This scarce antiquarian book is included in our special Legacy Reprint Series. In the interest of creating a more extensive selection of rare historical book reprints, we have chosen to reproduce this title even though it may possibly have occasional imperfections such as missing and blurred pages, missing text, poor pictures, markings, dark backgrounds and other reproduction issues beyond our control. Because this work is culturally important, we have made it available as a part of our commitment to protecting, preserving and promoting the world's literature.

After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq is premised on the judgment that the United States is not succeeding in Iraq and that Iraq itself is more divided and violent than ever. It concludes that the administration's decision to increase U.S. force levels will fail to prevent further deterioration in the situationand that there is no alternative policy with the potential to turn things around.

In "Preemption" one of our nation s foremost legal scholars puts forward a controversial new theory on crime and punishment in the postmodern world. Using the American government s 2003 invasion of Iraq as a starting point, Alan M. Dershowitz tracks our society s increasing reliance on preemptive action. In "Preemption," which Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals calls lucid, sober, courageous, and historically informed, Dershowitz has brought together all of his diverse and considerable talents and experiences to confront the idea of preemptive action as it applies to some of our most urgent political and moral dilemmas."

"In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait using several specific strategies. Schwarzkopf established a temporary supply base in the Saudi Arabian desert to form a base of operations for the U.S. Seventh Corps and then used Marine and Arab coalition allies in a pinning operation against Iraqi troops in Kuwait while the Seventh Corps made a turning movement into the Iraqi rear. Having captured its limited, geographic objective, the coalition called a halt to the war. Schwarzkopf's strategies came straight from Antoine-Henri Jomini's The Art of War, which is the foundation of professional military education in the Western world." - from the new introduction....Antoine Henri de Jomini's The Art of War is considered by many to be the definitive work on military strategy and tactics. His impact on professional military thinking, doctrine and vocabulary is unparalleled by any other military theoretician. Though authors like Clausewitz may be better known to some, few can match the breadth of practical advice offered by the man who served both Napoleon and the Russian Tsar....This edition faithfully reproduces Jomini's seminal work, beautifully reformatted and typeset and includes a new introduction and brief chapter by chapter commentary.

In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the Wests air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies.

In this clear and engaging introduction, Rod Thornton unpacks the meaning and significance of asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms, and examines why it has become such an important subject for study. He seeks to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker opponents apply asymmetric techniques against the Western world, and shows how the Wests military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. The book concludes by looking at the ways in which the US, the state most vulnerable to asymmetric attack, is attempting to cope with some new battlefield realities.

This is an indispensable guide to one of the key topics in security studies today.

Originally published in 1927. Contents Include Foreword Diary-July 11, 1871, to July 17, 1871 Preface Text Appendix Index "The Daily Impressions Received during the Campaign of 1870, 1871 and only Cursorily Jotted down in my Diary under Stress of Military Duties I have Supplemented and Completed since my Subsequent return Home by Extracts from the Correspondence Regularly Maintained between my Wife and Myself. On Principle, however, I was Firmly Resolved to Set down only my Actual, Personal Experiences and Feelings from Day to Day Consequently no Improvement or Alteration has been made under the Influence of Later Events. Thus my Diary is a Contribution to the History of that Great and Memorable War, Containing also much Information, Hardly to be found elsewhere, Throwing Light on the Events of which the outside World takes a View Differing Widely from the Reality. Similarly, the Character of Prominent Personages will often wear another aspect than that in which the Present Age and History represent it. But Revelations of this kind are not for Contemporaries to know I therefore direct that no one else but my Wife and my Grown-up Children is to examine my Diary till the year 1922 is ended. After that there is nothing to Hinder it's Publication." Illustrated with photographs. Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. Home Farm Books are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

There are numerous "order of battle" books on the market. So what makes this series so special? Why should one decide on this particular book? For one thing, most orders of battle usually deal with only the armies of the country/countries; and then only at the division and corps level. Most higher echelons of commands are not covered. This book deals with all the branches of a country's military, giving a breakdown of all the major echelons of command, from theatre down to division. Under each major component, in the book (army group, armies, corps and divisions), the equivalent commands of the other military branches of the country's armed forces are included.
Second, it attempts to give an overall command structure of the country's military showing the central headquarters command structure. The command structure for military theatres, army groups, naval commands, armies, fleets, corps and/or equivalent command is also listed.
Third, most order of battle list the commanders and their dates of tenure. This one includes those, but, also lists their next duty assignment, where they went after leaving this post. One can literally trace a general officer's career through the upper echelons of command with this book. This makes it completely different from all other books on the market.
Fourth, this book lists all the major warships of the country's navy. each major warship of carrier, battleship and cruiser is listed plus a list of the ship's commanders.
Fifth, military unit and/or ship insignia, crest, emblem, or patch is pictured next to the unit/ship, whenever it was found.
This is the second book in a series that I plan to write covering all the nations who wereinvolved in this world conflict.

If you loved American Sniper you will love Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. Award-winning journalist Sean Naylor, an eyewitness to the action, vividly portrays the fight for Afghanistan's most hostile battleground. At dawn on March 2, 2002, the first major battle of the 21st Century began. Over 200 soldiers of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions flew into Afghanistan's Shahikot valley - and into the mouth of a buzz-saw. They were about to pay a bloody price for strategic, higher-level miscalculations that underestimated the enemy's strength and willingness to fight. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Coalition forces quickly toppled the Taliban regime from the seat of government. But, believing the war to be all but over, the Pentagon and US Central Command refused to commit the forces required to achieve total victory in Afghanistan. Instead, they delegated responsibility for fighting the war's biggest battle to a tangle of untested units thrown together at the last moment. Then the world watched as Anaconda seemed to unravel. Denied the extra infantry, artillery and close air support with which they trained to go to war, the soldiers of this airborne assault fought for survival in brutal high-altitude combat. Backed up by a small, but crucial, team of special forces, they were all that stood between the Coalition and a military disaster. Perfect for fans of Black Hawk Down, Zero Dark Thirty, Chris Ryan, and Andy McNab. About the author: Sean Naylor is a senior writer for the Army Times. He has covered the Afghan mujahideen's war against the Soviets, and American military operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Named one of the 22 "unsung" influential print reporters in Washington by American Journalism Review in May 2002, he earned the White House Correspondents' Association's prestigious Edgar A. Poe Award for his coverage of Operation Anaconda.

What is Israel hoping to achieve with its recent pull-out from Gaza? Journalist Jonathan Cook, who spent five years reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presents a lucid account of the motivations and implications behind the Gaza withdrawal and the building of Israel's 700km fence-cum-wall around the West Bank. At the heart of the issue, he argues, is demography. The wars of 1948 and 1967 brought hundreds of thousands of Palestinians under Israeli rule. The biggest obstacle to a two-state solution comes not from Palestinians living under occupation, but from Israel's own Palestinian citizens - one in five of the population. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, they have been campaigning for democratic reforms to transform Israel from a Jewish state into a state of all its citizens. predicament over the course of the Intifada: its lethal military repression of Palestinian dissent on both sides; its claims that Palestinian citizens and the Palestinian Authority have been secretly conspiring to subvert the Jewish state from within; its banning of marriages between Palestinian citizens and Palestinians living under occupation to prevent a right of return through the back door; its plans to redraw the Green Line to exclude the heartlands of its Palestinian citizens from Israel; and the nascent alliance between Israel's secular leadership and its zealous settlers against the country's Palestinian minority. The path of unilateral separation will lead to more and greater abuses of the rights of Israel's Palestinian citizens. And ultimately, argues the author, it will lead to a third, far deadlier Intifada.

4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And we have done so three times - in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the USSR in Afghanistan...As the only Goliath left in the world, we should be worried that the world's Davids have found a sling and stone that work." - Chapter 1, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. The War in Iraq. The War on Terror. These types of "asymmetrical" warfare are the conflicts of the 21st century - and show how difficult it is for the world's remaining superpower to battle insurgents and terrorists who will fight unconventionally in the face of superior military power. This change in military conflict may seem sudden.

The last days of World War Two in Europe is on one level the story of great statesmen and supreme commanders vying for power and fighting for what each felt was the correct resolution. Whiting sets the final stage of the war against the background of the struggle between Churchill and Truman, and between Marshall and Eisenhower. But while statesmen exchanged telegrams, others kept up the exchange of fire. Mr Whiting vividly portrays the final collapse of the German army, which had fallen into the hands of the aged and the very young, their manic dread of the Russians, and the dissolution of the German High Command. 'Hitler's Defeat' is high drama, but also gives the reader an understanding of the Grand Strategy which led to the reshaping of Europe in 1945. CHARLES WHITING, the author, is Britain's most prolific military writer with over 250 books to his credit. He saw active service in the Second World War, serving in an armoured reconnaissance regiment attached to both the US and British Armies. He is therefore able to write with the insight and authority of someone who, as a combat soldier, actually experienced the horrors of World War II.

My Way of strategy is the sure method to win when fighting for your life one man against five or ten. There is nothing wrong with the principle "one man can beat ten, so a thousand men can beat ten thousand." You must research this. Of course you cannot assemble a thousand or ten thousand men for everyday training. But you can become a master of strategy by training alone with a sword, so that you can understand the enemy's stratagems, his strength and resources, and come to appreciate how to apply strategy to beat ten thousand enemies.

A compelling history of the greatest ships ever launched.The importance of the fighting ship is as considerable today as ever before. Battleships are built, counted, assessed and exercised with the same determination now as at the beginning of the twentieth century, and during the Napoleonic Wars. In this riveting book, leading historian Richard Hough examines fifteen of history's most significant and interesting battleships, from Lord Howard Effingham's Ark Royal, which held the Spanish Armada at bay, to the American New Jersey, which took part in three wars, and whose guns still remain ready for action. From the mighty German Bismarck of 1941, destroyed on its first operation voyage, Battleship ranges to Admiral Nelson's legendary HMS Victory, still a flagship after more than 200 years Hough weaves these examples into a pattern of progress ranging from the galleon to the immense super-dreadnought. In addition, he focuses in depth upon armaments, structural developments, and the tactics of war - all these play a crucial part in the epic history of the battleship. But above all Richard Hough's story is a human one, a record of men and ships, of courage and endurance - a true taste of the sea.

In this concise and penetrating study, Roger Barnett illuminates the effect of operational, organisational, legal, and moral constraints on the ability of the U.S. to use military force. As the tragic events of September 11 demonstrated, potential adversaries can take advantage of these limitations, thus spawning "asymmetrical warfare." Barnett defines asymmetrical warfare as not simply a case of pitting one's strength against another's weakness but rather of taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against, certain actions. For instance, launching chemical, biological, or suicide attacks; taking indiscriminate actions against critical infrastructure; using hostages or human shields; deliberately destroying the environment; and targeting non-combatants all constitute possible asymmetrical warfare scenarios. Against these acts, the U.S. has not prepared any response in kind. Indeed it either cannot or will not undertake such responses, thus making these attacks especially difficult to counter. This refusal to retaliate in an "eye for an eye" fashion complicates the dilemma of American policy makers who seek to wield power and influence on the world stage while simultaneously projecting a peaceful and benign image. Barnett concludes that the U.S. must create a formal system of selectively eliminating the constraints that dictate their response to certain situations or scenarios. Failure to make such changes will only increase paralysis and, when the use of force is required, contribute to the already heightened risks.

The Allied victory at Omaha Beach was a costly one. A direct infantry assault against a defense that was years in the making, undertaken in daylight following a mere thirty-minute bombardment, the attack had neither the advantage of tactical surprise nor that of overwhelming firepower. American forces were forced to improvise under enemy fire, and although they were ultimately victorious, they suffered devastating casualties. Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were. Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat. |A soldier-scholar reveals the flaws in the Allied invasion at Omaha Beach. Reanalyzing military records and battle plans, Adrian Lewis traces the evolution of combined operations (more than one nation) and joint operations (more than one service) to explain how the plan for swift victory at Omaha Beach went terribly wrong and turned into the bloodiest of the Allied invasions.

In Waging Modern War , General Wesley K. Clark recounts his experience leading NATO's forces to a hard-fought and ultimately successful victory in Kosovo in 1999. As the American military machine has swung into action in the months following the attacks on the World Trade centre and the Pentagon, it has become clear that the lessons of Kosovo are directly applicable to the war against terrorism and the nations that sponsor it. The problems posed, and overcome, in the war in Kosovo-how to fight an air war against unconventional forces in rough terrain and how to coordinate U.S. objectives with those of other nations-are the problems that America increasingly faces in the today's world. As the Los Angeles Times noted in late September of 2001, this book's "lessons are highly relevant now, . We need to think about exactly what steps will lessen, rather than increase, the terrorist threat. And we also need innovative commanders willing to improvise to meet a new kind of threat, more determined political leadership, a more flexible outlook in the Pentagon, . Gen. Clark has performed another service by highlighting these problems at a crucial moment in American history." Waging Modern War is history, memoir, guidebook, and forecast, essential reading for those who want to know how modern war is fought, and won.

"An astute military historian's appraisal of what separates the sheep from the wolves in the great game of war."—Kirkus Reviews

If a key to military victory is to "get there first with the most," the true test of the great general is to decide where "there" is—the enemy's Achilles heel. Here is a narrative account of decisive engagements that succeeded by brilliant strategy more than by direct force. The reader accompanies those who fought, from Roman legionaries and Mongol horsemen to Napoleonic soldiery, American Civil War Rebels and Yankees, World War I Tommies, Lawrence of Arabia's bedouins, Chinese revolutionaries, British Desert Rats, Rommel's Afrika Korps, and Douglas MacArthur's Inchon invaders.

However varied their weapons, the soldiers of all these eras followed a commander who faced the same obstacles and demonstrated the strategic and tactical genius essential for victory. "All warfare is based on deception," wrote Sun Tzu in The Art of War in 400 BCE. Bevin Alexander shows how great generals have interpreted this advice, and why it still holds true today. Maps, illustrations.

With the defeat and destruction of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad all but certain at the end of 1942, the war on the Eastern Front took a definitive turn as the Germans struggled to erect a new defensive front to halt the Soviet juggernaut driving west. Operation Don's Main Attack is the first detailed study of the dramatic clash of armies that followed, unfolding inexorably over the course of two months across an expanse of more than 1,600 kilometers. Using recently released Russian archival material never before available to researchers, David M. Glantz provides a close-up account, from both sides, of the planning and conduct of Operation Don- the Soviet offensive by the Red Army's Southern front that aimed to capture Rostov in January-February 1943. His book includes a full array of plans, candid daily reports, situation maps, and strength and casualty reports prepared for the forces that participated in the offensive at every level. Drawing on an unprecedented and comprehensive range of documents, the book delves into many hitherto forbidden topics, such as unit strengths and losses and the foibles and attitudes of command cadre. Glantz's work also presents rare insights into the military strategy, combat tactics, and operational art of such figures as Generals Eremenko and Malinovsky and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. A uniquely informed study of a critical but virtually forgotten Soviet military operation, Operation Don's Main Attack offers a fresh perspective on the nature of the twentieth century's most terrible of wars.

Little Round Top, the Railroad Cut, Pickett’s Charge—these are the turning points within the most important battle of the Civil War. Even careful students of Gettysburg, however, can find themselves disoriented when visiting the site itself. Here, finally, is a convenient guide for serious student and casual visitor alike that makes plain the sweep of events and the geography of the battlefield. This invaluable guidebook was created by scholars who have walked the battlegrounds, consulted with local experts and park guides, and studied the testimony left behind by the participants. Gettysburg will help you find all the important locales and understand what the participants saw in 1863, even if you have no prior knowledge of the battle. Designed to enhance the experience of both first-time and returning visitors, this guide can be used alone or as a supplement to a tour. Clearly written and illustrated with maps and photographs, this is the book to have when you explore Gettysburg.

The hard-fought and dramatic battles of Chickamauga (September 19-20, 1863) and Chattanooga (November 23-25, 1863) changed the course of the Civil War. These battles sounded the death knell of the Confederacy and put Ulysses S. Grant on the road to final victory. For the first time in one convenient guide, Steven E. Woodworth provides an overview of the battles and an on-site tour to help both serious students and casual visitors get the most out of a visit to Chickamauga and Chattanooga. The guide emphasizes how the opposing armies used terrain and how that terrain shaped the course of each battle. Easy-to-follow directions to specific locations enable you to view the field from the historic perspectives of the combatants. Whether used alone or as a supplement to a tour, this guide will enhance your visit. Clearly written and illustrated with maps and photographs, it is an invaluable tool for both knowledgeable Civil War enthusiasts and first-time visitors to Chickamauga and Chattanooga.

This book covers many topics that are crucial to military planning but often receive only passing mention in histories or briefings. Collins, a former Army officer, stresses land geography, but he does not stint oceans, the atmosphere, or interplanetary space. His discussions of urban areas are too brief, given the increasing amount of large-scale violence in cities since the end of World War II.

'War is too important to be left to the generals' snapped future French prime minister Georges Clemenceau on learning of yet another bloody and futile offensive on the Western Front. One of the great questions in the ongoing discussions and debate about the First World War is why did winning take so long and exact so appalling a human cost? After all this was a fight that, we were told, would be over by Christmas. Now, in his major new history, Allan Mallinson, former professional soldier and author of the acclaimed 1914: Fight the Good Fight, provides answers that are disturbing as well as controversial, and have a contemporary resonance. He disputes the growing consensus among historians that British generals were not to blame for the losses and setbacks in the 'war to end all wars' - that, given the magnitude of their task, they did as well anyone could have. He takes issue with the popular view that the 'amateur' opinions on strategy of politicians such as Lloyd George and, especially, Winston Churchill, prolonged the war and increased the death toll. On the contrary, he argues, even before the war began Churchill had a far more realistic, intelligent and humane grasp of strategy than any of the admirals or generals, while very few senior officers - including Sir Douglas Haig - were up to the intellectual challenge of waging war on this scale. And he repudiates the received notion that Churchill's stature as a wartime prime minister after 1940 owes much to the lessons he learned from his First World War 'mistakes' - notably the Dardanelles campaign - maintaining that in fact Churchill's achievement in the Second World War owes much to the thwarting of his better strategic judgement by the 'professionals' in the First - and his determination that this would not be repeated. Mallinson argues that from day one of the war Britain was wrong-footed by absurdly faulty French military doctrine and paid, as a result, an unnecessarily high price in casualties. He shows that Lloyd George understood only too well the catastrophically dysfunctional condition of military policy-making and struggled against the weight of military opposition to fix it. And he asserts that both the British and the French failed to appreciate what the Americans' contribution to victory could be - and, after the war, to acknowledge fully what it had actually been.

No one man can win a battle by himself, but battles have been won and lost because of the strength or failings of one individual: the leader. What went on in the minds and hearts of a select group of military leaders at critical moments in battle is the theme of this book. In Leaders and Battles, W. J. Wood re-creates ten battles from history, depicting the action in vivid detail--the brilliant formations, charging horses, clanking bayonets. The point of view is always that of the commanding officer. The particular quality of leadership that won--or lost--the encounter is very clear. For Mad Anthony Wayne at Stony Point, it was courage that won the day. For Scipio Africanus at Ilipa, it was imagination. Custer's judgment at the Little Big Horn was definitely in question. When the French stormed Ratisbon, it was the inspiration of Lannes that broke the impasse. At the battle of Bushy Run, Bouquet could never have outwitted Pontiac had he lacked flexibility. The dynamics of battle as well as the strategy and tactics involved are equally well demonstrated. Though the means of fighting varied as much as the time and the civilizations involved, the lessons learned are just as applicable today. Men no longer fight with drawn swords, make barricades out of mealie bags, or use a swarm of bees as a weapon. But that is part of this book's fascination. Leaders and Battles is a remarkable retelling of fighting engagements for the armchair strategist, the leader in training, the history buff, and the general reader. It will take time before the major wars and low-intensity skirmishes of this century can be written about with the historical detachment and understanding that the author displays here. In the meantime, we can all profit from these lessons of history.

Describing the radical transformation in German Infantry tactics that took place during World War I, this book presents the first detailed account of the evolution of stormtroop tactics available in English. It covers areas previously left unexplored: the German Infantry's tactical heritage, the squad's evolution as a tactical unit, the use of new weapons for close combat, the role of the elite assault units in the development of new tactics, and detailed descriptions of offensive battles that provided the inspiration and testing ground for this new way of fighting. Both a historical investigation and a standard of excellence in infantry tactics, Stormtroop Tactics is required reading for professional military officers and historians as well as enthusiasts. Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the "top down" intervention of reformers but instead a "bottom up" phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call "Blitzkrieg." Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I--tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.