International politics have become ever more volatile over the last decade, increasing the risk of large-scale military violence. Yet the precise character of future war will depend on a range of factors that relate to adversaries, allies, technology, geographical scope and multiple domains of warfighting. Few would question that land forces will be important also in the foreseeable future. However, given that the battlefield is in a state of transformation, so is the mission, purpose and utilization of land forces. Indeed, the future conduct of land warfare is subjected to serious and important questions in the face of large and complex challenges and security threats. Advanced Land Warfare explores the evolving role of land forces, paying particular attention to the changes that have taken place in the art of commanding and executing combat, as well as the role of rapid technological innovation and information dissemination in shaping warfare. The book provides insights into key contemporary developments in land warfare and presents case studies on land tactics and operations in different national contexts, drawing on the best of theory, practice, and professional experience and featuring chapters written by leading international scholars and practitioners. Relating to the realities of the modern battlefield, the book addresses a number of critical questions about land tactics and operations, combining a conceptual basis with empirical examples of tactical thinking and practice and emphasising the importance of understanding the perspectives of various national armies, in order to provide a current understanding of the central issues of land warfare. An open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence.

What was it like to be a soldier on a Napoleonic battlefield? What happened when cavalry regiments charged directly at one another? What did the generals do during battle? Drawing on memoirs, diaries, and letters of the time, this dramatic book explores what actually happened in battle and how the participants' feelings and reactions influenced the outcome. Rory Muir focuses on the dynamics of combat in the age of Napoleon, enhancing his analysis with vivid accounts of those who were there-the frightened foot soldier, the general in command, the young cavalry officer whose boils made it impossible to ride, and the smartly dressed aide-de-camp, tripped up by his voluminous pantaloons. This book sheds new light on how military tactics worked by concentrating on the experience of soldiers in the firing line. Muir considers the interaction of artillery, infantry, and cavalry; the role of the general, subordinate commanders, staff officers, and aides; morale, esprit de corps, and the role of regimental officers; soldiers' attitudes toward death and feelings about the enemy; the plight of the wounded; the difficulty of surrendering; and the way victories were finally decided. He discusses the mechanics of musketry, artillery, and cavalry charges and shows how they influenced the morale, discipline, and resolution of the opposing armies. This is a volume that will fascinate all readers with an interest in military history, European history, or the psychology of combat.

During World War II, the US Army and its allies faced a formidable challenge: the need to assault Hitler's 'Fortress Europe' from the sea. As a result, during 1941-45, the US Army had to add amphibious assault to its list of combat capabilities. Officers and troops from across the US Armed Forces had to develop the techniques and technologies to assault the coasts of Axis-occupied Europe, from logistics to beach assault and beachhead consolidation, and more. In order to win and hold a contested beachhead in the face of bitter enemy resistance, the amphibious-warfare specialists played a variety of essential battlefield roles; if the US troops could not establish a beachhead quickly, they risked being thrown back into the sea. For their part, the Germans had to devise a practical defensive doctrine that made the most of the limited resources and troops available and the terrain. The German infantry defenders immediately around the landing areas had to be able to call upon support from nearby artillery, mechanized troops, and armoured forces to have a chance of containing the enemy beachhead. This illustrated study analyses the specialist beach-landing troops involved in three key battles - the Allied amphibious landings at Salerno and Anzio in Italy, and Omaha Beach in Normandy - focusing upon the US Army's various types of beach-assault specialists and their German opponents, whose combat experience and effectiveness varied considerably. Each of the three featured battles is then examined in detail, exploring how the Germans made defensive preparations; how the US troops planned to overcome them; and the immediate actions undertaken by the US amphibious specialists and their German opponents both during and following the main assault landings.

Modern armies are planned and structured to fight massive World War II-type operations involving the large-scale movements of tanks and machinery across continents. In fact they are rarely called upon to participate in such conflicts. It is far more common for them to find themselves involved in lower-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as "unconventional warfare," typified by the 1990s conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Thomas Adams argues that, for the most part, the conventional war-fighting forces of the USA are not the best military forces to deal with such situations, where there is a lack of a clearly-defined enemy and a need for persuasion, negotiation and even community leadership alongside elements who are willing to resort to deadly force. The appropriate components of the US miltary to deal with this, in his view, are the Special Operations Forces (SOF). He discusses the composition of the SOF and their varying roles, discussing their evoluation, strengths and weaknesses, and gives a history of US involvement in non-conventional warfare from the American revolution to the 1990s. He argues that the US Department of Defense still sees military conflict in the form of conventional warfare, with its emphasis on high-technology combat. The very existence of high-technology systems, however, makes conventional warfare less likely, with the result that the US Army may become vulnerable to "low-tech" offensives, and already there has been an increase in "unconventional" conflicts since the demise of the Soviet Union.
Adams proposes a change in strategic thinking together with investment in training and ausable military doctrine to guide develoment. A shift in expectations is required, with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.

This is the second part of a two volume set exploring the inception, planning and preparation of the offensive to liberate Europe, Operation Overlord, culminating in its launch on D-Day.

From the US Department of Defense, the Skills, Tactics, and Traits of the Most Highly Skilled Soldiers in the World--Army Rangers. This handbook offers the techniques and tactics that make U.S. Army Rangers the best soldiers in the world. These highly trained, easily deployable, and widely skilled infantrymen specialize in airborne assault, raids, recovery of personnel and equipment, and airfield seizure, among other difficult and dangerous missions. Now, in this recently revised edition of the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook, you can get the latest info on everything from understanding the basics of Army operations and tactics to discovering what makes a soldier with good leadership qualities and character. Although primarily written for Rangers and other light infantry units, it serves as a handy reference for all military units, covering how infantry squad- and platoon-sized elements conduct combat operations in varied terrains. Drawing from over two centuries of lessons learned in special operations combat, this guide provides modern soldiers with best training possible. It effectively combines the lessons of the past with important insights for the future to help make army leaders the absolute best they can be. In straightforward, no-frills language, it covers deception, stealth, communications, escape and evasion, ambush operations, perimeter defense, counterintelligence, and much more. This book is the ultimate resource for anyone who wants to know how Rangers think and function.

THE EXTRAORDINARY SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER. Take control of your life, build resilience and learn to thrive in any situation with the powerful and inspiring new book from the number one bestselling author of Battle Scars. In Life Under Fire, ex-Special Forces Sergeant Jason Fox shows you how to build the strength of mind and the resilience of an elite soldier. Recounting stories from high-stakes operations and expeditions, Foxy draws on the practices of the British military and the skills he developed during his career to show how to respond positively to life's challenges. Using battle-tested techniques, he explains how to find true grit in life's difficult moments, and how to ensure you have the inner strength to thrive in any environment. Whether you're under emotional pressure or facing physical challenges, this book will equip you with the tools you need to overcome obstacles and excel in adversity.

In the early 1970s, Sir Maurice Oldfield of the British Secret Service, MI6, embarked upon a decade-long campaign to derail the political career of Charles Haughey. The English spymaster believed Haughey was a Provisional IRA godfather, therefore, a threat to Britain. Oldfield was assisted by unscrupulous British agents and by a shadowy group of conspirators inside the Irish state's security apparatus, all sharing his distrust of Haughey. Escaping scrutiny for their actions until now, Enemy of the Crown examines more than a dozen instances of their activities. Oldfield was conspiratorial by nature and lacked a moral compass. Involved in regime change plots and torture in the Middle East, in the Republic of Ireland he engaged with convicted criminals as agent provocateurs as well as the exploitation of pedophile rings in Northern Ireland. He and his spies engaged in dirty tricks as they ran vicious smear campaigns in Ireland, Britain and the US. MI6 and IRD intrigues were deployed to impede Haughey's bid to secure a position on Fianna Fail's front bench and any return to respectability. London's hateful drive against Haughey saw no let-up after Fianna Fail's triumphal return to power in 1977 which saw them win a large majority of seats in the Dail. When Haughey sought a place at Cabinet, Oldfield and his spies devised more dirty tricks to impede him. While Haughey was suspicious of MI6 interference, he had no inkling of the full extent of London's clandestine efforts to destroy him. By circulating lurid stories about him, they played a major part in trying to prevent him succeed Jack Lynch as Taoiseach in 1979. This book attempts to shed light on some of the anti-Haughey conspiracies which took place during the period of the late 1960s right through to the early 1980s.

How psychology explains why a leader is willing to use military force to protect or salvage reputation In Who Fights for Reputation, Keren Yarhi-Milo provides an original framework, based on insights from psychology, to explain why some political leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others. Rather than focusing on a leader's background, beliefs, bargaining skills, or biases, Yarhi-Milo draws a systematic link between a trait called self-monitoring and foreign policy behavior. She examines self-monitoring among national leaders and advisers and shows that while high self-monitors modify their behavior strategically to cultivate image-enhancing status, low self-monitors are less likely to change their behavior in response to reputation concerns. Exploring self-monitoring through case studies of foreign policy crises during the terms of U.S. presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, Yarhi-Milo disproves the notion that hawks are always more likely than doves to fight for reputation. Instead, Yarhi-Milo demonstrates that a decision maker's propensity for impression management is directly associated with the use of force to restore a reputation for resolve on the international stage. Who Fights for Reputation offers a brand-new understanding of the pivotal influence that psychological factors have on political leadership, military engagement, and the protection of public prestige.

After World War Two the rapid advance of communism and associated political instability threatened Great Britain's interest in the Far East. From 1948 until around 1967, troops were deployed throughout the Malaysian region. To equip the British soldier and Commonwealth troops or jungle warfare the 1944 pattern 'jungle' webbing, designed during World War Two, was issued. In the 1960s, the new 1958 pattern equipment was issued to troops serving in Borneo, alongside the existing 1944 pattern set. Both patterns of equipment were unofficially customized and formally modified to meet the needs of individual jungle soldiers and the tough environment, to keep up with the rapid innovation of small-arms technology. This book details the evolution of British post-war jungle webbing equipment and examines the items used specifically during the Malayan Emergency and later, the Borneo Confrontation. Brought together into one reference book, the contents include: Components of post-war 1944 pattern webbing; 1944 pattern equipment modifications; 1944 pattern ancillary webbing items, bayonets and radio packs; Small arms used during the conflicts, and carriage of their ammunition; Special forces bespoke webbing; Typical customization of infantry belt kits; Items comprising the 1958 pattern webbing equipment set

In an age of backroom generals who command from far behind troop lines, it is often forgotten that wars have been won or lost by the personality and leadership of a maverick commander. In twelve riveting portrait, best-selling historian, Robert Harvey, explores the mind and the action of such men. From the the Mediterranean sea Harvey investigates what make a military commander different - a charismatic leader of men, rational under fire, unafraid to improvise or lead his men into victory against the odds. Packed with compelling and insightful analysis and story telling, Mavericks is Robert Harvey's best book to date. The Mavericks, what made them great and their key battles include: Clive of India - a master of the decisive strike, and going for the jugular. Plassey. James Wolfe - renowned by his troops for being as demanding on himself as on them. Quebec. George Washington - patience, then boldness. Yorktown. Horatio Nelson - flamboyance, careful planning and improvisation. Trafalgar. Thomas Cochrane - Fearless commando tactics and an eye for the unexpected strike. Aix Roads. The Duke of Wellington - style and soundbites, caution and planning. Salamanca. Guiseppe Garibaldi - charismatic communicator, bold in battle. Messina. Ulysses S. Grant - Cool and rational, with determination to overcome all obstacles. Vicksburg Erwin Rommel - Careful calculation followed by bold strikes. Desert Campaign. George Patton - Aggression coupled with skill in tanks and training.The Battle of the Bulge. Field Marshal Montgomery - A natural rebel with a lightning mind. El Alamein. Douglas MacArthur - brilliant communicator and bold, cared for his men. Inchon. PRAISE FOR WAR OF WARS 'This is the 'definitive' one-volume account of a particularly rich slab of history.' Daily Express. '...so well paced that reading it is a pleasure.' Bernard Cornwell. 'I doubt a better account of the never-ending war will be written in many a year.' Allan Mallinson. 'an exhillirating sequence of dramatic set-pieces in narrative history's best traditions.' Literary Review

The story of Allied victory in the Holy Land, far from the carnage of the Western Front but a crucial, morale-boosting success under the aggressive and forward-thinking General Allenby. Three battles for the control of the key fortress-city of Gaza took place in 1917 between the `British' force [with units from across the Empire, most notably the ANZACs] and the Turks. The Allies were repulsed twice but on theirthird attempt, under the newly appointed General Allenby, a veteran of the Western Front where he was a vocal critic of Haig's command, finally penetrated Turkish lines, captured southern Palestine and, as instructed by Lloyd George, took Jerusalem in time for Christmas, ending 400 years of Ottoman occupation. This third battle, similar in many ways to the contemporaneous fighting in France, is at the heart of this account, with consideration of intelligence, espionage, air-warfare, and diplomatic and political elements, not to mention the logistical and medical aspects of the campaign, particularly water. The generally overlooked Turkish defence, in the face of vastly superior numbers, is also assessed. Far from laying out and executing a pre-ordained plan, Allenby, who is probably still best remembered as T. E. Lawrence's commanding officer in Arabia, was flexible and adaptable, responding to developmentsas they occurred. JOHN D. GRAINGER is the author of numerous books on military history, ranging from the Roman period to the twentieth century.

The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia. The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the “surge” in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century.

This book provides a history of the South China Sea conflict and lays out the stakes for each of the bordering states and China's interaction with them - namely, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia; it also examines the U.S. government's role in the region. China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea is highly topical; it examines the evolving perception of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) of the South China Sea (SCS), and Beijing's accompanying maritime strategy to claim the islands and waters, particularly in the context of the strategies of the neighbouring stake-holding nations. In addition to long-standing territorial disputes over the islands and waters of the SCS, China and the other littoral states - Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia - have growing and often mutually exclusive interests in the offshore energy reserves and fishing grounds. Many other countries outside of the region worry about the protection of sea lines of communication for military and commercial traffic, oil tankers in particular. These differences have been expressed in the increasing frequency and intensity of maritime incidents, involving both naval and civilian vessels, sometimes working in coordination against naval or civilian targets. Each chapter on the littoral states closely examines that state's territorial claims to the islands and waters of the SCS, its primary economic and military interests in these areas, its views on the sovereignty disputes over the entire SCS, its strategy to achieve its objectives, and its views on the U.S. involvement in any and all of these issues.

By the end of the American War in Vietnam, the coastal province of PhU YEn was one of the least-secure provinces in the Republic of Vietnam. It was also a prominent target of the American strategy of pacification-an effort, purportedly separate and distinct from conventional warfare, to win the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese. In Robert J. Thompson III's analysis, the consistent, and consistently unsuccessful, struggle to place PhU YEn under Saigon's banner makes the province particularly fertile ground for studying how the Americans advanced pacification and why this effort ultimately failed. In March 1970 a disastrous military engagement began in PhU YEn, revealing the enemy's continued presence after more than three years of pacification. Clear, Hold, and Destroy provides a fresh perspective on the war across multiple levels, from those making and implementing policy to those affected by it. Most pointedly, Thompson contends that pacification, far from existing apart from conventional warfare, actually depended on conventional military forces for its application. His study reaches back into PhU YEn's storied history with pacification before and during the French colonial period, then focuses on the province from the onset of the American war in 1965 to its conclusion in 1975. A sharply focused, fine-grained analysis of one critical province during the Vietnam War, Thompson's work demonstrates how pacification is better understood as the foundation of U.S. fighting in Vietnam.

A former Harvard professor of decision science and game theory draws on those disciplines in this review of controversial strategic and tactical decisions of World War II. Allied leadership-although outstanding in many ways-sometimes botched what now is termed meta-decision making or deciding how to decide. Operation Jubilee, a single-division amphibious raid on Dieppe in August 1942, illustrates the pitfalls of groupthink. Prior to the invasion of North Africa in November, American and British leaders fell victim to the planning fallacy, going in with rosy expectations for easily achievable objectives. In the conquest of Sicily, they violated the millennia-old principle of command unity-now re-endorsed and elaborated on by modern theorists. Had Allied tacticians understood the game-theoretic significance of the terrain and conditions for success at Anzio, they might well not have and landed two-plus divisions there to fight a months-long stalemate in the first half of 1944.

Token forces - tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions - have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.

It would be hard to overstate the impact of Sun Tzu's The Art of War on military thought. Beyond its impact in Asia, the work has been required reading in translation for US military personnel since the Cold War. Sun Tzu has been interpreted as arguing for 'Indirect Strategy' in contrast to 'Direct Strategy,' the latter idea stemming from Ancient Greece. This is a product of twentieth-century Western thinking, specifically that of Liddell Hart, who influenced Samuel B. Griffith's 1963 translation of Sun Tzu. The credibility of Griffith's translation was enhanced by his combat experience in the Pacific during World War II, and his translation of Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla War. This reading of Sun Tzu is, however, very different from Chinese interpretations. Western strategic thinkers have used Sun Tzu as a foil or facilitator for their own thinking, inadvertently engaging the Western military tradition and propagating misleading generalizations about Chinese warfare.

It would be hard to overstate the impact of Sun Tzu's The Art of War on military thought. Beyond its impact in Asia, the work has been required reading in translation for US military personnel since the Cold War. Sun Tzu has been interpreted as arguing for 'Indirect Strategy' in contrast to 'Direct Strategy,' the latter idea stemming from Ancient Greece. This is a product of twentieth-century Western thinking, specifically that of Liddell Hart, who influenced Samuel B. Griffith's 1963 translation of Sun Tzu. The credibility of Griffith's translation was enhanced by his combat experience in the Pacific during World War II, and his translation of Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla War. This reading of Sun Tzu is, however, very different from Chinese interpretations. Western strategic thinkers have used Sun Tzu as a foil or facilitator for their own thinking, inadvertently engaging the Western military tradition and propagating misleading generalizations about Chinese warfare.

The British Empire employed a diverse range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over its overseas territories in the Middle East. This new interpretation of how Britain maintained order, protected its interests and carried out its defence obligations in the Gulf in the decades before its withdrawal from the region in 1971 looks at how the British government increasingly sought to achieve security with great economy of force by building up local militaries instead of deploying costly military forces from the home country. Benefitting from the extensive use of recently declassified British Government archival documents and India Office records, this highly original narrative weighs the successes and failures of Britain's use of 'indirect rule' among the small states of Eastern Arabia, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States and Oman. Drawing important lessons for scholars and policymakers about the limitations of trying to outsource security to local partners, Security in the Gulf is a remarkable study of the deployment of British colonial policy in the Middle East before 1971.

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the U.S. military found itself in a battle with a lethal and adaptive insurgency, where the divisions between enemy and ally were ambiguous at best, and working with the local population was essential for day-to-day survival. From the lessons they learned during multiple tours of duty in Iraq, two American veterans have penned "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa," an instructional parable of counterinsurgency that addresses the myriad of difficulties associated with war in the postmodern era.

In this tactical primer based on the military classic "The Defence of Duffer's Drift," a young officer deployed for the first time in Iraq receives ground-level lessons about urban combat, communications technology, and high-powered weaponry in an environment where policy meets reality. Over the course of six dreams, the inexperienced soldier fights the same battle again and again, learning each time--the hard way--which false assumptions and misconceptions he needs to discard in order to help his men avoid being killed or captured. As the protagonist struggles with his missions and grapples with the consequences of his mistakes, he develops a keen understanding of counterinsurgency fundamentals and the potential pitfalls of working with the native population.

Accompanied here by the original novella that inspired it, " The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa" offers an invaluable resource for cadets and junior military leaders seeking to master counterinsurgency warfare--as well as general readers seeking a deeper understanding of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as its predecessor has been a hallmark of military instruction, "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa "will draw the road map for counterinsurgency in the postmodern world.

Visit a website for the book here: www.defenseofJAD.com

"Steel Wind" is a piece of historical detective work that explains how Colonel Georg Bruchmuller, an obscure German artillery officer recalled from retirement, played a pivotal role in the revolution of offensive tactics that took place in 1917-18. Ironically, the methods developed by Bruchmuller ultimately were rejected by the German Army of World War II, but they were taken up and applied with a vengeance by the emerging Red Army. The Soviets further developed Bruchmuller's principles and incorporated them into their doctrine, where they remain to this day. Through Soviet doctrine, they have become fundamental to the practice of many other armies. Bruchmuller's influence in shaping the former Soviet Army has also been mirrored in the shape of those armies designed to oppose it.

Daniel Whittingham presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell (1859-1928). It tells the story of his life, which included service in military intelligence, the South African War, and on the General Staff before and during the First World War. It also presents the first comprehensive analysis of his writing: from his well-known books Small Wars (1896) and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance (1905), to a host of other books and articles that are presented here for the first time. Through a study of Callwell's life and works, this book offers a new perspective on the nature and study of military history, the character of British strategy, and on the army to which he belonged.

This edited volume analyses siege warfare as a discrete type of military engagement, in the face of which civilians are particularly vulnerable. Siege warfare is a form of combat that has usually had devastating effects on civilian populations. From the near-contemporary Siege of Sarajevo to the real and mythical sieges of the ancient Mediterranean, this has been a recurring type of military engagement which, through bombardment, starvation, disease and massacre, places non-combatants at the heart of battle. To date, however, there has been little recognition of the effects of siege warfare on civilians. This edited volume addresses this gap. Using a distinctive regressive method, it begins with the present and works backwards, avoiding teleological interpretations that suggest the targeting of civilians in war is a modern phenomenon. Its contributors interrogate civilians' roles during sieges, both as victims and active participants; the laws and customs of siege warfare; its place in historical memory, and the ways civilian survivors have dealt with trauma. Its scope and content ensure that the collection is essential reading for all those interested in the place of civilians in war. Chapter 2 of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com

This account of the Yorktown campaign of the American Revolution presents six full-colour battle scenes detailing the critical points in the battle. By 1781 Britain's struggle to contain rebels in her American colonies had reached an inglorious stalemate. Her strategy had been to isolate General Washington's army in the middle states between Canada and the South, which she hoped to secure with aid of the Royal Navy. However, after defeat at Saratoga and with the northern army holed up in New York, King George's forces now saw this plan backfire. Yorktown would be a model example to the British Crown of the impossible odds she now faced in holding onto her colonies.