features are revealed in conflicts within cities.
Within a framework analyzing conventional operations, the author identifies the contextual factors that affect operations in urban environments. She advances an explanation as to why questions of theoretical understanding and policy response are as important as tactical concerns, and why cities will represent a politically significant area in the future. In doing so, Alice Hills demonstrates that urban operations present a unique set of political and moral challenges to both policy-makers and military commanders. "Future War in Cities" offers a rethinking of the liberal dilemma associated with the use of force across the spectrum of conflict, from terrorist attacks to major conventional operations.

This book is the first full-length study of a key security issue confronting the west in the twenty-first century, urban military operations - as currently being undertaken by US and UK forces in Iraq. It relates military operations in cities to the wider study of conflict and security in an era of urbanization, expeditionary warfare and new power conflicts; its central process is urban operations, but its context is the changing security environment, whose features are revealed in conflicts within cities.
Within a framework analyzing conventional operations, the author identifies the contextual factors that affect operations in urban environments. She advances an explanation as to why questions of theoretical understanding and policy response are as important as tactical concerns, and why cities will represent a politically significant area in the future. In doing so, Alice Hills demonstrates that urban operations present a unique set of political and moral challenges to both policy-makers and military commanders. "Future War in Cities" offers a rethinking of the liberal dilemma associated with the use of force across the spectrum of conflict, from terrorist attacks to major conventional operations.

The Commandos were created by Winston Churchill in 1940 as a 'butcher and bolt' raiding unit to destroy vital targets in German occupied Europe. Recruits for this 'special service' were all volunteers, drawn from the British Army, and later from the Royal Marines and other Allied armies. Commando training was extremely demanding - men had to be physically fit and show initiative, mental toughness and adaptability. The training courses were designed to cultivate these qualities and to simulate real battle experiences, which included the use of live ammunition. Commandos learned a diverse range of skills at dedicated training centres in the remote Scottish Highlands. This pocket-book draws on authentic training manuals, lecture notes, course literature and other material from the commando schools to give a real insight into this highly specialised fighting unit - demonstrating how commandos were taught to live, fight and move on offensive operations, initially as raiding parties, and later as skilled assault infantry. Sections of the book cover survival and fieldcraft skills; night operations; assaulting obstacles; use of equipment - such as the COPPS canoe for beach reconnaissance and sabotage; and weapons training, including the Thompson submachine gun, the Bren gun, and the famous emblem of the commandos - the Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Army aviation began to evolve from an observatory role to a mobility role. Helicopter air mobility began to develop in the Army from 1949 onwards. The outbreak of the Korean war assisted and accelerated the acceptance of greater helicopter air mobility within the Army. The Eisenhower period was a golden age for Army aviation, with rapid and extensive developments in air mobility doctrine and tactics. There was also a strong research and development effort to overcome the initial technological lag. These developments allowed the formation of the first air mobile division in 1965 to meet the growing demands of the Vietnam war. This work gives a new understanding of the process of military innovation. Moreover, this case study has important general implications for future military policy-making.

The Hellenistic pike-phalanx was a true military innovation, transforming the face of warfare in the ancient world. For nearly 200 years, from the rise of the Macedonians as a military power in the mid-fourth century BC, to their defeat at the hands of the Romans at Pydna in 168BC, the pike-wielding heavy infantryman (the phalangite) formed the basis of nearly every Hellenistic army to deploy on battlefields stretching from Italy to India. And yet, despite this dominance, and the vast literature dedicated to detailing the history of the Hellenistic world, there remains fierce debate among modern scholars about how infantry combat in this age was actually conducted. Christopher Matthews critically examines phalanx combat by using techniques such as physical re-creation, experimental archaeology, and ballistics testing, and then comparing the findings of this testing to the ancient literary, artistic and archaeological evidence, as well as modern theories. The result is the most comprehensive and up-to-date study of what heavy infantry combat was like in the age of Alexander the Great and his Successors.

The British Empire employed a diverse range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over its overseas territories in the Middle East. This new interpretation of how Britain maintained order, protected its interests and carried out its defence obligations in the Gulf in the decades before its withdrawal from the region in 1971 looks at how the British government increasingly sought to achieve security with great economy of force by building up local militaries instead of deploying costly military forces from the home country. Benefitting from the extensive use of recently declassified British Government archival documents and India Office records, this highly original narrative weighs the successes and failures of Britain's use of 'indirect rule' among the small states of Eastern Arabia, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States and Oman. Drawing important lessons for scholars and policymakers about the limitations of trying to outsource security to local partners, Security in the Gulf is a remarkable study of the deployment of British colonial policy in the Middle East before 1971.

In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the Wests air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies.

In this clear and engaging introduction, Rod Thornton unpacks the meaning and significance of asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms, and examines why it has become such an important subject for study. He seeks to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker opponents apply asymmetric techniques against the Western world, and shows how the Wests military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. The book concludes by looking at the ways in which the US, the state most vulnerable to asymmetric attack, is attempting to cope with some new battlefield realities.

This is an indispensable guide to one of the key topics in security studies today.

This book examines the military organization, strategy, and tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas during their efforts to overthrow the government. It is largely based on the authors' personal collections of guerrilla documents captured in the war, interviews with former and captured guerrillas, and personal combat experience during one of the fiercest wars fought in the Western hemisphere in the 20th century. The book describes the guerrilla tactics from a technical point of view, and their evolution during the war in El Salvador. It includes discussions of such tactical concepts as concentration and deconcentration, urban combat, anti-air defense, the use of mines, and homemade weapons. It contains a chapter on the FMLN special forces--they were responsible for most of the spectacular attacks of the war--and it examines the sophisticated logistical system of the FMLN that made the prolonged war possible. Wherever possible, these concepts are illustrated by actual combat experiences from sources on both sides of the conflict. An important text for all concerned with guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Latin Americanists and students of the developing world will also find much of interest.

During the 19th century, US forces confronted the Seminole people in a series of bitter wars over the fate of Florida. After the refusal of the Seminoles to move west to the Creek Reservation in Mississippi, the US government sent troops to bring Florida under federal control, marking the beginning of the Second Seminole War. On December 28, 1835, troops led by Major Francis Langhorne Dade were ambushed and massacred en route to Fort King. Two years of guerrilla warfare ensued, as the Seminoles evaded the US forces sent to defeat them. Ordered to hunt down the Seminoles, a US force led by Colonel Zachary Taylor incurred heavy losses at the battle of Lake Okeechobee (December 25, 1837), but the Seminoles were forced to withdraw. At the battle of the Loxahatchee River (January 24, 1838), forces led by Major General Thomas S. Jesup encountered a large group of Seminoles and met them with overwhelming numbers and greater firepower. Despite their stubborn efforts to resist the US military, the Seminoles were defeated and Florida became a state of the Union in 1845. This fully illustrated study assesses the forces fighting on both sides, casting light on the tactics, weaponry, and combat record of the Seminole warriors and their US opponents during the Second Seminole War.

This book discusses a number of raids undertaken by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps near the Black Sea in 1941/2 to explore the tactics used and why they were successful, based upon the detailed combat reports prepared by the corps staff immediately after each battle. "Die Wehrmacht im Kampf" Battles and Problems of the Second World War is a series published in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. Written by ex-members of the German army in WWII, it provides important information not available elsewhere on the German army's perspective of many crucial campaigns and battles. None of the volumes have previously been available in English. Each volume has a modern introduction by Professor Matthias Strohn, expert on the German army.

This book presents, in words and pictures, the history of the Schutzstaffeln from their formation as escort aircraft, to their being renamed Schlachstaffeln and their role as infantry support aircraft. Participating in all the major German offenses on the Western Front in 1918, and manned mainly by enlisted pilots and gunners, these units became the first true close air support squadrons.

Between June 1812 and January 1815, US and British forces, notably the regular infantrymen of both sides (including the Canadian Fencibles Regiment), fought one another on a host of North American battlefields. This study examines the evolving role and combat performance of the two sides' regulars during the conflict, with particular reference to three revealing battles in successive years: Queenston Heights, Crysler's Farm, and Chippawa. Featuring full-color artwork and battle maps, this fully illustrated study investigates the US and British regular infantry's role, tactics, junior leadership, and combat performance on three battlefields of the War of 1812. The actions assessed here notably demonstrate the evolution of US regulars from their initial poor showing to an emerging professionalism that allowed them to face their British opponents on equal terms.