This collection of writings covers the war on the Western Front. Whereas, traditionally, attention has been given to strategic or political matters, these essays highlight tactical issues. They show that the British high command could boast more achievements in tactics than is usually assumed.

This collection of writings covers the war on the Western Front. Whereas, traditionally, attention has been given to strategic or political matters, these essays highlight tactical issues. They show that the British high command could boast more achievements in tactics than is usually assumed.

Modern armies are planned and structured to fight massive World War II-type operations involving the large-scale movements of tanks and machinery across continents. In fact they are rarely called upon to participate in such conflicts. It is far more common for them to find themselves involved in lower-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as unconventional warfare, typified by the 1990s conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Rear Admiral Raja Menon contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, he develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall politial objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.

This analysis of close air support in world War II focuses on the use of tactical air power by British and American forces during the campaigns in Italy and North-west Europe from 1943-45. Gooderson asks whether the employment of air resources in the close support role provided sufficient advantage at the battlefront to justify the effort and the risk to aircraft and pilots. Or was the use of aircraft behind the battlefront to attack communications, transport and supplies a more effective and cost-efficient strategy?

This analysis of close air support in world War II focuses on the use of tactical air power by British and American forces during the campaigns in Italy and North-west Europe from 1943-45. Gooderson asks whether the employment of air resources in the close support role provided sufficient advantage at the battlefront to justify the effort and the risk to aircraft and pilots. Or was the use of aircraft behind the battlefront to attack communications, transport and supplies a more effective and cost-efficient strategy?

Statistical analysis in the 1970s by Colonel Trevor Dupuy of battles in the First World War demonstrated that the German Army enjoyed a consistent 20 per cent superiority in combat effectiveness over the British Army during that war, a superiority that had been asserted in the 1930s by Captain Graeme Wynne. In attempting to explain that advantage, this book follows the theory that such combat superiority can be understood best by means of a comparative study of the armies concerned, proposing that the German Army's superiority was due as much to poor performance by the British Army as to its own high performance. The book also suggests that the key difference between the two armies at this time was one of philosophy. The German Army saw combat as inherently chaotic: to achieve high combat effectiveness it was necessary to decentralise command, ensure a high standard of individual combat skill and adopt flexible tactical systems. The British Army, however, believed combat to be inherently structured: combat effectiveness was deemed to lie in the maintenance of order and symmetry, through centralised decision-making, training focused on developing unthinking obedience and the use of rigid tactics. An examination of the General Staff systems, the development of minor tactics and the evolution of defensive doctrines in both armies tests these hypotheses, while case studies of the battles of Thiepval and St Quentin reveal that both forces contained elements that supported the contrary philosophy to the majority. In the German Army, there was continual rear-guard action against flexibility, with the General Staff itself becoming increasingly narrow in outlook. In the British Army, severalattempts were made to adopt German practices, but misunderstanding and opposition distorted these, as when the system of directive control itself was converted into that of umpiring.

This is a comprehensive study of the major changes in infantry tacticts from the time of Frederick the Great to the beginning of what many see as the era of modern war, in the 1860s. Ross lays social and political change side by side with technical change. He argues that the French revolution, due to the fervour and loyalty it inspired in its participants, led to huge citizen armies of devolved command which were able to make use of new tactics that swept the poorly paid and poorly treated professional armies of their enemies from the field. Shortly after the Napoleonic wars other European countries experienced similar social change and by the middle of the Nineteenth Century these massive conscript armies were equipped with breech-loading rifles and more powerful artillery. The battlefield of the late 1860's had become a place where close infantry formations could not survive for long in the linear formations of the past.

Starting in the early part of the nineteenth century, American administrations expressed a desire to own Cuba. A rationale for adding Cuba to the territory of the United States could be built on Cuba's sugar and tobacco industries, as well as Cuba's mineral deposits. But economics was not the primary motivation. American presidents knew that in the event of war, any nation occupying Cuba would have an advantage over the US military strategies; this fear, coupled with the economic benefit, explains a century of policy decisions. As Frank R. Villafana shows, Cubans were not sitting idle, waiting for outsiders to liberate them from Spanish oppression. A major part of this research is devoted to studying Cuban efforts to liberate their island from prolonged Spanish domination. Cuba had been struggling for independence from Spain since the 1830s, followed by the Ten Year War. During the 1895-1898 War of Independence, Cuba came close to defeating Spain, but a merciless Spanish military effort converted Cuba into a series of concentration camps. Spain surrendered after its naval defeats by the US at Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba, following a failed ground campaign in eastern Cuba. After the US occupied Cuba militarily, American political leaders realized only a small minority of Cubans supported annexation, and the Platt Amendment was developed as a substitute. Today, most Cubans agree that independence, even constrained by the United States, was better than enslavement by the Castro brothers. However, as Villafana emphasizes, Cubans living in Cuba as well as abroad still seek a land free and independent of foreign threat and domestic tyrants.

Admiral Raoul Castex is France's most important modern naval strategist. Military historian Eugenia Kiesling offers the essence of Castex's original five volume study, Theories Strategiques, in a useful one-volume abridgment and a very readable translation. It emphasizes the admiral's method of strategic analysis while omitting most of the historical narrative. Included are chapters defining strategy and relating it to policy and geography, analyzing the role of maritime forces and the significance of command at sea, prescribing a theory of conduct of operations, and introducing Castex's favorite themes: strategic manoeuvre, strategie generale, and the theory of "perturbation." Two narrative chapters on German operations in the North Sea from 1914 to 1916 remain as examples of the author's historical style. The introduction places Castex's work in four distinct contexts: the international debate among naval theorists on the nature and importance of "command at sea," the controversy within France between advocates of the "historical" and "material" schools of naval strategy, the contemporary concern over coordinated naval strategy for total war, and his contribution to the formulation of French strategy between the world wars. In an era of expanding global responsibilities and shrinking national economies, Castex's balanced view of naval power offers many insights for today's new generation of naval thinkers.

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Last Hope is the story of the often heroic by governments to provide their aerial warriors with the tools to evade capture when forced down in enemy controlled territory, as told by the most visible and visually stunning artifact of this effort, the Blood Chit. Illustrated with the most comprehensive collection of color photographs of Blood Chits and related evasion aids ever assembled, it provides readers an unparalleled opportunity to discover the beauty and variety of these lifesaving artifacts of war. In addition to Blood Chits, a number of the beautiful theater-made souvenir patches in the form of Blood Chits are also illustrated. This definitive history of Blood Chits from their infancy at the dawn of the air age through their maturity at the close of World War II was compiled from accounts provided by more than fifty veteran airmen and intelligence officers from around the world, and from more than seventy formerly classified government documents. Last Hope is a thoroughly annotated and fully illustrated journey into the secretive world of air crew evasion and escape aides for the casual reader and serious researcher alike, and is a valuable resource for the military and aviation enthusiast, collector, researcher, and museum curator.

What if you could combine the agility, adaptability, and cohesion of a small team with the power and resources of a giant organization? When General Stanley McChrystal took command of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq in 2003, he quickly realized that conventional military tactics were failing. The allied forces had a huge advantage in numbers, equipment and training - but none of the enemy's speed and flexibility. McChrystal and his colleagues discarded a century of conventional wisdom to create a 'team of teams' that combined extremely transparent communication with decentralized decision-making authority. Faster, flatter and more flexible, the task force beat back al-Qaeda. In this powerful book, McChrystal and his colleagues show how the challenges they faced in Iraq can be relevant to any leader. Through compelling examples, the authors demonstrate that the 'team of teams' strategy has worked everywhere from hospital emergency rooms to NASA and has the potential to transform organizations large and small. 'A bold argument that leaders can help teams become greater than the sum of their parts' Charles Duhigg, author of The Power of Habit 'An indispensable guide to organizational change' Walter Isaacson, author of Steve Jobs

Acclaimed historian Stephen Robinson brings to life a legendary last stand. Shanghai 1937. With invading Japanese troops poised to capture one of the world's greatest cities after almost three months of brutal urban warfare, the Chinese Army begins to retreat - except for a single battalion that stays behind to fight. These soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Xie Jinyuan, known as the 'Eight Hundred Heroes', defended Sihang Warehouse - a six-storey concrete building and natural fortress. The men repulsed waves of Japanese attacks with intense bravery as thousands of spectators looked on from the relative safety of the British Concession inside Shanghai's International Settlement. Western journalists with front row seats to the spectacle spread the story across the globe as the plight of the heroes captured the sympathy of the world. Their valour raised Chinese morale as did the actions of the heroine Yang Huimin, a Girl Guide who delivered a Chinese flag to the defenders that flew over Sihang Warehouse as a beacon of hope. Eight Hundred Heroes is an in-depth account, resulting from extensive research that for the first time comprehensively utilises first-hand accounts of the Chinese participants and the observations of westerners who witnessed the battle at close range. It also explains how this incredible feat of heroism became an enduring myth that helped define modern China.

At the height of its power, the Roman Empire encompassed the entire Mediterranean basin, extending much beyond it from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Rhine to the Black Sea. Rome prospered for centuries while successfully resisting attack, fending off everything from overnight robbery raids to full-scale invasion attempts by entire nations on the move. How were troops able to defend the Empire's vast territories from constant attacks? And how did they do so at such moderate cost that their treasury could pay for an immensity of highways, aqueducts, amphitheaters, city baths, and magnificent temples? In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, seasoned defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak reveals how the Romans were able to combine military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to effectively respond to changing threats. Rome's secret was not ceaseless fighting, but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure of roads, forts, walls, and barriers. Initially relying on client states to buffer attacks, Rome moved to a permanent frontier defense around 117 CE. Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome filed large armies in a strategy of "defense-in-depth," allowing invaders to pierce Rome's borders. This updated edition has been extensively revised to incorporate recent scholarship and archeological findings. A new preface explores Roman imperial statecraft. This illuminating book remains essential to both ancient historians and students of modern strategy.

The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), waged between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, involved some of the most important developments in ancient warfare. A life-and-death struggle between the two most powerful Greek city-states in the wake of their combined successes against the Persian invasion of Xerxes in 480-479 BC, the conflict dragged in communities from all over the Greek world on one side or the other. Ranging from the Black Sea to Sicily, the war saw the first recorded widespread use of light-armed troops, reserves, the deep phalanx, and other ideas important for the development of Western warfare into the 4th century BC, such as strategic thinking. It also revealed lessons (some learned and some not) with respect to the strengths and weaknesses of hoplite warfare and the various states in Greece. Featuring full-color artwork and drawing upon an array of sources, this study of three pivotal clashes between Spartan and Athenian hoplite forces during the Peloponnesian War highlights all of these developments and lessons.

"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with." With these words, Robert Taber began a revolution in conventional military thought that has dramatically impacted the way armed conflicts have been fought since the book's initial publication in 1965. Whether ideological, nationalistic, or religious, all guerrilla insurgencies use similar tactics to advance their cause. "War of the Flea's" timeless analysis of the guerrilla fighter's means and methods provides a fundamental resource for any reader seeking to understand this distinct form of warfare and the challenge it continues to present to today's armed forces in the Philippines, Colombia, and elsewhere.

Asymmetric warfare, involving conflicts where smaller powers apply their strengths against the weaknesses of a more powerful opponent, has become a key modern concern since the September 11th attacks. Conflict in Afghanistan tackles this issue by examining the five wars Afghanistan has waged against foreign powers over the past two centuries, all of which have involved forms of asymmetric warfare.

Incorporating contemporary documents and material from Soviet archives, the text analyzes each war s antecedents, conduct, and consequences. Important questions are asked about the role of religious beliefs, fanaticism, diplomacy, governmental decision-making and military competence, issues that have great contemporary relevance. The book provides an illuminating commentary of Afghanistan s wars and examines the relevance of these conflicts to the modern-day challenge of counter-insurgency and asymmetric warfare.

Few historians have looked beyond the veil of the Teapot Dome scandal and examined the naval policies of President Warren Harding and his secretary of navy, Edwin Denby. Historians have also periodically overlooked the personal papers and archives of the Harding administration as it bears on U.S. naval policy. However, Professor Manley R. Irwin brings forth an innovative approach to researching these policies, papers, and archives in Silent Strategists. The book boldly brings forth the argument that Harding and Denby exercised unusual foresight in preparing the navy for a war against Japan. Both individuals promulgated structural changes in the department and adopted a set of management tools that would redound to the navy in its prosecution of its Pacific offensive, World War II. The administrative legacy of the Harding administration remains as vital today as it did eight decades ago, and Professor Irwin's thorough investigation provides invaluable new details and insights.

During the 19th century, US forces confronted the Seminole people in a series of bitter wars over the fate of Florida. After the refusal of the Seminoles to move west to the Creek Reservation in Mississippi, the US government sent troops to bring Florida under federal control, marking the beginning of the Second Seminole War. On December 28, 1835, troops led by Major Francis Langhorne Dade were ambushed and massacred en route to Fort King. Two years of guerrilla warfare ensued, as the Seminoles evaded the US forces sent to defeat them. Ordered to hunt down the Seminoles, a US force led by Colonel Zachary Taylor incurred heavy losses at the battle of Lake Okeechobee (December 25, 1837), but the Seminoles were forced to withdraw. At the battle of the Loxahatchee River (January 24, 1838), forces led by Major General Thomas S. Jesup encountered a large group of Seminoles and met them with overwhelming numbers and greater firepower. Despite their stubborn efforts to resist the US military, the Seminoles were defeated and Florida became a state of the Union in 1845. This fully illustrated study assesses the forces fighting on both sides, casting light on the tactics, weaponry, and combat record of the Seminole warriors and their US opponents during the Second Seminole War.

This book is the first full-length study of a key security issue confronting the west in the twenty-first century, urban military operations - as currently being undertaken by US and UK forces in Iraq. It relates military operations in cities to the wider study of conflict and security in an era of urbanization, expeditionary warfare and new power conflicts; its central process is urban operations, but its context is the changing security environment, whose features are revealed in conflicts within cities.
Within a framework analyzing conventional operations, the author identifies the contextual factors that affect operations in urban environments. She advances an explanation as to why questions of theoretical understanding and policy response are as important as tactical concerns, and why cities will represent a politically significant area in the future. In doing so, Alice Hills demonstrates that urban operations present a unique set of political and moral challenges to both policy-makers and military commanders. "Future War in Cities" offers a rethinking of the liberal dilemma associated with the use of force across the spectrum of conflict, from terrorist attacks to major conventional operations.

Building on a strong foundation of primary sources, this unique study traces the role of East Germany's military (NVA) in the country's unification with West Germany. Utilizing interviews with and questionnaires from NVA officers, Herspring unravels the puzzle of the NVA's decision against using force to save the political system it was sworn to serve. The author also examines the integration of a select minority of officers and NCOs into the Bundeswehr. Illuminating the problems encountered by the Bundeswehr as it incorporated these individuals, Herspring constructs an ideal type of officer in one of the most politicized and tightly controlled of all communist militaries. His findings will be invaluable for all military-political specialists and for anyone interested in the process of transition from authoritarian/totalitarian to democratic systems.

Scotland has had a uniquely important military history over the last five centuries. Conflict with England in the 16th century, Jacobite rebellions in the 18th century, 20th-century defences and the two world wars, as well as the Cold War, all resulted in significant cartographic activity. In this book two map experts explore the extraordinarily rich legacy of Scottish military mapping, including fortification plans, reconnaissance mapping, battle plans, plans of military roads and routeways, tactical maps, plans of mines, enemy maps showing targets, as well as plans showing the construction of defences. In addition to plans, elevations and views, they also discuss unrealised proposals and projected schemes. Most of the maps - some of them reproduced in book form for the first time - are visually striking and attractive, and all have been selected for the particular stories they tell about both attacking and defending the country.

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. Terence Zuber challenges this orthodox view to present a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.

Fully illustrated, this book casts light on the utility and role of the German and British cavalry in the early stages of World War I on the Western Front. In the early months of World War I, before the fighting degenerated into static trench warfare, there was a brief period of mobile combat as the German Army advanced through Belgium and northern France, forcing the French and British forces facing them to retreat. Both sides in the escalating conflict deployed substantial numbers of cavalry units to screen their infantry forces, conduct reconnaissance and harness their superior mobility to undertake aggressive combat operations. In the summer of 1914, the British cavalry had the difficult task of covering the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force and the German cavalry, the equally demanding task, after weeks of combat and forced marches, of maintaining contact with a rapidly retiring enemy. In this book a comparative assessment is made of each side's doctrine, organization, equipment and training, followed by a detailed analysis of their actual performance in three key encounter actions: Casteau/Soignies (22 August), Cerizy/Moy (28 August) and Le Montcel/Fretoy (7 September). This analysis is supported by carefully chosen photographs and specially commissioned full-colour artwork and maps.